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Abstract 
There is a substantial amount of existing literature that focuses on the revolutionary events 
of 1989 in East-Central Europe. Yet, there are few comparisons which apply a 
comparative-historical approach to a small set of cases. A large body of existing literature 
provides the ideal situation for a comparative-historical study. This thesis will test the 
utility of applying a comparative-historical methodological approach to the events of 1989 
in four countries in East-Central Europe. The four countries are paired into two cases. The 
case of Poland and Hungary is compared with the case of Bulgaria and Romania. A 
theoretical frame of reference is developed from previous comparative-historical studies of 
revolutionary events, criticisms of them, and the general theoretical debates which they 
generate. This frame of reference incorporates a broad range of variables, and is used to 
inform the application of the method. Differences (and similarities) between the cases are 
then investigated, and the utility of the method assessed. Additionally, the application of 
the method allows some current theoretical and conceptual debates concerning the East- 
Central European events to be confronted. 
Part 1 of the thesis applies a comparative-historical method of analysis to the cases up to, 
and including some aspects of the 1989 events. In Part 2, patterns of difference between the 
cases are identified in terms of revolutionary forms and outcomes. Following the logic of 
the method common factors are identified as potential contributing factors to the collapse 
of communism, while patterns of difference suggest that the political, economic and social 
"nature" of the communist systems had an impact on the forms of change and their 
outcomes. 
It is recognised that the comparative-historical approach utilised in this thesis has 
limitations. However, the method is shown to be useful for identifying common factors 
across cases, and significant variations between cases, which can generate potential 
explanation, and provide better understanding of such revolutionary phenomena as that 
which occurred in East-Central Europe in 1989. 
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Chapter 1 Explaining the 1989 Revolutions in Four Countries 
The East-Central European revolutions of 1989 provide a unique opportunity for 
comparative analysis. ' Since 1989 a profusion of political science texts have emerged 
which seek to describe and explain the processes of change from so-called communism 
towards capitalism and democracy. Much of the comparative political analysis which now 
exists focuses on transition and processes of democratisation. 2 A comparative-historical 
approach may yet have a contribution to make to this field of study. 
The primary aim of this thesis will be to assess the utility of applying a comparative- 
historical methodological approach to the events of 1989 in four countries in East-Central 
Europe. In determining the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach, this thesis 
employs an original research design which has hitherto been omitted from the analytical 
literature on the countries chosen and phenomena that occurred. The method to be used is 
J. S. Mill's method of agreement. ' A theoretical frame of reference will be established by 
discussing previous comparative studies of revolution, and criticisms of them, and building 
on the general theoretical debates which these studies generate. ' The method will then be 
applied to East-Central Europe using two sets of case studies. These two cases consist of 
Poland and Hungary on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Romania on the other. Through the 
method outlined above, the thesis will first, establish the usefulness of a comparative- 
1 East-Central Europe is a general term used here to describe the region between "Western 
Europe" and the former Soviet Union, and includes Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Romania. I acknowledge that many Poles and Hungarians may now prefer to distinguish 
"Central Europe" from the countries further East and South-East. The use of the concept 
"revolution" in the context of this thesis will be elaborated further in section 1.4 in this 
chapter on defining the 1989 events and processes, and in the concluding chapter section 
8.2. 
2 For the use of the term "transition" and more on these approaches see section 1.1 on 
existing comparative literature on the East-Central European revolutions. 
3 It might be argued that this method generally underpins all comparative analysis. 
Similarity and difference is - in some form - inherent to comparison of any kind. 
However, the comparative-historical method utilised in this thesis pursues J. S. Mill's 
method of agreement to its logical conclusion, drawing inferences from the similarities 
across the cases, and from the patterns of difference between them. More will be said 
explicitly about the method in section 1.2 on methodological issues. 
4 The broad theoretical framework to be used in this thesis is potentially problematic, 
especially in terms of generating integrated theory. However the application of the method, 
informed by a broad theoretical frame of reference, allows some theoretical and conceptual 
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historical method of analysis as a means of identifying differences (and similarities) 
between the chosen cases; second, examine contributing factors to the revolutions, and 
seek to explain the differences in revolutionary forms and outcomes; and third, contribute 
to the literature on explanations of why such revolutionary phenomena occur. 5 The main 
argument developed within this thesis is that in both cases similar factors contributed to 
similar revolutionary events, and that the differences in form and outcome emanated from 
the different (what is called here) "nature" of the communist systems. 
This introductory chapter will address the issues involved in applying a comparative- 
historical method of analysis, building a theoretical frame of reference, and defining the 
1989 phenomena. First, a review of existing political comparative literature on the East- 
Central European revolutions, and a discussion of the main approaches utilised in this 
literature will be undertaken. Second, methodological issues surrounding the comparative- 
historical approach, and the strengths and weaknesses of the method will be considered. 
The remaining sections will be concerned with developing and outlining a theoretical 
frame of reference, and the approach to be taken in this thesis; defining the events and 
processes within the context of East-Central Europe in 1989; the reasons for choosing the 
two sets of cases; and finally the main argument, and an outline of the chapters of the 
thesis will be set out. 
1.1 Existing Comparative Literature on the Revolutions in East-Central Europe 
Since the demise of communism there has been a profusion of published works which 
examine political change in East-Central Europe. Most early works were either 
journalistic, such as Glenny (1993) The Rebirth of History, or country by country accounts, 
for example East (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe. Analysts have examined the 
causes of the collapse of communism, and produced detailed accounts of post-communist 
issues to be confronted as they are met throughout the research inquiry. See also section 
1.3 on theoretical debates. 
5 "Revolutionary form" is used here to denote the type of political and economic change 
that occurred. For example the Polish and Hungarian "form" might be described as 
"negotiated". For more on this in terms of the cases presented here, see later in Part 2, 
especially Chapter 4. "Outcomes" refers to significant results or consequences of the 
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particular focus of attention. 10 One of the main assumptions is that different modes of 
transition will have a particular impact on the consolidation of democracy. I' A number of 
variables have been identified as important to the democratisation process, and certain 
aspects of the relationship between the nature of the old regime, the mode of transition, and 
consequences of transition have been addressed. 
Two main competing approaches have emerged from the existing literature; the "legacies 
of the past", and the "imperatives of liberalisation" approaches. 12 The "legacies" 
explanation suggests that the unique historical inheritance of each communist system 
provide the main background for shaping the post-communist systems. Whereas the 
liberalisation perspective emphasises the immediate contextual circumstances - the post- 
communist reality of international pressures and new institutions - which will influence 
and temper negative influences from the past. The findings from this research suggest that 
the immediate context can provide conditions whereby past legacies may be blocked, but 
may also undermine liberalisers permitting old legacies to remain dominant. However, it 
isn't always clear which legacies will become politically relevant, or why some immediate 
circumstances have undermined economic and political liberalisation. 13 
There are criticisms of much of the democratisation literature. These criticisms include 
determinism, lack of explanation for the actual collapse of communism in 1989, and 
inadequacy of cross-regional comparison. 14 In the past theories on transition have tended to 
10 For example, modes of transition and their impact on democratic outcomes have been 
examined by Karl, T. C., & Schmitter, P., "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern 
and Eastern Europe". International Social Science Journal, 128, May 1991, pp. 269-284. 
11 Mode of transition is used to describe the different processes whereby old regimes are 
replaced by new ones. See for example, Munck, G. L., & Leff, C. S., "Modes of Transition 
and Democratization", Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997, pp. 343-362. 
Generally differentiation is made between transition from above 
(transformation/transaction/reform), transitions from below 
(replacement/breakdown/rupture) and transition where regime and opposition play a 
roughly equal role (transplacement and extrication). For this and an alternative focus in 
terms of "mode", see Welsh, H. A., "Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern 
Europe", Comparative Politics, July 1994 pp. 379-394 
12 For these terms and an overview of these approaches see Crawford, B., & Lijphart, A., 
"Explaining Political and Economic change in Post-communist Eastern Europe", 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, July 1995, pp. 171-199 
13 Crawford, B., & Lijphart, A., (1995) pp. 194-197 
I' See for example, Henderson, K., & Robinson, N., (1997) pp. 32-33. A central debate 
emerged between cross-regional comparativists and area specialists as to whether cross- 
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overemphasis the role of political elites, and underplay international and historical 
dimensions. 15A confusion over terms - such as, when does the transition begin and end, or 
when is a democracy consolidated - complicate these studies. Different theoretical and 
methodological approaches produce disagreements concerning the effects of the pre- 
revolutionary regime upon outcomes. 16 
Within this kind of literature the concentration on aspects of democratisation, and the use 
of models developed during the post-1945 (Cold War) period to describe the communist 
states has tended to create a conceptualisation of what happened in East-Central Europe 
before and after 1989 as "negative" to "positive" transition. The typologies initially used to 
describe the communist systems were often value-laden, and a successful outcome 
invariably equated to successful liberal democracy. The emphasis of such studies is on 
destination, rather than on processes of change. Many analysts now recognise that the 
totalitarian model is inadequate to describe East-Central European countries between 1948 
and 1989, and that authoritarianism is too general a term. 17 Some analysts have attempted 
to differentiate between regime type in a more discerning fashion. '8 Many also recognise 
that the form of democracy evolving in East-Central Europe will be particular to the 
region. However, the often less than adequate concepts used to describe communist 
regimes, and the emphasis on measuring the extent of liberal democratic outcomes 
dominates this type of analysis. There is a tendency to focus on political system, or regime 
change and elite actions. Yet, such aspects as the role of the military are often not taken 
into account. Equally the internal and external conditions and contexts which help to create 
regional studies are comparatively valid. A debate was ongoing in Slavic Review from 
1993. For example, Terry, S. M., "Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How 
different are they? ", Slavic Review 52 Summer 1993, pp. 333-337; Bunce, V., "Should the 
Transitologists be Grounded? ", Slavic Review 54, Spring 1995, pp. 111-127 
'' See Pridham, G., & Vanhanen, T., (eds) (1994) p. 3 
16 For an overview of three major studies and a discussion on these issues, see Munck, G. L., 
"Democratic Transition in Comparative Perspective", Comparative Politics, April 1994, 
Review Article, pp. 355-375 
17 For an interesting overview of conceptions of political change in East-Central Europe 
see Karasimeonov, G., "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Political Change in East- 
Central Europe", in Bull, M. J., & Ingham, M., (eds) (1998) Reform of the Socialist System in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Macmillan, London 
18 For example, Linz and Stepan describe these regimes as totalitarian, authoritarian, post- 
totalitarian and sultanistic. See Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A., (1996) Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 
especially Chapter 4 
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the circumstances within which political decisions and actions take place are often not 
adequately incorporated into analysis. By focusing on conditions necessary for a 
democratic outcome - such as civil society (or the lack of it), institutional forms, or the 
norms and values present (or absent) - the actual changes in social, economic and political 
spheres are often understated. It is not just that political factors cannot be examined in 
isolation, but that inter-relationships between a broad range of variables require attention. 
East-Central European communist systems created not only particular types of political 
system, but also well educated societies and industrialised economies which had its effects 
for the 1989 events. The revolutionary events did not just involve regime change, changes 
to the economy and to society were also significant for the collapse of communism, and for 
processes of change and their outcomes. This thesis examines a broader range of variables, 
addresses inter-relationships between variables, and applies a comparative-historical 
method more systematically than has yet been attained in this existing literature. 
Although the existing literature may not fully address the processes of change that 
occurred, it does provide some insights and raises some useful theoretical issues that can 
be confronted as part of the approach taken in this thesis. Certain "legacies" of the 
communist systems had their consequences, just as the post-1989 conditions aided or 
constrained the new regimes. The form or "mode" of change also had an impact on 
outcomes. These studies do - in fact - provide a wealth of information. Along with 
historical literature, these works are essential for comparative-historical studies. Indeed 
"the work of a comparativist only becomes possible after a large primary literature has 
been built up by specialists. "19 A systematic review of this literature alongside historic, 
economic and sociological works therefore provides the primary basis for an analysis of 
the kind to be undertaken in this thesis (more will be said about comparative-historical 
research methods in the following sections). 
19 Skocpol, T., (1979) States & Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. xiv 
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1.2 MethodoloLyical Issues 
In discussing methodological issues, it is not the intention to delve into the problems of 
comparative study as a whole, but to concentrate on comparative history. "Comparative 
method" is often used to refer to analyses of a small number of cases within comparative 
political studies. 20 Lijphart's assessment of the comparative method defines and "collapses" 
comparative history and other "small number case" approaches into a single 
methodological logic. However, comparative history is a distinct approach which uses 
case-based methods. Like general historical investigations, comparative history has an 
interest in large-scale historical variation. It has, in common with historical studies, a 
necessary recourse to secondary sources, but is more focused and thematic in investigating 
historical variation. It is an empirical inquiry to discover what happened in a given set of 
circumstances, and why. 21 Three major logics have been distinguished within the 
comparative-historical approach. These are parallel demonstrations of theory, contrasts of 
contexts and macro-causal analysis. 22 These will be outlined in turn, before the strengths 
and weaknesses of comparative history are assessed. 
Parallel Demonstrations of Theory 
The parallel demonstration of theory is generally intended to convince the reader of the 
validity of certain theoretical arguments. Typically such works seek to demonstrate that a 
theory holds good from case to case, across a broad selection. Any differences amongst 
cases are primarily contextual particularities against which generalities can be highlighted. 
For example, Eisenstadt in The Political Systems of Empires (1963), derives his 
classification of social forms using Parsonian concepts. Working within, as well as in 
tension with structural-functional analysis, he tends to absorb situational factors, such as 
historical context, making them as much a result of his "configurational patterns" as factors 
20 Collier, D., "New Perspectives on the Comparative Methods", in Rustow, D. A., & 
Erickson, K. P., (eds)(1991) Comparative Political Dynamics, Harper Collins, New York, 
7 
2For a discussion of the differece between history and comparative history see 
Goldstone, J., "Soliology and History: Producing Comparative History", in Gans, H. J., 
(ed) (1990) Sociology in America, Sage, Newbury Park, pp. 275-292 
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which might influence the development of social forms. 23 His chief interest is the 
identification and analysis of unified social wholes as posited by theoretical classification. 
The temptation is to then make the abstract concepts explain historical outcomes rather 
than seriously confronting the historical evidence. 
Contrast-Oriented Approaches 
The contrast-oriented comparativists do not aspire to generate new explanatory 
generalisations. Explanations are less ideas to be tested or applied, rather they are frames 
of reference with which to highlight contexts within which more detailed causal inferences 
can be drawn. The objective is almost exactly opposite to that of the parallel demonstration 
of theory. They seek to expose unique features between and among individual cases and 
show how these features affect general social processes. The concern is often to preserve a 
sense of historical particularity which leads to specific problems. 
Reinhard Bendix's Kings or People (1978) is an example which provides self-imposed 
limitations. He is sceptical of systematic theoretical explanation. Yet, his use of common 
themes or assertions is not simply drawn from historical evidence. A theoretical 
perspective is implicit to the concepts and ideal types used. However, the presentation of 
themes and concepts as self-evident truths, or neutral tools, leaves an implied explanatory 
hypotheses open to challenge. In being critical of general theories Bendix tries to avoid 
developing propositions which pertain to theory. Yet, he not only misses the opportunities 
to draw out specific causal inferences, but he is also potentially theoretically misleading. 24 
22 Skocpol, T., & Somers, M., "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry, ºº 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 2,1980 p. 175 
23 Hamilton, in Skocpol. T., (1984) p. 116 
24 Rueschemeyer, in Skocpol, T., (1984) p. 159 
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The Macro-Causal Approach 
Macro-causal analysts, of which Skocpol is an example, use comparative history for the 
purpose of making causal inferences about macro-level structures and processes. 25 The 
method used is J. S. Mill's "method of agreement" and/or his indirect "method of 
difference. "" The method of agreement takes cases where similar events or processes 
occur and search for similarities (and differences) across the cases. There may be overall 
differences between the cases, but crucial similarities may be found that can imply causal 
argument. The method of difference takes cases where the chosen phenomenon has not 
occurred, and the hypothesised causes are not present, and compares them with positive 
cases. The method of difference is more powerful for establishing valid causal 
associations. The method of agreement is the simplest and most straightforward, whereby 
similar cases are studied and the search for differences can eliminate possible explanatory 
variables. However, on its own the method of agreement does not establish any necessary 
link between cause and effect. By incorporating the method of difference, suitable negative 
cases can be used as contrasts, reinforcing conclusions drawn from the method of 
agreement. 
The main problem with this method is that perfectly controlled comparisons are never 
really feasible. Yet, skilfully used in conjunction with theoretical argument, it can be a 
powerful tool in providing explanation. In uncovering patterns of similarities and 
differences, probabilistic relationships are not accepted as demonstrations of cause. All 
deviating cases have to be accounted for in some way, forcing close investigation of 
factors and cases as whole entities. 27 The relationship between variables is thus more likely 
to be investigated and explained within their historical and structural context. 
25 Skocpol undertook a macro-causal analysis of the so-called classic French, Russian and 
Chinese revolutions, see Skocpol, T., (1979) States & Social Revolutions, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
26 See Nagel, E., (ed) (1950) John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method, Book 3, 
Chapter 8, Hafner, New York 
27 Ragin, C., (1987) The Comparative Method, University of California Press, p. 52. 
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The Strengths and Weaknesses of Comparative History 
All comparative studies hold potential pitfalls. Such problems as conceptual stretching, 
selection bias, too many variables and too few cases, or interdependence of cases 
potentially arise. 28 However as implied in the outlines above, there are particular issues 
within each comparative-historical "logic" which require attention when considering the 
application of a comparative-historical approach. On the positive side comparative- 
historical approaches encourage cases to be viewed as wholes, and put cases in context. 
They are essentially interpretive, can lead to the development of new typologies and often 
stimulate the development of new theories. Theory necessarily informs argument, but 
when cases do not "fit" theory, new interpretations are often developed. 29 Skocpol suggests 
that comparative-historical analyses provide "a valuable check and anchor for theoretical 
speculation. Arguments supported by grand theoretical approaches need to be spelled out 
when illuminating the actual causal regularities across cases". Similarly to Ragin, she 
suggests that comparative history is a strategy for "mediating between theory and history" 
which can prompt extensions and reformulations of theory, and new ways of looking at 
particular cases. " Contrast-oriented approaches, in particular, can bring out rich detail and 
provide descriptive holism. While macro-analytical approaches can attempt to validate or 
invalidate theory. 
Skocpol and Somers suggest that these three "logics" can create a complementary research 
cycle. Each logic can give rise to the next. When parallel demonstrations appear to make 
overly generalised claims, contrast-oriented approaches can limit the scope and suggest 
testable hypotheses. These hypotheses may then be validated or invalidated with macro- 
causal analyses. The generalisations generated can, in turn, be demonstrated by a parallel 
approach. 31 
There are also weaknesses in these "logics". Parallel demonstrations of theory can only 
illustrate, clarify and refine theory; theory predominates. Contrast-oriented approaches are 
28 For problems of comparison see for example, Hague, R., Harrop, M., & Breslin, S., (1998) 
Comparative Government and Politics, Macmillan Press, London 
29 See for example Ragin, who is referring to what he calls "case-oriented" methods which 
includes all three "logics", Ragin, C., (1987) pp. 48-49 
30 Skocpol, T.. (1979) pp. 39-40 
31 Skocpol. T., & Somers, M., (1980) 
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poor in generating theory through a refusal to recognise the role that theory is actually 
playing in examining cases. Macro-causal approaches can only draw inferences. The 
validity of causal hypotheses can never be perfectly established, nor can they necessarily 
provide generalisations beyond the cases studied. The method is no substitute for theory. 
On its own the method cannot select appropriate variables, or provide research questions. 
This latter point highlights the need to recognise the role theory plays in the application of 
any method of analysis. In examining the events and processes of change in East-Central 
Europe in 1989 a simple research question might suffice. For example, why were there 
differences in the form and outcome of the 1989 revolutions in Poland and Hungary 
compared to those in Bulgaria and Romania? Yet, this question does not in itself determine 
which areas or details may be significant in explaining these differences. Whether 
implicitly or explicitly stated, theory informs the selection of cases and variables, and helps 
to define questions. This then leads us to the next section, where theory will be discussed, 
and a framework for analysis set out. 
1.3 Theoretical Debates 
Just as social science in general has gone through phases of theory development, so has 
comparative history. There is considerable diversity in theoretical approaches. Such issues 
as the autonomy or potential autonomy of the state, or the relationship of structure to 
agency, and culture to structure are ongoing debates. 32 To illustrate these developments an 
overview of revolutionary theory, and criticisms of it, will be undertaken. Revolutionary 
theory and its development is chosen as a basis for discussion for two main reasons. First, 
revolutions are macro-phenomena which are rare. This type of event has been a major 
focus for comparative-historical research. Second, The East-Central European phenomena 
can be defined as revolutionary and as a unique historical event (more will be said about 
this in the section on defining the 1989 events and processes). Although it must be 
acknowledged that this may be a controversial starting point with which to develop a 
theoretical framework, and that it may cause some selection bias, it must also be 
32 See for example, Eisenstadt, S. N., "Frameworks of the great revolutions: culture, social 
structure, history and human agency", International Social Science Journal, Vol. 133, 
Augusr 1992. pp. 385-387 
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acknowledged that such issues are not confined to applying a comparative-historical 
method; they are potential issues in any comparative study. 
Theories of revolution are extensively reviewed by several political and sociological 
writers. 33 Theories are categorised and analysed in a variety of ways. For instance Kimmel 
examines non-structural theories dividing these into natural history, social system, 
individual psychology and aggregate social-psychological explanatory approaches. 34 He 
then contrasts these with structural approaches which include Marxist and historical- 
comparative analyses. Skocpol groups theories into four "families" of Marxist, aggregate- 
psychological, systems/value consensus and political conflict theories. 35 Goldstone, 
perhaps crudely, classifies theories into "three generations" of historical-descriptive, 
behaviouralist, and comparative-historical. 36 
No categorisation can successfully encompass the diversity of approaches. For instance, 
Charles Tilly's approach straddles both quantitative and qualitative methods. Theoretical 
bases also cut across the "generations. " Tilly's theoretical base derives from political 
science rather than sociology and psychology which inform the majority of second 
generation theorists. Nevertheless, although Goldstone's categorisation is simplistic, it will 
serve adequately to present an overview of theories, and provide a basis for theoretical 
debate. 
33 For example: Calvert, P., (1970); Skocpol, T., (1979); 
Moshiri, F., "Revolutionary Conflict Theory in an Evolutionary Perspective", in 
Goldstone, J., et al (1991); and Kimmel, M. S., (1990) Revolution: A Sociological 
Interpretation, Polity Press. 
34 Kimmel, M. S., (1990) p. 47. 
3' Skocpol, T., (1979) p. 6&9. 
36 Goldstone, J., "Theories of Revolution; The Third Generation, " World Politics, No. 3, 
1980, p. 425. 
Motyl challenges Goldstone on the use of the term "generations", and suggests that 
"schools" would be more appropriate to describe the "multiplicity of theories" which 
Goldstone includes in his categorisation, see Motyl, A. J., (1992) p. Ill 
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Historical-Descriptive Approaches 
The historical-descriptive approaches include works such as Crane Brinton's The Anatomy 
of Revolution (1938), Lyford Edwards' The Natural History of Revolution (1927) and 
George Pettee's The Process of Revolution (1938). There is general agreement amongst 
political scientists that despite rich descriptions their approach contributed little to 
theoretical debate. Although offering some hypotheses - mainly of a social-psychological 
nature - little attempt is made to validate them through comparisons of historical cases. 
In general, these approaches assume that revolutions pass through a number of successive 
stages. There is agreement over the transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals from support 
to criticism of the old regime as the crucial event which "tips the scales. " However, there 
are differences in suggesting the causes of alienation. Some, such as Edwards, emphasise 
lower class discontent, while others, such as Brinton and Pettee, suggest that ideology 
plays a more important role in creating revolutionary forces. These are fruitful issues in 
considering causes of revolution, as will be seen below. It is also worth noting that Brinton 
is attributed with making an important methodological contribution to studying revolutions 
in terms of using qualitative comparisons to the benefit of scientific historical research. 
However, these approaches also face serious criticisms. Kimmel suggests an overemphasis 
on the role of intellectuals, an overemphasis of the French case as analogous to all 
revolutions and that the outcome must include restoration and consolidation of a new 
regime. Finally, as already mentioned, the narrative quality does not provide theoretical 
explanation. 37 
37 Kimmel, M. S., (1990) p. 52 
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Behaviouralist Approaches 
The behaviouralists can be divided into structural-functionalists such as Chalmers Johnson 
or Neil Smelser and aggregate social-psychological theorists such as James Davies and Ted 
Gurr. 38 Approaches which can be seen to connect behaviouralists to comparative-historical 
analyses are the approaches based on political science. These include Charles Tilly, 
Samuel Huntington, Amman, and Stinchcombe. 39 
Although behaviouralists are often sophisticated in their approach and detail the links 
between certain patterns of events and the situation of potential revolution in a complex 
manner, they contain a structural similarity. The development of the revolutionary 
situations is considered as basically a two-step process. First a pattern of events arises that 
somehow marks a break or change from previous patterns. Second, this change then affects 
some critical variable, which if it is of sufficient magnitude will precipitate a potentially 
revolutionary situation. 
Johnson for instance, grounding his analysis in Parsonian theory, both defines and explains 
revolutions in terms of "dysfunctioning" society. A social system comes into crisis 
whenever values and environment become "dysynchronized", due to internal or external 
intrusions such as new values or technologies. Society becomes disoriented and open to 
conversion by a revolutionary movement. Almost any kind of social change could then be 
seen to give rise to a potentially revolutionary situation. Yet why these variables should 
lead to revolution in some cases and to gradual decline and decay in others is not 
adequately explained. 
For social-psychological theorists, such as Gurr, a precondition for revolution is the 
development of discontent followed by the politicisation of that discontent and finally its 
38 Johnson, C., (1966) (1966) Revolutionary Change, Stanford University Press, Stanford; 
Smelser, N., (1963) Theory of Collective Behaviour, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York; 
Davies, J., "Towards a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, Vol. 27,1962 
39 Tilly, C., "Revolutions and Collective Violence", in Greenstein, F., & Polsby, N., (eds) 
(1975) Handbook of Political Science III, Addison-Wesley, Reading & Massachusetts; 
Huntington, S., (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New 
Haven; Arnman, P.. (1962), Stinchcombe, A., "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class 
Relations", in Bendix, R.. & Lipset, S., (eds) (1966) Class Status and Power, Free Press, 
New York 
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"actualisation in violent action against political objects and actors. "40 This implies that no 
regime could survive for long if the masses are consciously discontented which again 
provides little explanation, particularly when considering the long term survival of 
oppressive regimes. 
What becomes evident is that these studies are restricted in their ability to observe and 
measure the critical variables which purport to cause the revolutionary situation. Social 
change, strain or disequelibrium within a social system, the magnitude of goal conflict over 
resources or the state of mind of the masses are not readily open to empirical testing. The 
indicators which have been chosen to represent the changes in the frustration variable, such 
as education, economic stress and religious cleavages, are not necessarily proved to have a 
relationship with the actual extent of relative deprivation. In fact attempts to measure 
directly the correlation between personal cognitive states and social changes in America, 
Nigeria and Uganda, using interviews and questionnaires, failed to find any correlation 
between cognitive dissatisfaction and either prior dislocation and modernisation or a 
revolutionary, anti-regime orientation. 41 
What these points highlight is that the grounding of these studies in behaviouralism 
produced methods of analysis which suffered severe inadequacies in the operationalisation 
of adequate indicators to serve their empirical requirements. The testing of hypotheses 
which incorporated such diverse critical variables as the cognitive state of the masses, the 
equilibrium of the system or the magnitude of conflict and resource control of competing 
interest groups tended to lead to contradictory results. 
In Goldstone's view, what was particularly lacking was attention to the structural details or 
specific government programs of different states. The state was generally seen as an arena 
or as the means for coercion of certain elements of society by others. Goldstone highlights 
five major points which were omitted from most second generation theories, with the 
partial exception of Tilly and Huntington: the goals and structures of states, international 
economic and political pressures exacted on the internal elements of the state, the structure 
of peasant communities, the strength or weakness of the military and factors affecting elite 
40 Gurr T. R., (1970) Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 12-13. 
41 Goldstone, J., (1980) p. 432. 
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behaviour. 42 What these points reflect is the general nature of theoretical debate within 
comparative politics as a whole, whereby a diversity of approaches and perspectives began 
to challenge behaviouralists and structural-functionalists, and brought new focus to such 
aspects as the state, the structure of societies and the effects of the international dimension 
upon states. 
Comparative-History 
A wide range of theories have been developed within the comparative-historical approach 
incorporating issues identified by Goldstone as necessary for a more complete analysis. 
Early contributors notably include Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf. 43 A major input from 
these theorists is to note that social change is often triggered by international political 
conflicts or by the impingement of international capitalist markets on pre-industrial 
agriculture and trade systems. Third generation theorists also emphasise that the state is 
not merely an arena for conflict or a means of coercion. The state is regarded as an 
autonomous or "potentially autonomous organisation. "44 
For example, Barrington Moore isolates structural and historical factors which are likely to 
result in political systems of either an authoritarian or democratic nature. He focuses on 
economic classes, their interaction with each other and with the state. He uses historical 
case studies to determine three major routes to modern society. These are first, bourgeois 
revolutions leading to capitalism and democracy, such as Britain, France or the United 
States; second, capitalism reached through authoritarian regimes, such as occurred in 
Germany or Japan; and third, peasant revolt leading to an industrial, non-democratic 
society as in Russia or China. 
42 ibid. p. 435. 
43 Moore, B. Jnr., (1966) The social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: lord and 
peasant in the making of the modern world, Beacon Press, Boston; Wolf, E., (1969) 
Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Harper and Row, New York 
44 Skocpol. T., (1979) p. 33. 
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Much of the proof of conditions necessary for democratic type political systems to emerge 
has been criticised as inadequate and vague. 45 In particular Britain and the United States 
are pinpointed as not meeting Barrington Moore's structural conditions in a convincing 
manner. Revolutions are not necessarily demonstrated to be caused by certain historical 
changes, they could just as well be the result of institutional upheaval. Similarly the change 
of system to fascist, democratic or communist may have come about without revolution. 
Finally, Moore generally dismisses ideas and cultural values as independent causes of 
change or instability. 
However, leaving these criticisms aside for the moment, his approach is taken up and 
effectively used and refined in Skocpol's study of the classic French, Russian and Chinese 
revolutions, establishing an analytical framework which provides new insights. 46 She uses 
a comparative-historical method of analysis. She rejects any notions of voluntarism 
espoused by the behaviouralists and builds on Barrington Moore's comparative-structural 
approach, more adequately combining history and theory and emphasising the need to 
incorporate the exogenous frame into domestic analysis. She sees a particular combination 
of structural conditions as conducive to social revolutions: first, well organised and 
autonomous peasant communities; second, a dominant class of absentee agricultural 
landowners who are highly dependent on the state; and third, a semibureaucratised state 
that falls behind in military competition with rival states. Although regarded as increasing 
understanding of the detailed historical conditions under which states become vulnerable to 
international pressures, popular opposition potential and elite conflict, she equally received 
47 intense criticisms of her work. 
45 Femia, J., "Barrington Moore and the Preconditions for Democracy, " British Journal of 
Political Science, 2,1972, p. 23. 
46 Skocpol, T., (1979) 
47 For examples of criticism see: Berejikian, J., "Revolutionary Collective Action and the 
Agent-Structure Problem", American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, September 
1992, p. 647-657; Burawoy, M., "Two Methods in Search of Science: Skocpol versus 
Trotsky, " Theory and Society 18,1989, p. 759-805; Davidheisser, E., "Strong States, Weak 
States, the Role of States in Revolution, " Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4, July 1992, 
p. 463-475; Laitin, D., & Warner, C., "Structure and Irony in Social Revolutions, " Political 
Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, February 1992, p. 147-151; Motyl, A. J., "Concepts and Skocpol: 
ambiguity and vagueness in the study of revolution, " Journal of Theoretical Politics. 
Vol. 4,1992, p. 93-112; Sewell, W., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the 
French Case. " Journal of Modern History, Vol. 57,1985, p. 57-85. 
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For example, Motyl accuses Skocpol of being ambiguous and vague in her application of 
concepts. The use of "potentially autonomous state" is inconsistent and confused. The state 
as structure and the state as political actor being used in terms which provide a conceptual 
gap. The "international relations state" is used in a way which suggests that the state is a 
single political actor; a country at war acting as if it were an international relations elite. 
Yet, within the "structural" domestic state, only one component - the military - is 
responsible for defeat in that war. Similarly her use of "revolution" apparently varies 
between signifying such diverse notions as popular upheaval, crisis and transformations. 
Motyl suggests that Skocpol's lack of conceptual rigour is potentially detrimental to 
identifying causal factors and subversive to theory building. 48 
In the light of the 1979 Iranian revolution Skocpol's non-voluntarist viewpoint in 
particular, became hard to sustain. She admits to three main problems: her rejection of 
rapid modernisation as a factor which may have contributed to discontent amongst groups 
in society, the army and police being rendered ineffective without defeat in a foreign war, 
and ideology and the role of political actors being significant. 49 Despite these and other 
severe criticisms, and perhaps because of her innovative approach, her work has been 
viewed as path breaking. 50 She has been praised for her ability to solve the problems of 
dealing with multiple causation, 51 and at the very least, for capturing the social science 
imagination. 52 
48 Moty1, A. J., (1992) p. 110-111 
49 Skocpol, T., "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution, " Theory and 
Society, Vol. 11, No. 3, May 1982, p. 265-283 
'O Foran, J., "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation? " Sociological 
Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1993, p. 3 
51 Sewell, W., (1985) p-58- 
52 Motyl, A. J., (1992) p. 108. 
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A "Fourth Generation? " 
The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a resurgence of interest in themes that third 
generation theorists are seen to have neglected. These include areas concerning agency, 
social structure and the roles of culture and ideology. 53 In particular Goldstone provides an 
example which attempts to integrate culture and ideology. 
From Skocpol's work and that of Charles Tilly, 54 Goldstone identifies the critical 
conjuncture of three crises as preconditions for the breakdown of existing state structures: 
state fiscal crisis, elite divisions and popular mass mobilisation potential. He incorporates 
elements and critiques of previous approaches, providing a framework in which several 
key variables can be identified and studied. To some extent he combines comparative- 
historical analysis with quantitative testing of particular arguments; a partial merger of 
qualitative-historical and quantitative approaches. Goldstone's "synthesis" has enlarged the 
scope of analysis from Skocpol's framework by incorporating demographic forces, urban 
as well as rural revolt and shifts in ideology. His method combines comparative-historical 
analysis with quantitative testing of particular arguments. Moshiri suggests that this is a 
considerable advance over "either purely historical or purely quantitative analyses, which 
are too often isolated. "55 
Although such a framework encompasses wide ranging factors, there are problems within 
this synthesis. There are criticisms, particularly with regard to the building of theory. 
Goldstone's emphasis is on multiple conjunctural causation. In other words, there is no 
simple answer to the question of whether any single factor produces instability. Yet, there 
is a tendency to fall back on a single concept to finally explain state breakdown. 
Despite taking an essentially structuralist approach, the use of legitimation crisis as a 
distinct empirical "cause" for state breakdown takes us back to social-psychological 
9 See: Foran, J., (1993) p. 6; Eisenstadt, S. N., "Frameworks of the Great Revolutions: 
"culture, social structure, history and human agency, " International Social Science 
Journal, 133, August 1992, p. 385-401; Taylor, M., "Structure, Culture and Action in the 
Explanation of Social Change, " Politics & Society, Vol. 17 No. 2, June 1989, p. 115-135 
54 Tilly, C., (1978) From Mobilisation to Revolution, Addison-Wesley, Reading & 
Massachusetts 
55 Moshiri, in Goldstone, J., et al (1991) p. 34. 
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explanations for state incapacitation. 56 Charles Tilly is also criticised on a similar basis. '' 
Social psychological variables, particularly discontent, re-emerge as central explanatory 
factors, resurrecting the problem of accounting for the continuance of some illegitimate 
states to successfully repress revolutionary situations. Legitimation crisis is seen as too 
broad a concept to explain state incapacitation. It also may be unnecessary if elite 
alienation and mass mobilisation already imply the existence of such a crisis. 
The crushing of the Hungarian revolt of 1956, or the events in Poland in 1980 to 1981, and 
Tiananmen in 1989 are examples where movements against states which are perceived as 
illegitimate did not result in the overthrow of the existing political system. In these cases 
the state was not incapacitated. In Hungary and Poland external forces played their part 
despite internal political regime crises. In China internal structures remained sufficiently 
strong to suppress any democratic forces. 
There are pitfalls within Goldstone's approach both in terms of over-generalisation and of 
reductionism. The recent efforts to incorporate states and culture into theoretical models 
have tended to attach further levels or variables to a catalogue of conditions without fully 
theorising components of processes. For Goodwin, government effectiveness rests on 
cultural and moral assumptions of state managers in pursuing goals and their methods of 
achieving them. He argues that Goldstone fails to adequately analyse the cultural sources 
of state practices that might lead to legitimation crises and only concentrates on these 
aspects with regard to outcomes. 58 However, as Tilly points out it is unclear what this 
"culture" is "that Goodwin urges us to take more seriously". 59 Yet, Tilly tells us little more 
about what culture is in this context. Instead he suggests that theorists need to examine 
how state and civil society interact and how culture enters into the very constitution of 
political institutions. Nevertheless, problems remain. Culture is difficult to perceive 
independently of the action political scientists are trying to explain. Culture, state and 
action are incessantly interacting. For Tilly, integration of this aspect into analysis requires 
56 Goodwin, J., "Toward a new sociology of revolutions, " Theory and Society, Vol. 23/26, 
Dec. 1994, p. 747-8 
57 Kimmel, M. S., (1990) p. 215 
58 Goodwin, J., (1994) p. 748 
59 Tilly, C., "In search of revolution, " Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 6, December 1994, 
p. 801 
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either abandoning the search for general explanations or breaking phenomena into separate 
theoretically coherent components. 60 
Farhi suggests that many recent studies of modern revolutions lack acknowledgment to 
cultural context and its relationship to ideology, especially within the state and emerging 
civil society. 61 Skocpol urges us to separately conceptualise ideology and - what she terms 
- "cultural idioms". "Cultural idioms have a longer-term, more anonymous, and less 
partisan existence than ideologies....... both phenomena must be studied in relation to the 
central drama of the breakdown and rebuilding of state organizations". 62 Multiple cultural 
idioms coexist, and are drawn upon by actors as they seek to make sense of their situation. 
In other words individuals and groups may manipulate ideological symbols and images in 
relation to the cultural context that exists. 
The discussions above highlight the ongoing debates within comparative analysis which 
centre around issues of structure and agency, culture and ideology. No single theoretical 
model can provide all the tools necessary to explain all cases. A general framework may 
try to incorporate variables without fully theorising processes and inter-relationships. A 
macro-analytical approach must necessarily attend to macro-level structures and contexts. 
It cannot deal with micro-level processes in detail. In any case it can be argued that 
comparative history is not the application of social theory to history, "it is the investigation 
of the degree of difference between non-identical, but possibly similar selections or 
sequences of events. " Additionally "identifying similar sequences of events is not the same 
as identifying general [predictive or determinate] laws independent of their historical 
context". 63 However, theoretical discussion does suggest factors which may need to be 
examined in order to understand complex phenomena such as revolutionary situations. 
These include the role and structure of states, the international dimension, the role of 
political actors, as well as economic and social factors. 
60 Tilly, C., (1994) p. 801 
61 Farhi, F., "Comments on Jeff Goodwin's "Toward a new sociology of revolutions, "" 
Theory and Society, Vol. 23/26, Dec. 1994, p. 786-7 
62 Skocpol, T.. "Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Construction 
of State Power: a rejoinder to Sewell", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 57. No. 1, 
March 1985, pp. 86-96, especially pp. 91 & 92 
63 Goldstone, J., in Gans, H. J., (ed) (1990) p. 279 & p. 284 
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A Framework for Analysis 
The methodological and theoretical discussions above highlight some of the difficulties in 
applying a comparative-historical method to the East-Central European cases, and the 
problems of developing theoretical frameworks within a comparative study of this kind. 
Most comparative political scholars pursue - what has been described as - an "eclectic 
messy centre" in terms of theoretical approach. 64 Equally, works of comparative history 
often combine at least two of the major "logics" in their method of inquiry. 65 In applying a 
comparative-historical method to the East-Central European cases it is therefore important 
to set out the method to be used and to outline the theoretical frame of reference which 
informs the application of the method. 
The method to be used in this thesis is essentially J. S. Mill's method of agreement -a 
partial application of a macro-analytical approach. Similarities and differences between 
(and within) the cases will be searched out to establish whether (or not) there is a causal 
pattern that may explain the collapse of communism in the four states. Additionally, 
differences between the cases will be investigated in order to understand why the cases 
varied in their form and outcome. This requires drawing on a broad body of knowledge. A 
comparative historian has neither the time nor the necessary resources to undertake the 
primary research that is required for a broadly conceived project such as the one to be 
undertaken here. A large body of existing literature is necessary to enable such an 
investigation. The comparative historian's task is not necessarily to reveal new data about 
particular aspects of an event, but to investigate historical variation, and offer explanation. 
Therefore, a systematic survey of historical and area specialist texts provides the primary 
means of obtaining sufficient relevant material for a comparative-historical analysis of this 
kind. In this thesis interviews with leading academics in the field provide a supplement to 
what is the primary means of obtaining information - searching out and surveying 
secondary text-based sources. 
It must be acknowledged that the method is essentially inductive, and that this alone cannot 
provide complete explanation. Inferences can be drawn, but not fully tested. It must also be 
64 See for example, Evans, P., in Kohli, A., et al "The Role of Theory in Comparative 
Politics: a symposium", World Politics, No. 48, October 1995, pp. 1-49 
65 Skocpol, T., & Somers. M., (1980) 
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acknowledged that a theoretical frame of reference is required to inform the application of 
the method. Theoretical discussion shows that macro-analytical comparative-historical 
approaches are not completely satisfactory. No framework can incorporate all the variables 
or hope to be totally adequate in explanation. This is part of the reason for a movement 
away from "grand theory". There are always exceptions to be accounted for. In particular, 
macro-analytical comparative-historical approaches have rarely, if ever, purported to 
provide "universal" theories. The very nature of their approach, which is grounded in 
specific historical contexts, prevents generalisations to all situations. Yet this approach is 
"distinctly appropriate for developing explanations of macro-historical phenomena where 
there are inherently few cases. , 66 There may be assumptions that units of comparison are 
independent of one another and yet inter-relationships are often addressed when 
considering the historical and international context of cases under study. The problems of 
the comparative method and assumptions about what contextual features or variables 
should be included in analysis is not solely confined to comparative-historical approaches. 
Informed analyses are dependent on the theoretical debates of the day. Through building 
on previous approaches and their critiques, a model can be established which can attempt 
explanation within the world historical context of the phenomena to be studied. 
As the previous discussion on Goldstone's work indicates, there is no doubt that there are 
still problems to be addressed within a synthesis of approaches. All revolutionary 
phenomena are likely to have unique features and it might well be argued that there is no 
point in developing a theoretical basis for the analysis of such phenomena. In the case of 
East-Central Europe, the movement from communism and centralised economies towards 
democracy and capitalism provides a unique form of change that may not be comparable to 
any other. However, any analysis requires some kind of framework with which to make 
sense of the events being studied. The best that can be achieved is to develop a frame of 
reference which builds and expands on previous studies through application of differing 
methods and approaches. Conjunctural models can provide new theoretical leads. Each 
incorporation of new or different variables cannot in itself provide an integrated theory. 
Yet, greater exploration of factors and inter-relationships through the testing of different 
methods of analysis can attempt to add to knowledge and explanation, and contribute to 
shaping new theoretical perspectives. The intention in this analysis is to do just that. Whilst 
66 Skocpol, T., (1979) p. 36 
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remaining sensitive to theoretical concepts and current debates, this study will employ a 
comparative-historical analytical approach in order to investigate differences (and 
similarities) within and between cases, and draw inferences from the patterns of difference 
which become apparent. In addition, the approach taken in this thesis enables some current 
theoretical issues to be confronted as they are met within existing East-Central European 
literature. Theories encountered in existing texts are not automatically accepted as 
explaining events or processes. 67 For example, legitimacy crisis is explored as an 
explanation for the collapse of communism (see Chapter 3, section 4), and the 
"circulation" and "reproduction" of elites theses are addressed as part of the examination 
of social outcomes (in Chapter 6, section 2). As a result of this latter debate some 
implications for defining and conceptualising the East-Central European changes can be 
made (see Chapter 8, section 2). 
The comparative frame of reference to be utilised in this thesis will attempt to incorporate 
a range of variables including significant external influences; political, economic and 
social structural factors internal to each country; and the role of political actors. Theoretical 
discussion suggests that external factors such as political, economic and military 
dependence on Soviet direction or the effects of Soviet hegemony and consequent elite 
behaviour, and internal factors such as top-down government and bureaucracy, mass 
mobilisation potential or social structural constraints are potential foci of investigation 
when considering what contributed to the revolutionary situations. Within Part 1 of this 
thesis contributing factors of this nature will be drawn out. The international context, the 
structure of states, economic and social conditions, social and political groups, and certain 
political actors also require attention in investigating the form and outcome of change. 
Whilst acknowledging that there are difficulties in incorporating culture and ideology into 
any analysis, this thesis will also attempt to include some cultural and ideological 
elements. If - as the theoretical discussions above suggest - culture is difficult to perceive 
independently, and it is the interweaving of culture, structure and human agency that 
67 It must be acknowledged that all potential theoretical issues encountered in such a broad 
investigation as the one to be undertaken here cannot be addressed or confronted in depth. 
There are numerous sociological, economic, political and cultural arguments which are 
passed over or omitted purely because they are beyond the scope of this thesis to include, 
not because they are unimportant or might not have significance for explaining events and 
processes. 
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shapes processes, culture and ideology cannot be treated as separate variables. Cultural and 
ideological factors will therefore be incorporated into discussions where they appear to be 
most significant. For example, the penetration of Western cultural influences will be 
discussed as part of the international context; ideological representation will be included in 
developments of post-1989 political parties; and values included in relating attitudes of 
society to political and economic change. In addition the role of ideology and social values 
will be included within a discussion surrounding legitimacy. 
Although it is difficult to isolate variables, some compartmentalisation is necessary. Whilst 
acknowledging the interplay of variables, each chapter will focus on particular sets of 
factors in turn. This frame of reference will not only provide a basis for applying and 
testing the utility of the method, it also provides a basis for assessing contributing factors 
to the 1989 revolutions, examining why there were differences in revolutionary forms and 
outcomes, and addressing some theoretical and conceptual issues in existing East-Central 
European literature. 
1.4 Defining the 1989 Events and Processes: The Concert of Revolution 
Many would deny that the events of 1989 in East-Central Europe constitute a "revolution". 
The changes that occurred have been more commonly described as transitions or 
transformations. 68 Nevertheless, the East-Central European events are often referred to as 
revolutions. 69 However, the 1989 phenomena do not neatly fit classical definitions of either 
term. 70 In Hungary "rendszervaltas" is a colourless, uninspiring label used to describe the 
68 For reviews and discussions on the subject, see the section on existing literature on East- 
Central Europe, and for example, Munck, G. L., & Leff, C. S., "Modes of Transition and 
Democratization", Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997, pp. 343-362; 
Welsh, H. A., "Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe", Comparative 
Politics, July 1994, pp. 379-394; and Munck, G. L., "Democratic Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective", Comparative Politics, April 1994, pp. 355-375. 
The terms "transition" or "transformation" will be used when appropriate in this work in 
reference to other author's use of the terms. 
69 See for example several articles in East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 
Spring 1999 
70 For a discussion on this see for example, Henderson, K., and Robinson, N., (1997) Post- 
Communist Politics: an Introduction, Prentice Hall, Europe, pp. 25-33 
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changes, literally meaning "exchange of systems. "" When the term revolution is used, it is 
often qualified by adjectives such as peaceful, bloodless or negotiated. 
Garton Ash refers to "refolution", a term he uses to describe the negotiated political 
transitions which took place in Poland and Hungary. He refers to a mixture of reform and 
revolution. There were changes from above led by "an enlightened minority in the still 
ruling communist party. But .... also a vital element of popular pressure 
from below". 72 
Kis also argues that the East-Central European events of 1989-1990 shared the properties 
of both reform and revolution. However, he suggests that including certain elements of 
both concepts directs attention to a paradox. A process cannot preserve historical 
continuity (be reforming) and break continuity (be revolutionary) at the same time. Kis 
argues for a third concept - what he calls "coordinated transition". 
73 However, as with 
many other analyses of the East-Central European events, Kis falls back on legitimation 
crisis as a central cause of communist collapse. He provides a complex analysis of the 
"form" of political and legal change. He concentrates on "modality of change", and 
focuses on political elite actions. He describes the process as an "open-ended game whose 
final result depends on how skilfully and responsibly it is played by the major actors". 74 
The concept he uses then merely describes the changeover of political elites, and the 
negotiation process involved in that changeover. He falls short of explaining differences 
between cases, especially with regard to outcomes. 
Revolution is a controversial concept and, as with any concept, there is no definitive 
answer to the question "What is revolution"? Meanings attached to the term have ranged 
from "defiance of authority, " through "overthrow of rulers, " to an "inevitable stage of 
71 Arato, A., in Bryant, C. G. A., & Mokrzycki, E., (eds) (1994) The New Great 
Transformation, Routledge, London & New York, p. 103 
72 Garton Ash, T., (1990) We the People, Granta Books, Cambridge. He also refers to the 
processes taking place during 1988 and 1989 as somewhere between reform and revolution 
in his essay "Reform or Revolution? " written in 1988, in The Uses ofAdvesity; Essays on 
the Fate of Central Europe, Granta Books, Cambridge (1991); and as refolutions (although 
he does not explicitly define the term) in his articles "Refolution, the Springtime of two 
Nations", The New York Review of Books, July 5,1989, and "Refolution in Poland and 
Hungary", ibid, August 17,1989. 
73 Kis, J., "Between Reform and Revolution", East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 
12, No. 2, Spring 1998 
74 Ibid, p. 371 
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development. "75 Within existing theoretical literature on revolutions, definitions of 
revolution extend from the very broad, such as Crane Brinton's "... change, affected by the 
use of violence, in government, and/or regime, and/or society, , 76 to the more specific, such 
as Skocpol's "... rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; 
... accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts 
from below. "77 The 
former is criticised for encompassing too wide a range of change of government by 
violence which makes it hard to distinguish between such events as civil wars and social 
revolution. The latter is berated for including explanation which pertains to proposition, 
rather than definition. 
When considering what factors "revolution" should include there is some agreement on 
violence (except for Tilly and Goldstone), popular involvement, and a change of governing 
body as necessary characteristics. However, when it comes to including political or social 
structural change there is considerable divergence. There is disagreement over what 
political structural change entails. Some, such as Skocpol, focus on the transformation of 
state structures, while Easton or Chalmers Johnson propose regime change, or changes in 
"the rules of the game", as elements of political structural change. Only Marxists clearly 
expect a change in social stratification. In other words most definitions are about political 
revolutions. They suggest that involvement of the masses or popular uprisings are integral 
to political change, but do not necessarily anticipate changes in social structure as a result. 
This is what Kotowski describes as "extension", or the boundary problem in defining 
revolution. There is also the "intention" problem: whether revolutions are seen as 
regressive breakdowns of a system, or progressive transformations. 78 When considering the 
meaning of the term such factors as value inclinations, theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks are bound to come into play. 79 Definitions are often then chosen to fit the 
relevant circumstances and theoretical confines. This may not be entirely satisfactory, but 
equally there is little alternative when there is no consensus on what exactly constitutes a 
75 Calvert, P., (1970) Revolution, Macmillan, London, p. 132 
76 Cited in Stone, L., "Theories of Revolution, " World Politics (1966), Vol. 18 No. 2, p. 159 
77 Skocpol, T., (1979) States & Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 4 
78 Kotowski, C. M., "Revolution", in Sartori, G., (ed) (1984) Social Science Concepts, Sage, 
pp. 403-451 
79 See Moty1, A. J., "Concepts and Skocpol: ambiguity and vagueness in the study of 
revolution, " Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4,1992, p. 109 
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revolution. What can, and should be achieved is a consistent definition for the phenomenon 
within the context of the events being studied. 
From the range of existing definitions, aspects which relate specifically to the East-Central 
European experience can be identified. In this context, "revolution" can be distinguished in 
terms associated with three main theoretical constructs. First, it can be broadly defined in 
terms associated with Tilly and Goldstone as not necessarily including violence. Second, 
with Huntington and Chalmers Johnson as breakdowns of political and/or social systems; 
and third, with Marx, Moore or Skocpol, as "progressive" transformations of political, 
economic and/or social structure. 80 Although there is an apparent contradiction in including 
both breakdown and progression, to include the former acknowledges that revolution may 
not produce radical social change and may incur a high cost to a particular society. The 
latter acknowledges a transformation of political, economic and social structures that is not 
necessarily a regressive form of change. 
The use of violence is central to the majority of definitions of revolution. However, the 
more recent examples of revolution suggest that this emphasis is misplaced. 81 The 
international context and shifts in foreign power policies have resulted in regimes choosing 
not to fight revolutionary movements when they know, or assume, they will be unable to 
command allied support. Revolution in East-Central Europe has included breakdown and 
rebuilding of political and economic systems, which had consequences for society. 
Although the basic state structures did not completely collapse, and there were no "class 
based revolts from below", in each country the old communist regime and the party-state 
was - at least - radically changed. 
82 In Poland and Hungary the old regime completely 
collapsed, and the party-state apparatus was quickly dismantled. Reform of these systems 
was already in progress - albeit in different ways - before 1989. In Bulgaria and Romania 
the collapse of the old system was partial, and in some respects incomplete. Yet, 
considering the pre-1989 conditions in these two countries, there was at least an agenda for 
system change, and in many respects radical and rapid change did occur. 
80 Kotowski, C. M., "Revolution", in Sartori, G., (ed) (1984) Social Science Concepts, Sage, 
439 
1 Goldstone, J., et al (1991) Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, Westview, Boulder 
& Oxford, p. 338 
82 These aspects relate to the "classic" French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, see 
Skocpol, T., (1979) p. 4 
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These points will be elaborated further later in the text, but a preliminary characterisation 
of revolution in the East-Central European context can be stated as (at least attempted) 
radical change of the political, economic and social system which does not necessarily 
include violence. It must be acknowledged that this may be seen as a definition which is 
"all encompassing" and defined in a manner which fulfills the present research needs. 83 
However, when there is no consensus over what revolution as a concept means, nor a 
consensus on how to describe the East-Central European events, the term can be used as a 
consistent means to describe the overall process of political, economic and social change 
that occurred in the region. They may not - as yet - be classified as social revolutions, and 
may indeed be unique events. Ultimately, no matter how they are defined, what cannot be 
denied is that the events in East-Central Europe in the second half of 1989 constituted rare 
political phenomena. As such, they provide useful cases for the testing of a comparative- 
historical method, and the consequent assessment of its utility in analysis of such 
phenomena. This is the primary aim and focus of the thesis. 
1.5 Why Analyse Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania 
All four countries have some general similarities. They were all "satellites" of the Soviet 
Union; were dominated for forty years by communist regimes; and were all subject to rapid 
political and economic change during 1989 and the early 1990s. These countries also 
provide two sets of case studies with which to apply the method and analyse the 
revolutions within a comparative framework. Poland and Hungary on the one hand, and 
Romania and Bulgaria on the other, are invariably placed within equivalent groupings. 
There are notable historical and cultural differences between the cases. 84 For example, 
Poland and Hungary were historically strongly influenced by the enlightenment and 
Western European culture, whereas Bulgaria remained largely dominated by Eastern 
orthodoxy and was directed by patterns of Ottoman rule. Culturally and ideologically, 
83 Kotowski, C. M., in Sartori, G., (ed) (1984) p. 404 
84 There are many implicit, if not explicit references to a division between what is now 
often termed Central Europe (which includes Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) 
and the more Southern or Eastern countries of Eastern Europe. See for example, 
Bideleux, R., & Jeffries, I., (1998) A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change, 
Routledge, London & New York, especially pp. x-xi 
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Romania might have served as a bridge between these "Eastern" and "Western" 
orientations. Certain Eastern aspects were overlaid with strong attachments to the West - 
particularly France. However, the intermediate geographical and historical/cultural position 
of Romania, alongside the effects of communist rule has since placed this country closer to 
the "East" than to the "West". 
These cases have also been "paired" in terms of their "mode of transition" from communist 
rule. Poland and Hungary have been labelled as "negotiated" or "party competition/election 
transitions", while Bulgaria and Romania have been described as "compromise 
transitions". A more complex pairing includes other factors, such as per capita industrial 
production before 1989 (intermediate versus low), the predominant mode of social 
integration (national versus repressive), and geostrategic location (intermediate versus 
remote from Western Europe). 85 This more detailed classification acknowledges some of 
the political and socio-economic differences between the cases which are important for 
understanding the divergence of the communist and post-communist systems. 
There are also differences within the cases which can highlight the particular uniqueness of 
each country's revolution. Both Poland and Hungary might be classed as negotiated 
revolutions, yet in Poland Solidarity was unique in terms of its success as an opposition 
movement. Hungary might be described as experiencing a more "top down" revolutionary 
process. Romania stands apart in many respects. There was a complete lack of organised 
autonomous opposition which could counter communist dominance by the late 1980s. This 
country also provides the only case of extreme violence during the change of regime. 
Bulgaria was in many ways an interim case where there was some late opposition 
development and involvement in the 1989 events. Yet in both Bulgaria and Romania 
former communists were initially reinstated after the collapse of the old regimes while in 
Poland and Hungary former communists were overthrown. 
These examples of similarities and differences need to be explored in order to highlight 
common factors and interpret differences, which might provide explanation for the events 
and consequences of the revolutions. Although it must be acknowledged that without 
introducing similar cases where the indirect method of difference can be utilised some 
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aspects cannot be fully tested, these cases do provide useful comparisons for analysis. 
There are also many detailed arguments which this analysis cannot hope to explore. For 
example, why Polish Solidarity failed to reach a "historic compromise" with the Polish 
communist party in 1980 to 1981, thereby precipitating the 1989 negotiated process. 86 A 
much broader approach which examines a wide range of variables will be taken here. 
One of the foremost merits in applying a comparative-historical method will be shown to 
be the demonstration of significant differences between the cases. In relation to these 
differences an argument is developed. It will be argued that the political, economic and 
social "nature" of the communist systems had significance for the differing forms and 
outcomes of the revolutions. In Poland and Hungary established and influential opposition 
groups took part in negotiations with communist parties within communist systems that 
were already partially reformed and restructured. This resulted in complete regime change; 
the marginalisation of communists from politics; further decentralisation of political and 
economic systems; and relatively rapid post-1989 liberalisation and marketisation. 
In Bulgaria and Romania some elements within the communist party-state were far more 
successful in manipulating revolutionary events; events which occurred within very 
different internal contexts. Communists lost their monopoly of power, but maintained 
political dominance over post-1989 processes. The post-1989 regimes initiated "stop-go" 
liberalisation and marketisation of stagnated, unrestructured economies, and appeared to be 
less able or willing to reform political processes. 
The application of a comparative-historical method shows that the responses of communist 
regimes to external influences and the internal crises they faced, alongside the presence or 
absence of organised opposition movements within revolutionary processes, are a focus for 
examining different forms of revolutionary phenomena. Additionally, the application of the 
85 Offe, C., (1996) Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German 
Experience, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK 
86 For the details of whether it was the strength of Soviet opposition or the failure of 
Solidarity to hold a firm line which resulted in the introduction of martial law rather than 
forcing a similar compromise to that promoted by social confrontation in 1956, see 
Sanford, G., "Communism's weakest link - democratic capitalism's greatest challenge: 
Poland", in Pridham, G., Herring, E., & Sanford, G., (eds) (1997) Building Democracy? The 
International dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe, Leicester University Press, 
London & Washington, p. 174-5 
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method can facilitate identification of the fact that the type of regime and party-state 
apparatus, and particular socio-economic conditions which existed by the late 1980s were 
equally significant in creating differences within and between the cases. The political, 
economic and social "nature" of the communist systems provided the conditions within 
which revolutionary processes took place, and provided the bases on which the post-1989 
systems were rebuilt. These bases contributed to the conditions that the post-communist 
regimes faced, and along with international influences were integral to shaping outcomes. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The following chapters will apply the method, and utilise the frame of reference, already 
outlined in this first chapter, to examine significant factors which contributed to the 
revolutions and establish the "nature" of the communist systems, drawing out differences 
between the cases. The differing revolutionary forms and outcomes will then be described 
and discussed in order to draw out potential explanation for variation between the cases. 
An examination of cultural and ideological influences, which helped to shape the modern 
nation-state, might be the logical place to begin a comparative-historical analysis of the 
region. These influences permeate the historical context within which twentieth century 
states and social structures were established and communist systems developed. There are 
a considerable number of descriptive studies that address these issues. 87 Although these 
historical preconditions are relevant to explaining some of the variance in communist and 
post-communist political systems, they are not explicitly addressed here. World War II and 
subsequent communist take-overs eradicated much of the pre-war structures of these states 
and societies. Each country's historical symbols and myths were no less important for that. 
In fact they probably became more important under repressive conditions. However, rather 
than addressing these historical aspects in a separate chapter, they will be incorporated 
within the discussion of developments of communist and post-communist systems. Whilst 
87 For example, Jelavich, B., (1983) History of the Balkans, Volume 2, Cambridge 
University Press; Okey, R., (1986) Eastern Europe 1740-1985, Routledge; and the 
previously mentioned Bideleux, R., & Jeffries, I., (1998) which is a comprehensive study of 
the region 
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referring to pre-World War II historical aspects where necessary throughout the text, the 
following chapters begin with developments in the communist states. 
Part 1 of the thesis will focus on significant factors which contributed to the 1989 
revolutions, drawing out the differing "nature" of the communist systems. Chapter 2 
examines international influences and internal structural factors that provided the context 
for the revolutionary processes which took place in 1989. Chapter 3 addresses 
developments in opposition movements, the role of significant political actors, the role of 
the military, and their contribution to the form of revolution. Legitimacy will also be 
discussed in order to evaluate the importance of this concept in explaining the collapse of 
the communist systems. Part 2 will then examine the forms and outcomes of the 
revolutions in order to identify the relationship between the "nature" of the communist 
systems, forms of revolution and outcomes. Chapter 4 begins by briefly identifying the 
forms of revolution, and then goes on to examine the post-communist states. Chapter 5 
discusses the development of post-1989 political parties, party systems and associated 
ideological representation. Chapter 6 is concerned with economic and social outcomes, and 
will address some aspects of the elite "reproduction" and "circulation" theses. Chapter 7 
addresses significant international economic and political influences, and their effects on 
the post-communist systems. Finally, Chapter 8 will conclude the analysis by first, drawing 
together patterns of difference between the cases; second, by addressing theoretical and 
conceptual issues highlighted within the investigation; and finally, by assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the method employed, and evaluating its utility in analysing 
and understanding such political phenomena as the 1989 events in East-Central Europe. 
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Partl 
Contributing Factors to the 1989 Revolutions 
and The Nature of the Communist Systems 
Part 1 will apply the comparative-historical method outlined in Chapter 1 to the two chosen 
cases up to, and including, some aspects of the 1989 events. In examining similarities and 
differences between the cases common contributing factors to the revolutions will be 
identified, and the differing nature of the communist systems will be established. Particular 
structural, cultural and ideological conditions were apparent in each country by the late 
1980s. Conditions within which political actors, regimes and social movements acted or 
reacted in different ways to internal and external influences. Part 1 will examine these 
features by looking at each state's inter-relationship with the international context; the 
political, economic and social conditions within each communist system; and the action or 
reaction of significant actors and groups, drawing out similarities and differences within 
and between the two cases. Although there are some differences within the cases and 
similarities across the cases which require interpretation, by 1989 the communist systems 
of Poland and Hungary were very different from those of Bulgaria and Romania. All four 
countries faced some form of political, economic and social crises by 1989, but there were 
differences in the penetration and effects of external influences, and different regime action 
or reaction to those influences. The patterns of difference identified suggest that the nature 
of the communist systems was crucial, not only for contributing to significant variance in 
the forms of revolution, but also in providing contrasting bases for post-1989 
developments. 
It is important to understand the inter-relationship of variables which created the contexts 
and conditions for the 1989 events. However, it is difficult to isolate variables. Structure 
inevitably overlaps and interacts with culture, ideology and agency. Yet, some 
compartmentalisation is necessary in order to discuss relevant factors. The interplay of 
variables will be recognised within a framework which examines sets of significant factors 
in turn. In addition, relevant historical details will be integrated into the discussion where it 
appears to be most relevant. Chapter 2 begins by looking at significant external factors 
which affected the East-Central European states, and the mainly structural features of the 
communist systems. This provides the context within which the role of political and state 
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actors, and social groups can be examined. Chapter 3 will address these latter issues by 
examining developments in opposition movements, and presenting examples of certain 
political actors, and their influence on processes. This chapter will also look at the role of 
the military, and finally discuss legitimacy in relation to the collapse of communism. 
Chapter 2 The International Context and the Structure of Communist Systems 
This chapter will focus on significant international influences and internal structural factors 
which created the context for the 1989 revolutions. 88 Throughout the communist period 
external influences had their effects for East-Central European states. The application of 
the comparative-historical method will show that these influences became inextricably 
linked to internal developments by the late 1980s, especially for Poland and Hungary. The 
interplay of external influences with internal conditions created a context where reform 
communists within the Polish and Hungarian regimes were willing to negotiate with 
established opposition groups to try and resolve the acute political, economic and social 
crises which emerged. In contrast the Bulgarian and Romanian regimes - despite suffering 
similar internal structural crises - chose to virtually disregard the external context and 
maintain their centralised structures until the old regime leaders were finally forced from 
their positions. 
To examine the effects of the international context on East-Central Europe two main areas 
will be explored: first, Soviet influences and their effect on East-Central European states; 
second, other world pressures. There are two strands within the first area; the effect on 
East-Central Europe of policy changes within the Soviet Union, and changes in Soviet 
policy towards East-Central Europe. The second international element can be divided into 
the changes within the world economy and the effects of Western cultural penetration. 
Examples of the effects of international factors on each country will be incorporated into 
each subsection. 
88 In this chapter "international influences" relates specifically to the effects on East- 
Central Europe of changes in Soviet policy and Western economic, cultural and ideological 
penetration. It is acknowledged that these influences were essentially part of the wider 
globalisation process. However, it is not the intention here to address globalisation issues, 
nor does this fall within the remit of this thesis. Significant external factors will be 
examined in terms of their effects for the internal context. 
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Significant internal structural factors which contributed to the nature of the communist 
systems include economic and social structural developments within East-Central 
European states, the structure of the communist states, and the ruling party elite. Economic 
developments within East-Central European states have certain general features and 
interlink with the international context. These general developments will be examined 
before going on to look at economic factors within the two cases; contrasting Poland and 
Hungary on the one hand with Romania and Bulgaria on the other. Social structural 
development will be examined by discussing the changes in social structure and education 
during the communist period, and the slow down in social mobility that occurred across all 
the cases. When examining the structural and political aspects of the communist states the 
two cases can be contrasted; after discussion of the general features of the states, the two 
cases will be compared. Due to the top down nature of the states, the ruling party elites are 
an important feature. This factor involves two main themes that will be examined together; 
first the reactions of party leaders to reform measures in the Soviet Union and second, the 
resulting splits within each party elite. Again the two cases can be compared and 
differences between the cases drawn out. 
2.1 The International Context 
External influences had significant effects for East-Central Europe in the 1980s. Both the 
reform process within the Soviet Union begun in the mid 1980s, and the advances in 
Western technology alongside increasing world economic interdependence, put strains on 
all Soviet-type systems. By the 1980s the pressures of the world economy could no longer 
be ignored by socialist bloc countries. The relative economic backwardness and isolation 
from the West resulted in economic and political stagnation. Although there were some 
indications that reform would take place under Andropov, it was the ascendancy of 
Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in 1985 which heralded a new approach to the 
problems facing the bloc. Changes in policy within the Soviet Union and a change of 
attitude towards East-Central Europe were key factors in the political changes of 1989 and 
1990. As satellites of the Soviet Union, East-Central European states were inevitably 
affected by Soviet internal reforms and revisions of policy, and these elements will be 
examined first. 
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The Soviet Influence 
The leading role of the Soviet communist party meant that any revisions to policy or 
ideology within the Soviet Union had to be at least acknowledged by the satellite parties. 
Each state had taken its own road to communism since 1956. For example, departure from 
the strict command economy had been tolerated, particularly in Hungary. However, the 
limits of deviation from the Soviet path were prescribed by what became known as the 
Brezhnev doctrine; there were limits to political reform, as the experience of Hungary in 
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed. 89 Economic reform was tolerated by the Soviet 
Union as long as the indigenous communist party did not lose political control. As 
Gorbachev began to attempt to reform the Soviet system these limits became less clearly 
defined. Two interactive areas of Soviet influence can be discerned as important in the 
1980s; first the reforms of perestroika and glasnost within the Soviet Union and second, 
the change in Soviet policy towards East-Central Europe which gradually moved away 
from the Brezhnev doctrine towards the so-called Sinatra doctrine. 90 Both these factors 
potentially reduced constraints on each East-Central European country's internal and 
external policy options. 
Internal Soviet Reform: Perestroika and Glasnost 
The effects of perestroika and glasnost cut across several areas within this chapter and will 
also be mentioned in later sections. Here it is important to point out that perestroika and 
glasnost were as much about new ways of thinking, exchanges of ideas and freedom of 
expression as about structural change. Gorbachev's call for perestroika was to provide 
impetus for political reform which coupled with glasnost eventually led to the addition of 
89 The Soviet leadership justified Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, to crush the 
1968 Prague Spring, by arguing that it was necessary to protect the gains of socialism. The 
Soviet policy of limited sovereignty, and the idea that an attack on socialism in one East 
European state was an attack on all socialist states, was dubbed the Brezhnev doctrine in 
the West. 
90 A phrase first used by Gorbachev's Foreign Affairs spokesman, Genadii Gerasimov in 
1987. It signalled the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine by the Soviet leadership, and 
suggested a willingness to allow the East-Central European states to do things their way -a 
reference to Frank Sinatra's popular song "My Way". 
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demokratizatsiya to the list of political watchwords. It was less the practical implications of 
restructuring which effected the East-Central Europeans, as the opening up of public 
debate on the possibilities of reform, not only in the economy but also within political and 
social areas. The admission that the Soviet system had failed where previously it had 
claimed to be superior to capitalism, alongside the renunciation of traditional orthodox 
ideology, promoted open discussion on a scale previously not tolerated. By opening debate 
within the Soviet Union, the Soviet communist party was implicitly giving the East-Central 
Europeans a signal that they too could participate in similar debates and experiments. This 
created a dilemma for the East-Central European communist parties, especially for some 
hard-line leaders. 
In Hungary, economic restructuring was certainly not new. It might even be argued that 
Hungary had been practising a form of perestroika for the previous twenty years. 91 The 
New Economic Mechanism (NEM) was introduced in 1968 and commitment to a strict 
command economy was already a thing of the past. Political reform was minimal, but 
within Hungary's relatively liberalised system debates within the party and intellectual elite 
grew as Gorbachev attempted to implement perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union. 
Reformist party members in Hungary could look to the Soviets as potential supporters for 
further changes to the system. In Poland the changes in the Soviet Union had similar 
effects, not only giving reformists within the regime an opportunity to respond to economic 
and social crisis in a way previously not open to them, but also providing motivation for 
opposition groups outside the party apparatus - such as Solidarity - to renew their efforts in 
pushing for reform. 
Any practical steps to implement reform by the more orthodox regimes of Bulgaria and 
Romania was minimal. Both Zhivkov and Ceausescu claimed to have been practising 
perestroika and glasnost for a number of years, but neither leader put any real reform into 
effect. However, the people in these countries were to become more aware of the 
91 It was argued that Poland had also been practising a form of perestroika for years. The 
result of these reforms was termed "catastroika", and the lesson both Poland and Hungary 
had drawn from this failure was not evident to Gorbachev when he introduced his own 
reform to the Soviet Union. It was suggested that Gorbachev offered these countries no 
intellectual inspiration, merely a greater margin for manoeuvre. See Puprink, J., in 
Gathy, V., & Jensen, J., (eds) (1992) Citizenship in Europe?, Institute of Sociology, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Berzsenyi College, Szombathely, p. 15 
38 
possibility of change. Glasnost opened the door to wider communications between states. It 
became more difficult for the leaders of these countries to isolate their populations from 
the wider world as the jamming of radio signals became less effective and video cassette 
recordings became more widely available. Both countries received Soviet media, which by 
the late 1980s was extolling the virtues of glasnost. 
Even in Romania, where there were strict controls on transmissions, some people could see 
the events unfolding in the rest of East-Central Europe via other media networks, such as 
Yugoslav television. For the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, knowledge of the 
changes taking place in their homeland had considerable effect. The popularisation of the 
outspoken pastor Laszlo Tokes became an important factor in December 1989 when his 
eviction by the Securitate sparked the revolutionary demonstrations in Timisoara. Similarly 
in Bulgaria, the Turkish minority could gather information from Turkish television. 
Despite the jamming of foreign radio stations such as the BBC and Voice of America, the 
Bulgarian leadership could not prevent Soviet media from infiltrating the country. Relayed 
Soviet television and Soviet publications became increasingly critical of the Zhivkov 
regime after 1987, undermining the personality cult he had developed over the years. 
Bulgarians would have been able to watch the televised Soviet Congress of Peoples 
Deputies in May 1989. The open criticism of politburo members was a new experience, 
bringing political and ideological debates into the public domain. 
The effects of perestroika and glasnost created dilemmas for East-Central European 
leaders. The hard-liners were perplexed and resistant, while reformists were initially 
uncertain how far they could go with reform. The effects on each state will be discussed 
further when internal structural variables are examined. Acknowledged here is that 
Gorbachev's commitment to democratisation represented an ideological revision which 
could not be ignored. Not only had Gorbachev opened up the systems to the possibility of 
economic and political change, but he had transformed the dominant thinking on four 
ideological concepts significant within Moscow's policy towards East-Central Europe: the 
class basis for rule; democratic centralism; peaceful coexistence and socialist 
internationalism. The last of these concepts was to provide the greatest impact for East- 
Central Europe and is examined next. 
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Changes in Soviet Policy towards East-Central Europe 
The changes in Soviet Union foreign policy and the effects of foreign policy signals for the 
East-Central European regimes were equally, if not more significant than the internal 
reforms initiated in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev did not initially suggest that East-Central 
Europe should be free to choose its own destiny. His early speeches and meetings with 
East-Central European leaders consolidated Soviet-East-Central European links within the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA or Comecon). 92 Gorbachev did not advocate any move away from Soviet 
hegemony in terms of ideology and stressed democratisation within socialist confines. 
However, as Gorbachev's term of office proceeded, structural changes were initiated which 
suggested a reorientation of attitude towards East-Central Europe. In 1986 three "new 
generation" party secretaries: Aleksandr Yakovlev, Anetolu Dobrinin and Vadim 
Medvedev, replaced "old guard" officials within East-Central European policy formulation 
bodies. There were also changes in the Central Committee apparatus whereby the East- 
Central European Department's role was reduced; it became a subsection within the 
International Department rather than a separate entity. 
Implicit signs of ideological erosion of the Brezhnev doctrine gradually increased. 
Gorbachev's speeches became notable for what was not mentioned as much as for what 
was said. For example, Gorbachev's speech delivered at the 70th anniversary of the 
October Revolution on November 2nd 1987 reaffirmed Khrushchev's formula of different 
roads to socialism. Gorbachev stressed the importance of mutual relations between 
socialist states, but no mention was made of principles of socialist internationalism as 
expected on such occasions. 
Other implications also came indirectly within international military doctrine changes. The 
reversal of Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) capability towards the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), from offensive to defensive, meant negotiations for the 
withdrawal of intermediate range nuclear missiles and Soviet troops from Europe. The 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe in September 1986, whereby challenge inspections 
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by Western observers could take place, potentially prevented any build up of Soviet troops 
on East-Central European borders as a threat in times of crisis (as had happened in Poland 
in 1980-81). The announcement that troops were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan was 
also interpreted as a signal that the Soviets would no longer use force to impose a Soviet- 
type system on another country. 
By 1988 more direct signals began to emanate from Moscow indicating that the Soviet 
Union would no longer adhere to socialist internationalism as a principle governing its 
relations with other parties. Pragmatic responses to Eastern bloc political dilemmas and 
indeed positive interventions towards change in certain circumstances increasingly 
suggested that the Brezhnev doctrine's "limited sovereignty" principle was being eroded. 
For example, the removal of Kadar from his position as first secretary at the May 1988 
Hungarian Communist party conference was accepted by the Soviets. Also there are 
suggestions that Gorbachev discussed the legalisation of Solidarity with Jaruzelski in the 
autumn of 1988 and indicated that there was no Soviet objection. 93 
The repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine became more explicit with Gorbachev's 
announcement at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988 and 
Shevardnadze's speech at the Helsinki Review Conference in January 1989, that the Soviet 
Union would withdraw 50,000 Soviet troops and 5,000 tanks from East-Central Europe. 
These were additional indications that the Soviets would not have the capability to 
intervene militarily in internal affairs. Also after Solidarity's surprising success in the semi- 
free elections of June 1989, a forty minute phone call between Gorbachev and the Polish 
party leader Rakowski in August 1989 reputedly reversed the party's opposition to 
communist participation in a new coalition government. 94 
In some countries the Soviets may have been more directly involved in the reform process 
and removal of "old guard" leaders. It is reputed that Mladenov (the Bulgarian Foreign 
Minister), discussed the deposing of Zhivkov (which took place in November 1989) with 
92 See for example, Kusin, V., "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe, " Problems of Communism, 
Jan-Feb 1986, pp. 39-53. 
93 Schopflin, G., (1993) Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992, Blackwell, Oxford UK & 
Cambridge USA, p. 234 
94 Clines, F., "Gorbachev calls, then Polish party drops its demands, " New York Times, 23 
August 1989, p. 1 A 
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Gorbachev in Moscow while en route to China in October 1989.95 Zhivkov's appeal for 
Soviet backing in November 1989 was apparently refused. 96 However, there are counter 
suggestions that there was no coup conspiracy in Bulgaria, despite conflict between 
Mladenov and Zhivkov. 97 
There is also evidence to suggest that there may have been covert interference by the KGB 
in attempts to replace hard-line party leaders with Moscow approved reformist 
replacements. 98 It is unclear whether Gorbachev was personally involved in such cases, or 
how much of the events of 1989 were unintended effects of Soviet policy. Yet there is no 
doubt that in the growing momentum of change in 1989, the Soviet veto of military 
suppression removed the ultimate constraint of the Brezhnev doctrine. What became 
known as the Sinatra doctrine was a key factor in transforming the East-Central European 
states. 
The World Economy and the West 
Two other external influences were significant for East-Central Europe in the 1980s; world 
economic pressures and Western cultural penetration. World economic pressures not only 
had consequences for the internal economies of each state, but also played a major role in 
changing Soviet policy. Gorbachev's realisation that the communist world could no longer 
compete with the industrial and technological advances in the West was a motivating force 
behind reforming and restructuring the Soviet system. Brezhnev's commitment to the arms 
race had created an overburdening commitment to military expenditure which could no 
longer be sustained. The reported advances in strategic defence by the United States in the 
early 1980s finally called the Soviet's bluff. Foreign policy reorientations and internal 
95 see for example East, R., (1992) Revolutions in Eastern Europe, Pinter, London, p. 35 
96 Schopflin, G., (1993) p. 235 
97 see Tchakarov, K., (1991) The Second Floor, MacDonald & Co Ltd, London, pp. 192 & 
193 
98 See more below in Chapter 3, and for example on Romania see Shafir, M., "Ceausescu's 
Overthrow. Popular Uprising or Moscow-guided conspiracy? " Report on Eastern Europe, 
Radio Free Europe, January 19 1990, pp. 15-19; or for the Czech case see 
Urban, J., "Czechoslovakia: the power and politics of humiliation, " in Prins, G., (ed) (1990) 
Spring in Winter, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p. 116-117 
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reformist measures were based on the necessity to revive economic fortunes and counter 
relative decline. Alongside this, advances in technology were affecting the capability of 
Soviet bloc leaders to isolate communist countries from the West. As already mentioned, 
the communications and information revolution made it increasingly difficult for leaders to 
hide the discrepancies between propaganda and reality. 
World Economic Pressures 
Although the Soviet Bloc was to some extent an internally interdependent system of 
command economies, East-Central Europe was increasingly subject and sensitive to world 
economic circumstances. As world economic interdependence increased, so East-Central 
Europe's problems became more acute. A rise in world energy prices in the 1970s, when 
Soviet oil production was slowing down, only added to the problems of coping with 
declining economic growth. 
Adjustments were required in order to compete with the rest of the world. The commitment 
to heavy industry and central planning brought the system under increasing strain. 
Continued use of material and energy intensive industrial structures, alongside a slow 
down in raw material and fuel production (except natural gas in the Soviet Union), was 
exacerbated by the inability of central plans to take account of necessary changes in 
demand and supply. These factors, alongside technological backwardness in relation to the 
West, all raised questions about the future of East-West trade and the financing of 1986-90 
growth ambitions. 99 
The political rhetoric of "imperialism" had always hidden an economic agenda which 
required Western trade relations. Co-operation ventures initiated by individual companies 
gathered pace from the 1950s, political co-operation and agreements being as much a 
response to economic relations as to any political considerations. '°° The need for new 
99 see for example Csaba, L., (1990) Eastern Europe in the World Economy, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 182-6 
100 Levinson argues that the economic reality of Vodka-Colanisation had been the driving 
force for political and ideological detente on both sides of the Cold War front. See 
Levinson, C., (1980) Vodka-Cola, Gordon & Cremonesi 
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technology and provision of improved consumption standards for the population drove 
East-Central European countries to trade with the West and avail themselves of cheap 
foreign loans which allowed governments to push for economic growth. However, from 
the late 1970s East-West trade ventures led to greater susceptibility to world economic 
crises as markets between East and West became more interdependent. This in turn 
constrained internal economic policy. 
All the countries increasingly relied on foreign credit to service and develop their 
economies during the 1970s. Problems arose when Western governments were faced with 
inflation and recession after the increase in world oil prices. By the early 1980s Western 
enthusiasm to expand loans and credit decreased. The Soviet Union was no longer seen as 
providing a safety net for defaulting countries. This was also a time of increased hostility 
from the United States especially after the imposition of martial law in Poland. 
At this time Poland was hardest hit by the lack of Western support. The Polish regime had 
opted for massive imports of Western technology and equipment to modernise its 
economy. lol In other countries East-West economic relations were assigned a relatively 
modest role in development plans, but servicing hard currency debts became a major 
problem for all the regimes, and remained a difficulty for all post-communist governments 
apart from Romania. Ceausescu's extreme response to the withdrawal of Western credits 
by attempting to pay off foreign debt had severe effects on Romanian society, but left the 
country more isolated from Western economic and political pressures. Bulgaria was to 
some extent shielded by its dependence on Soviet support, but by the late 1980s, with the 
increasing unwillingness and inability of the Soviets to prop up ailing economies, coupled 
with the removal of Soviet subsidies on oil imports, Bulgaria found itself saddled with a 
foreign debt it could no longer service. The world market had the greatest impact on 
Hungary and Poland, not only in terms of internal economic crises, but also in terms of 
greater susceptibility to other external pressures. For Hungary this even went to the point 
of incentives; heavily dependent on foreign borrowing, Hungarian reformists were 
eventually encouraged by offers of loan packages from the West German government. 102 
lot see for example Bornstein, M., in Bornstein, Gitleman and Zimmerman, (eds) (1981) 
East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe, Allen & Unwin, London, p. 33 
102 The West Germans offered loans to the Hungarians to encourage reform and indirectly 
pressurise the East German regime. The United States also put pressure on the Hungarians, 
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Western Cultural Influence 
Although there was continuous contact with the West during the communist period, 
especially through emigres and exiled intellectuals, it was not until the late 1960s that the 
infiltration of Western culture began in earnest for many East-Central European citizens. 
Especially for those in the more liberalised states, the impact of popular music and 
particularly American culture helped create alternative youth subcultures. By the 1980s, 
the advance of modern technology played its part in promoting a Western image which 
was often unrealistic. It appeared that only one aspect of capitalism - consumerism - was 
absorbed by the majority. By this time the most important channels of infiltration were 
through radio and television, written publications and travel. 
Broadcasts from foreign radio stations, such as DeutscheWelle, Radio Vatican, Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty could be heard by most East-Central Europeans. Although 
attempts at jamming some radio stations continued in Bulgaria, as already indicated 
Bulgarian citizens were at least informed of the changes taking place within the Soviet 
Union by the direct relay of Soviet television. People were well aware of Soviet domestic 
issues and the fact that other communist leaders could no longer suppress the reporting of 
significant events. For example, Gorbachev could not cover up the potentially devastating 
effects of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the earthquake in Armenia or the crisis in 
Ngorno-Karabakh. Despite initial delays and sparse commentary by the official press in the 
immediate aftermath of such incidents (suggested as a return to the "old ways") in the end 
there was no option but to respond openly in the atmosphere of glasnost. 103 Ironically, by 
the very nature of their link with the Soviet Union, even if East-Central European regimes 
attempted to control internal information, they could not prevent the affects of Soviet 
glasnost penetrating the public domain in their own countries. 
suggesting that expansion in trade relations would discontinue if East German "refugees" 
were not allowed to cross the Austro-Hungarian border in the summer of 1989. See also 
Szelenyi, I., & Szelenyi, B., "Why socialism failed: Towards a theory of system breakdown - 
Causes of disintegration of East European state socialism, " Theory and Society, Vol. 23/2, 
April 1994, p. 211-233 
1o McNair, B., (1988) Images of the Enemy, Routledge, London 
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Television became a primary source of news and information in East-Central European 
societies and a major means of obtaining an often unrealistic impression of the West. In 
Romania, despite strict controls and the use of television to build Ceausescu's cult of 
personality, false visions of the West could be found. The United States was portrayed in 
terms of the lunar landing in 1969 and such programmes as Dallas. '04 Even in Bulgaria 
where Soviet influence was supposed to be greatest, Western culture was popular for the 
masses and intellectuals alike. "Soviet movies played to empty houses, while even third- 
rate Western films attract[ed] huge crowds. The backlash against the Zhivkhov regime's 
efforts at Russification through regular broadcasting of Soviet programmes on Sofia 
television and mandatory Russian language classes in education was an intense fetishism 
for all things Western, particularly American, from jeans to jazz". 105 Ironically in Poland, it 
was popularisation by Western mass media of Walesa's charismatic image which helped to 
convince many of Poland's middle class sceptics to embrace his opposition leadership. 106 
Western media was most freely accessible in Poland and Hungary and along with internal 
underground publications led to higher cultural penetration. The proximity to the West and 
a relatively liberalised political atmosphere allowed greater freedom of information to the 
whole population. In Poland, particularly from the 1970s, samizdat publications filled in 
gaps in the news and debates covered in the official press. In Hungary, key documents 
from opposition groups were published and widely available. For example, the democratic 
opposition produced a special issue of the Beszelo journal, the "Social Contract", which 
called for political pluralism and a free press. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of samizdat and foreign broadcasts since reliable survey 
data is hard to come by. 107 It was argued that new communication technologies could 
undermine the controlled Soviet system. Although new technology was important in 
104 Showing the television series "Dallas" on Romanian television in the 1980s may have 
stimulated a desire for the consumer lifestyle rather than exposing the decadence of 
American capitalism as was apparently intended. See Belk, R. W., "Romanian Consumer 
Desires and Feelings of Deservingness, " in Stan, L., (ed) (1997) Romania in Transition, 
Dartmouth, UK & USA, p. 192 
los Alexiev, A., "Demystifying Bulgaria", book review, Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct 
1985, pp. 90/91 
106 Zubek, V., "Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition, " Problems of Communism, 
Jan-April 1991, p. 70 
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influencing the situation, this case was probably overstated as was the counter argument 
that new technology would strengthen the system. Glasnost had great effects for East- 
Central Europe in allowing public airing of what previously might have been classed as 
ideological heresy. However, the argument that the newspapers and broadcast media 
within the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe were agents of change has been 
challenged; their role and influence being seen as too slight. 108 Ordinary people did at least 
gain impressions of the West which potentially highlighted the inadequacies of their own 
systems. 
Those with more freedom to travel were also able to see the relative decline in Eastern 
economies and the lack of consumer goods available through official channels. Hungarians 
in particular were able to move more freely into and out of the West during the 1980s. 
Apart from political freedom, the proximity to Austria made it easier to bring goods back 
home to the black market or "second economy" trade. Many Hungarian students of the 
1980s also studied abroad, bringing Western ideas of civil society, pluralism and new right 
economic thinking back to the academies and universities. An expansion in Western 
tourists also brought increased cultural influence along with hard currency earnings. 
By 1988 there were few restrictions on travel other than financial constraints. A relatively 
smaller proportion of Bulgarians and Romanians were permitted visits outside East-Central 
Europe, but only Romanians found it a continuing problem. This was due to the 
increasingly difficult internal conditions in Romania. Although all four countries were 
potentially influenced by external forces, the affects of these influences were partially 
dependent on internal conditions. Internal conditions varied considerably, as we shall see 
in the following sections. In the more liberalised and open atmosphere of Poland and 
Hungary Soviet policy changes, economic interdependence with the West, and Western 
cultural penetration affected regimes, opposition movements and wider society alike. 
External influences acted as catalysts for political and economic change; change already 
partially in progress. In the relatively closed, centralised Bulgarian and Romanian systems 
regime and society were far more reactionary and spontaneous in response to external 
107 See for example, Dizard, W., & Swensrud, S, (1987) Gorbachev's information revolution: 
Controlling glasnost in a new electronic era, Westview, Boulder & Oxford. 
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changes. Gorbachev's policies were misunderstood or ignored. Hierarchical leaderships 
attempted to isolate themselves from change, but as we shall see external events and 
internal political, economic and social crises could not ultimately be ignored. 
2.2 Developments in East-Central European Economies 
Innovations in economic development came to East-Central Europe with the Stalinist 
conception of modernisation. This conception tied the economic to the political. 
Improvements in the economy and standard of living became part of ideological 
legitimation. Socialist countries were pronounced to be superior to Western capitalist 
systems in both social and economic conditions. Although starting from a much lower base 
than the West, in the early years the reality often lived up to the rhetoric (and official 
figures) in terms of advancement and improvements. In later years the economy was to 
prove one of the most difficult and potentially destructive elements for the regimes. The 
imposition of the Stalinist model of economic development provided the seeds of 
economic stagnation. Centralised planning, forced industrialisation and attempts at 
collectivisation eventually led to inefficiency, wasted resources and poor or ineffectual 
investment. 
The drive towards industrialisation and urbanisation through central planning was initially 
quite successful, raising industrial production significantly. In the Balkans, Soviet 
reconstruction after the war affected initial development, draining resources at a time when 
these countries needed to concentrate on their own reconstruction. Nevertheless these 
countries were brought firmly into the twentieth century. However, the rapid expansion of 
industrial production without adequate investment in agriculture soon exhausted internal 
natural resources and a reliance on heavy industry was to create future problems for the 
communists. Attempts at forced collectivisation did not ease the situation and although 
partially successful in Romania and Bulgaria, largely failed. 
108 for these arguments see Johnson, O., in Ramet, S. P., (ed) (1992) Adaptations and 
Transformations in Communist and Post-Communist Systems, Westview, Boulder & 
Oxford, Chap. 8, pp. 211,228 & 234 
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Traditional peasant habits, such as subsistence farming, also caused problems for socialist 
economies. Industrial managers did not tend to define a firm's success in terms of 
competitiveness and entrepreneurship. Following their predecessors techniques of survival, 
they tended to channel subsidies into bottomless pits of outdated technology and excessive 
reserves. Industrial workers, used to survival under exploitation, beat the system by go- 
slows and refusals to work for low wages. 109 By the 1960s, the centrally planned system 
was coming under strain and reappraisals of policy took place throughout East-Central 
Europe. Decline in annual growth rates, poor agricultural production, shortages of skilled 
labour, poor technological development, even unemployment in some countries, 
contributed to varying reforms with equally varying results. 
Most attempts to reform the economies were unsuccessful in the longer term. All four 
countries suffered relative economic decline, problems of foreign debt and a resulting 
decline in technological advancement in comparison to the West from the 1970s onwards. 
Despite supposed attention by policy makers to the issue of technical development in the 
mid 1980s, investment practice still concentrated on securing raw materials and energy 
supplies from domestic sources and attempts to be self-reliant in agriculture. ' 10 
The regimes suffered from increasing strains on state budgets when there was a pressing 
need to renew infrastructure and counter environmental decay. As already mentioned the 
burgeoning debt repayment to Western governments was one factor that increased the 
difficulties in maintaining economic growth (see tables 2.1 and 2.2). Secondly, they were 
tied to the Soviet Union through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 
Dependence on the Soviet economy in terms of imports and exports softened the East- 
Central Europeans from the impacts of the second oil shock, but isolated them from the 
competitiveness they needed in order to produce quality goods and update their industry. 
Despite some economic recovery through regaining international creditworthiness and less 
stringent CMEA terms, the regimes failed to initiate the structural adjustment needed to 
adapt to developments in the world economy. These general conditions affected all four 
countries in different ways. Each country's attempt to deal with these difficulties depended 
109 Heinrich, H., (1986) Hungary: Politics Economics and Society, Pinter, London, p. 142 
110 Csaba, L., (1990) Eastern Europe in the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 260 
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to a great extent on their relationship with external influences and differing internal 
contexts. To highlight these differences the countries will be examined as two cases. 
Table 2.1 Hard-Currency Debt 1971-1989 
selected years (billions US dollars) 
Country 1971 1975 1982 1988 1989 
Poland 1.1 8.0 24.8 39.2 40.2 
Hungary 1.1 3.1 7.7 19.3 19.2 
Bulgaria 0.7 2.6 2.8 7.8 6.4 
Romania 1.2 2.9 9.8 1.9 -1.3 
Source: 1971-1988 data (gross debt): Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1987,1988, 
Directorate of Intelligence, CIA; PlanEcon Report, Vol. 5, No. 42-43, Nov. 3,1989, p. 53; 
1989 data (external debt, net of reserves): Bartholdy, K., Statistical Tables, in The 
Economics of Transition, Vol. 2, No. 4,1994, Oxford University Press, pp. 514-518. 
Table 2.2 Annual Rates of Growth of Gross National Product (GNP), 1970-1984 
(selected figures; constant prices; percent) 
Country 1970-75 1979 1980 1981 1982 1984 
Poland 6.6 -1.7 -3.2 -5.3 -0.6 3.4 
Hungary 3.4 0.6 0.5 -0.1 1.5 1.3 
Bulgaria 4.5 3.7 -2.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 
Romania 6.2 3.8 -1.7 0.5 2.3 4.3 
Source: Thad Alton et al, reproduced in Dawisha, K., (1988) Eastern Europe, Gorbachev 
and Reform, Cambridge University Press, p. 135. 
The Economies of Poland and Hungary 
Although there are arguments over the more intricate details of differences between Poland 
and Hungary, these two countries were broadly similarly situated with regard to economic 
conditions. "' Both countries had a history of unsuccessful attempts to introduce a 
"' For these arguments see Kozminski, A. J., "Transition from Planned to Market Economy: 
Hungary and Poland Compared, " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXV, No. 4, 
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compromise between planned and market economies and had developed close links with 
the West through cultural influences, expatriate communities and relative freedom of 
movement for citizens. Their proximity to, and dependence on, financial, technological and 
economic links with the West promoted greater contact and in turn, considerable leverage 
by Western governments and businesses in their dealings with the two communist 
governments. Although Western institutions may not have had a direct role in the political 
democratisation process, their indirect encouragement of neo-liberal economic policies 
certainly aided the influence of certain groups, particularly within Hungarian political 
processes. 112 
The economic differences between Poland and Hungary to some extent reflected variations 
within state structures and the particular path chosen by respective leaderships (as we shall 
see below). Hungary was to prove the most enterprising in economic development, 
whereas Poland suffered continuous economic crises. 
In Hungary there were problems with industrialisation in the early years due to poor raw 
material resources (lost with break up of the Hapsburg Empire). Rakosi's attempt to make 
Hungary industrially self-sufficient was unsuccessful and left later leaders with a need to 
acknowledge consumer demands and develop foreign trade. The necessity to import raw 
materials and to export goods left the country vulnerable to external economic influences. 
However, the Hungarian attempt to solve the economic difficulties of the 1960s was to 
some extent successful. Within the New Economic Mechanism of 1968, enterprises were 
freed from petty plan tutelage and proved successful for the first three years. The strict 
command economy was removed. Bargaining of subsidies and credits replaced plans, but 
the system remained monitored from above and centred round large state monopolies. 
Service, commercial and agricultural sectors were officially run outside the state sector, 
Dec. 1992, pp. 315-333; and Slay, B., "Transition from Planned to Market Economy: 
Hungary and Poland Compared: a Comment, " Studies in Comparative Communism, 
Vol. XXV, No. 4, Dec. 1992, pp. 333-340. 
112 see Andor. L., "The Role of the Debt Crisis in Hungary's Transition", Labour focus on 
Eastern Europe, No. 52, Autumn 1995 pp 84-99 
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although it was not until 1981 that small private production units were legalised in 
industry. 
The government linked the domestic economy to world markets in order to import Western 
technology and supply extra energy needs. Hungary joined the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1973 and became a World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) member in 1982. "Between 1973 and 1980 Hungary lost 80% of a year's 
national income" because of unfavourable terms of trade, due to the rise in oil prices, 
recession in the West and a fall in the export price of goods. 113 There was a deliberate 
policy to expose domestic markets to international competition in an attempt to strengthen 
export capacity whatever the social and political costs. From the end of the 1970s private 
production and service trades received encouragement. Western technology, imported to 
mechanise farming, also led to self-sufficiency in agricultural production. 
Despite many attempts at economic reform in Poland, none were particularly successful. 
Decollectivisation of farming from 1956 aided peasant income, but productivity remained 
relatively low. There was some encouragement of private enterprise in other sectors, 
particularly from the 1960s, but the failure to deliver sustained and sufficient 
improvements in living standards was to hound the leadership throughout the communist 
period. Poland's economic problems were partially obscured by massive subsidies. 
Whenever the government attempted to correct economic imbalances it invariably led to 
price increases provoking riots, strikes and popular resistance. 
In a similar way to Hungary, industrial development in the 1970s was financed by 
borrowing resulting in the rapid accumulation of foreign debt. The attempts at investment 
in new machinery to improve industry and export capacity were hindered by centralisation, 
bureaucratic interests and distortions. Coupled with the global recession from 1974, Polish 
products became more difficult to sell abroad. Serious balance of payments problems and 
consumer shortages followed. By the end of the 1970s economic growth had halted (see 
table 2.2). Yet again proposed price increases led to strike action in 1976. The deterioration 
of the economy and discontent - especially amongst workers in state industry - was to 
prove the downfall of the Gierek government in 1980. As we shall see (in Chapter 3) the 
113 Heinrich, H., (1986) p. 143 
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Solidarity opposition movement was partially born out of this discontent and continuing 
economic crises. 
In both countries the inefficiencies of the official command economy were partially 
counteracted by "second economies, " "black markets" or "moonlighting". However, this 
"mixed economy" had mixed results. On the one hand many workers were appeased and 
technocrats acquiesced by supplementing their incomes. On the other hand it promoted 
higher expectations and a false picture of what a market economy actually involved. For 
example, in Poland small farmers could cultivate private plots, were never wealthy, but 
were cushioned from market economy "risk" by state subsidies. Small private enterprises 
in urban areas had difficulty in obtaining licences and suppliers, but once established could 
make considerable profits with little effort. Where the second economy gained ground, as 
it did most significantly in Hungary, the state sector could not compete with the wages that 
workers could gain in their spare time. This was especially relevant when the state sector 
work could be used as a rest from labours in outside activities. For ordinary Hungarians it 
gave a boost to earnings and relatively satisfactory socio-economic conditions for a large 
percentage of the population. In Hungary the "black" economy was recognised as lucrative 
and although not officially acknowledged in statistics, allowing legal private enterprise was 
an attempt to paint the black economy white. The black economy supplied an estimated 
50% of home construction, and a possible 80% of national income was derived by 
"unofficial means". 114 In both countries second economies were at least tolerated by the 
regimes as a means to counter socialist economic inefficiencies, but also altered social and 
political relationships within the systems. As we shall see (in Chapter 3) this had 
unforeseen consequences for the regimes as opposition movements developed and became 
established within the political space partly created by these economic conditions. 
The Economies of Bulgaria and Romania 
In contrast to Poland and Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania maintained highly centralised 
economies with little or no opportunities for private enterprise or any other alternative 
economic or social development. Both countries were also far more isolated from Western 
1 14 Heinrich, H., (1986) p. 151 
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influences due to their geographical position and the nature of the regimes. They had lower 
levels of hard-currency debt to Western institutions by the end of the 1980s (see table 2.1). 
Partly as a result, Western institutions had less influence on these regimes. Bulgaria's close 
liaison with the Soviet Union contrasted with Romania's internationally independent 
stance. Each system was also maintained differently, yet both systems remained more 
comparatively more centralised economically and under closer political control. 
Bulgaria's economic system was slightly less centralised than Romania's, but Soviet-type 
planning institutions were maintained throughout Zhivkov's rule. In agriculture the 
collectivisation process was relatively successful. Pragmatic introduction of this process 
alongside an integration of private plot cultivation - similar to that of Hungary - provided 
the rural population with a reasonable standard of living. It was the industrial sector which 
witnessed the most radical change during the communist period. Pre-war modern industry 
accounted for only 5.6% of national income. 115 Communist methods of rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation transformed an economy "dependent mainly on 
agriculture and light industry, to one in which the share of agriculture [was a mere] 11.2%" 
by 1989.116 By the 1960s labour shortages and the growing role of foreign trade brought 
some streamlining of state planning and decentralisation of control. In 1982 a New 
Economic Mechanism was introduced ostensibly aimed at further decentralisation. 
However, the rhetoric espoused was not often matched by any substantial structural 
change. 
Zhivkhov often made statements which apparently supported innovative economic ideas, 
such as those surrounding the Prague Spring. He later compared perestroika with Czech 
reforms, openly blaming the Soviet government for failing to realise what socialism 
needed. Zhivkov also apparently supported the introduction of market economy reforms 
with real prices, taxes and wages. He had visited Japan in the early 1970s and "was 
mesmerised by the advances in technology compared to the East. " 117 Yet despite some 
material concessions made to the population in terms of raising some welfare provision 
115 Lampe, J. R., (1986) The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, Croom Held, 
London & Sydney, p. 94 
116 Izvorski, I., "Economic Reform in Bulgaria: 1989 -1993", Communist Economies and 
Economic Transformation, February 1993, Columbia Education, Columbia University, 
electronic version, p. 3 
117 Tchakarov, K., (1991) p. 99 
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and benefits (such as old age pensions) little real economic reform ever took place. 
Paradoxically as a result of aiding the Soviet clamp down on the Czech innovations of 
1968, Bulgaria received favourable terms of trade and raw materials from the Soviets in 
excess of their needs. Zhivkov's relations with the Soviets, which were particularly good 
between 1971 and 1974, paid dividends. Bulgaria kept its economy afloat by simply re- 
exporting Soviet goods, such as petrochemicals, at Western price levels. 
However, excessive reliance on Soviet subsidies and CMEA trade also proved to be a 
contributing factor to Bulgaria's economic downfall. By 1984, partly because of these close 
ties, Bulgaria was beginning to suffer acute economic crisis. Gross National Product 
growth had slowed to 3% and agricultural production had actually gone down by 7% in the 
previous year. 118 Zhivkov attempted to play a game of double alliance with the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and met with Western businessmen promising 
to follow principles of Western market economies and ownership. Despite this rhetoric, 
and co-operative agreements with Japanese firms, which resulted in a relatively successful 
computer industry, Bulgaria's dependence on Soviet trade (around 60% in 1985) was its 
major structural economic weakness. 119 The general result was uncompetitive goods for 
Western consumption, particularly in terms of quality. There was still a dependence on 
imports from the West for technological development which resulted in foreign debt of 8 
billion dollars by 1988, but this was less of an influence on Zhivkov than his relations with 
Moscow. 
There is conflicting evidence over Bulgarian standards of living and economic growth rates 
during the communist period, probably due to discrepancies between "official" and "real" 
statistics. 120 However, there is no doubt that the 1980s brought an increase in economic 
problems including shortages of consumer goods and energy, coupled with hidden 
inflation. Although the cultivation of private plots meant many could maintain a reasonable 
standard of living, the Bulgarian "private economy" did not thrive as it did in Hungary. 
118 Handbook of Economic Statistics, Washington DC. US Government Printing Office, 
September 1982, p. 27. Also see industrial production growth tables from Statistical 
Y'earbook, New York: UN, 1966,78, pp. 88/9 
119 Alexeiv, A., (1985) p. 91 
120 see book reviews of Alexiev, A., (1985) op. cit. versus Shashko, P., "The Past in 
Bulgaria's Future, " Problems of Communism, Sep-Oct 1990, pp. 75-83. 
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In Romania the regime ascribed a major importance to nationalisation of industry. 
Collectivisation was carried out in earnest between 1948 and 1950 and rapid 
industrialisation in the early post-war years reduced rural overpopulation. Romania took an 
independent stance in terms of relations with the Moscow party from the early 1960s under 
Gheorgiu-Dej. Ceausescu continued to defy direction from the Soviets and favoured a 
policy of rapid industrial development, which included forced urbanisation. Between 1965- 
1979 Romania had relatively high growth rates. 121 However, there was a cost for 
agriculture and society; as population growth slowed so investment of human capital 
slowed. After 1965 industrial production expanded faster than in any other East-Central 
European country, mainly due to Ceausescu's determination, but with no consideration for 
social consequences. Economic priorities and goals were set arbitrarily and based on 
personal inclinations. A fixation with heavy industry led to the development of steel and 
metallurgical industries. Elena Ceaucesu's scientific pretensions as a chemist called for a 
vast petrochemical industry which disregarded the lack of raw materials and energy 
resources. Oil reserves were insufficient and imports of raw materials made up the majority 
of consumption. In 1984 a policy to increase the population at a time when food and 
housing was in short supply proved disastrous. It led to increased infant mortality, a rise in 
the number of orphans, alongside an increase in poverty and suffering for the general 
population. Corruption and soul-selling for survival, through such channels as informers to 
the Securitate, became a way of life. 
Ceausescu frittered away any advantages of early economic progress and by the end of the 
1980s Romania ranked lowest among European countries on virtually all living standard 
indicators. 122 In addition Romania took the most extreme course of action to avoid the 
possible dictates of Western creditors such as the IMF and World Bank. When Western 
credit dried up at the end of the 1970s, Ceausescu was determined to repay external debt 
through the export of goods diverted from the domestic economy. The attempt to offset 
economic imbalances by exporting agricultural products and consumer goods in return for 
hard currency or energy exacerbated the austere conditions. There were severe domestic 
consumer shortages; basic commodities were rationed, even to restrictions on the 
availability of electricity. There was little or no independent economic activity outside of 
121 See table 3.2 and Sislin, J.. "Revolution Betrayed? Romania and the National Salvation 
Front, " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, December 1991, p. 397 
122 Ratesh, N., (1991) Romania: The Entangled Revolution, Praeger, New York, p. 8 
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the supposed "command economy" to give the population the opportunity to supplement 
their "official" incomes. This is not to say that there was no corruption or privilege, but that 
it went on within the state apparatus to the advantage of an elite, rather than to the 
advantage of the population at large. 
In all four countries the economic pressures of the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with Western 
cultural penetration, had the potential to modify the "social-compact norms" which had 
helped to maintain stability from the 1960s. '23 Higher consumer demands not only 
stimulated an increase in imports on credit from the West, but also potentially heightened 
awareness for consumers of the poorer quality and lack of variety obtainable from 
domestic suppliers. The growth in Western dealings, particularly for Poland and Hungary, 
during times of unfavourable terms of trade and increasing international competition put 
added pressure on these regimes. Yet, despite economic conditions being partly 
responsible for promoting radical change, Poland and Hungary were - in the longer term - 
advantaged by their Western associations and partially restructured economies. As will be 
emphasised later (in Chapters 6 and 7) Bulgaria and Romania were comparatively 
disadvantaged, not only in terms of their relative economic isolation from the West, but 
also in terms of their economic structural bases. The type of industry - large numbers of 
state-owned heavy industrial enterprises - and centralised systems were far more difficult 
to dismantle or restructure when radical reforms were finally introduced after 1989. All 
four countries suffered economic crises during the late 1980s, but the outcomes of these 
pressures were to some extent dependent on political, economic and social conditions, and 
the ability and political will of elites. However, before examining political aspects we must 
turn to the general changes in social structure which contributed to the context within 
which developments took place. 
123 Pravda argues that the "social compact" was primarily an economic, but later also a 
political and social bargain, see Alex Pravda in Bornstein, M. Gitelman, Z., & 
Zimmerman, W., (eds) (1981) East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe, 
Allen & Unwin, London 
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2.3 Social Structural Change 
World War II and Sovietisation radically changed society. Much of the pre-war political 
and economic elite lost their status either as a result of the war or Stalinisation. Rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation in the early post-war period created distinct changes in 
society. Peasants and workers were often catapulted into high office through the party 
ranks. However, after the first generational change there was a tendency for previous 
patterns of social configuration to be replicated, albeit in a different form. Elite domination 
and rural-urban divides remained significant. Nevertheless, two elements were important 
within social structural conditions which had significant effects by the 1980s. First, 
occupational changes and an increase in the levels of education altered the nature of 
society. Second, a slow-down in social mobility led to a decrease in opportunities for 
younger generations, at a time when expectations were growing. 
Changes in Occupations and Education 
Between the 1950s and 1980s there was a significant rise in the urban population and a 
shift from jobs in the primary sector to secondary and tertiary sectors. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 
below show the decline in traditional peasant populations and increase in manual and non- 
manual workers employed by the state. By the late 1980s in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, 
over 60% of the population lived in urban areas and over 80% were manual and non- 
manual state employees. Only Romania had relatively low levels of urban dwellers and 
employees (see tables 2.3 and 2.4). Romania is also notable for the low percentage of 
"non-productive" or professional categories (see Table 2.5). In the early years peasants 
became factory workers and during the rapid modernisation period of the first five or six 
year "plans", opportunities to become office workers or bureaucrats were available to this 
newly mobilised generation. Some people moved up the social ladder very rapidly through 
membership of the communist party. A talented peasant could move to the city, gain a 
good education and become a manager or apparatchik. 
Modernisation produced a new social hierarchy. A cadre party elite with access to 
privileges, such as country houses and special shops, dominated society. A bureaucratic 
and expanding middle strata emerged to run the state apparatus and fulfil the professional 
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and non-manual occupational roles, whilst the workers laboured in heavy industrial plants. 
In Poland a particular category of peasant-worker emerged from the pre-war landless 
labourers. A peasant-worker employed in a factory could also produce food for minimal 
subsistence on a tiny plot of land. Also in Hungary and Bulgaria many urban workers 
maintained their own small private plots to supplement their incomes. 
Table 2.3 Rise in Urban population 1950-1989 (percent of total population) 
selected figures 
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 
Poland 36.9 48.3 52.3 58.7 61.9 
Hungary 37.8 41.7 49.9 56.8 62.0 
Bulgaria 27.5 38.0 53.0 62.5 62.0 
Romania 25.2 32.4 36.9 45.8 53.2 
Source: Soviet Statistical Yearbooks (Moscow 1988, p. 18 & 1990 p. 590) in Lane, D., 
(1996) The Rise and Fall of State Socialism, Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 157. 
Table 2.4 Growth of population by social groups of manual workers and non-manual 
employees (percent of total population) 
Country 1950-65 1977-85 
Poland 52.5 (Dec. 50) 77.6 (Dec. 84) 
Hungary 72.8 (Jan. 65) 80.5 (Jan. 80) 
Bulgaria 43.9 (Dec. 56) 94.2 (Dec. 85) 
Romania 37.0 (Feb. 56) 68.9 (Jan. 77) 
Source: Soviet Statistical Yearbook (Moscow 1988, pp. 21-2) in Lane, D., (1996) p. 158. 
Table 2.5 Non-manual employment 1950-1987 (as a percentage of workforce) 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1987 
Poland 11.6 14.4 16.4 19.0 
Hungary 14.3 15.2 19.0 21.1 
Bulgaria 9.2 13.1 16.9 18.2 
Romania 7.6 10.2 12.4 12.7 
Source: Soviet Statistical Yearbook (Moscow 1988, pp. 409-413) in Lane, D., (1996) p. 158. 
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Alongside the development of these social categories education levels generally increased. 
State schools and networks of evening classes and correspondence courses provided basic 
education for the majority. In the 1960s higher education expanded, but this did not 
necessarily provide equality of opportunity. The numbers going on to university remained 
proportionally small. For example, in Poland in 1972 22% of the working population 
reached higher or secondary levels of education, but only half of those were of lower status 
origin. 124 In Hungary even in 1984 only 9.9% of those eligible by age had university 
places. 125 
Education was selective and the proportion of students from working class or peasant 
origin decreased progressively. This was not only a result of the changes in social 
structure. Increasingly higher education opportunities were only open to the children of 
professionals and party elites. However, the numbers of people with tertiary education who 
were qualified for non-manual occupations in the economy increased (see Table 2.6). 
These changes produced an increasingly well educated, potentially white collar workforce 
with restricted access to higher level occupations. For the generation who had experienced 
the war and pre-war conditions, the possibility for social advancement was welcomed and 
often achieved. For the generations born after 1945 improvements in education and 
standards of living were expected. This created problems in societies where social mobility 
was declining. 
Table 2.6 Numbers of qualified non-manual employees with higher and specialist 
secondary education (000s) 
Country 1968-70 1980-83 1986-88 
Poland 1781 3365 3772 
Hungary 430 868 n. a. 
Bulgaria 521 858 1013 
Romania n. a. n. a. n. a. 
(n. a. - not available) 
Source: Soviet Statistical Yearbook (Moscow 1988, p. 422) in Lane, D., (1996) p. 160. 
124 Kende, P., & Strmiska, Z., (1987) Equality and Inequality in Eastern Europe, Berg 
Publishers, Leamington Spa UK p. 385 
125 Heinrich, H., (1986) p. 166 
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The Decline in Social Mobility 
From the 1960s the rate of industrialisation tended to slow. By the late 1970s a decline in 
economic growth was accompanied by a slow-down in social mobility. After the initial 
upheaval of society in the early post war period there was a decline in individuals of 
peasant or working class origin moving into managerial and professional occupations. This 
was accompanied by an increasing propensity for children to inherit parental 
occupations. 126 The reduced opportunities for social advancement, especially for younger 
non-communists created a structural barrier. Well educated people were employed in 
relatively low status occupations with little opportunity for career advancement. Even 
within the communist elite, career paths were often blocked by ageing party members 
unwilling to relinquish their posts to a younger generation. 
When reforming the system away from the command economy towards more efficient and 
rationalistic management, the potential losers were the middle-level party bureaucrats. 127 
This group tended to resist change and often blocked attempts at reform (as we shall see 
below in the following sections). Their material privileges tended to decline as a result of 
reform. This was especially the case in the area of fringe benefits, such as government 
subsidised housing. Technocratic reform was also less likely to benefit the blue-collar, 
semi-skilled, urban worker. They were often excluded from earning extra income in a 
second economy (through part-time farming for example) or lacked the necessary skills for 
self-employment. In Poland this may have been particularly relevant in contributing to the 
greater discontent amongst workers. 
In Hungary the decline in social mobility was less of a problem for society than elsewhere. 
While real wages were declining, living standards actually increased. The Hungarian 
"second economy" expanded. During the early 1980s around 70% of families generated 
incomes from outside the official economy. Although this often produced only a small 
126 for details see Andorka, R., "Tendencies of Social Mobility in Hungary: Comparisons of 
Historical Periods and Cohorts, " in Wesolowski, W., Slomczynski, K., Mach, B., (eds) 
(1978) Social Mobility in Comparative Perspective, Ossolineum, Polish Academy of 
Sciences Press, pp. 305-319; and Kende, P., & Strmiska, Z., (1987) p. 182. See also 
Tokes, R. L., (1996) especially Chapter 3 
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supplement, such as additional income or produce from private plots, the accumulation of 
extra wealth produced a dual system of social stratification. 128 Those who would otherwise 
be frustrated by the lack of opportunities could turn to some form of private enterprise. 
Elites in the more liberalised political and economic systems of Poland and Hungary had 
an ambiguous position. On the one hand those dependent on the nomenklatura for their 
position were more likely to resist change towards a market economic system in which 
their privileges would decline. On the other hand there was an educated professional class 
who could potentially benefit and improve their life chances by reform away from state 
planning and political control. In Bulgaria and especially Romania opportunities for 
advancement were limited. Patronage networks within the communist parties were 
virtually the only means of climbing the social hierarchy. 
These social structural conditions had the potential to affect the political system. Declining 
social mobility put a glass ceiling on opportunities for much of the younger and middle 
aged groups. Combined with higher levels of education amongst these groups, 
dissatisfaction with the political and economic system was more likely. In fact it was 
members of this post-war generation which were to become prominent in the post- 
communist political and economic systems (as we shall see in Part 2). 
2.4 The Communist States 
The structure of the communist states was essentially similar initially, and based on the 
Soviet model. Between 1944-1948 the communists gained political control, eliminating or 
absorbing other political parties and associations. In Poland and Bulgaria remnants of 
political associations remained within the communist "Front" organisations. Parties such as 
the Polish United Peasant Party (ZSL), Polish Democratic Party (SD) and the Bulgarian 
Agrarian Union (BANU), retained little more than their names; all associations were 
subordinated and ultimately controlled by the communists. Each state embodied a top 
127 Szelenyi, I., "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An 
Auto-critical Reflection on The intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, " Politics and 
Society, Vol. 15, No. 2,1986-87, p. 133 
128 ibid p. 126 
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down hierarchical structure, heavily dependent for its continuation on the nomenklatura 
system, party leadership and ideological legitimation. Despite an apparent uniformity of 
state structures there were differences in the development of each state which affected the 
potential for change. This potential depended most significantly on how closely the party 
was interwoven with the bureaucracy, as well as the ability and political will of each party 
hierarchy to maintain a closed political system. 
There were complex relationships and interdependencies woven in and through the various 
state institutions from the politburo to local district offices. 129 These relationships varied. 
The difficulties encountered by the parties in the early years in Poland and Hungary led to 
relatively liberalised political systems after 1956, within which bureaucratic and party 
relationships were generally less clientelistic. Hungary provides a particular example 
where institutional relationships differed as a result of Hungary's "goulash communism". 
Romania provides an example of the opposite extreme where the development of rigid 
state structures and the particular style of leadership constrained any movement towards 
reform. By the 1980s these differences manifested themselves significantly in two ways. 
First, in the way each regime reacted to the changes in Soviet policy and second, how each 
party hierarchy was affected (as we shall see in the section on ruling party elites). Before 
turning to these points, the general developments and institutional features will be 
examined by comparing Hungary and Poland separately in order to highlight their 
particular differences, followed by the case of Romania and Bulgaria. 
The State in Hungary 
There are two aspects which contributed to Hungary's particular institutional path. First, 
there is evidence to suggest that the movement away from central planning helped to alter 
political relationships, which in turn altered dependence patterns within the party 
hierarchy. Second, the effects of the 1956 revolution helped to create an institutional form 
within which reformist party members could eventually initiate the transformation process. 
129 see especially Csanadi, M., "The diary of Decline: a Case-study of the Disintegration of 
the Party in One District in Hungary, " Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6,1991, p. 1088/9 
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Within the first aspect alternative forms of revenue from outside the planned or official 
economy created greater political autonomy for party agents. As dependence patterns 
loosened so the top down hierarchical links were broken giving opportunities for resistance 
within the state structure to develop. 130 This aspect was partly a result of the post 1956 
normalisation process and was complemented by the particular institutional form created at 
that time. These elements were later compounded by changes of personnel within the party 
and state apparatus from the mid 1970s. 
After the revolution and a period of coercive rule from 1956 to 1962, the party was almost 
completely reconstructed and rebuilt on reconciliation rather than force. The introduction 
of liberalised policies and a relatively decentralised political system which incorporated an 
array of ad hoc organisations became reasonably successful as a means of co-opting 
society and professional experts. Rather than driving intellectuals out of the party, a 
controlled intellectual dissent was allowed within party ranks and the formation of social 
opposition was successfully blocked for many years. 
In the mid 1970s, in response to early signs of economic crisis, the political leadership 
began handing over politburo decision making powers to the party's financial and 
economic experts and, through them, to the state bureaucracy. To counter these "experts" 
and the growing influence of non-party ideas, an acceleration of co-optation of blue-collar 
workers to key positions was instigated by the politburo. However, this policy turned out to 
be self defeating for the party. The party apparatus was deficient in the professional skills 
necessary for the effective supervision and administration of the state bureaucracies. This 
eventually weakened the party's control over the economy and political administration at 
local and regional level. 131 It is evident that the turnover of top state personnel increased 
from around 9% in the 1970s to 53% between 1984 and 1988, indicating drastic changes 
within the nomenklatura. It is suggested that by 1989 the ageing, mainly unskilled, party 
130 for a more extensive review of this argument see Walder, A. G., "The decline of 
communist power: Elements of a theory of institutional change, " Theory & Society, 
Vol. 23/2 April 1994, p. 297-323 
131 Tokes, R. L., "Hungary's New Political Elites, " Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec 
1990, p. 54 
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apparatus was a "sinking ship" which had allowed a "specialist intelligentsia" to occupy 
positions which then provided for the party's own disintegration. 132 
Meanwhile regional party organisations had stagnated. The greater tendency towards 
clientelistic relationships in rural areas meant that intellectuals were more marginalised. 
However, as social tensions increased in the late 1980s, so reform circles began to emerge 
within the rural parties. '33 Although they did not organise themselves into a cohesive 
central group, the horizontal connections they did make challenged the vertical structure of 
the party, and affected increasingly anxious party leaders. Additionally from 1987 the so- 
called "parachutist phenomenon" began to occur. The increasingly uncertain political, 
economic and social climate led many privileged party and state bureaucracy members to 
find themselves new mid-level positions within the political and economic structures 
becoming factory directors or school principles, thereby manoeuvring themselves out of 
the political power structure into the economic-managerial sector. 134 Many within the 
Politburo and Central Committee began to concede that political reform was inevitable. 
These processes within the party and state apparatus help to explain the deconstruction of 
the party from within and Hungary's particular reform movement, which emanated from 
intellectuals and intelligentsia at both central and regional level. 
The State in Poland 
In Poland the party and government bureaucracies were generally conservative, resisting 
innovations and reforms. The party apparat tended to be opportunistic and careerist. Unlike 
Hungary, the post 1956 normalisation did not include repression by occupying forces. 
Some achievements were preserved. These included the rejection of forced collectivisation, 
the maintenance of the independent-minded Catholic Church, along with the heightened 
132 Figures from Gazso, F., "Certain Sociological Characteristics of the Cadre 
Bureaucracy, " 1990 and "The Upper 6,000, " Nepszabadsag, July 7,1990, Budapest, 
quoted in Tokes, R. L., (1990) p. 55 
13 see below and O'Neil, P., "Revolutions from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions 
from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary, " World Politics, Vol. 48 No. 4, July 1996, 
579-603. 14 
See Fellegi, T. L., "Regime Transformation and the Mid-Level Bureaucratic Forces in 
Hungary", in Volten, P. M. E., (ed) (1992) Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in 
East Central Europe, Institute for East West Studies, New York & Prague 
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class consciousness and assertiveness of the working class. 135 The Church was even 
represented in the Sejm, by three associations licensed by the regime; the PAX association 
of patriotic priests, established by the regime in an attempt to undermine the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy, the Christian Social Association, and Znak. The latter was the most 
significant; reformed as the Polish Catholic Social Union in the mid 1970s, it was the 
nearest equivalent to a licensed opposition. Nevertheless, rather than taking the opportunity 
to implement Kadarist policies, Gomulka utilised the Hungarian experience to repress 
revolutionary change and became increasingly isolated from the reformist forces who had 
initially supported him in 1956. 
Gierek (1970-1980) fared little better. His reliance on technocratic government further 
isolated the regime from an already dissatisfied population. Gierek opened Poland "a little 
bit to the West", and there was much less fervent communist propaganda. Yet, unlike 
Hungary where Kadar managed to improve lifestyles, Poland always had problems. In 
Tyszkiewicz's view the 1970s, and "opening" the system to Western contacts was "a very 
important factor" not only in changing the basis for opposition (as we shall see below in 
Chapter 3 in developments in opposition), but also in starting the gradual withdrawal of 
communism as legitimation for the regime. 136 During this period reformists within the 
party were severely hampered in attempts to modernise and develop either the internal 
functioning of government or the wider political system. Intellectuals and the technical 
intelligentsia were unable to become fully involved in reform processes. The nomenklatura 
system served as a means to enhance elite privileges. Periodic attempts to make the system 
more efficient were usually blocked by bureaucratic opposition. Gierek alienated one 
group after another until even the bureaucracy lost faith in the ability of the party to rule 
with any competence. 137 The resulting stagnation left the government unable to resolve 
economic crisis and left it vulnerable to mounting opposition from workers. The wave of 
strikes in 1980 finally brought government concessions in the shape of the Gdansk accords, 
giving workers the right to strike and form free trade unions (see Chapter 3). Gierek 
suffered a heart attack in September 1980 and Stanyslaw Kania became party leader. 
Between 1980 and 1981, the army began to fill the vacuum as the party became unable to 
135 Valenta, J., "Revolutionary Change, Soviet Intervention, and "Normalization" in East- 
Central Europe, " Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, January 1984, pp. 144/5 
136 Views gathered from an interview with Dr. Jakub Tyszkiewicz, Department of History, 
Wroclaw University by Ruth Rodda, 30/3/98 
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function as government. Reformist elements within the apparat were crushed in the 
summer of 1981 and martial law was imposed for the following two years. 
Jaruzelski was a compromise leader of a divided coalition. He attempted to revitalise the 
party by recruiting younger members and appealing to nationalist sentiments. However, 
Jaruzelski was constrained by the same structural features as his predecessors. His attempts 
to initiate economic and political reforms came up against the resistance of bureaucrats and 
an ageing party hierarchy, who were unwilling to dilute the nomenklatura system and their 
own privileges. Supreme power was in the hands of around two hundred generals who 
ruled through the section of the party charged with supervision of the armed forces. In the 
1980s a new pattern of recruitment to the elite was supposedly introduced based on 
meritocratic principles. Some electoral changes were also initiated. Revised procedures 
allowing for more voter choice for local government elections in 1984 and 1988, and for 
Sejm elections in 1988.138 However, the nomenklatura proved to be strong enough to 
control recruitment to its own ranks. 139 The communist party became just another 
bureaucracy. This kind of attempt at reform followed by reversals of policy or empty 
formulas for propaganda purposes were to undermine what little elite authority remained. 
Despite Jaruzelski's endeavours to establish a centralised power system, a variety of 
unsupervised groups, committees and clubs persisted. The power and influence of the party 
elite was completely demoralised by the defeat suffered at the hands of Solidarity in 1980. 
Jaruzelski's imposition of martial law in 1981 and limited party purge only served to 
destabilise this elite even further. 140 The regime finally had to give in to an independent 
opposition of marginalised intellectuals and disaffected workers. 
137 Schopflin. G., (1993) pp. 183/4 
138 Kolankiewitz, G., & Lewis, P., (1988) Poland, Pinter, London, pp. 84 & 90 
139 Wasilewski, J., "Dilemmas and Controversies Concerning the Leadership Recruitment 
in Eastern Europe, " Praxis International, Vol. 11, No. 2, July, 1991, p. 241 
140 During martial law Jaruzelski got rid of many conservatives, reformists and those seen 
as too close to Solidarity. Those removed were mainly from lower levels of the party, the 
purge was not impressive at higher levels. See Hahn, W. G., (1987) Democracy in a 
Communist Party: Poland's Experience since 1980, Columbia University Press, New 
York, p. 211 
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The State in Bulgaria and Romania 
Corruption and personal patronage were the hall marks of both the Bulgarian and 
Romanian regimes. In Bulgaria the power of the regional party organisation was 
sacrosanct. 141 The regional barons owed their powers to Zhivkov and he enjoyed their 
support for thirty five years. Zhivkov became First Secretary of the party, styling himself 
on Khrushchev, and in 1962 took control of the government. Throughout his rule Zhivkov 
pursued a course of mimicking Soviet policy. In 1971 a new constitution was enacted 
which created a State Council as the top policy making body. As president of this council 
he became the head of state, was relieved of the day to day running of the country, but set 
the policy line. The implementation of policies fell to the Council of Ministers headed by a 
series of pliant Prime Ministers. 
There is little evidence to suggest that any significant bureaucratic or party organisation 
changes took place from the 1970s. Corruption and dishonesty permeated much of society. 
Opposition to the regime was dealt with at first brutally and later with the use of 
psychiatric hospitals. There were some minor changes during the 1980s which gave 
potential for autonomous activity within society. For example, although remaining 
officially subordinate to the party, the Central Council of the Bulgarian trade unions 
functioned as an agency for the formulation of national labour relations strategy. 142 
However, such actions as the forced assimilation of the Turkish minority, beginning in 
1984, were reminiscent of the Stalinist era. While Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union, 
Zhivkov's policies were accepted. Some tentative reforms were made in the economy, but 
political structures were generally rigidly maintained. It appears that over the years the 
institutions stagnated and the party elite became more and more removed from the realities 
of the outside world, and from the realities that the population had to face. 
In Romania, Ceausescu took patronage and clientelism to extremes. Despite extolling the 
virtues of collective leadership in the early years, his recruitment of a hegemonic team to 
support his consolidation of power provided the basis for his personalised rule. He placed 
141 Glenny, M., (1990) p. 169 
142 See Thirkell, J., Atanasov, B., & Gradev, G., "Trade Unions, Political Parties and 
Governments in Bulgaria, 1989-92", in Myant, M., & Waller, M., (eds) (1994) Parties, 
Trade Unions and Society in East-Central Europe, Frank Cass, UK & US 
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himself at the helm of party and state in 1974 (as President of the Republic), and a 
marginalisation of the party apparatus began. Frequent reorganisation of ministries and 
rotation of top personnel were initiated in order to prevent potential rivals from 
establishing a power base. From the late 1970s reorganisation of ministries on a basis more 
reminiscent of the Stalinist era took place. Gradually members of his own family and close 
associates were appointed to high positions. A new political elite emerged, closely linked 
to Ceausescu and his wife Elena. Ceausescu took control of policy and ministries reported 
directly to him. Within state structures the Securitate played a significant role. The 
Department of State Security within the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for 
internal security against "terrorists" and for propagating the cult of personality. As supreme 
commander of the armed forces, Ceausescu maintained direct control of the Securitate and 
loyalty to him was maintained with high wages and privileges. 143 
As a result of Ceausescu's extremely personalised form of leadership and abuse of power, 
the party became paralysed. The Securitate effectively prevented opposition both within 
state structures and in wider society; dissident intellectuals even facing harassment in exile. 
In both Bulgaria and Romania rigid state structures, patronage networks and terrorist 
tactics obstructed any form of internal party reform process. While Ceausescu and Zhivkov 
remained in control, the formation of cohesive opposition organisations was successfully 
suppressed. 
2.5 The RulinLy Party Elites 
By the late 1970s, the general tendency within communist regimes was for there to be a 
preponderance of rigid, conservative "old guard" leaders in power underpinned by a 
bureaucracy similarly resistant to change. The army and security services were controlled 
by, and intermixed with, these older party members. Amongst this "old guard", the general 
tendency was a desire to maintain the status quo. This was partly due to three factors. First, 
the nomenklatura system which, coupled with elite privileges, did not encourage change. 
Second, generational change; the mass recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s to the parties 
143 For a detailed study of the Securitate's role, see Deletant, D., (1995) Ceausescu and the Securitate: 
Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989, C. Hurst & Co., London. 
69 
were from young people, who by the 1980s were ageing and entrenched in their positions. 
Third, the parties had difficulty in recruiting younger members from the 1970s onwards. 144 
In Poland and Hungary democratic centralism had already begun to break down by the 
1980s. In Hungary the turnover of personnel and weakening of the nomenklatura at the 
centre contributed to a breakdown of the hierarchical structure within the ruling party elite. 
In Poland economic and social pressures had demoralised the party. Recruitment from 
younger members of society had dramatically declined and attempts to rejuvenate the party 
failed. In Romania and Bulgaria the party simply stagnated. Managerial positions tended to 
be filled with a gerontocracy who consistently looked to the leadership for direction. 
Younger, reform-minded, party members were excluded from the top echelons, and often 
expelled from the party. Opportunities for reform of the system were severely restricted. 
These general differences were reflected most significantly within two aspects of ruling 
elite interaction, which in turn affected the forms of revolution. First, party leaders' 
reactions to Soviet reforms, and second, the resulting splits within the party elites. Each of 
these interactions will be contrasted between the two cases. 
Party Elite Reactions and Ruling Elite Splits in Poland and Hungary 
By the mid 1980s the Polish and Hungarian regimes recognised the need for change. They 
had already experimented with economic reform and attempted some political 
reorganisation, well before the Soviets initiated reform. In fact Hungary may well have 
been the model for Gorbachev's reform programme. In this context the Soviet influence 
gave more room for political as well as economic manoeuvre, allowing the possibility of 
further reforms without fear of Soviet reprisals. 
Although cautious at first, the Hungarian government took some quite radical steps 
towards attempting to solve the country's problems. Having become the most dependent on 
Western trade and generating the highest per capita hard-currency debt by the second half 
of the 1980s, a first step was to tackle the economic situation. This involved political as 
144 See for example the ageing of the party in Poland, Sulek, A., in Wedel, J. R., (ed) (1992) 
The Unplanned Society: Poland During and After Communism, Columbia University 
Press, New York, pp. 256-261 
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well as economic changes. The communist government reaction to the decline in 
Hungarian credit worthiness on international financial markets was to replace top 
economic ministers, oust the premier Lazar and replace him with the ambitious party 
bureaucrat Karoly Grosz. Grosz's image as a party reformer was welcomed by the West, 
particularly by Kohl in Germany, and a government programme tailored to International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) taste was introduced in 1987. 
There were changes in elections in June 1985 (the electoral law was changed in 1983), 
where a choice of party candidates was introduced - and some independents won - but 
Kadar was unwilling to go further with political reform of this kind. Kadar became more 
and more isolated, both within the Hungarian party and with Gorbachev. At the party 
conference in May 1988 Kadar was unceremoniously ousted as General Secretary and 
replaced by Karoly Grosz. Grosz was not a radical reformer. He embraced ideas of 
economic and political pluralism, standing for modified party supremacy. Despite his 
reformist image he did not embrace ideas of Western capitalism or parliamentarianism. '45 
More radical change was initiated by such figures as Imre Pozsgay, who came to the 
forefront during the following year. 
Within the party elite reformers, such as Poszgay and Nemeth were able to influence the 
top echelons, eventually ousting Kadar and reforming the party at the top. At the rural level 
too, a series of scandals finally undermined the conservative, often corrupt party leadership 
in the counties. The reform circles, which began to emerge in 1988, had their origins in 
Csongrad county. Although never becoming a strong political force in their own right, 
these circles were highly influential over the following year. Their demands for reform and 
democratisation of the party and Hungarian institutions were influential, not only in the 
reform of the Hungarian Communist Party (MSzMP) itself, but also in the reformed party's 
(MSzP) final demise at the 1990 elections. 146 
Pozsgay (as leader of the Patriotic Peoples Front) had already built a power base within a 
reform wing of the party and was dissatisfied with Kadar's increasingly inept attempts at 
economic and political renewal. Nyers and Poszgay were promoted to the politburo at the 
145 Brown, J. F., (1991) Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, 
Duke University Press, Durham and London, p. 109 
146 See O'Neil, P., (1996) 
71 
conference in May 1988 and pressured Grosz for more radical political reform. By August 
1988 there were calls for revisions of the country's constitution. 147 Supported by 
Gorbachev's new posture vis-a-vis East-Central Europe, the group around Poszgay 
transformed an economic debate into a political one on democratisation and national 
sovereignty. By early 1989 opposition groups were conducting Round Table negotiations, 
and by September the party was involved in agreeing moves towards multi-party 
democracy. 148 
As we have seen, in Poland continued economic crises had contributed to a destabilisation 
of elites over the years. Jaruzelski's imposition of martial law only served to enhance 
destabilisation within the party hierarchy. The radical reform programme introduced 
during the martial law period suffered from those hard liners who, fighting for their 
political survival and economic interests, were able to disrupt the process. Politburo 
members, such as Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski advocated tough policies for 
dealing with dissidents and saw Mieczyslaw Rakowski and Kazimierz Barczikowski as too 
liberal. It was not until some hard liners were finally removed by Jaruzelski in 1987 that 
acceleration of reform took place. 149 However, in the final months of the regime, unlike 
Hungary, the reformers did not have the time, experience or skill to dismantle the system 
and convert themselves into "social democrats". They were constrained far more by the 
economic and political conditions. There were some similarities with Hungary; a "shadow 
economy" which could provide alternative career paths for the old nomenklatura, 
pressures from Western governments and the world economy. Yet unlike Hungary, they 
147 for example from Kalman Kulcsar, Minister of Justice -see Hungarian Situation 
Reports, Radio Free Europe, September 1, July 9, & September 12,1989 
148 By March 1989 the Hungarian Communist Party had conceded to reform of the political 
system and accepted that some form of multi-party elections would take place at a future 
date. However, at that time, that future date was thought to be several years ahead. It was 
anticipated that after elections the Communists would hold onto power via the Presidency 
and key ministries. It was not until events later in 1989 (especially the semi-free elections 
in Poland) that the communists conceded to complete democratisation of the political 
system. 
149 see Kozminski, A. J., "Transition from Planned to Market Economy: Hungary and 
Poland Compared, " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXV, No. 4, December 
1992, p. 316/7 
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had less political space in which to manoeuvre, and far greater difficulties to face; not least 
of these was the challenge from Solidarity. ' 50 
Following a period of repression in the first half of 1986, Jaruzelski had already begun to 
change tactics after the martial law period and the change of leadership in the Soviet 
Union. He acknowledged Gorbachev's calls for reform at the Tenth Party Congress in June 
(which Gorbachev attended) and initiated several responses. These included a full amnesty 
for those involved in the opposition movements, declared in September 1986, and a Social- 
Consultative Council was also established. A third visit by the Pope was allowed in 1987, 
and a more liberal economic reform plan developed. The reform plan was put to the people 
in a referendum in the hope that the regime would gain public support for what would be a 
painful economic programme. In the event the referendum did not provide public support, 
mainly because the turn out was too low. Regardless of the referendum result, the regime 
announced steep price increases on commodities in early 1988. In April and August strikes 
calling for higher pay were the public response. 
Pressures from the West affected the regime as much as Soviet demands. Western 
sympathies for Solidarity at a time of burdening foreign debt, coupled with the outbreak of 
strikes in 1988, left the government with little room for manoeuvre. Martial law would not 
be acceptable again and some other way forward had to be found. In July a further visit by 
Gorbachev probably helped convince the leadership that the economic and political 
impasse of previous years had to be resolved. The response to the August unrest was to 
offer talks with Solidarity with a view to legalising the movement. This caused serious 
upheaval within the regime and those acknowledged as hard-liners, or who felt defeated, 
withdrew. Messner, Prime Minister since October 1985, resigned, as did Szalajda, a leader 
of the hard-line faction. The more liberal replacements included Josef Czyrek, Wladyslaw 
Baka (politburo members), Stanislaw Ciosek (regime economic official), Kazimierz 
'so After the imposition of martial law, Solidarity was banned and the mass following of 
1980-1981 subsided and remained relatively weak, even when strikes began again in 
earnest in 1988. However, any worsening of economic conditions was likely to evoke 
further pressure from a social opposition. Pressures from the opposition will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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Barcikowski (president of PRON), Czeslaw Kiszczak and Rakowski, who became Prime 
Minister in September 1988.151 
Party Elite Reactions and Ruling Elite Splits in Bulgaria and Romania 
These two countries had not made any significant moves towards political or economic 
reform by the 1980s. Unlike in Poland and Hungary, calls for reform from the Soviets was 
not a signal to the Bulgarian and Romanian leadership that they could continue reform. 
Rather it produced the usual sycophantic and omnipotent reactions. Zhivkov gave formal 
approval to the Soviet prescription and announced radical change in the form of the July 
Concept, introduced in 1987. The Concept purported to proceed from equality and 
diversity of ownership, from the separation of the communist party from the state 
administration, from corporate self-management and municipal self-government, from new 
principles on pensions, banking, shareholding and so on. Decree no. 35 encouraged free 
enterprise and no. 56 on economic activity attempted to put some of the ideas into 
practice. 1 52 
Yet, there are conflicting accounts surrounding the July Concept. It is suggested that 
Zhivkov merely paid lip service to Gorbachev's pressure for reform and that he had no 
intention of actually implementing any of it. 153 In contrast, it is reported that the reforms 
heavily affected the planning organs and the state's financial system. However, old 
structures remained under the umbrella of a super ministry, which actually increased 
bureaucracy and clogged information channels. 154 Apparently many ministries were closed 
down and parasitic departments eliminated, but restructuring met with resistance from the 
bureaucracy. The Soviet Union Central Committee secretary, Medvedev, came to Sofia 
and was sceptical about what the Bulgarians were doing. Zhivkov apparently spoke to 
Gorbachev about the need to democratise the bureaucracy, blaming the political form for 
1' 1 PRON (Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego, Patriotic Movement for National 
Rebirth) was a party agency formed in 1982. This was an attempt by the party to create "a 
kind of surrogate pressure group", see Kolankiewicz, G., & Lewis, P., (1988) p. 92 
152 Tchakarov, K., (1991) p. 111 
153 for example, Simons, T. W., (1993) Eastern Europe in the Postwar World, MacMillan 
Press, Basingstoke and London, p. 205 and Glenny, M., (1990) p. 170 
154 Tchakarov, K.. (1991) p. 158 
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the failure of economic reforms. Gorbachev is reported to have urged a more measured 
pace and was also concerned that too many party members would be sidelined by the 
reduction in district and state officials. ' 55 
It is uncertain what effect these changes had on the party. Tchakarov alludes to increased 
dissatisfaction and disunity within the party cadres, while others imply that party members 
saw the publication of the document "as a sign that Zhivkov was no longer assured of 
power as he used to be". 156 Whatever the interim disunity within the party, by the autumn 
of 1989 top party members were disturbed by the changes taking place in the Soviet Union, 
Poland, Hungary and East Germany. On 10 November a reformist group headed by Dobri 
Dzhurov (Defence Minister), Petar Mladenov, Alexander Lilov, and Andrei Lukanov, 
ousted Zhivkov from his post as Head of State and General Secretary of the party. This 
was the first significant sacrifice the ruling elite offered in its attempt to preserve a 
monopoly on political power. 
Ceausescu's reaction to Gorbachev was to deny any need for reform. He insisted that 
Romania was already implementing reforms beyond Gorbachev's remit. When Gorbachev 
visited Bucharest in 1987 Ceausescu attempted to show off the prosperity and democracy 
of his country. Gorbachev was greeted by thousands of people chanting "Gorbachev- 
Ceausescu" and he was given a tour of new buildings and the Bucharest-Danube Canal 
construction, but Gorbachev was not taken in. He saw the crowds as a staged performance 
and Ceausescu's proposition that the Romanian economy was a model to emulate as 
tragic. ' 57 
As already stated, Ceausescu's personalised rule and clan leadership left little room for 
reformers within the party. However, indications of interest in perestroika and glasnost had 
been received by the Soviets from 1986.158 There was deep resentment and frustration 
amongst members of the bureaucracy, the military and party elite. In March 1989 
Ceausescu was challenged by six party veterans, including two former general secretaries 
1" ibid p. 112 & p. 117 
156 Tchakarov, K., (1991) p. 159-162 and Glenny, M., (1990) p. 170 
157 see Gorbachev, M., (1996) p. 474-478 
158 see Gorbachev, M., (1996) p. 474 and Tismaneanu, V., "Personal Power and Political 
Crisis in Romania, " Government and Opposition, Vol. 24,1989, p. 194-195 
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(Apostol and Pirvulescu), in an open letter criticising his erratic rule. '59 There were also 
younger party members who were worried about the deepening crisis. Most notable 
amongst these reform-minded communists was Ion Iliescu, who had been purged from his 
post for liberalism and intellectualism in 1971. It is suggested that an assassination of 
Ceausescu was planned amongst "a nucleus of former communist party members.... who 
approached the Russians [and were] 'very happy if you do it, but don't expect any help"'. 160 
However, it was not until the violent events of December 1989 that party oppositionists 
emerged within the hastily formed National Salvation Front. Unlike Hungary, where 
intellectuals were co-opted by the party, the climate of anti-intellectualism in Romania 
isolated and marginalised those who challenged Ceausescu. The only criteria for political 
success was unconditional loyalty to the president. 
In all four countries the Soviet reform process created difficulties for the old established 
ruling party elites. The undermining of ideological orthodoxy which underpinned old guard 
rule, coupled with bewilderment over the new hands off approach, created problems. In 
Poland and especially Hungary, splits in the party elite appeared relatively early. Younger, 
reform-minded party members were able to manoeuvre and influence the political process. 
In Romania and Bulgaria, elite splits were not evident until much later, and reformers had 
less room to manoeuvre against their entrenched leaders. 
Conclusion 
The application of the comparative-historical method shows that the common factor for the 
East-Central European countries in the 1980s was the international context. The Soviet 
influence was especially significant. Soviet party ideological reorientation in the past 
(under Krushchev for example) had created potential and actual public rifts in the 
"satellite" parties, and Gorbachev's reformist policies had similar effects. The undermining 
of old guard leadership, and insecurity created by the apparent Soviet hands off approach 
towards East-Central Europe, destabilised the ruling elite. This was even more notable 
when all the countries were also suffering from varying economic and social crises. 
1 ý9 Calinescu, M., & Tismaneanu, V., "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future, " 
Problems of Communism, Jan-April 1991, p. 43 
160 Shafir, M., interview with Ruth Rodda, Radio Free Europe, Prague, 27/3/98 
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However, the interaction of these external influences with different internal conditions, had 
different effects within and between cases. Although burdened economically by its 
Western connections, Hungary was able to adapt to external pressures through greater 
economic and political openness. The more liberalised political and economic system, and 
accompanying decentralisation of state structures, provided opportunities for reformers 
inside the communist party to promote themselves and react positively towards the 
international situation. Poland's high risk strategy of an import-led boom severely 
aggravated the volatile populace. Polish internal conditions were potentially more 
conflictual, but without resorting to violent suppression of opposition forces, and without 
Soviet support and intervention, there was little alternative for the party but to negotiate a 
solution. In Romania and Bulgaria the attempts to isolate society and carry on business as 
usual might well have succeeded under different external conditions. If Poland and 
Hungary had not moved towards negotiated reform of their political systems in 1989, the 
communist institutions in Bulgaria and Romania may have remained unaltered, even if 
Ceausescu and Zhivkov had been replaced by reformers. 
Alongside these political and economic conditions changes in social structure, education 
and social mobility altered the social base of political support (and non-support) for the 
system. By the 1980s a large educated non-manual urban population was the ascendant 
group to which Gorbachev's reform policies were most likely to appeal. Within the party 
apparat the younger reform communists had the opportunity to remove the "old guard". In 
Poland and Hungary the more open political, economic and social structures created 
autonomous "space" within which intellectuals and intelligentsia disaffected with the 
system had the opportunity to form alliances both within the party and on oppositional 
bases. In Bulgaria and Romania, the intellectuals were marginalised or repressed. 
Reformists and oppositionists had neither the opportunity nor the structural conditions on 
which to organise, whilst a suppressed society resorted to spontaneous outbursts of 
discontent. In all four countries manual and unskilled workers continuing expectations of 
higher living standards were not matched by real rises due to declining economic 
conditions in the 1980s. The "social contract" the regimes made with the working classes, 
which was premised on steadily increasing living standards and price stability in return for 
citizen compliance, steadily broke down (if indeed a "social contract" ever existed in 
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Poland). 161 In all four countries, communist party claims to a "vanguard" role became 
irrelevant. 
These external influences and internal structural conditions provided the preconditions for 
the breakdown of communist rule, and go some way to establishing the differences 
between the cases. Yet they are not enough to completely explain either the collapse of the 
old regimes, or the different forms of revolution. We must turn to developments in 
opposition movements, the role of political actors and the military, and discuss aspects of 
legitimacy, in order to understand more about the revolutions and their differing forms. 
161 See more in Chapter 3 in the sections on Developments in Opposition and Legitimacy. 
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Chapter 3 Opposition, Political Actors, the Military and Legitimac 
The previous chapter examined the structural preconditions for the breakdown of 
communist rule. These conditions provided the context within which organisations and 
political actors could transform the political systems. This chapter will examine other 
major factors which help to explain the revolutionary changes that occurred, and further 
establish the differing nature of the communist systems. These factors include 
developments in opposition movements, the role of political actors and the role of the 
military. These elements are not only important in explaining the breakdown of the 
communist regimes at a particular time, but also help to account for the differing forms of 
revolution. In the light of previous studies of revolutionary phenomena, and assessments of 
the collapse of communism, the concept of legitimacy also requires examination. As in the 
previous chapter, variables are difficult to isolate from their structural, cultural and 
ideological context, but some compartmentalisation is necessary in order to examine their 
contribution to the revolutions. 
Developments in opposition will be examined by comparing dissent and opposition 
between the two cases. Three political actors: Gorbachev, Walesa and Ceausescu, have 
been chosen to illustrate the role played by important political actors. Although it is 
uncertain what exact role the military played in each country's revolution, the potential for 
intervention or non-intervention will be discussed. Finally, two aspects of legitimacy will 
be examined to discern what part legitimation crisis may have played in the breakdown of 
the old regimes. 
3.1 Developments in Opposition 
In all four countries there was continuous resistance to communists rule. In the communist 
take-over period removal of old elites from the political system and their replacement with 
peasant and working class party members, although initially a radical change, eventually 
resulted in a similar situation for society to that of the inter-war years. The so-called 
politicisation and atomisation of society left individuals isolated and perpetuated much of 
the inter-war elite-mass relations in a different form. However, it was not solely a state- 
society split which created opposition to communism; inter-elite battles were also fought. 
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There were two main forces of resistance evident. First, dissent amongst the intellectuals, 
and second, dissent within wider society. Both forces were frequently apparent, even in 
Romania and Bulgaria, despite the greater oppression within these regimes. However, there 
were distinct differences in the development and form of opposition movements which 
emerged to challenge each system in the 1980s. There was also a distinction between 
intellectual opposition, often grounded in ideological debates, and the spontaneous 
outbursts of disaffected groups in wider society. These two strands of dissent will be 
examined within a comparison of the two cases. 
Dissent and Opposition in Poland and Hungary 
Although dissent over the years emanated from disparate groups involving a range of 
issues, there were two notable forces which laid the bases for political opposition in the 
1980s. These were; first, the critical intellectuals; and second, opposition amongst workers. 
In Poland these two forces amalgamated, while in Hungary the former provided the main 
pressure for change. 
For both Polish and Hungarian intellectuals critical Marxism and the revisionist 
movements provided a basis for opposition to the political system. Intellectual ferment 
already existed prior to 1956 and reached a peak in 1957. The so called "Budapest School" 
in Hungary, and intellectuals such as Kolakowski, Kuron and Modzelewski in Poland, 
openly criticised the form of Marxism-Leninism practised in the East European regimes. 162 
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 became a symbol of anti-totalitarianism, and revisionist 
thinking developed to challenge regime Marxism and undermine dogmatism. However, 
'62 There was considerable diversity within the intellectual criticism which existed and 
developed. The examples given here are from the critical Marxist schools of thought. For 
more complexity on critical ideological thinking and its development from the revisionist 
period see for example Taras, R., on Poland & Feher, F., on Hungary in Taras, R., (ed)(1992) 
The Road to Disillusion, From Critical Marxism to Postcommunism in Eastern Europe, 
M. E. Sharpe, New York & London; or Korbonski, A., "Dissent in Poland 1956-76", pp. 25- 
45 and Schopflin, G., "Opposition in Hungary: 1956 and beyond", pp. 69-81, and Curry, J. L., 
"Polish dissent and establishment criticism: The new evolutionism", pp. 153-171, in 
Curry, J. L., (ed)(1983) Dissent in Eastern Europe, Praeger. See also, Tismaneanu, V., (1988) 
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after the Prague Spring of 1968 many revisionists began to openly question the possibility 
of reforming Marxism, and marginalised dissident groups began to emerge. 
The differences in the development of specific movements were partly due to the 
consequences of the 1956 uprisings. The Soviet military intervention in Hungary left a 
bitter memory for both the population and the regime. The nature of the Kadarist system, 
which cleverly manipulated and co-opted potential opposition, left an intelligentsia which, 
up until the 1980s, did not openly challenge the regime on specifically political issues. In 
Hungary elite-dissident interaction was a prominent factor in opposition formation. By the 
early 1960s a rapprochement between the young, newly graduated intellectuals and the 
cadre bureaucracy developed, partly as a result of the ideological re-orientation and 
scientific successes of the late Khrushchev period. A new generation of optimistic and 
ambitious radicals and reform Marxists emerged determined to bring about a renaissance 
of Marxism. 163 From the late 1970s, a new generation of technocrats became established 
within the middle layers of the party and state bureaucracy, and a new reform intelligentsia 
began to promote political change to accompany economic reform. 
Unlike the Polish, the Hungarian reform minded intellectuals did not opt out of the regime 
framework or insist on a dialogue on equal terms; most remained co-opted within the 
political system. There was continuous antagonism between an intractable cadre 
bureaucracy and reformists within the regime. Intellectual disillusionment and frustration 
with Kadar's backsliding on reform did not become apparent until the 1980s. 164 Only a 
small group concentrated on dissident activities after leading members of the Budapest 
school were exiled in 1973. Not until the 1980s were there discussions amongst 
intellectuals about pursuing a course of action similar to that undertaken by Polish 
intellectuals from the 1970s. As pointed out by the former dissident Ferenc Miszlevitz, 
attempts were made by some members of the Flying Universities and the Network of Free 
Initiatives to stir the population at grass roots level, but grass roots political engagement on 
The Crisis of Marxist Ideology, Routledge, especially Chap. 7; and Kolakowski, L., (1978) 
Main Currents of Marxism Vol. 1I1, Clarendon Press, p. 457-474. 
16; Lukacs and the Budapest School influenced many of those who were to become future 
dissidents. For example, Janos Kis and George Benczte and economic reformer Tamas 
Bauer, see Szelenyi, I., "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class project: 
An auto-critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power", Politics and 
Society, 15, No. 2,1986-87, pp. 103-144 
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the Polish scale was mainly rejected. 165 Despite publishing samidzat articles, participating 
in Flying Universities and setting up independent groups, such as SZETA (Szegenyeket 
Tamogato Alap - Foundation for the Support of the Poor, founded around 1979), critical 
intellectuals remained essentially self-limiting in their approach towards political action 
against the state for most of the communist period. 
Within society, fringe cultural movements grew over the years. By the 1980s public 
involvement in alternative lifestyle movements were frequent. These movements were 
non-political or even anti-political, but as indirect expressions of critical attitudes, they 
created some "autonomous spaces in society". 166 Single issue movements eventually 
developed; ecological groups and peace movements, such as the Danube Circle and 
Dialogue Peace Group, began to indirectly express political opposition to the regime. The 
number of public demonstrations rose (for example, student-led pro-democracy 
demonstrations on the anniversary of the 1956 uprising from March 1986), but these kinds 
of activities were still mostly limited to Budapest. Despite some evidence of official trades 
union opposition, regime attempts to marginalise groups by trying to politicise them was 
relatively successful. The Hungarian people were allowed greater access to internal 
bargaining and decision making processes through official channels. The official unions 
had considerable influence on policy making. 167 This led to few strikes, and coupled with 
the relative effectiveness of the "black economy" - which supplied private and self- 
sufficiency strategies for home repairs, food production and construction of family homes - 
resulted in a relatively acquiescent population. Nevertheless, the increase in clubs and 
groups, which often discussed political issues, was seen by some as a "revitalisation" of 
civil society. The notion of civil society, as a political as well as an economic term, became 
important amongst elements of the intellectual elite. Observers and participants within 
'6a Szelenyi, I., (1986-7) 
165 Miszlevitz, F., (Senior Research Fellow and 
Director of Research, Center for European Studies, 
Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) interview with Ruth Rodda, May 
1996, Budapest. 
166 Bozoki, A., in Cox, T., & Furlong, A., (eds) (1995) Hungary: The Politics of Transition, 
Frank Cass, London, p. 38 
167 For example, in 1972 the Trade Union Council forced the Ministry of Health to co- 
finance the construction of three major health resorts after the government had agreed a 
stop to investment prior to the trade union decision. They also had influence in wage 
increases for blue collar workers in growing economic crisis and after the negative effects 
of the NEM - see Heinrich, H., (1986) p. 153. 
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opposition movements were often optimistic about the possibility of a revitalised civil 
society in the early 1980s, but were later disillusioned by the eventual lack of public 
participation. Although demonstrators chanting slogans demanding freedom and 
democracy encouraged the emerging political opposition in the late 1980s, unlike Poland 
where many opposition intellectuals actively encouraged grass roots organisations, certain 
Hungarian political elites were seen to have co-opted a "potentially civil democratisation 
process". 168 
Overt political opposition eventually emerged from within the party and the intellectual 
elite. As we have seen (previously in Chapter 2) reformers, such as Poszgay and Nemeth 
were able to influence the top party elite, while reform circles within the rural party also 
influenced political change. However, the intellectual movements were to provide the 
bases for opposition parties. 
Two main groups were discernible amongst the intellectuals. First, a populist group of 
writers, artists and academics who initially had close connections with reform communists, 
but later rejected any contact with the regime to become strongly anti-communist. This 
group regarded communism as an enemy of the nation and of the peasant. The second 
group was dominated by urban and democratic members, many of whom were influenced 
initially by critical Marxism. Although these groups were small and mainly confined to 
academics and professionals, they took the initiative in publicly confronting the 
government with the economic and political realities of the 1980s. 
In 1987 three significant events took place which showed the extent to which confidence in 
the regime by party members and other elite groups had deteriorated. Each event involved 
groups and individuals who later became prominent within processes of political and 
economic change. First, radical economists published a document which brought into the 
public arena the acute economic difficulties the regime faced, along with radical proposals 
on how to deal with these problems. Second, a special issue of the samidzat publication 
Beszelo entitled the "Social Contract" was produced by urban and democratic 
oppositionists calling for political pluralism, and a free press. Most strikingly this included 
168 Miszlivetz, F., interview with Ruth Rodda, Budapest, May 1996. 
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a proposal for Kadar to step down. 169 Third, a meeting at Lakitelek, dominated by populist 
writers and critics, which also included reformist members of the communist party; most 
notably the guest of honour, Imre Pozsgay. The meeting was the foundation for the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) as a discussion group for democratically committed 
people. l7o 
In 1988 the pace of change accelerated. The urbanists and other groups formed the 
Network of Free Initiatives (members of which later formed The Alliance of Free 
Democrats). A younger group formed the first oppositionist political organisation: the 
Alliance of Young Democrats (AYD or Fidesz). 171 Finally in May 1988, a special party 
conference was convened at which economic decline, the growth of extra-party movements 
and inter-party splits were discussed. 
Party reformers such as Pozsgay, Nyers and Nemeth, understood that Kadarist solutions 
had reached a dead end and political reform was required. The May 1988 Party Conference 
(the first since 1957) ousted Kadar and replaced him with Grosz. In November 1988 the 
government accepted amendments to the Act of Association which gave evolving political 
organisations a legal framework. This was seen by some as creating legal conditions for a 
multi-party system. Late in 1988 "historical" parties such as the Independent Smallholders 
Party, began to appear. Although many hard-line communists saw the Act as applying 
merely to interest groups, by February 1989 the Hungarian Communist Party (HSWP) had 
accepted that a multi-party democracy was inevitable, and in June 1989 agreed to 
Roundtable negotiations. Also significant was that unlike Poland, party reformers like 
'69 Members of the mainly "urbanist" groups were radical-liberal oppositionists. They had 
no communist links and were attached to the principles of human rights. They later formed 
the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD or SzDSz) in November 1988. 
"o This meeting was a follow up to the 1985 Monor gathering of dissident groups when 
urbanists and populists first came together. Many populists had close links with reform 
communists, but in September 1988 the MDF became an oppositionist political 
organisation which by the time of the elections in March-April 1990 had abandoned its 
"third way" philosophy. 
"' The founders of Fidesz gained political experience in the "college movement", several 
became financially independent due to foundational support, see Bozoki, A., & Sukosd, M., 
"Civil Society and Populism in the Eastern European Democratic transitions, " Praxis 
International, Vol. 13, No. 3, October 1993, pp. 224-241. It is also suggested that financial 
support for democratic groups and individuals came from the United States. Information 
from a leading academic (who preferred to remain anonymous), interviewed by Ruth 
Rodda, Budapest, May 1996. 
84 
Pozsgay were popular, and there was a feeling that a reformed party could continue to play 
a political role after elections. In contrast to other East-Central European countries, the 
Hungarian opposition lacked comparable parallels. There was no powerful Catholic or 
religious contingent of dissent, little opposition action amongst workers and little liberal or 
social democratic tradition on which to base a theory or ideology of opposition. 
In contrast to Hungarian co-optation under Kadar, a section of Polish intellectuals were cut 
off from the regime framework during the Gierek period. Despite developing a cynicism 
about the possibilities of dramatic political change, these intellectuals were to become 
openly critical of the regime. Unlike Hungarian intellectuals, this criticism was more 
specifically outside and in opposition to the party-state, and appeared at a much earlier 
stage. This intellectual movement eventually developed a unique, although sometimes 
strained, partnership with disaffected workers, finally rallying public support in direct 
political opposition to the Polish regime. 
Workers began to seriously challenge the regime in Poznan in 1956, continuing to threaten 
regime stability in the 1970s and early 1980s. The intellectuals assumed a chief role in 
criticising the regime in the early 1960s and early 1970s, reaching a peak in opposing 
government in the campaign against constitutional revisions in early 1976. However, by 
this time there was a growing realisation that success in opposing the regime lay in re- 
establishing an alliance with the workers. An alliance that had successfully supported 
Gomulka in 1956, but would now challenge a vulnerably perceived Gierek. From the 
1970s many intellectuals put theory into political practice, organising a number of groups, 
most notably The Workers Defence Committee (KOR) and the Movement for the Defence 
of Human and Civil Rights (ROBCIO). The creation of these groups in the wake of the 
1976 strikes - although initially uncohesive - provided the foundation of support for 
worker's rights and for the Solidarity movement. 
The Catholic Church in Poland was also important. Although tending towards ambivalence 
on the question of dissent throughout much of the communist period, the Church not only 
produced a Catholic intelligentsia which grew more critical of the communist regime, but 
also provided a symbol of opposition for the Polish people. From 1976 Church-state 
relations became more confrontational. The Church played an increasingly more subtle 
political role and attracted many intellectuals to its ranks. The election of Cardinal Karol 
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Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II in 1978, and his subsequent visits to Poland in 1979,1983 
and 1987, boosted the Church's status as an independent non-communist structure. This 
provided a catalyst to unite Church and society, and gave the opposition movements 
renewed impetus. 
Dissent after 1976 had a different character than elsewhere in East-Central Europe. Even 
amongst those who were not antisocialist, the "new evolutionist" conception of criticism 
for the system was founded in seeking a change in the behaviour of the population, rather 
than in a simple "revision" of regime policy or institutions. 172 The Soviet signing of the 
Helsinki Accords in 1975 is seen as having little or no influence on the opposition in 
Poland. "It was allowing people to go abroad to work, and the relative lack of strong 
oppression in the Gierek era" which helped to promote ideas of liberalisation. 173 However, 
human rights became part of some oppositionists political articulation at around this time. 
The apparently homogenous opposition which emerged by the 1980s was in fact made up 
of diverse groups and organisations which individually articulated a wide range of ideas 
and values. Opposition movements included Church, non-communist left, national 
independence, workers, self-education and citizen's action groups representing traditions 
and values which ranged from Catholic social doctrine to freedom, tolerance and human 
rights; a central compromise being between the Church and non-communist left which laid 
the foundations for the non-violent means of protest. 174 
Ironically the political rights, which many intellectuals expected to wait years for, were 
won by workers' open confrontation within the single year of 1980. In this year, after the 
wave of strikes in the Silesian coal fields and Baltic ports, the signing of the Gdansk 
Accords in August was a triumph for the workers, gaining them institutional guarantees of 
12 Adam Michnik's and Leszek Kolakowski's disillusionment with Marxist revisionism led 
to the theory of New Evolutionism. The concept was anti-totalitarian and supportive of 
extra-systemic opposition rather than activity within the party. The organisation of social 
opposition and forcing of concessions was expected to be a very long process. See for 
example Adam Michnik, "Nowy ewolucjonizm, " 1978, in Szanse polskiej demokracji, 
1984, London, p. 77-87 
13 Dr. Jakub Tyszkiewicz, Department of History, Wroclaw University, interview with 
Ruth Rodda, 30/3/98 
"' For an interesting account of the heterogeneity of groups see for example, Wloch, B., 
"The political Culture of Opposition: The Case of Solidarity in Wroclaw 1980/81" in 
Jablonski, A. W., & Meyer, G., (eds) (1996) The Political Culture of Poland in Transition, 
University of Wroclaw Press, Wroclaw 
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their status as an independent, autonomous movement. The Gdansk Accords were a turning 
point for the different groups which had striven separately since the mid 1970s to gain 
freedoms of organisation, information and an end to inequality in society. Although the 
union movement was initially intent on pressing for workers' rights and economic reform, 
the recognition of Solidarity as an independent organisation outside the party-state 
apparatus was the foundation for overt political opposition. Although the movement was 
outlawed during the martial law period, by August 1988 the government implicitly 
acknowledged defeat by agreeing to convene Round Table talks to end the impasse which 
had paralysed Polish politics since 1981. The strikes of 1988 were weak in comparison to 
those of 1980. However, the central demand for the relegalisation of Solidarity, together 
with Catholic intellectual pressure and the party's inability to govern successfully, led 
finally to the "constructive opposition" (centred around Walesa) negotiating its way to the 
historic elections of 1989.175 
Dissent and Opposition in Romania and Bulgaria 
In contrast to Poland and Hungary, the opportunity for political opposition to develop in 
Bulgaria and Romania was severely restricted by oppression and the intolerance of dissent 
by the regimes. This is not to say that dissenters inside or outside the parties did not exist, 
but that the more closed societies, and what has been classed as "odious Stalinist 
practices, " continued well into the 1980s, making the formation of groups extremely 
difficult and dangerous. '76 
In Bulgaria there were dissidents and defectors throughout the communist period. There 
were tobacco workers strikes in 1953, and in the 1970s there was recognition of an 
Agrarian movement. There was a series of bombings, sabotage and arson incidents 
beginning in 1984, which it is suggested were politically motivated and well organised. 177 
Yet, it was not until November 1987 that an independent group emerged. The Discussion 
175 see for example Barany, Z., & Vinton, L., "Breakthrough to Democracy: Elections in 
Poland and Hungary, " Studies in Comparative Communism, VoI. XXIII, No. 2, Summer 
1990, pp. 191-212, especially pp. 192-3 
16 On Bulgaria see Alexiev, A., "Demystifying Bulgaria, " Problems of Communism, Sept- 
Oct 1985, pp. 89-94 
177 Alexeiv, A.. (1985) p. 93 
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Group for the Support of Glasnost and Perestroika was formed by intellectuals - some of 
whom were party members - to articulate the case for openness and reconstruction. This 
was followed by the Independent Society for Human Rights in January 1988, which was 
the first structured dissident organisation. During the following eighteen months several 
other movements appeared, Ekoglasnost becoming one of the most political. By the latter 
half of the 1980s environmental concerns touched the national consciousness and created a 
common cause between intellectuals and wider society. 
A coherent intellectual opposition emerged as much as a result of the changing 
circumstances in the Soviet Union and other East-Central European countries, as from the 
demands of the younger generation, or from token gestures to reform emanating from the 
Zhivkov regime. 178 The regime was not totally insensitive to public demands and with the 
close links to the Soviets (especially economically), could not ignore pressures from 
society. However, Zhivkov miscalculated when he attempted to suppress the Turkish 
minority after they formed independent groups and began promoting their cause 
internationally. 179The Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) to discuss the 
environment, held in Sofia in October and November 1989, provided the now flourishing 
independent groups with an international stage on which they could rally mass support. 
Although not the sole cause of Zhivkov's demise, opposition from the intellectuals and 
wider society was a contributing factor in his removal. Although only appearing very late 
this opposition pressured the party towards reforming itself and seeking Round Table talks 
in 1990 (see more below in section 3.3 and Chapter 4). 
Romania had some similarities with Poland. Consumer shortages and economic tinkering 
prompted worker unrest beginning in 1971.180 There was a miners strike in 1977 and a Free 
Trade Union Movement (SLOMR) founded in 1979 when 20 intellectuals and workers 
"' At the 1987 July Plenum Zhivkov stated that it was time to develop voluntary 
associations, but subsequent actions did not support the intellectuals' idea of civil society 
development, see Crampton, R., "The Intelligentsia, the ecology and the opposition in 
Bulgaria, " The World Today 1990,46,2 London, pp. 23-26. 
19 The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Paris May-June 
1989 was used by the Democratic League for the Defence of Human Rights in Bulgaria to 
represent the Turks cause against assimilation pressures. 
180 In response to the Polish unrest of December 1970, Paraschiv, a petro-chemical plant 
worker, sent a letter to discuss trade union improvements. Although the regime had 
encouraged the move, Paraschiv was detained in a mental hospital and later exiled. 
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signed a document announcing the formation. Despite these similarities, no independent 
organised opposition in a similar form to Solidarity emerged. Leaders of the union were 
swiftly jailed and later exiled. 
Dissidents themselves blamed the lack of opposition organisation on the timidity of the 
masses due to the history of oppression. They also blamed the West for not supporting 
them. The West supposedly "sold the East to the Russians in 1945". 181 However, it is also 
suggested that there was no adequate political support amongst the intelligentsia for 
workers' revolts, when such incidents as the Jiu Valley miners strike in 1977, or tractor 
plant workers strike in Brasov (1987) took place. 
Ideological control of the mass media and intellectual life, coupled with repression, did not 
allow the framing of political problems in political terms. Many intellectuals became 
isolated with few - if any - students being able to study outside Romania by the late 1980s. 
After Ceausescu's "cultural mini-revolution" in the 1970s contacts with Western 
universities and institutions (which had flourished during the late 1960s) were gradually 
reduced and eventually completely disappeared. 182 The intellectuals only voice was 
through literature, historical writing and philosophy of culture. Those, such as Paul Goma, 
Dorin Tudoran or Doina Cornea could only be openly political via external voices such as 
Radio Free Europe. ' 83 There was therefore little opportunity for a worker-intelligentsia 
type organisation to emerge. 
Although it is suggested that some of the most vocal dissent came from the intellectuals, 
there appears to have been a lack of ideological revisionism on which to base intellectual 
opposition on the same terms adopted in Poland. 184 There was also a lack of 
communication between intellectuals and the masses, especially with the more poorly 
'g' Georgescu, V., in Curry, J. L., (ed) (1983) Dissent in Eastern Europe, Praeger, p. 190 
182 Dr. George Voicu, Faculty of Political and Administrative Sciences, Bucharest 
University, e-mail conversation with Ruth Rodda, 29 October 1998 
183 see Marga, A., "Cultural and Political Trends in Romania Before and After 1989", East 
European Politics and Societies, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1993, p. 14-32, p. 24. 
184 For example, in 1977 Goma and others sent an open letter to the Belgrade conference 
attacking the regime on violations of human rights. After the Helsinki Accords, Frunza 
sent Ceausescu a letter attacking the regime and its interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. 
Also in the 1980s the Writers Union had a relatively open literary debate on cultural 
policies, see Freund, E., in Curry, J. L. (ed) (1983) p. 63-4 
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educated rural population. ' 85 This was despite religious fervour being a way for ordinary 
people to show their opposition to the regime, and despite attempts by Hungarian minority 
groups to make their opposition to discriminatory policies heard. 186 There was - and still is 
-a tendency for intellectuals to hold an attitude of disdain for the workers; "they look upon 
them from above - very patronising". 
187 Intellectuals emerged within oppositional groups 
only after the December 1989 revolution. Intellectuals, students and groups such as the 
Group for Social Dialogue only began to openly criticise the National Salvation Front 
(NSF) during 1990.188 
The perversion of Romanian communism into a particular form of nationalism, and the 
purging of potential dissent from the party contributed to the lack of opposition movements 
or reformist within the party in the pre-1989 period. The initial spark for the revolution 
emanated from the Hungarian minority where intellectuals, church and ordinary people had 
a common cause, on a similar basis to that of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 189 Partly 
because no coherent opposition movements emerged to pressurise and negotiate with the 
communists it took a mass spontaneous outburst to promote political change. Reformists 
within the party appeared to seize the opportunity to oust Ceausescu (see 3.3 below). 
3.2 The Role of Political Actors 
Structural conditions can provide the context within which certain actors can become 
prominent. These actors can then provide a focus of attention and potentially influence 
185 For details of intellectual groups in Romania and possible reasons for their lack of 
salience with the population, both pre and post-1989, see Mungiu, A., "Intellectuals as 
political actors in Eastern Europe: the Romanian case", East European Politics and 
Societies, Spring 1996, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 333 (32), electronic version. 
186 This was despite regime attempts to cut church attendance and prevent religious 
education. Also some ministers and pastors formed the Romanian Committee for the 
Defence of Freedom of Religion calling for an end to state intervention into the church. 
187 Shafir, M., interview with Ruth Rodda, (Radio Free Europe) Prague, 27/3/98 
188 See for example, Fischer, M. E., "The New Leaders and the Opposition", in Nelson, D. N., 
(ed) (1992) Romania After Tyranny, Westview Press, Boulder, San Fransisco, Oxford, 
pp. 45-81 
189 For accounts of the revolution in Romania, see Tismaneanu, V., & Calinescu, M., "The 
1989 Revolution and Romania's Future, " Problems of Communism, Jan-April 1991 pp. 42- 
59 and Socor, V., "Pastor Tokes and the Outbreak of the Revolution in Timisoara, " Report 
on Eastern Europe (Munich), Radio Free Europe, February 2 1990, pp. 19-26 
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political events. Three such political actors will be examined here: Mikhail Gorbachev. 
who helped to provide external conditions which favoured political change; Lech Walesa, 
who provided a focus for the Polish opposition; and Nicolae Ceausescu, whose personality 
and form of rule contributed to the particular conditions of Romania. This is not to say that 
the role of the actor and their ideological orientations are part of a deliberate effort; that 
they are somehow the root "cause" of revolutionary movements and regime overthrow, but 
that there is a place for identifying the role of key political actors, and their attitudes and 
ideas in explaining events. '90 
It is, of course, difficult to assess the significance of the role of political actors in the 
process. 191 However, there are certain probabilities that can be assessed. It can be surmised 
that if Andropov had remained in power for longer a slower, more pragmatic political 
change may well have taken place in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe. 
Consequently, in Hungary the economic reforms already introduced under Kadar might 
have promoted a more gradual political liberalisation without Gorbachev's intervention. 
Romania without Ceausescu may not have been so repressive, and as a result not 
succumbed to violence. The Polish opposition may not have aroused such popular support 
without the charismatic leadership of Walesa. It appears that without such people, or actors 
like them, it is unlikely that certain events would have taken place when, or in the way they 
did. Strategic choices of political actors can be important, and sometimes crucial at key 
points in time. For example, Ceausescu's decision to hold a rally in Bucharest on December 
the 21 st 1989, to demonstrate support for himself and the regime, was central to the 
revolutionary events that followed. 
Gorbachev 
Gorbachev can be regarded as a key figure in the process of change. His initiation of 
reformist measures and ideological revisionism certainly provided a climate in which 
'9o Alternative ideological claims may also be part of the political actor's role. See also 
below in section 3.4 on Legitimacy and later in Chapter 5. 
19' As Park suggests, the role of personality in history is a philosophical one. No-one can 
avoid political values and we must remain aware of our ability to reach the truth on the 
subject, Park, A., "Gorbachev and the Role of Personality in History", Studies in 
Comparative Communism, Vol. XXV, No. 1, March 1992, p. 47 
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political change was more readily accepted, both within the Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Bloc states. There is little doubt that structural conditions were a factor in enabling him to 
take steps towards change, but without his personal visions and motivations a different 
route might have arisen. If for example, one of the other possible candidates for General 
Secretary at the time had taken control there may have still been some kind of reform 
process - due to the poor economic situation - but it would probably have been much 
slower, and could have followed the Chinese route to market-oriented reform without 
political liberalisation. 
Park argues that Gorbachev's role diminished after 1985 in terms of his affect on Soviet 
events. 192 However, for East-Central Europe it might be argued that his personal 
intervention remained significant up until the end of 1989 at least, and possibly up until the 
unsuccessful Soviet coup in August 1991. For some, especially Poles, although perestroika 
and glasnost are accepted as important factors, Gorbachev is not seen as so important. 
"Poland's internal conditions - the scenario started in 1980 - were part of the dynamic. 
Glasnost "opened the window" a little bit wider". 193 It is also suggested that in Poland the 
(so-called) "Gorbachev factor is neglected" because Solidarity wanted to "play the role of 
defeating communism". 194 Nevertheless, Gorbachev's meetings with regime leaders and 
attitude towards military intervention could have been decisive in terms of the relatively 
peaceful forms of revolution. 
Although it is uncertain how much direct involvement Gorbachev had within the East- 
Central European parties in the late 1980s, it may well be that he was able to influence 
events up to, and even after, the official dissolving of the communist parties. In his actions 
and statements he gave hope (and at least ideological support) to reform elements within 
the communist parties, and to the dissidents and wider populations. He appeared to put 
pressure on the more resistant regimes to instigate change, even though he did not wish to 
undermine the influence of the communist party as the "vanguard". 195 There are suspicions 
192 ibid. (1992) p. 48 
193 Professor Ryszard Herbut, Institute of Poltical Science, Wroclaw University, interview 
with Ruth Rodda, Wroclaw, 2/4/98 
194 Dr. Jakub Tyszkiewicz, Department of History, Wroclaw University interview with 
Ruth Rodda, 30/3/98 
195 For example, Tchakarov reports a meeting between Gorbachev and Zhivkov on 16 
October 1987, in which Gorbachev was concerned that restructuring did not diminish the 
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over Moscow's involvement in the events of December 1989 in Romania. Ion Iliescu, who 
was prominent in the revolution and became Romania's first post-communist President. 
had attended university in Moscow with Gorbachev and remained a close friend. The 
choice of Mazowiecki as Prime Minister in Poland may also have been directly influenced 
by Gorbachev. 196 
Whatever his personal involvement in these events, Gorbachev was certainly part of the 
younger generation of technocrats with which reform communists could identify. Without 
his initiative it is unlikely that the reform process within the Soviet Union would have 
taken the form that it did. Nor might the effects for East-Central Europe, or the events of 
1989 have taken place at that time. 
Walesa 
Walesa's charismatic leadership during the height of Solidarity's opposition years promoted 
the movement. He rallied workers, united them with middle class and intelligentsia 
dissenters, and provided a symbol of resistance for the Western media. His possibly 
dictatorial and certainly commanding style of leadership was perhaps what was needed to 
commend him to a disaffected public. It was certainly his photographic image which was 
to catapult Solidarity into government in the first semi-free elections of June 1989.197 
Walesa's working class background and ability to motivate a crowd with improvised and 
impromptu speeches brought him to the forefront of the workers movement in the 1970s as 
a bold and stubborn opponent of the communist system. Between 1981 and 1988 Walesa's 
role was mainly symbolic. During the early 1980s the intellectuals were able to co-operate 
with him and promote his image as a leader among the middle class and intelligentsia. 
Later, during the round table agreements he let the intellectuals participate in, and iron out, 
role of the communist party as vanguard. It was obvious that the younger Soviet leader did 
not see eye to eye with the old guard Bulgarian, and by July 1989 Zhivkov apparently had 
no illusions about Gorbachev's feelings towards him, see Tchakarov, K., (1991) pp. 112-121 
& 186. 
196 see previously in section 2.1, and below in 4.3, and for example, Garton Ash, T., (1990) 
We the People, Granta Books, Cambridge, p. 40-1 
197 see Garton Ash, T., (1990) pp. 25-46 
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the details. He preferred to travel the countryside and deliver speeches in support of 
negotiations, rather than partake directly in the political process. He finally assumed centre 
stage as a national leader in the aftermath of the 1989 elections and Solidarity's 
unanticipated formation of a coalition government. 
Without his leadership image or a similar rallying point, the election campaign may well 
not have been so successful. Without his particular personality the later fragmentation of 
Solidarity may also not have been so contentious. 198 
Ceausescu 
Ceausescu personalised the politics of Romania to the extreme. He took on the role of 
dictator, legitimising his leadership not through Marxism-Leninism and the vanguard 
party, but through appeals to the nation reputedly embodied in his own person. All 
significant issues had to be presented to the General Secretary and his wife, including 
matters of culture and sport. The leading role of the party was superseded by Ceausescu 
and his extended family, who held key positions in the party and government. Any party 
members who mistrusted Ceausescu's increasing hold on power were removed from 
positions of influence. 199 This, coupled with constant purges and rotations of personnel, 
effectively suppressed any opposition within the party. As a result Ceausescu's own 
interpretation of history, the essence of Romanian socialism and decisions on policy were 
imprinted on the party and structures of government. 
Ceausescu's promotion of nationalism and his megalomania in later years, certainly 
contributed to his downfall. His use of national symbolism was combined with an 
antagonistic and discriminatory foreign and domestic policy. He isolated the Romanian 
communist party from the Moscow leadership and attempted to gain Western support for 
his anti-Soviet foreign policy stance. His success in acquiring popularity in the West and 
isolation from other communist countries eventually backfired in the late 1980s. Western 
198 see Zubek, V., "Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition, " Problems of Communism, 
Jan-April 1991; and later in part 2 
'99 Tismaneanu, V., "Personal Power and Political Crisis in Romania", Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 24,1989, pp. 177-198, and Calinescu, M., & Tismaneanu, V., (1991) 
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and Hungarian government concerns over human rights issues (especially during the 
systemisation campaign), and the withdrawal of most favoured nation (MFN) status by the 
Americans, isolated Ceausescu on the world stage. 200 
Internally Ceausescu adopted discriminatory policies against non-Romanian minorities 
with regard to education, linguistic and cultural provision. Anti-semitism was revived in 
the late 1970s adding to xenophobic domestic policy orientations. In particular Ceausescu 
aggravated the Hungarian minority, compounding their anxieties with assimilation 
campaigns and the threat of destruction of their villages. By his own actions, Ceausescu 
alienated himself; externally, from Western and communist states, internally from the 
people, and finally from his own party and the military. 
3.3 The Role of the Military 
In a politically unstable situation, the military could potentially take an active political role. 
The form of revolution is then partly dependent on how the military reacts to the process of 
political change. Within the communist systems the military was integral to political 
control. The military was potentially highly politicised and both dependent on and 
supportive of the party leadership. In East-Central Europe the armies were controlled by 
the national party, but were ultimately dominated by the Kremlin as members of Warsaw 
Pact forces. East-Central European leaders were both potentially restrained by Soviet 
military inter-relationships and bolstered by them. As Soviet foreign policy changed in the 
latter half of the 1980s, so that restraint and support became less effective. This in turn 
potentially modified the capabilities of leaders in maintaining control when internal 
conditions became unstable. Although there are considerable overlaps between external 
and internal conditions, the two will be looked at separately, integrating facets relevant to 
each country within the two sections. 
Zoo In March 1988 Ceausescu announced details of a plan (the systemisation plan) for rural 
redevelopment which involved the destruction of around 7000 villages. The programme 
was started, having the greatest effect on the Wallachian plain and the Western region of 
Transylvania near the Hungarian border. See Rady, M., (1992) pp. 70-71. 
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External Military Considerations 
Soviet influence in national military and security services were considerably modified after 
the full Stalinisation of the early post-war period. The communist party had originally 
infiltrated and controlled organisations and personnel, but after Stalin's death direct Soviet 
military control was considerably reduced. The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation (WTO) in 1955 was a more indirect means of maintaining Soviet military 
influence in East-Central Europe and provided a legal basis for the presence of Soviet 
troops on East-Central European soil and, more important, assisted the maintenance of 
Soviet political influence. Although the Warsaw Pact remit did not officially include 
interference in internal national affairs, instability within East-Central European countries 
(Hungary and Poland 1956, Poland 1980,1981 for example) was successfully suppressed 
by national armed forces and either the threat, or actual use of Soviet and, or Warsaw pact 
military support. 
In fact, national armies were reluctant to repress challenges to communism within their 
own countries and the party was more inclined to use its own militia in internal crises. 
However, the threat of Soviet interference no doubt played a part in each party's reaction to 
internal crises, and was likely to be more acute where Soviet troops were deployed on 
East-Central European soil. Hungary and Poland were occupied from 1945 to 1991 and 
1992, respectively. Although the Soviets did not deploy troops in Bulgaria, close Soviet 
military ties were maintained. 201 Romania took a very different attitude. The Red Army left 
Romanian soil in 1958, Romania refused to participate in WTO activities and took an 
independent stance in foreign policy. Ironically in the 1980s, it was the latter two countries 
where Soviet troops were not deployed, which became more likely to succumb to military 
intervention, not from Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces, but from their own national military 
organisations. 
The reduced threat from the Soviets emanated from the changes which Gorbachev 
introduced in foreign relations with East-Central Europe. Soviet foreign policy changes in 
the 1980s included significant alterations in military doctrine from an offensive to 
201 Barany, Z., "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative perspective: East-Central Europe 
and Southeastern Europe, " Political Studies, Vol. XLI, 1993, pp. 594-610, and especially 
p. 595 footnote 5 
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defensive position. Although Gorbachev initially renewed WTO principles in 1985, Soviet 
political influence within East-Central Europe was significantly reduced by measures 
intended primarily to diminish Cold War tensions with the West. The Conference on 
Disarmament in Europe in September 1986, which included challenge inspections, 
alongside the announcement in 1988 that a significant number of troops and tanks would 
be withdrawn from East-Central Europe, meant previous options for intervention in 
internal affairs were effectively prevented (and if enacted, intervention would be tactically 
impossible). These signals potentially provided different scenarios for East-Central 
European national forces, depending on Soviet military inter-relationships. Where there 
were strong Soviet ties, as in Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, withdrawal meant that 
Moscow would no longer play a major role in national security decision making. Nor could 
senior officers rely on Soviet pressure for their promotions or increases in military 
budgets. 202 In these three countries top military officers were trained in the Soviet Union 
and were closely tied to their respective national parties. Only Romania insisted on 
educating all military officers in its own institutions. 203 
By the late 1980s old guard East-Central European leaders could no longer count on Soviet 
tanks to help out when experiencing difficulties within their own countries. Nor could they 
use the potential of Soviet intervention as a justification for severe internal suppression, as 
Jaruzelski probably did in 1981. This may partly explain why repressive measures were not 
used to control escalating opposition forces in Poland in the late 1980s. The removal of 
Soviet backing left the communist parties more vulnerable to internal dissent, and, 
ironically it was the Romanian party who potentially needed that backing. Yet, that 
removal of support could also have produced a destabilising effect within the national 
militaries, where Soviet trained officers saw promotion prospects and military budgets 
potentially undermined. To understand why there was little or no military intervention on 
that basis, we must turn to internal civil-military relations. 
202 Herspring, D., "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: The 
Potential for Praetorianism, " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXI, No. 2, June 
1992, p. 99-122, especially p. 103 
203 Jones, C., "Agencies of the Alliance: Multinational in Form, Bilateral in Content, " in 
Simon, J., & Gilberg, T.. (eds) (1986) Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern 
Europe, Westview, Boulder & London, p. 149 
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Internal Civil-Military Relations 
The function of the military in communist systems was not only to protect against external 
foes, but also to suppress internal opposition to socialism. 204 Close ties with the party were 
paramount for both sides. The party needed loyalty in defense of the regime. The military 
needed the party for improved material status and social prestige. Political control over the 
military was strongly maintained in Romania and Bulgaria, but became more subtle in 
Poland and Hungary in the post-Stalinist period. Representation of military personnel 
within the politburos was relatively small, or in Hungary's case non-existent. Poland after 
the imposition of martial law in the 1980s was exceptional. The creation of the Military 
Council of National Salvation consisting of twenty high ranking officers, and the election 
of Jaruzelski as leader of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP), gave the military an 
unusually high number of political offices. 
In all the countries, despite a high number of military personnel being members of their 
respective communist parties (as much out of necessity as loyalty to communism), 
evidence suggests that they were reluctant to actively support the communist regimes 
against internal foes. The party was also more likely to rely on militias and internal 
security troops to suppress popular revolts. 205 Certainly after 1956 in Poland and Hungary, 
internal suppression was not a function which the army would willingly perform against its 
own national population. Poland insisted on the removal of Soviet officers from national 
forces and Hungary's forces were reconstructed and considerably reduced, becoming the 
smallest East-Central European army. 
In Poland, the Baltic Coast riots (December 1970) were the last time the army was asked to 
act as a police force when ordered to shoot at striking workers. Jaruzelski, as Defence 
minister at the time, was apparently unhappy with this use of his forces and decided they 
should not be used to suppress workers again. 206 From then on the Polish military acted 
204 Barany, Z., (1993) p. 595 
205 ibid p. 598 
206 Wiatr suggests that army units were used to suppress the riots. However, Korbonski 
suggests that regular army units were not used. The use of police and internal security 
troops was stressed by the military in order to present the army as a professional body 
which refused to perform police duties for the discredited Gomulka regime, See 
Korbonski, A., in Simon & Gilberg (1986) p. 267; Korbonski, A., in Held, J., (ed) (1992) 
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very much as a veto group; the communist party was unable to take important decisions 
without consultation with military leaders. By the 1980s the government and military 
became virtually one and the same, and appeared to be in favour of greater freedom and 
democracy. In 1988 and 1989 they certainly did not prevent democratisation, despite being 
in a perfect position to do so. The regime leaders did not anticipate the overwhelming 
support for Solidarity in the first semi-free elections, no doubt expecting to maintain 
overall control of the political system at that time. 
Similarly in Hungary, the military apparently condoned the process and did not play an 
appreciable role. It may not be possible to find out exactly what happened between the 
military and political leaders during negotiations to transform communist institutions. 
What was "most important" for many observers was that "the transition was peaceful". 207 
Top military officials may have been reluctant to embrace radical political change. They 
possibly envisaged the purge of potentially disloyal elements and undermining of 
cohesiveness which took place from 1990.208 Yet they did not intervene, partly because 
they were not asked to by the party. Also the majority of younger career soldiers were less 
supportive of any continued involvement of the communist party within the army. They 
were more likely to take advantage of joining other political parties, allowed after mid- 
1989. The protracted liberalisation and transition process probably aided the negotiated 
path that was taken, and the adjustments the military made in conforming to post- 
communism. 
In Bulgaria strong Soviet links amongst the officers to some extent over-rode national 
party affiliations. However, in the final analysis the military was most loyal to itself. 
During 1989 military leaders happily supported ideas of democratisation and glasnost 
within a framework of socialism, and in 1990 gave assurances of loyalty to the reformed 
communist party when it renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). By the late 
1980s there was little loyalty shown to the old party or to Zhivkov, probably due to 
The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, Columbia University 
Press, New York, p. 270; and Wiatr, J., (1988) The Soldier and the Nation: The Role of the 
Military in Polish Politics, 1918-1985, Westview, Boulder & London, p. 118 
207 Pok, A., (senior historian) interview with Ruth Rodda, 30 May 1996, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Budapest 
208 For what happened to the military in the wake of the revolutions see for example, 
Herspring, D., (1992) 
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decreasing military budgets and subsequent reductions in living standards. Officers 
supported Zhivkov's removal; Defence Minister Dzhurov, who participated in the cabal to 
unseat the party leader in November 1989, almost certainly enjoyed the tacit support of the 
military. 209 The military involvement in politics was prominent during revolutionary 
events, but armed intervention was not apparently considered, despite Bulgaria's tradition 
of military putschism. 21 ° The military merely transferred its allegiance from the 
Communist party to the BSP. This suggests they expected no wholesale change in the 
political system; anticipating their support for the new regime would aid their own 
influence and provide improvements in their own situation. 
Romania differed from the other three countries not only in the more prominent role of the 
military in the revolutionary process, but also in terms of violence during the revolution. 
The Romanian People's Army (RPA) was both asked to play a role and took an active part 
in the revolution. In some part this can be attributed to Ceausescu's appeals to nationalism, 
which were aimed at the military as well as the general population, in order to bolster 
support for the regime. The independent stance taken with regard to military operations 
and institutions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, reduced the co-optation of officers by the 
Soviets in order to reinforce nationalist orientations of the RPA. However, the danger of 
promoting nationalism rather than Marxism-Leninism was all too apparent when the 
military acted finally in defence of the nation, rather than in defence of communism or the 
party leader. The intense politicisation intended to ensure the loyalty of the officer corps 
ultimately failed. 
Ceausescu appeared to be firmly in control of the military for much of his rule. Patronage 
networks and nepotism ensured the political manipulation of the highest officers. A branch 
of the Securitate (Military Counterintelligence), under the responsibility of Ceausescu's 
two brothers (Ilie and Nicolae Andruta), monitored the military officer cadre. However, the 
RPA was neglected for years. In comparison to the troops of the interior ministry and the 
Securitate, the RPA was marginalised and humiliated. The Securitate was perceived as the 
elite force which gained the most privileges from Ceausescu's regime and in return 
provided greater loyalty. The RPA was frequently mobilised for civilian economic 
209 Perry, D. M., "A new military lobby, " Report on Eastern Europe, October 5,1990, p. 1-4 
2'o There were reputedly two coup attempts in the 1960s, see Brown, J. F., (1970) Bulgaria 
under Communist Rule, Praeger, New York 
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projects, such as Ceausescu's Bucharest renovation and reconstruction projects. With the 
increasing economic and social crises in the 1980s the army was even used as cheap labour 
for industrial production, further degrading their status. The potential for military 
intervention was acute, and there are suggestions that there were several military 
conspiracies to overthrow Ceausescu. 211 
Although there is evidence that the military was involved in the final removal of 
Ceausescu, there is considerable contention over revolutionary events and the extent of 
military involvement in December 1989.212 There are allegations that the revolution was 
"hijacked" as part of a conspiracy by military and secret service plotters with involvement 
from Moscow. Plotters apparently fabricated evidence of genocide by pro-Ceausescu 
forces in order to heighten public opposition to the former regime and to legitimise the new 
leaders. There is much conflicting evidence and it is just as probable that any conspirators 
were totally inefficient and ineffectual. 213 
Yet it is apparent that some army and Securitate units did open fire on demonstrators in 
Timisoara, Cluj and Bucharest when ordered to. The army subsequently refused to shoot at 
the people, and Defence Minister Milea refused to reinforce troops in Bucharest to defend 
the political leadership. 214 It may be that the army and Securitate became hesitant when 
events in Timisoara escalated. It is also suggested that Ceausescu could have accused 
military leaders of treason which, with the realisation that the regime was crumbling, led to 
the military turning against their leader. 215 There is controversy over whether or not 
Ceausescu had a force of terrorist (Securitate or foreign) troops who tried to derail the 
revolution, and whether Iliescu made a deal with the army. General Militaru (a former 
army officer and high ranking communist party member) and Dimitru Mazilu (reported to 
have held the rank of colonel in the Securitate) were certainly initially influential within 
21 ' There are several references to attempted coup plots, but there is little hard evidence to 
substantiate rumours. See for example, Barany, Z., (1993) footnote 26 
212 See for example, Rady, M., (1992), Watts, L. L., "The Romanian Army in the December 
Revolution and beyond", in Nelson, D., (1992); and Calinescu, M. & Tismaneanu, V., (1991) 
(especially notes 16 & 17) 
213 see especially, Shafir, M., "The Revolution: an initial assessment, " Report on Eastern 
Europe, January 26,1990 & Shafir, M., "Preparing for the future by revising the past, " 
Report on Eastern Europe, Radio Free Europe, October 12,1990, p. 29-42 
214 See for example Barany, Z., (1993) 
215 See Ratesh, N., (1991) Romania: The Entangled Revolution, Praeger, New York. 
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the NSF Council. Iliescu enjoyed the support of the generals after negotiations on 
December 22 1989. It appears most likely that any coup conspirators took advantage of the 
situation rather than driving the revolution. 
The revolution was bloody, but there was considerable exaggeration over the numbers 
shot. Early reports of 10,000 or more were later reduced. The official numbers reported in 
June 1990 were 144 killed and 727 wounded during the seven days and 889 with 1,471 
wounded after Ceausescu's flight. 216 Whatever the actual circumstances it is certain that the 
army was prominent within the revolutionary process and contributed to its violent form. 
Both the Bulgarian and Romanian militaries were relatively "politicised"; political 
indoctrination outweighed professional training, and communist party control remained 
more intensive and extensive. Although the Bulgarian military played a prominent role 
within the process of political change, the old guard leadership did not request intervention 
against the reformers, and the armed forces were pragmatic in defence of their own 
interests. The Romanian situation was the most volatile and the only East-Central 
European revolution in which armed interference was requested and actually occurred. The 
fact that the armed forces finally opposed the old regime was crucial to the revolutionary 
outcome. In contrast both Polish and Hungarian political elites were able to negotiate 
successfully with the military. Indeed in the case of Poland, a number of the political elite 
were military personnel. However, the communist party maintained its dominance over the 
more "professional" military institutions. 217 Neither army appeared to want to lose their 
high standing with the population and consequently supported political reform. 218 Where 
liberalisation took place early the military took the least active role in the process of 
change. Their action was neither requested by the party, nor did the military intervene to 
defend their own interests. 
2'6 ibid p. 78 
217 For an interesting discussion of civil-military relations, and the "politicised" and 
"professionalised" militaries in East-Central Europe, see Barany, Z., "Democratic 
Consolidation and the Military; the East European Experience", Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 30, No. 1, October 1997, pp. 21-43 
218 The Polish population in particular maintained high confidence in the military as an 
institution despite becoming directly involved in politics, see for example Wiatr, J., chap. 9 
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3.4 Legitimacy 
Prior to Gorbachev's leadership of the Soviet Union, it was commonly assumed that ruling 
elites in communist regimes ruled with little or no regard for mass legitimacy. However, 
since the collapse of communism there has been renewed interest in legitimacy as a 
potential factor to explain the breakdown of the old regimes. A crisis of legitimacy is often 
invoked as the major factor in any state breakdown and is examined here to evaluate its 
importance. 219 
Legitimacy is a complex concept which potentially encompasses the relationship between 
the principal objects of legitimacy (the nation-state, socio-political institutions of the state, 
and the rulers), and the principal subjects of legitimacy (the elite, the political 
administrative personnel, the intelligentsia and the masses). Closely related to the objects 
of legitimacy are three key normative references: national interests, values of a "good" 
society (such as justice and fairness) and "charismatic qualities" (such as wisdom, courage 
and determination). 
220 
It is also necessary to distinguish between legitimacy of the state or its institutions, and the 
legitimacy of the rulers. The legitimacy of the state was not questioned in the two cases 
(excluding the possible exception of ethnic minorities, such as the Hungarian minority in 
Romania). Mass support, or tolerance for the regimes may have been based on sheer 
acceptance of the status quo. As long as the people perceived that the state was being run 
in a smooth and efficient way, they were willing to acquiesce to their rulers and even 
endorsed some leaders (for example Gomulka was relatively popular in 1956). In this 
context two normative references appear most relevant; the ability of rulers to provide 
social and economic benefits, and their ability to provide human rights and freedoms. 
There is little concrete evidence to prove or refute aspects of legitimacy within closed 
societies. This is especially the case when these systems did not, in the main, support 
2'9 See previously in Chapter 1 
22' For analyses of legitimacy and legitimation crisis in the context of Eastern Europe, see 
for example Lewis, P. G., (ed)(1984) Eastern Europe. Political Crisis and Legitimation, 
Croom Helm, London & Sydney, Pakulski, J., "East European Revolutions and 
"Legitimacy Crisis"", in Frentzel-Zagorska, J., (ed) (1993) pp. 67-91; and for legitimacy and 
dissent, Korbonski, A., in Curry, J. L., (ed) (1983) pp. 25-45. 
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legitimacy tests, such as contested elections, opinion polls or studies of public attitudes. 
However, several surveys were carried out, especially in Poland, where social scientists 
were able to practice relatively freely, and less direct sources give indications of 
legitimacy, or the lack of it. 221 
Two main areas will be addressed here. First, the acceptance of the masses of a ruling 
body's right to dominate. Second, how rulers perceive their own effectiveness, both within 
their own state and in terms of their relations to other states. The latter factor may be the 
most significant in the East-Central European case. 
Legitimacy and the masses 
Mass legitimacy is often seen as the only basis for long term stable rule, whether it is 
conferred by willing consent or manufactured by ideological indoctrination. The general 
vision of Soviet-type systems was that they relied heavily on ideological factors to 
legitimate their systems. Yet despite the considerable energy exerted by the regimes to 
mobilise popular consent through constant agitation and propaganda, there is little 
evidence that the people regarded their participation in the political process as in any way 
meaningful. 
It may be the case that the regimes obtained some kind of "conditional tolerance" through 
the use of ideological rhetoric and - in the early years - through advancing economic and 
social conditions. 222 Regime tolerance was potentially based on the social values which 
underpin the image of a good and desirable society. This was periodically sustained during 
the communist period, through economic and social benefits and the degree to which 
22' In Poland there is evidence that the regime became interested in public opinion from the 
1960s. From 1980 the spread of survey research was rapid. The Jaruzelski regime 
undertook regular polls through the Centre for Social Opinion Research. There were also 
national surveys undertaken by academics. See for example, the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, Adamski, W., et al, "Poles 1980. Results of Survey Research, " Sisiphus, 
Vol. III, 1982 
222 Pakulski, J.. "East Europeans and 'Legitimacy Crisis"', pp. 67-90, in Frentzel-Zagorska, J., 
(ed) (1993) p. 83. See also the idea of a "social contract" in Pravda, A., in Bornstein, M., et 
al (eds) (1981) 
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human rights and freedoms were upheld. However, the regimes also survived through 
systematic repression and the habits of inertia and apathy. 
Although reliable data on attitudes is difficult to obtain in closed societies, some 
indications are available. Evidence from East-Central Europeans travelling in the West 
suggests that public support for communist regimes eroded over time. A longitudinal 
survey showed that between the periods 1975/6-1979/80 and 1979/80-1984/85 the 
population's attitude towards regime performance declined, with Romania and Poland 
showing the largest negative shift in opinion. Bulgaria was the only country to exhibit 
growth in positive responses to system performance. 223 However, a distinction between 
popularity and legitimacy may be needed here. Legitimacy implies effective 
communication between rulers and ruled. It also implies a link between the bases of claims 
to legitimacy and reality. These links were mainly absent, especially in Romania. Regime 
claims that they were successfully "building socialism" did not fit well with the realities of 
declining economies (especially from the 1970s onwards). Nor did ideological claims 
associated with socialist values correspond with actual conditions. 
Evidence suggests that support for socialist values did not decline, but any association of 
these values with socialism or the communist party disappeared. For example, in Poland, 
core social values included justice, respect for human dignity, equality of opportunity, and 
freedom of expression, as well as notions of democracy, truth and social welfare. By the 
1980s these values were rarely associated with the communist establishment, and more 
often used to oppose the regime. 224 
Nevertheless, it appears that support for state institutions remained fairly high in Poland. 
Even the army retained a high degree of support, despite martial law and a strong 
association with the party regime. However, the institution which people had the greatest 
confidence in was the Catholic Church, the communist party coming tenth on the list of 
preferences. 
225 
223 See adaptation of "Political legitimacy in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study", Radio 
Free Europe Area Audience Opinion Research, March 1987, Table 6, p. 18, reproduced in 
Nelson, D. N., in Ramet, S., (ed) (1992) p. 27 
224 Adamski, W., et al (1982) 
225 Center for Social Opinion Research in Wiatr, J., (1988) p. 187. Surveys also showed that 
the leading role of the party was accepted by only between one quarter and one fifth of 
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It may well be that by the 1980s any "conditional tolerance" that existed was generally 
eroded by worsening socio-economic circumstances and the increasing influence of 
glasnost and Western cultural penetration. It was likely that the communist parties were 
blamed for economic crises. Arguably the web of dependency which the centralised 
political-economic system generated meant there was no-one else to blame. 226 Certain 
groups in society were also likely to condemn the regime for their poor conditions. For 
example, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and the Hungarian minority in Romania were 
likely to feel an erosion of their rights and freedoms as a result of the actions of communist 
leaders. Opposition groups which eventually emerged in these two countries articulated 
their protest on such bases. Across northern tier states, cross-national connections amongst 
dissident groups deepened in the late 1980s. Topics for collaboration included human 
rights, religious freedom, workers' rights to form independent unions and nuclear 
disarmament. Yet concerns over economic and social conditions, and the lack of consumer 
goods, were also cause for mass dissatisfaction well before 1989. The masses had long 
perceived their rulers as ineffectual, as the workers' strikes in Poland showed. In Romania, 
the masses took the opportunity to publicly articulate their grievances within the 
revolutionary atmosphere of December 1989. 
Legitimacy and the Ruling Elite 
It is argued that legitimacy does not rest solely on mass perceptions. It also rests on the 
rulers sense of their own legitimacy. 227 There are two main aspects which potentially 
affected the East-Central European regimes. First, their perceptions of the state in relation 
to other states; second, their perceptions of themselves as rulers. Again it is difficult to 
produce evidence, but there are indications that in some cases ruling elite perceptions were 
altered by the time of 1989. 
employees, and approval rates amongst students were as low as 4%, Adamski, W., et al 
(1982) 
226 Valerie Bunce "Socialism and Underdevelopment", in Ramet, S. P., (1992) p. 99 
"' For example, Rotchild, J., "Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe, " Political 
Science Quarterly. vol. 92, No. 3,1977. (in Pakulski, J., in Frentzel-Zagorska, J., (ed) 1993, 
p. 70) 
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For the elite, ideological justification was potentially significant. This was particularly the 
case in the East-Central European context, where a well cultivated political formula, based 
on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, was used to justify the communist party's domination and the 
leadership profiles propagated by the party. 228 Any breakdown in the ideology on which 
that justification rested was potentially harmful to the parties own sense of legitimacy. 
Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in 1956 produced splits within the elites and undermined the 
basis of the parties' self-legitimation. Gorbachev's reform programme and movement away 
from the Brezhnev doctrine had a similar effect (as we saw previously in Chapter 2). 
In all four countries the parties' "satellite" status changed by the late 1980s. For Poland and 
Hungary, as Soviet international relations changed so Western governments became more 
prominent in pressurising them economically, indirectly constraining their political policies 
and creating dilemmas for the political elite. For Bulgaria, the new international 
environment also posed problems. The ally, which could have become a Soviet republic, 
was being cast adrift to fend for itself. 229 Zhivkov's close liaison with Moscow was put in 
jeopardy by Gorbachev's hands off approach. Zhivkov did not appear to understand the 
new climate created by the Soviets. There were attempts to trade with the West, but 
internally ideological rhetoric was not matched by serious practical steps to implement 
reform. Romania's independent stance vis-a-vis the Soviets left the country isolated in the 
1980s. Gorbachev clearly rejected Ceausescu, but equally the West declined to bolster a 
regime which had such an appalling human rights record in an atmosphere of Soviet-US 
detente. 
Internally, the political elites of Poland and Hungary relied less on ideology to maintain 
their own sense of effectiveness. There were considerable attempts to utilise economic 
reform and provide consumer goods to maintain a measure of popular support. 
228 This formula incorporated the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
superiority of centralised social and economic control and the "brotherly ties" with the 
Soviet Union. Socialist internationalism or "socialist communisty" was invoked to justify 
Soviet intervention in Prague (1968) and Hungary (1956), see Pakulski, J., in Frentzel- 
Zagorska, J., (ed) (1993) p. 77 
229 Bulgaria's historically pro-Russian tradition continued into the communist period. For 
the political elite, their own legitimacy rested on rigorously following the Moscow 
communist party line. Modernisation of the country initiated by the communists, gave the 
party some legitimacy amongst the masses in the early years, and the Bulgarian communist 
party saw no reason to diverge from following the Soviet path to socialism. 
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Legitimation was especially difficult for the Polish regime where Marxist-Leninist 
principles were abandoned by the 1980s as a means to legitimate authority, and the regime 
resorted to technocratic and pragmatic rule in order to appease society. Ideology served a 
ritualistic function for the elite signalling loyalty to the regime, and ultimately to Moscow. 
Regime appeals to nationalistic elements in society on the basis of patriotism and national 
unity had limited success for Moscow backed rulers given the Polish anti-Russian and anti- 
statist traditions. 230 The elite had to take notice of public disaffection, especially after the 
success of Solidarity. Heavy subsidies were frequently utilised in an attempt to keep the 
population satisfied. However, the party was reduced to crisis management for much of 
communist rule. Eventually much of the bureaucracy, many intellectuals, and military 
personnel lost faith in the party's ability to rule. With the introduction of Gorbachev's 
foreign policy approach the Soviet constraint (whether real or threatened) was removed. 
Soviet hegemony no longer protected the Polish regime, neither could the threat of Soviet 
military strength be used by the regime as a reason for constraint regarding systemic 
reform. 
The Hungarian party also relied less on Soviet-type ideological justifications. Reformers 
within the party were more open to Gorbachev's new direction, which endorsed their own 
perceptions that political change was required. The Hungarian party took measures to deal 
with economic crisis and attempted to accommodate pressures to give legal status to 
groups outside the party apparatus in the 1980s. In a similar way to Poland, loss of support 
from factions of the elite was significant in undermining old guard leadership. However, 
the reformist party members in Hungary did not lose faith in their own ability to adapt, as 
their attempts to reform the party and institutions during 1988 and 1989 show. There were 
factions within the Polish and Hungarian parties who realised the need for change. 
Reformers initially hoped to bolster their mass support through economic and political 
reform within the one-party state, but eventually acknowledged the need for greater change 
and dismantling of their own power base. 
230 For these traditions and the dilemmas faced by the Polish regime, see for example, 
Schimmelfennig, F., "International Relations and Political Culture: International Debate 
and Transition to Democracy in Poland", in Jablonski, A. W., & Meyer, G., (eds)(1996), 
pp. 65-81 
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Romania and Bulgaria appeared less willing to decentralise control. The leaders self- 
legitimation rested far more on old style ideological rhetoric. In both countries the regimes' 
appeals to nationalism resulted in the persecution of ethnic minorities. The Bulgarian 
leadership took a somewhat ambiguous position. On the one hand Zhivkov's aggravation of 
the Turkish minority was more reminiscent of old style Stalinist measures. Yet, by the late 
1980s minor attempts to placate public demands were made, even though concern over the 
environment was directed initially at the Romanian government, rather than at the 
Bulgarian regime. 231 Eventually the splits within the party elite resulted in a loss of support 
for the old guard. In the charged atmosphere of late 1989, the reform communists had to 
quickly renounce any affiliation to one-party rule. Yet the political bases of the communist 
party remained basically intact. 232 
Ceausescu's extreme use of nationalism and development of the cult of personality finally 
isolated him from all factions of society. 233 Yet, he did not appear to lose faith in his own 
ability to rule. Even in the final few days of his leadership, he held a mass rally to affirm 
his position. There were no attempts to appease public disaffection, or even to 
acknowledge discontent. He was apparently oblivious to the reality of the circumstances 
until the final moments. Even then, he suspected a Soviet plot, rather than admit that the 
people were against him. The former communists of the NSF were not in a position to 
undertake gradual reform of the party. Their communist affiliations were not in doubt. 
They had to rely on disassociating themselves with Ceausescu. Iliescu's assertion that the 
NSF Council had filled the power vacuum left by Ceaucescu's flight from Bucharest - even 
if not entirely true - was designed to maintain support for the NSF as a revolutionary 
organisation. 
For much of the communist period, it appears that mass compliance was generated by 
rewarding conformism, sanctioning dissent and intermittent disciplinary measures. In the 
231 Public protest over air pollution in Ruse in 1987/8 was allowed by the authorities. 
However, protest was directed at Ceausescu's regime for allowing chemical emissions from 
industrial plants, which blew across the Danube river border. See for example, Nelson, D., 
in Ramet, S., (1992) p. 32 
232 See Part 2 and for example, Karasimeonov, G., "Differentiation Postponed: Party 
Pluralism in Bulgaria", in Wightman, G., (ed) (1995) Party Formation in East-Central 
Europe, Edward Elgar, England & USA. 
233 See for example, Tismaneanu, V., "Personal Power and Political Crisis in Romania", 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 24,1989, pp. 177-198. 
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less coercive regimes of Poland and Hungary, where glasnost gained most relevance, the 
regimes perceived that reform was necessary to retain continued compliance, and the 
parties attempted to gain some popular support. In Romania and Bulgaria, the more 
coercive regimes lacked almost any kind of bases for regime support, especially on human 
rights grounds. The Romanian and Bulgarian regimes were seriously undermined by the 
Gorbachev reforms. Yet even under internal pressures, the old guard leadership did little to 
indicate that their own sense of legitimacy was eroding until very late in the day. In all four 
countries the regimes' ideological legitimation was challenged from both reformism in the 
Soviet Union and from the penetration of Western ideas and culture. Yet even the Polish 
and Hungarian regimes were unsuccessful in legitimating themselves on the basis of 
reform and renewal. 
In Poland and Hungary the party was more open to public pressure, self-reflection and 
reorganisation. However, the reformers within each party initially expected to maintain the 
parties' dominant position. It was not until the semi-free elections of 1989 in Poland and 
the rapid rise of independent parties in Hungary that the communist parties appeared to 
realise their vulnerability as a ruling body. In Romania and Bulgaria, although each 
country's circumstances were different, the communist parties were pressurised into rapidly 
transforming their identity. Yet neither party fully disassociated themselves with the old 
regime structures or bases of support. 
Summing Up Part 1 
The application of the method has shown that there were factors common to all four 
countries. The international context of the late 1980s, alongside severe economic and 
social crises provided preconditions for change. Within these preconditions opportunities 
for political actors and independent organisations to transform the political systems arose. 
The changes in the Soviet Union and Western cultural and ideological penetration 
alongside internal crises provided potential for destabilisation of the communist systems. 
In particular the economies were in need of radical reform to enable these systems to 
provide adequately for society, and compete in the international arena. Each regime 
encountered party-elite splits and faced dilemmas as a result of the conjuncture of external 
influences and internal pressures. The application of the method has also identified 
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significant differences between the cases. These differences emerged from different 
internal conditions in each state. The actions - or reactions - of each regime to external 
factors and internal crises, and each society's response during the late 1980s, partly 
reflected the specific political and socio-economic conditions within each country. 
In Poland and Hungary post-1956 "normalisation" resulted in more liberalised and open 
state structures, economies and societies. In consequence - what might be described as - 
"semi-plural" political, social and economic systems existed by the late 1980s. Greater 
penetration of Western economic and cultural influences partly created and partly resulted 
from these more open and liberalised systems. In this context Gorbachev's reforms and 
foreign policy signals enabled party reformers, intellectuals and society to openly 
challenge the old regimes, and reformers from within the party-state could respond with 
attempts to change the system. In Hungary relatively successful economic reform from the 
late 1960s, and particular party-state developments resulted in the formation of an "inside" 
opposition movement. Wider society remained mainly uninvolved in oppositional 
activities. In contrast, the Polish communist party and reformists within it were confronted 
by continuous economic crises and the development of an "outside" mass opposition in the 
form of Solidarity. In both these countries the regimes acted in response to Soviet reforms, 
the more "professionalised" militaries did not intervene when the regimes collapsed, and 
anti-communist opposition movements became politically prominent and active within the 
revolutionary changes of 1989. 
In Romania and Bulgaria the regimes were less affected directly by the West, but also 
faced potential economic and social crises. However, the entrenched regimes responded 
differently to external influences. Zhivkov misunderstood Soviet reform policy whilst 
Ceausescu rejected the need for change. In both Bulgaria and Romania, rigid state 
structures, patronage networks and repressive conditions meant opposition from within the 
party or in wider society was restricted. Not until the other East-Central European 
communist regimes were on the brink of collapse, and the masses took to the streets, were 
reformists and intellectual oppositionists able to openly confront hard-line regime leaders. 
Yet, unlike the Polish and Hungarian oppositions - which were well organised and 
involved in negotiating change - the Bulgarian and Romanian opposition forces developed 
late, lacked focus, organisation and resources, and were restricted in their ability to 
influence revolutionary processes. Although Bulgarian opposition movements and 
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Romanian street protests played their part in toppling the old regimes, reform of the 
systems emanated from within the unrestructured party-states. Elites from within the 
regimes were finally forced to react to external and internal pressures in an attempt to 
protect their own power bases. 
A lack of legitimacy may well have played a precipitating role. Changes in Soviet policy, 
splits within the ruling elite and discontent amongst the masses - especially over economic 
problems - put added pressure on potentially vulnerable regimes. The popular support for 
organisations outside the party, mass demonstrations and spontaneous outbursts of 
discontent, may have provided the "final nail in the coffin. " 
However, a lack of legitimacy cannot be taken as a main "cause" of instability, especially 
as it may not have existed in the first place. The loss of mass legitimacy may not, in effect, 
destabilise the state, especially if the coercive organisations of the state remain coherent 
and effective. For example, the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Polish upheavals in 
1956,1976 and 1980 were effectively repressed. The role of the military, and external 
support, can be important in this context. One reason for the mainly peaceful forms of 
revolution was the lack of military intervention. This was partly due to political forces not 
requesting their assistance in repressing opposition (Romania apart). Also the militaries 
were willing to shift their allegiance from old to new elites. The interdependence of the 
Soviet bloc, and the attitude of the Moscow regime was significant for this action. The 
armies in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria were not prepared to stand firm without Soviet 
assistance, and decided to back - or at least tolerate - political change. Some elements of 
the Romanian forces did initially resist, perhaps for similar reasons. They suspected there 
would be no external help, but saw little alternative than to defend the old regime in the 
confusion of the first few days of disruption. Although Soviet intervention may have been 
requested in the case of Romania, neither the Soviets nor the West openly backed military 
intervention in the climate of the late 1980s. 
The application of a comparative-historical approach has identified common factors which 
appear significant for the collapse of the old regimes. The approach also shows that similar 
contributing factors had differing effects in each country. These differences appear to be 
dependent on the political, economic and social "nature" of the communist systems. The 
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different political, economic and social conditions that existed by the late 1980s were 
integral to the revolutionary processes which took place. 
The investigation does not, however, end with the collapse of the communist regimes. The 
1989 conditions also provided the "starting point" for the political, economic and social 
changes which occurred after 1989. We must now move on and apply the method to the 
forms of change and the post-1989 systems to trace what changed, and to examine what 
impact the differing nature of the communist systems had on outcomes. Part 2 will 
establish the differing forms of revolution, and compare international, political, economic 
and social aspects of the post-communist systems. 
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Part 2 
Outcomes of the Revolutions 
Part 1 has established that each communist regime faced some form of political, economic 
and social crises by 1989. Yet, - what has been described as - the "nature" of the 
communist systems created very different contexts and consequences in each case. The 
more open and liberalised systems in Poland and Hungary provided the conditions for 
political negotiations between communists and established opposition movements to take 
place. In Bulgaria and Romania rigid regime and party-state ties, alongside centralised 
economies and closed societies, meant little or no established alternative political 
organisations developed to compete with the communist parties. 
Political factors provide a focus for investigating the different political forms of revolution. 
The type of regime and party-state structure which existed by 1989, the responses of the 
communist regimes to the crises they faced, and the presence or absence of organised anti- 
communist opposition movements within revolutionary processes appear significant. In 
Poland and Hungary complete regime change took place. In Bulgaria and Romania the old 
regime collapsed, but the former communists remained dominant within the post-1989 
systems. These differences in political forms of revolution had effects for post-1989 reform 
processes. Yet, integral to political factors were economic and social conditions which 
played a part in shaping outcomes. Change occurred within different internal conditions 
and a specific external context. Post-1989 regimes were both aided and constrained by the 
conditions within and surrounding each system in 1989, and by the issues raised through 
attempting both political and economic restructuring at virtually the same time. 
It is difficult to delineate the effects of the pre-1989 systems from the effects which post- 
1989 conditions had upon outcomes. However, some aspects of the impact of the nature of 
the communist systems on outcomes can be separately identified. Part 2 will focus on these 
aspects, whilst also recognising additional aids and constraints to post-1989 system 
building. 
In order to compare the two cases, and trace the post-1989 changes that occurred, it is first 
necessary to briefly establish the differences in political forms of revolution. The following 
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chapters will then compare outcomes by describing and discussing political, economic, 
social and international aspects of the post-communist systems in turn. These areas interact 
and overlap, but - as identified in Part 1- some compartmentalisation is necessary in order 
to discuss processes and outcomes of change. Chapter 4 will first, establish and compare 
the political forms of revolution before going on to compare the nature of the new states. 
Chapter 5 will complete the discussion of political factors by describing political party 
developments, concentrating on the early 1990s, but including 1989 to 1997 elections. 
Chapter 6 will discuss some major aspects of economic and social change. Chapter 7 will 
look at the international context and the effects of external influences on attempts to 
restructure post-89 systems. The final chapter will conclude the investigation by first 
drawing together the differences between the cases, and suggesting some reasons for those 
differences. Secondly, it will summarise the two main theoretical issues addressed within 
the thesis. Thirdly, it will assess the strengths and weaknesses of the comparative-historical 
method, and examine the usefulness of its application to the East-Central European cases. 
Chanter 4 The New Political Order 
All four post-communist regimes faced unique situations in rebuilding political and 
economic systems. To change from communist one-party states and command economies 
towards democracy and market economies was a completely new phenomenon. Each new 
regime made at least some attempt to decentralise power and reform ailing economies. 
They all looked to Western Europe for institutional and economic models. Yet, none could 
anticipate the effects of attempting economic reform alongside political reform. However, 
Poland and Hungary probably achieved the greatest success in moving towards complete 
political system change. Why is this the case? The political form of revolution, and 
resulting regime change had an impact, but integral to this form were the political, 
economic and social contexts within which each new regime attempted to rebuild the 
political system. These features will be addressed by first briefly comparing the form of 
revolution in Poland and Hungary with the form of revolution in Bulgaria and Romania. 
The structure of post-communist political institutions and aspects of political power 
relationships will then be described. A comparison of the two cases will show some 
similarities across the cases, and differences within the cases. The issues which each new 
115 
regime faced also had consequences. However, there are patterns of difference between the 
cases which can be highlighted. 
4.1 Forms of Revolution 
The revolutions in East-Central Europe were relatively peaceful. Only in Romania was 
wide-scale violence experienced on the streets in 1989. Despite this obvious difference, 
similarities between the Polish and Hungarian revolutionary form can be contrasted with 
the Romanian and Bulgarian form. 234 Details of revolutionary events and negotiations 
(such as Round Table talks) will not be discussed here. Some significant elements have 
already been mentioned in Part 1, and other important details will be addressed below in 
future sections and chapters. The purpose here is to identify the general similarities and 
differences in political form by comparing the two cases. We have already seen (in Part 1) 
that the Polish and Hungarian party-state structures were less rigid and hierarchic by 1989. 
The type of regime and party-state in these two countries created conditions within which 
reformists could act in response to the late 1980s crises, and established, organised anti- 
communist opposition movements became prominent within revolutionary processes. In 
contrast Bulgarian and Romanian anti-communist opposition movements were either very 
recently established or non-existent, and had limited influence in institutional change or 
within political elite processes. These are key factors in comparing the political forms of 
revolution in the two cases. 
Poland and Hungary 
Poland and Hungary both experienced - what might be classed as -a form of "negotiated" 
revolution which was essentially peaceful. In both countries, the old regime response to the 
Soviet reform signals of the mid 1980s was to attempt some kind of party democratisation 
and reform of the political system. However, communist actions were promoted for 
different reasons. There was more pressure "from below" in Poland in the form of 
Solidarity. Although by the late 1980s Solidarity was less of a social force than it was in 
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1981, the regime recognised the potential disruption the Polish people could exert upon the 
political system. The differing external conditions from those of the early 1980s (especially 
in the Soviet Union) provided different opportunities for the anti-communist opposition 
and reformists within the party; a context within which regime leaders were pressured 
towards reform after the wave of strikes in the spring and summer of 1988. In Hungary 
demands for reform came from sections of the elite. Mass participation during 1989 was 
far less significant than in Poland. The communist party itself was more involved in 
initiating political change. Reform communists and emerging opposition elites made pacts 
which determined the speed and extent of political events; the "old guard" offering little 
resistance as they surrendered power. 235 
In both countries communist parties and leaders of opposition groups were involved in 
round-table negotiations. During 1989 both Polish and Hungarian parliaments, still 
dominated by communists, played an active role in accepting laws that determined post- 
1989 political institutions and processes. Round-table negotiations began earlier in Poland, 
and with the unexpected support for Solidarity in the June semi-free elections, political 
change accelerated. 236 In Hungary, party and counter elites maintained greater control of 
the revolutionary process, without similar pressure from grass-roots movements. Yet, both 
countries experienced a complete change of regime as anti-communist opposition parties 
gained power in the early post-communist period. In both countries the communist parties 
initially expected to retain considerable control over any reform process they initiated, but 
were thwarted by external and internal conditions. In particular the strength and ability of 
oppositional groups, and public support for them, was underestimated by leaders and 
reformists within the communist parties. Partial reform of the systems prior to 1989, and 
subsequent complete regime change, was to have significant consequences for post-1989 
234 Only the general political form of revolutions will be discussed here. See previously in 
Chapters 2 and 3, and the following sections of Chapter 4 for more political details. 
235 There are some differences of opinion over the idea of elite transaction. Some argue that 
it was mainly an elite process, for example Tokes, R. L., "Hungary's New Political Elites" 
Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec 1990, pp. 44-65; Bruszt, L., "1989: Hungary's 
Negotiated Revolution" Social Research, 1990, pp. 365-387. Others emphasise social and 
economic forces precipitating and accompanying change, for example, Keri, L., (1991) 
Oss: eomlas utan (After the Collapse), Kossuth, Budapest 
236 Details of each country's post-communist elections will be addressed in the following 
chapter on Political Parties. 
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political, economic and social change (as we shall see in the following sections and 
chapters). 
Bulgaria and Romania 
At first glance Romania and Bulgaria appear to have experienced very different forms of 
revolution. Bulgaria was similar to both Poland and Hungary, being essentially 
"negotiated". It was similar to Hungary in terms of the involvement of the communist elite 
in the initial reform process. As in Poland and Hungary, opposition movements were 
formed and participated in round-table negotiations. However, these movements were 
established late and barely disassociated from the party-state apparatus. Revolutionary 
events were "collapsed" into a few short months after November 1989, at a time when 
other communist regimes in the region were already losing power. 
The main similarity evident in Bulgaria and Romania was that the communists did not 
anticipate reform of the political system before the autumn of 1989. The communist parties 
had to adapt very quickly to the changing conditions of late 1989 and early 1990. People 
came out onto the streets in large numbers in November and December 1989 
(respectively). In Bulgaria, although there was no violence initially, there was widespread 
industrial and ethnic conflict in the immediate aftermath of Zhivkov's removal from 
power. 237 In Romania the masses on the streets gave alternative elites the opportunity to 
remove the old regime (as we have seen in Chapter 3). In both countries the communists 
were forced to respond to external conditions, and the associated spontaneous action of 
237 In Bulgaria people started coming out onto the streets in urban areas in large numbers 
immediately after the first wave of resignations from the communist party in November 
1989. See Popov, S., "Political and Symbolic Elements at earlier stages of Bulgaria's 
Transition", Praxis International Vol. 13 No. 3, October 1993 pp. 268-284. Demonstrations 
in January 1990 over the Turkish issue forced the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and 
opposition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) to make progress at round table 
negotiations. In February UDF supporters marched complaining that the BCP was using 
delaying tactics at the round table, and in March forced the government to make 
concessions over freedom of the press. Also in March Turks, Pomaks and Muslims secured 
concessions over the restoration of Muslim names through protest. The trade union 
Podkrepa also caused disruption by threatening strikes on several occasions. See 
Crampton, R., "Bulgaria", in Whitefield, S., (ed) (1993) The New Institutional Architecture 
of Eastern Europe, Macmillan, Basingstoke & London, pp. 15-19 
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people on the streets within their own states. In both countries the form of regime change 
was essentially through mimicry of Round Table formulas, and "facade negotiations". 
Initially in Bulgaria and Romania former communists were very much in evidence within 
the early post-communist governments. In Romania, the ruling body within the National 
Salvation Front (NSF), which took power immediately after the revolution of December 
(and was later elected to government), was comprised of communists not immediately 
associated with Ceausescu. This ruling group were quickly accused of co-opting the 
revolution by many intellectuals and students. 238 In Bulgaria former communists within 
both the reformed communist party (Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)) and within a section 
of the oppositionist Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) (around Zhelyu Zhelev, Clubs for 
Glasnost and Democracy) were involved in the initial political changes. Like the NSF, the 
BSP was elected to govern in June 1990. 
Despite some differences between the Romanian and Bulgarian events, former communists 
maintained considerable dominance over revolutionary processes and post-1989 political 
and economic systems. This had its effects for system change and post-1989 reform 
processes. 
4.2 The Nature of the New States 
In all four countries the revolutions left intact much of the structure of communist rule. 
This was especially the case initially within the state bureaucracies and the large state 
owned enterprises. 239 However, considerable restructuring of government and 
administration in both Poland and Hungary prior to 1989 left very different conditions in 
place. In the late 1980s both countries had already made changes to their institutions and 
238 In particular the announcement by the NSF Council on 23 January 1990 that the NSF 
would stand in the April elections as a political organisation outraged dissidents. For those 
with suspicions about the former communists who led the NSF, it was a clear contradiction 
to the December 1989 programme and promises of the provisional government. See for 
example, Gallagher, T., (1995) pp. 81-82 
239 see more below in Economic and Social change; and for example, Erzsebet Szalai " 
Political and Social Conflicts Arising from the Transformation of Property relations in 
Hungary", in Cox & Furlong (eds) (1995) Hungary: The Politics of Transition, Frank Cass. 
London 
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procedures, and it was these remnants of communist rule which remained after 1989. The 
first post-communist governments also initiated further changes in administrative structure 
and personnel. It was in Bulgaria, and especially Romania, where old communist structures 
and processes remained more firmly in place and proved difficult to dismantle. 
The more complete regime change in Poland and Hungary led to rapid attempts to change 
the political systems. In both countries Round Table talks in 1989 provided a framework 
and timetable to enable movement towards more liberal democratic institutions and 
processes. In Poland the semi-free elections of 1989 slightly delayed the establishment of 
settled institutional relationships. Yet, in both countries communists were politically 
marginalised within a short period. In Bulgaria and Romania former communists continued 
to dominate politics in the early 1990s. In Bulgaria political change was in some respects 
different and more conflictual to that in Romania, but in these countries political reform 
was at least much slower. Indeed in Romania many questioned that any reform of 
institutions or practices initially took place. 240 In order to examine the patterns of 
difference apparent in the post-communist states the new institutions and political reform 
processes will be outlined. Additionally some significant aspects of central and regional 
administrative power relations will be discussed in order to see how political processes 
changed. Some of the issues faced by the regimes will also be incorporated into this 
section. Finally, some political consequences of economic reform will be discussed. This 
latter issue was one of the most significant for the political fortunes of each new regime, 
and will be discussed in relation to the effects for all four post-1989 regimes. 
New Institutions and Political Reform Processes 
In all four countries revolutionary events led to changes in political institutions, and 
political reforms were initiated. However, Poland and Hungary began from very different 
institutional bases; they were already less centralised by 1989. Additionally, the more 
complete change of regime in this case led to more rapid and effective political reform 
processes. 
240 See for example Rady, M., (1992) 
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Poland and Hungary 
In Poland the Round table negotiations begun in February 1989 resulted in a partial reform 
of the political system. By April the communist party had agreed to the relegalisation of 
Solidarity and semi-free elections to a reformed Sejm and reconstituted Senate. The first 
non-communist government led by Mazowiecki continued dismantling the old system in 
late 1989 and early 1990. The Polish republic was reconstituted in December 1989. Pre- 
communist national symbols were restored and the Polish United Workers Party's (PUWP) 
"leading role" erased from the constitution. By 1991 the political system had been 
transformed. Presidential elections in November 1990 and free Parliamentary elections in 
1991 completed institutional change. The Presidential election of 1990 altered the 
parameters of politics. Conflict over political and constitutional issues between the 
President, Parliament and the prime minister ensued (see below). The "little constitution" 
of 1992 provided compromises and went some way to clarify the system of government 
after the paralysis experienced in late 1991 and early 1992.241 In fact, it took until May 
1997 for compromises to be reached over a new constitution. The new document 
represented bitterly fought debates between "new-old opponents"; those who supported a 
secular state and church-backed moral crusaders. 242 
In Hungary a similar process of change took place during 1989. From June to September 
1989 opposition parties and social organisations met with the Hungarian Socialist Worker's 
Party (HSWP) to prepare the ground for constitutional reform and the holding of free 
elections. Talks concluded with an agreement to amend the constitution, establish a 
constitutional court and introduce an electoral law clarifying the status of political parties. 
There was considerable conflict over proposals to hold Presidential elections prior to 
Parliamentary elections. The communists favoured Presidential elections first. The 
Hungarian reform communists had similar expectations to their counterparts in Poland 
thinking that a communist President would retain overall control of a transforming 
system. 243 However, by the autumn of 1989 the communists accepted their unpopularity 
241 For details of this period, see for example Michta, A. A., "The Presidential-Parliamentary 
System, " in Staar, R., (ed) (1993) Transition to Democracy in Poland, St. Martin's Press, 
New York, pp-57-76 
242 Rollnick, R., "Polish constitution exposes rifts, " The European, 15-21 May 1997 
243 Pozsgay was popular and many thought he would become the first post-communist 
President up until the autumn of 1989 when anti-communists reduced the chance of a 
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and relented to the holding of a referendum to determine the timing of elections. The 
referendum was also used to make decisions about HSWP assets, the worker's guard and 
factory cells. The narrow victory for the postponement of Presidential elections until after 
Parliamentary elections defined the political landscape of the new Parliamentary system. 244 
Form then on a basic consensus on the need for a Parliamentary system was not 
challenged. Although there was some debate over the need for a bicameral legislature, the 
unicameral system and the first post-communist government remained remarkably stable 
and generally uncontested. 245 Hungary is like Bulgaria in having a unicameral Parliament, 
but remains unique amongst the four countries in having an indirectly elected President. 
In both Poland and Hungary the legislatures had strong historical traditions and played an 
important role in changing the political systems. After the organised opposition of the early 
1980s, the Sejm in Poland became less of a "rubber stamp" as the communists permitted 
Parliament to play a more active role. During the 1989 to 1991 period the National 
Assembly became the main arena for political battles. Similarly in Hungary the last 
Parliament of the communist era became the main focus for politics, eventually accepting 
the laws which would determine the new democratic Parliament and new political 
processes. 
Although there were difficulties in making a complete break with the past, there was a 
basic consensus in both countries that the old state structures should be dismantled and 
new processes adopted quickly. This included "depoliticisation" of the army, and reformed 
civil-military relations. 246 The modernisation of the administration at central and regional 
level, and the devolving of power away from the centre was seen as necessary. Again 
former communist attaining the post. The Free Democrats (see below in Political Parties) 
were also insistent that a Parliamentary system, rather than Presidential system should be 
established. 
244 The vote was 50.1% to 49.9%, Whitefield, S., (ed) (1993) p. 84 
245 for details on the new parliaments see Agh, A., "Democratic Parliamentarianism in 
Hungary: The First Parliament (1990-1994) and the Entry of the Second Parliament", and 
Simon, M. D., "Institutional Development of Poland's Post-Communist Sejm: A 
Comparative Analysis", both in Olsen & Norton (eds) (1996) The New Parliaments of 
Central and Eastern Europe, Frank Cass, London & Portland, Oregan 
246 For details of military reform in Poland and Hungary, see for example, Barany, Z., 
"Democratic Consolidation and the Military; the East European Experience", Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, October 1997, pp. 21-43; Michta, A. A., (1992) East Central Europe 
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reforms during the communist period, aimed at strengthening economic development, 
proved to be a useful starting point from which to further decentralise control. The regional 
levels of government in Poland date back to the 1970s and the basically two-tier system 
remained largely unchanged. Reform legislation covering functional, political 
administrative and financial areas potentially transformed the role of local government, 
giving greater political and economic autonomy. 247 Actual reform of local government in 
Poland was slow to materialise, partly because of the quick succession of governments in 
the 1990 to 1993 period (except the reforms introduced during Suchocka's government), 
and the conflicts over appointments to regional districts. 248 
Hungary probably took the greatest steps towards local government reform. The relative 
tolerance of political debate in the 1980s allowed a basic tax structure for the finance of 
local authorities and restoration of local government autonomy to take place almost 
immediately after legislative elections in 1990.249 This early establishment of democratic 
local-central relations led to less controversy over relationships between tiers of 
administration, and better co-operation and supervision of local amenities. Devolution of 
functions, property and resources to the local level at an early stage helped to legitimise 
local democracy and put a system in place which the new government in 1994 merely fine- 
tuned, rather than radically changed. 
In both countries the election of reformed communist party personnel to power (Hungary 
1994, Poland 1993) did not significantly alter the institutional form or democratic 
processes already established. However, there were some difficulties in reorganising the 
bureaucracies. 
Poland and Hungary did not have over large state bureaucracies in terms of numbers of 
personnel during the communist period, therefore neither country had to significantly 
after the Warsaw Pact; Security Dilemmas in the 1990s, Greenwood Press, New York & 
London, especially Chapters 3&5 
247 see for example Hesse, J. J. "From Transformation to Modernisation: Administrative 
Change in Central and Eastern Europe", Discussion Paper No. 27, Centre for European 
Studies, Nuffield College, Oxford, April 1993 
248 see below and Cielecka, A., & Gibson, J., "Polish Local Government: Wither the Second 
Stage of Reform", in Gibson, J., & Hanson, P., (eds) (1996) p. 139-142, especially p. 13 5 
249 see Davey, K., "Hungary: Into the Second Reform Cycle", in Gibson, J., & Hanson, P., 
(eds) 1996 
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reduce core administrative state employees after 1989. However there were problems with 
recruitment of skilled and qualified staff who could implement policy within a reformed 
political and economic state sector. Rather than being able to recruit the staff 
administration needed, public service had to take what it could get. Relatively low pay and 
poor prestige did not attract qualified or well motivated candidates. There was also 
evidence of recruitment on the basis of party affiliations, favouritism and nepotism. 25° This 
did not necessarily mean that new state structures were reliant on a type of democratic 
centralism to operate, but the public sector had to deal with unstable governments (in the 
Polish case), unpredictable policy output, and was under pressure to adapt to the new 
political and economic climate without appropriate skills to deal with the situation. 
Additionally in Poland there were problems with de-communisation which created added 
difficulties and heightened tensions within both government and administration. Although 
these conditions had potential to slow reform processes, in both countries compromises 
were made which enabled reform to continue without complete dismantling of the old state 
structures. 
Bulgaria and Romania 
In Bulgaria, and especially Romania, movement towards new institutions and practices 
was initially much slower and in many ways incomplete in comparison to the Polish and 
Hungarian case. Two main reasons for this can be discerned; the lack of developed 
opposition organisations which could successfully bargain with the communist 
establishment (although Round Table negotiations did take place in Bulgaria and Romania 
they were very different from the Polish and Hungarian equivalents), and the number and 
strength of communist personnel who remained within the post-communist state 
institutions. The greater focus on the leader (and leadership) in these states prior to 1989 
was reflected both within revolutionary processes and subsequent political relationships. 
Although old guard leaders in Bulgaria and Ceausescu's clan were removed from office, 
the clientelistic networks and corrupt practices of communist rule were less easily removed 
from the administrations. Additionally the more "politicised" militaries were involved in 
250 See Hesse, J. J., 1993 p. 38 
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1989 events, and were potentially more prominent within the post-communist systems. 
This was especially the case in Romania (see more below in the following section). 
In Bulgaria there were initially some similarities to Hungarian and Polish processes of 
change, but Round Table negotiations were established on a somewhat different basis. The 
talks were not the result of a long history of oppositional activities, although they were of 
considerable symbolic significance to the population. 251 Mladenov, who replaced Zhivkov 
in November 1989, had similar aspirations to those of Pozsgay in Hungary earlier that 
year. 252 With a similar reaction to political crisis - albeit to a different set of circumstances 
than those which had taken place much earlier in Poland and Hungary - the Bulgarian 
communists sought reform measures and compromise as an exercise in self- 
preservation. 253 Mladenov's new administration declared its intent to reform the political 
system. At the 14th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) which met from 
30th January to 2nd February 1990, an interim government was engineered. Mladenov was 
pushed - as much by public opinion and flourishing opposition groups, as by reformist 
motives - towards dismantling the BCP's leading role over state and society. He resigned as 
party leader, promoted Aleksandr Lilov to that post and appointed Andrei Lukanov (a close 
associate and former foreign economic relations minister) as prime minister. 
Round Table talks took place from January to April 1990, and produced a framework for 
general elections to a Grand National Assembly (GNA) to take place in June. Following 
the country's historic tradition, the main task of this assembly was to adopt a new 
constitution. (It took until July 1991 for a new constitution to be agreed. ) During the 
Round Table talks, after some disagreement between BCP and the oppositionist Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) representatives, a compromise concerning election of the 
254 President was reached. The existing assembly (sobranie) continued its function of 
251 Popov, S., "Political and Symbolic Elements at earlier stages of Bulgaria's Transition", 
Praxis International 13; 3 October 1993 pp. 268-284 
252 Mladenov was Zhivkov's foreign secretary for 17 years and replaced Zhivkov on his 
resignation on November 10,1989. 
253 An indication of the BSPs attempt to preserve its power can be seen in the reform of the 
electoral law which was deemed to be the most favourable for the party's own electoral 
success. See Simon, J., "Electoral Systems and Regime Change in Central and Eastern 
Europe 1990-1994", Representation, Vol. 35, Nos. 2&3, Spring/Autumn 1998, p. 128 
254 In a similar conflict to that which took place in Hungary between reformed communists 
and the liberal opposition, the BCP wanted direct elections alongside GNA elections, while 
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"rubber stamping" executive decisions even under the extra-constitutional remit of Round 
Table authority. The sobranie signed its own death sentence by approving the end of 
communist rule and nominated the President until the GNA was able to elect the head of 
state. Mladenov was elected President on April 3 1990 (the BCP also became the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) that day), and the former communist chief administrative 
body of the State Council was dissolved. The Bulgarian communists attempted to establish 
paternalistic rule - similar to the Polish and Hungarian communist parties' attempts before 
and during 1989 - whereby reforms would be granted and concessions issued to select 
opposition groups. 
Once national assembly elections took place in June 1990, the GNA became the main 
centre of political life and focus for reform of the system. The BSP won the most seats in 
the elections, but the party suffered from its communist heritage. The pattern exhibited by 
the BCP in the initial stages of political reform, and in reforming itself, was one of making 
concessions in principle, but then watering them down in detail. 255 This led to many 
oppositionists and more radical reformers within the party discerning the supposedly 
reformed BSP as somewhat undemocratic. The communist power structure was certainly 
reduced: party cells were disbanded, members of the judiciary, the army, police and 
foreign service relinquished their party membership in order to pursue their careers, and 
the traditional communist "transmission belts" - such as trade unions or Komsomol - were 
separated from the party. 256 However, there was continuous suspicion of the BSP when 
avowed commitments to reform were delayed by the party's own prevarications. 
The instability of governments did not help, but there were instances when Parliamentary 
politics were viewed as an instrument for marginalising political opponents, rather than as 
a forum for the representation of balanced interests. This approach was also utilised by the 
the UDF wanted Parliamentary election of the President. The President was initially 
elected by the GNA after Mladenov was forced to stand down. As in Hungary, the 
reformed communists did not gain by the conflict and a UDF President took office (Zheliu 
Zhelev). Zhelev was subsequently elected by direct means in 1992 and another UDF 
President (Petar Stoyanov) was elected in November 1996. 
255 Crampton, R., "Bulgaria" in Whitefield, S., (ed) (1993) pp. 14-34 
256 The traditional "transmission belt" role of trade unions was modified in the late 1980s 
providing a basis for political activity before alternative parties were legalised. See 
Thirkell, J., et al, "Trade Uions, Political Parties and Governments in Bulgaria, 1989-92" in 
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Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) when they gained power in the minority government 
after the 1991 elections. 257 The conflict which arose between the polarised political forces 
was a major factor in contributing to delays in the reform process. The time spent on 
adopting a new constitution also added to the slow progress of reform. In the 1991-1994 
period, although many bills were passed by parliament, out of 210 bills adopted only 25 
were new laws, and only around 10 of these were substantially connected with reform of 
the old authoritarian system. 258 
Some decentralisation of local government had already begun before 1989 with the 
introduction of a new system introduced in January 1988. It appears that this 
decentralisation continued under the post-communist government. A new "Local Self 
Government and Local Administration Act" was passed in 1991 giving municipalities a 
wide range of responsibilities over local policy, including local economic development, but 
limited direct control over their capital or revenue budgets. However, the main issue for 
decentralisation was the lack of organisational capacity or skilled staff, and concerns over 
the level of independence for municipalities vis-a-vis central authority. 259 
In Romania the pace of political change was slow. The National Salvation Front (NSF) 
which took power during the bloody events of December 1989 presented itself as a 
transitional ruling body. The Front's first proclamation claimed that all communist 
institutions would be dissolved. Yet, the early months of NSF government bore significant 
resemblance to communist party rule. Despite setting up a council - apparently delegated 
by 145 National Front members - control was initially concentrated in the hands of Silviu 
Brucan, Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman. 260 The communist party was never officially 
Myant, M., & Waller, M., (eds) (1994) Parties, Trade Unions and Society in East-Central 
Europe, Frank Cass, UK & US pp. 98-115. 
257 for elections, see below and Karasimeonov, G., in Olsen, D. M., & Norton, P., (eds) 
(1996) p. 54 
258 ibid p. 51. 
259 Jepson, D., McDonell, V., & Mollov, B., "Local Government in Bulgaria", in Coulson 
(ed) (1995) Local Government in Eastern Europe, Edward Elgar, Hants. & Vermont, 
pp. 102-114 
° Brucan and Iliescu joined the communist party in 1944. Brucan was the most outspoken 
in his criticism of Ceausescu and finally put under house arrest, but neither men were ever 
completely denounced by the regime, yet both utilised their apparent opposition to 
Ceausescu as evidence to legitimise their positions within the NSF. Roman's father was a 
close associate of Iliescu, see Rady, M., (1992) pp. 124-128. 
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dissolved and although some political and civil freedoms were immediately established, 
changes to political practices was initially slow. Promises to institute a special committee 
to investigate the previous regime's crimes, and hold referendums on banning the 
communist party and the question of the death penalty, were rescinded. Many communist 
techniques of political centralisation were utilised by the NSF both at executive and local 
level. 261 
The NSF did make a commitment to holding free elections, and the electoral law published 
on March 14 1990 overtly specified democratic principles. The law provided for the 
simultaneous election of a national President and two houses chosen by a system of 
proportional representation based on constituencies and party lists. However, in these early 
elections, the National Salvation Front's resounding victory in both houses and Iliescu's 
Presidential victory defined the political conditions of the early post-communist 
institutions and practices. 
Following the May 1990 elections, the primary task of the new legislature was to draft a 
new constitution and a new law for the September 1992 national elections. Iliescu was 
extremely influential in obtaining significant powers for the executive (see below in the 
following section). The new electoral rules also appeared to protect the National Salvation 
Front's control over the legislature. 262 Although the Democratic National Salvation Front 
(DNSF - the NSF was renamed after a formal split in 1992, and in 1993 renamed the Party 
of Social Democracy of Romania - see the chapter on Political Parties below) had to form a 
coalition with several extremist parties after the 1992 elections, the DNSF held the 
majority of government portfolios and Iliescu retained the Presidency until 1996. 
The Romanian post-communist government was committed to gradual reform ostensibly in 
order to maintain stability. This applied to economic and political reform. Although there 
was some conflict over the pace and nature of reform, both from within the NSF and by 
opposing organisations, the NSF also appeared committed to maintaining control of the 
political system. In the first two years after the revolution decentralisation of authority was 
261 see Rady, M., (1992) pp. 136-139. 
262 see especially Crowther, W., & Roper, S. D., "A Comparative Analysis of Institutional 
Development in the Romanian and Moldovan Legislatures", in Olsen, D. M., & Norton, P., 
(eds) (1996) pp-138-140 
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not a priority and opposition to the NSF was frequently brutally dealt with. 263 Prefects and 
Mayors were initially appointed and local government elections were postponed. Public 
finance of local councils also remained highly centralised. Central government argued that 
it was difficult to decentralise the over centralised state inherited from the communist 
regime, and that local authorities were not yet ready to take on their appointed role. 264 
Although the central authorities may well have been committed to democratisation of local 
government, reform was initiated in such a way as to minimise any political threat to 
265 central authority and keep intact central monitoring, co-ordination and control. 
Political Power Relations 
Although new political institutions were established and considerable political and 
economic reform initiated (in three countries at least), the effects of more complete regime 
change in Poland and Hungary compared to incomplete change in Bulgaria and Romania 
can already be seen. To look at this in more depth some aspects of central and central-local 
power relationships will be discussed. Constitutional and institutional arrangements can 
provide a framework for democratic practice. Within this framework the distribution of 
power and influence may remain ambiguous. An examination of some aspects of power 
relations is then useful to discern the changes in political practice that took place during the 
early post-communist period. Not all aspects of power conflict can be addressed here, but 
some examples will serve to illustrate the complexities that political change engendered in 
this area. Previous examinations of the new political systems have often taken the role and 
powers of Presidents and decentralisation of state control as primary concerns. 266 These 
263 For example, a group of miners were co-opted to discourage student protests in 
University Square in Bucharest after the May 1990 elections. Also an example is the 
events in Tirgu Mures in March 1990. There was also evidence of intimidation and 
electoral irregularities at the 1990 elections, see for example Rady, M., (1992) pp. 145-159 
& pp. 160-173 
264 Iliescu, to a conference on local democracy and development held in Bucharest 28-30 
October 1994, in Campbell, A., in Gibson, J., & Hanson, P., (eds) (1996) Transformation 
from Below, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Glos. UK & Brookfield Vermont US p. 89 
265 ibid p. 90 
266 For example, Lijphart suggests that Parliamentary rather than Presidential systems are 
preferable for building new democracies, see Lijphart, A., "The Southern European 
examples of democratisation: six lessons for Latin America", Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 25,1990 pp-68-84 
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aspects will be examined here, but not to discern the effects of Presidential or 
Parliamentary systems for democratic outcomes, but to highlight the differences between 
the cases in terms of power conflicts at the institutional level. Many political conflicts were 
based around issues such as freeing the media from state supervision, and antagonism 
surrounding decommunisation of administrations. Some of these points will be addressed 
within a comparison of political power relations. 
Poland and Hungary 
Both Poland and Hungary might be described as essentially Parliamentary systems. 267 Yet 
there are differences in the interpretation of the role and powers of the President vis-a-vis 
government and Parliament in each country. In Hungary Arpad Goncz became a mainly 
symbolic figure; "the father of the nation, " denoted by his popular title of "Uncle Arpy". 
Although possessing similar formal powers as Walesa in Poland, less conflict between the 
President and government was apparent. Where there was conflict in Hungary it 
manifested itself mainly around opposing party political platforms. For example, the 
protracted battle between Goncz and Prime Minister Antall over the leadership of 
Hungarian radio and television reflected the President and his party's (Alliance of Free 
Democrats) objection to Antall's apparent manipulation of the media in the interests of the 
MDF. 268 Although not afraid to use his influence, Goncz did not seek to extend 
Presidential powers or exploit divisions within Parliament to bring down governments. 
Even the election of a former communist to the office of prime minister in 1994 did not 
lead to significant conflict with the former dissident President. In fact the MSP and Free 
Democrats formed a coalition government. Political conflict was more apparent within and 
between the former opposition parties than between former communists and oppositionists, 
or between government institutions. 
267 see for example Baylis, T. A., "Presidents versus Prime ministers; Shaping Executive 
authority in Eastern Europe", World Politics, Vol. 48, April 1996 pp. 297-323 
268 State control of the broadcast media was a particularly contentious area. The MDF was 
frequently accused of interfering in the editorial freedom of television and radio 
broadcasting and purging the media of anti-government journalists, especially in the run up 
to the 1994 elections. See East, R., & Pontin, J., (1997) Revolution and Change in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Pinter, London. In fact the first commercial television station did not 
begin broadcasting until October 1997, ending forty years of a state monopoly; see Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Nelvsline Report, 13 October 1997, electronic version 
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In contrast Walesa attempted to create a Presidential system in Poland. The fact that 
Walesa had the mandate of a direct election placed him in a strong position vis-a-vis the 
Sejm which - in December 1990 - was still composed of a majority of communist deputies 
elected before the end of communist rule. 269 Walesa's assertiveness became apparent when 
he called for the creation of a Presidential council. It was feared that this would become a 
shadow cabinet which would encroach on the executive authority of the prime minister. 
The 1991 Parliamentary elections initiated "the war at the top. " Up until 1992 when the 
Little Constitution to some extent alleviated the situation, the "Bermuda Triangle" - as 
Walesa termed the confrontation between the key political players of government, 
Parliament and President - battled over where executive and legislative authority lay. 
270 
Key issues involved appointments of senior personnel, de-communisation of administrative 
and military positions, and the apparent failure of successive prime ministers to conform to 
Walesa's policy line. 271 Walesa's dictatorial style and attempts to put himself "above 
politics" did not help. 272 Additionally the influence of the Church was visible in Polish 
politics. For example, the 1993 media law which stipulated that radio and television 
programs should respect Christian values. Hungary suffered far less from such conflicts. In 
particular decommunisation was not a major issue. One reason for this was that the secret 
police files were not published (although Antall had access to files) and Hungary did not 
experience public recrimination over ex-communists and possible "collaborators". 
As already mentioned (in the previous section) considerable movement was made towards 
devolving power from the centre in both countries. Yet there were still problems in 
establishing central-local power relations. Again it was in Poland where conflict was most 
apparent. 273 The first "Solidarity" government acted quickly to decentralise the political 
system and establish local self-government. The Local Self-Government Act, adopted on 
269 For elections and composition of the Sejm, see below in the chapter on Political Parties 
270 see Baylis, T. A., (1996) p. 310 
271 For example, Olszewski's government was brought down after a bitter debate 
concerning the government's release of names of alleged secret police collaborators 
occupying high public office. See for example, Mason, D. S., "Poland", in White, S., Batt, J., 
& Lewis, P. G., (1993) p. 48; and Michta, A. A., "The Presidential-Parliamentary System, " in 
Staar, R. F., (ed) (1993), p. 62-69 
272 Walesa attempted to build a non-party bloc (BBWR), seen by some as a parallel to 
Pilsudski's interwar grouping. See also more below. 
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March 22 1990 provided for local government based around the municipalities (gminy) 
which was intended to devolve power, allow for local democracy, and assist small business 
privatisation (where there was reasonable success) by making the local authority 
responsible for managing local property. 274 However, there were complaints that the 
government did not devolve sufficient power, provide sufficient resources to the local 
authorities, and that local issues were marginalised. Only the Suchocka government 
addressed these issues. 275 Much of the conflict was due to party political friction. In the 
local elections of 1990 candidates supported by Solidarity citizens committees won most 
posts. As happened at the national level - once opposition activists had defeated their 
communist opponents - internal bickering within the Solidarity movement ensued. Local 
political elites became embroiled in narrow interests dominated by personal bias and 
individual ambition, rather than community-wide issues. 276 After 1993 the Peasant and 
Left Alliance (PSL-SLD) coalition in central government wanted to postpone further local 
reforms, and made many appointments of coalition approved candidates to vovoidships. 
The governments actions were seen by some as postponing, if not stopping, 
decentralisation and recreating the politicisation of the civil service. 277 
Hungary also did not immediately solve all the issues surrounding local government or 
administrative reform. The basis for electing mayors, and the issue of co-operation 
amongst small rural villages in employing a professional rather than political 
administrative advisor to elected officials, were bones of contention. Differences between 
local and national elections (1990-1994 when most mayors were Free Democrats whilst 
national elections were won by the MDF) also meant that local interests were stoutly 
defended by the opposition. Since 1994, as part of the government alliance, the Free 
273 For more detail, see Hicks, J. F. Jr, & Kaminski, B., "Local Government Reform" in 
Staar, R., (ed) (1993) 
274 There are also Voivodships which are regional districts. Local government 
representatives are brought together in Voivodship Assemblies. Both districts and 
municipalities had some autonomy in the late communist period (1980s) but were not 
delineated from central authority or guaranteed as autonomous bodies. 
275 Staar,, R., (ed) (1993) p. 88-93 
276 see for example Bukowski, A., "Citizens' Committees in the Process of Local Power: A 
Polish Case Study, " in Gibson, J., & Hanson, P., (eds) (1996) pp. 145-161 
277 Kulesza, M., (1994) "Dlaczego Rezygnuje", Wspolnota 22/220,28 May, cited in 
Cielecka, A., & Gibson, J., "Polish Local Government: Wither the Second Stage of 
Reform", in Gibson, J., & Hanson, P., (eds) (1996) p. 138. Kulesza resigned as 
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Democrats had to practice what they preached in opposition. Hungary's advantage was 
being able to deal with these conflicts within a more settled local government political and 
economic framework from the beginning. 
Bulgaria and Romania 
In Romania and Bulgaria the continued dominance of former communists within 
institutions and administration had its effects. In Bulgaria communist dominance was to 
some extent constrained by the opposition forces that emerged in 1989. In particular the 
demise of Mladenov (forced to resign in July 1990 after publicity of his apparent 
suggestion of the use of tanks to disperse demonstrators in December 1989), and GNA 
election of oppositionist Zhelev (UDF) to President helped. Zhelev created a Political 
Consultative Council (PCC) which brought together Parliamentary groups and members of 
other organisations as a consultative body - basically a continuation of the round table. 
Although Zhelev may have been attempting to provide himself with more extensive 
executive authority, the PCC did help to contain crises when the GNA became 
ineffective. 278 
However, Zhelev could not prevent the reformed communists from maintaining control of 
much of the still centralised state system. Lukanov's government (which ended in 
November 1990) had already allowed the nomenklatura to acquire key positions in state 
banks and industries and, under the guise of reform, divert resources into new trading 
companies, banks and brokerage houses. Despite attempts by the UDF led government in 
1992 to break up the cartels, the machinery of government - still controlled by communist 
apparatchiks - delayed implementation of reform. For example, the UDF-Dimitrov 
government made vigorous efforts to break the hold of former communists over the civil 
service, but a Parliamentary decision in 1993 to prevent the divulging of secret police files 
impeded decommunisation proposals. 279 The elections of 1994, which brought a new 
plenipotentiary for administration reform objecting to Michal Strak's (PSL chief of the 
Council of Minister's Office) strategy over local government reform. 
278 See Crampton, R., in Whitefield, S., (ed) (1993) p. 20. 
279 See for example, "Human Rights and Democratization in Bulgaria", CSCE Report, 
Prepared by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
September 1993, electronic version. Other issues which generated conflict in 1991 and 
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generation of former communists to power, under Zhan Videnov, reportedly built 
patronage networks similar to those of the first BSP government. The corrupt practices of 
the old state were generally transferred to the new post-1989 state, but lacked the 
constraints of either new laws or the ideological and legal limits of the old regime. 280 
The difficulties for alternative political forces to oppose, or gain power over former 
communists could also be seen within the mass media. For example, most television and 
radio transmitters remained under government ownership, and private licensing continued 
to be complex. The majority of people outside the main cities had easy access to state run 
television, radio and newspapers. Slow implementation of new media laws and lack of 
private finance severely restricted alternative independent news sources. Despite the 
possibly deliberate delays in implementing reforms, liberalisation of the media was as 
much due to lack of access to finance and professional training, as to deliberate attempts to 
keep new technology and an independent press from emerging. 28' 
The Romanian context was more reminiscent of old regime practices, with continued 
tactics to suppress any opposition to the ruling body. The first free elections in 1990 were 
certainly flawed. Intimidation of opposition candidates and electoral fraud, especially in 
rural areas, was reputedly widespread. 282 The media was used to promote a negative image 
of groups standing in opposition to the NSF. A lack of coverage - especially on television - 
for opposing political parties and some political events distorted and manipulated public 
perception and opinion. 283 However, the decisive victory for the NSF in 1990 did not 
produce the legitimation hoped for by the NSF government. In fact, the tactics of the NSF 
1992, included the monarchy and land restitution which created rifts between the UDF and 
its coalition partner (the Turkish minority party), and with President Zhelev. See Bell, J. D., 
"Bulgaria", in White, S., Batt, J., & Lewis, P. G., (1993) pp. 93-94 
280 See more below in Chapter 6 Economic Change, and Borger, J., The Observer, 27 
October, 1996, p. 22 
281 For more details regarding communications and media change in Bulgaria in the early 
1990s, see for example Hall, L., "Post-communist Developments in the Media in Bulgaria", 
Columbia Education, electronic version, archive accessed 18/3/99 
282 see for example, Rady, M., (1992) pp. 160-173 
283 For example, in December 1989 and January 1990 protest rallies against the NSF 
political monopoly were not broadcast live on television. The population was told that a 
violent coup against the Revolution and NSF was taking place. For this and further detail 
on manipulation of information through media control and influence, see Pourchot, G.. 
"Mass Media and Democracy in Romania: Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the 
Future". in Stan, L., (ed) (1997) pp-67-90 
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gave the emerging opposition ammunition with which they attempted to undermine the 
Front's power. This was especially evident in intellectual circles, and helped to unify anti- 
Front groups into an oppositionist coalition (see below in Chapter 5). 
There was also resistance to the new regime from within state institutions. For example, 
the conflict which ensued with the army. Just as the army was involved in the 
revolutionary events of 1989, so senior personnel and sections of the military were also 
involved in the immediate aftermath. Conflict surrounded such issues as army involvement 
in the revolution and depoliticisation of the army. In particular, confrontations between the 
NSF and a group of officers (the Action Committee for the Democratisation of the army 
(CADA)) - especially over who should be minister of defence - caused potential for 
destabilisation within the army and political problems for the government. 284 
Another source of tension developed when local government elections finally took place in 
February 1992, and parties in opposition to the NSF (notably the Democratic Convention) 
won mayoral and council elections in the vast majority of major towns and cities. Central 
government perceived local authorities as a threat to stability. 285 A main source of conflict 
in local-central relations was the fact that the government did not want local authorities to 
have a role in privatisation. Despite the promise of decentralisation of powers - given in 
principle in the 1991 Law of Local Public Administration - finances were restricted by 
central authority control, while functions and actual power of local administration 
remained ambiguous. The role of the prefect - the appointed representative, seen by many 
as too similar to the party district first secretary under communism - was also viewed with 
suspicion, and seen as having greater influence at local level than elected councillors. 286 
The NSF gradually became less sure of itself and splits emerged within the party, 
especially between Iliescu, the old guard and conservative wings, and Roman and the more 
radical technocrats. Yet there is considerable evidence that a continuance of old state 
structures and practices helped to maintain Iliescu's power base. As already mentioned, 
284 For details see Watts, L., "The Romanian Army in the December Revolution and 
Beyond", in Nelson, D., (ed) (1992). 
285 See Adrian Campbell "Local Government and the Centre in Romania and Moldova", in 
Gibson, J., & Hanson, P., (eds) (1996) 
286 These views are taken from interviews with local mayors (March 1993) in Campbell, A., 
"Local government in Romania", in Coulson (ed) (1995) p. 82 
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NSF influence over the media - especially television - was utilised to promote the Front as 
the "the emanation of a popular anti-Ceausescu revolt" during the revolution. Influence 
over the media continued during the early post-1989 period. It became apparent that the 
NSF commitment to democratic practices and "freedoms" were continually recast, and 
honoured only to the degree that media outlets did not question the NSF's chosen path to 
democracy. Biased and limited reporting of political events cast opposition parties and 
those questioning NSF practice in a negative, illegitimate light. Iliescu also cultivated links 
with the successor to the communist trade union, the National Confederation of Romanian 
Free Trade Unions (NCRFTU), whose members in the mining communities were 
subsequently deployed in his own private army. 287 Iliescu enjoyed support from the 
nomenklatura who still occupied key positions within the bureaucracy. There is also 
evidence that another central prop of the old regime was left intact. Although a new 
intelligence service was supposedly subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, there were 
suggestions that the Securitate was resurrected in the guise of the Romanian Intelligence 
Service (SRI), and that old surveillance techniques continued to be used for personal and 
political purposes. 288 
Romania's post-communist regime retained the greatest control of the political system, and 
appeared more unwilling to decentralise institutions or reform political practices. However, 
none of the post-communist regimes could avoid political conflicts within the changing 
systems, nor could they dismiss issues raised. In particular the consequences of economic 
issues could not be ignored once the new regimes had submitted themselves to open 
elections. 
287 see previously in Chapter 3& Rady, M., (1992) p. 184 
288 see for example, Borger, J., The Guardian, 16 November 1996 p. 15. There is also 
evidence of nine post-communist intelligence agencies with connections to the Securitate, 
Baleaunu, V. G., "The Enemy Within: The Romanian Intelligence Service in Transition", 
Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, Camberley, 
Surrey, electronic version 
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Some Political Consequences of Economic Reform289 
Attempts to reform the economies inevitably had political consequences, and was an issue 
which none of the regimes could afford to ignore. For example, in Hungary both 
opposition and government alike realised that their political future hinged on the success of 
economic restructuring. 290 This was a critical factor in building political support at the 
societal level, as well as amongst political elites. In fact, in all four countries a political 
backlash towards incumbent governments was experienced after 1989, partly due to 
economic conditions. Various explanations have been put forward, from the increase in 
unemployment through increasing uncertainty related to economic disruption, and 
increases in income inequality. 29 1 Also such issues as the introduction of State Property 
organisations to oversee privatisation programmes were generally seen as increasing state 
bureaucracy and aiding state managers to become part of the new economic elite. 292 
Examples of government tensions arising from these kinds of issues, and the repercussions 
for governments from the electorate will be compared between the two cases. 
Poland and Hungary 
In Poland in 1990, the effects of rapid economic change created tensions within and 
between political parties and coalitions as well as between Parliament and President. 
Although Walesa backed the economic reform programme of the government once he 
became President, he strongly criticised the first post-communist government's approach in 
1990, and it was not long before "shock treatment" was dropped as a slogan. 293 One policy 
mistake of the 1990 to 1991 period was excessively optimistic official forecasts of the 
extent and length of recession. The failure of prophesied recovery to materialise damaged 
289 Details of economic reform will not be discussed here. For details of economic reform 
processes mentioned in this section please refer to Chapter 6 below. 
290 See for example, Fellegi, T. L., "Regime Transformation and the Mid-Level Bureaucratic 
Forces in Hungary", in Volten, P. M., (ed) (1992) pp. 119-150 
291 For example, these kind of explanations are discussed in Roland, G., "Political 
constraints and the transition experience", in Zecchini, S., (ed) (1997) Lessons from the 
Economic Transition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, US & the Netherlands, pp. 169-187 
292 The consequences of this issue will be addressed more fully in the Social Change 
section in Chapter 6 
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the credibility of the Mazowiecki and Bielicki governments' economic programmes. A 
further charge against Mazowiecki was that he had sold the country's business to foreigners 
too cheaply. Few businesses had actually been sold at the time, but the allegations 
contributed to his defeat in the 1991 Sejm elections, and in the first round of the 
Presidential elections of November 1990.294 The first non-communist government also 
under-estimated the strength of insider coalitions who were able to block mass 
privatisation plans. 
Successive cabinets became reluctant to introduce further austerity measures, and 
Balcerowicz (the initiator of rapid economic reform) was dropped from the Olszewski 
cabinet in December 1991. Fragile coalitions made it difficult for Olszewski - who faced 
opposition from an alliance of the left and economic liberals - and subsequently Suchocka - 
who faced pressure from the Sjem over radical plans to restructure the coal industry - to 
implement economic plans to alleviate macro-economic crises. In fact the Suchocka 
government fell due to a refusal to amend the budget which was to permit pay rises for 
striking health and education workers. 
In Hungary in 1990, in the run up to the election, the two main "opposition" parties (the 
MDF and SzDSz) displayed similar stances on the economy: both advocated privatisation 
and the expansion of the free market, whilst neither party paid much attention to the 
possibility of growing social inequalities or unemployment. It is argued that there was a 
considerable social-democratic constituency within the Hungarian electorate which 
remained unmobilised in the 1990 elections, which was reflected in the low voter 
turnout. 295 A lack of support for the first post-communist government was also indicated 
by the fact that the MDF were in trouble within months of receiving an apparent mandate 
to govern. They were unable to institute a petrol price rise in October 1990 as truck and 
taxi drivers blockaded roads throughout the country. Two months later the State Secretary 
293 "shock treatment" refers to the rapid economic reform programme put forward by 
Balcerowicz. For more detail see below in Chapter 6 
294 The accusation was made by returning emigre Stanislaw Tyminski who ran against 
Mazowiecki during the Presidential campaign. Linden, R. H., "The New International 
Political Economy of East Europe, " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXV, No. I. 
March 1992, pp. 3-22, especially pp. 18-19 
295 See for example, Szelenyi, S., "The Vacuum in Hungarian Politics: Class and Parties", 
New Left Review, 187.1991 pp. 121-13 7 
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for Economic Policy Gyorgy Matolcsy, and Finance Minister Ferenc Rabar, resigned as a 
result of a dispute over the pace of reform. 
One source of controversy within the Hungarian government in the 1990 to 1994 period 
was the county's relationship with international creditors and the management of the debt 
crisis. Conflicts between political personnel over how to deal with debt management 
alongside the failure of economic policy to deliver an increase in living standards increased 
political tensions, and roused nationalist factions within the governing coalition. 296 
Bulgaria and Romania 
In Bulgaria, the small majority held by the BSP after the 1990 elections did not aid the 
passage of economic reform programmes presented by the government. Lukanov presented 
two successive economic programmes which failed to find legislative support. The second 
programme of November 1990 led to nation-wide strikes and to the downfall of the 
government. After the 1991 election, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) failed to 
improve matters as reform proceeded slowly and the economy stagnated. The UDF were 
out of office within the year. The instability of successive cross-party governments also did 
not ease the situation. In 1992 a more than six fold price rise created a less than 
sympathetic atmosphere amongst the population towards a continuation of radical 
economic change. Key economic policy "shocks" created enormous opposition to further 
change. 297 By 1994 no government had managed to produce any substantial reform 
measures or prevented the economy from moving towards deeper economic crisis. The 
consequence of the return of the BSP in 1994 was even more catastrophic. By 1996 a 
severe economic crisis led to the BSP rapidly losing its credibility. Mass demonstrations 
forced an election early in 1997. The UDF won the election and subsequently the 
membership of the BSP dramatically declined. 298 
296 See more below in Chapter 5; and for example, Andor, L., "The Role of the Debt Crisis 
in Hungary's Transition", Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, No. 52, Autumn 1995, pp. 84- 
99 
297 Jones, D. C., & Miller, J. B., "Early Transition in Bulgaria: Review and Evaluation", in 
Jones, D. C., & Miller, J. B., (eds) (1997) The Bulgarian Economy. Lessons from Reform 
during Early Transition, Avebury, UK & US, p. 7 
298 See Michael Shafir, RFE/RL Newsline, 27/4/98, Electronic Version. 
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In Romania hesitant movement towards democracy and a market economy produced 
public discontent and contributed to early divisions within the NSF. The liberalisation of 
almost 50% of prices in November 1990 produced a three fold increase by the end of the 
year. The resulting widespread protests reflected a growing discontent amongst the 
population for the effects of increasing inflation and accelerating unemployment. 
Continuing strikes into December forced the government to defer price liberalisation. 
Matters finally came to a head in September 1991 when the Jiu valley miners descended on 
Bucharest, not - as in 1990 - as pro-government shocktroops, but this time with the 
government as their target. Petre Roman was forced to resign, and a power struggle within 
the NSF ensued. Iliescu's initial endorsement of Roman's stated aim of transforming the 
economy into a competitive one had become increasingly lukewarm. The miners created 
the opportunity for Iliescu to replace Roman with more conservative Prime Ministers 
(Stolojan, and in November 1992 Vacarioiu). Reformers within the NSF were gradually 
marginalised. As a result, the liberalisation measures of 1991 were far less radical than 
those originally proposed. After the local elections of 1992 the party formally split into two 
rival parties. 
Electoral support for Iliescu's DNSF in the 1992 national elections declined significantly in 
comparison to NSF support in 1990 (see Chapter 5 on Political Parties). However, Iliescu's 
Presidential success allowed him to control the formation of government. Vacaroiu's non- 
party government relied on the support of the DNSF and ultra-nationalist parties for its 
survival. The government continued hesitant reform, but by 1993 public opinion polls 
indicated dissatisfaction with material conditions and the performance of the Vacaroiu 
government in managing system change. 299 By 1994, the government faced growing 
industrial unrest and large scale strikes. The government blamed political instability and 
299 Adevarul (23 December 1993 and 17/18 December 1994) reported that only 3% of the 
population felt their material conditions were much better, 25% somewhat better, and the 
rest that conditions were the same or worse. As much as 42% were dissatisfied with 
Vacaroiu's performance and 26% very dissatisfied. See Weiner, R., "Democratization in 
Romania" in Stan, L., (ed) (1997) p. 12. Also in November 1993 the Caritas pyramid 
investment scheme began to collapse. Oppositionists denounced the scheme as a scam, 
while the government made no attempt to intervene. The government's reliance on the 
extreme nationalists may have had an influence. The leader of the group, the mayor of 
Cluj, was an avid Caritas supporter. See Branson, L., "Romania faces a harsh reality", 
Sunday Times, 7 November 1993, CD-ROM 
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the slow progress towards a market economy on miners' previous actions. 300 Continued 
failure to speed up privatisation and economic reform eventually contributed to the further 
downturn in electoral support, and final defeat for Iliescu and his party in 1996. 
Conclusion 
In all four countries post-communist regimes had to face issues arising from attempts to 
change the political and economic systems which had consequences for political elites in 
power. Free elections meant none of the post-communist regimes could ignore issues 
raised by the changing systems. This was especially evident regarding problems arising 
from economic change. These issues not only created divisions within and between 
political elites, but also created a backlash against incumbent governments from society. In 
Romania Iliescu utilised economic issues to remove those opposing him. However, in the 
end he also lost popularity, partly because of the slow pace of reform. Even the former 
communist dominated regimes of Bulgaria and Romania had to attend to the high 
expectations for change from the electorate (see more in following chapters, especially 
Chapter 6). 
Additionally, despite considerable institutional change in all four countries, elements of the 
old state structures and systems were retained. However, the differences in political 
structures and systems already evident by 1989, and the differing forms of revolution, 
appeared to have an impact on outcomes. 
In Poland and Hungary smaller, less clientelistic communist state bureaucracies, partially 
dismantled or dislocated party-states, and more "professionalised" militaries provided 
partially restructured systems by 1989. This alongside the involvement of established 
opposition groups in Round Table negotiations, and the political marginalisation of former 
communists immediately after the first free elections, aided reform processes during and 
after 1989. Polish and Hungarian post-communist regimes had both alternative political 
elites, and the structural foundations, to further decentralise the political systems. Although 
there was considerable political conflict over certain aspects of political reform (especially 
300 See Borger, J., "Strike adds to Romanian government troubles", The Guardian, 28 
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in Poland), there was at least a general consensus that further political change should take 
place, and a basis already present for political autonomy, especially at the local level. 
In Bulgaria and Romania larger, clientelistic bureaucracies overseen by leadership oriented 
parties and hierarchical party-states prior to 1989, created conditions within which former 
communist party members could dominate political processes and maintain control over 
unrestructured, highly centralised states after 1989. In Bulgaria the newly formed 
opposition had some impact, as political conflict emerged over the establishment of new 
institutions and reform processes. However, the former communists in both countries were 
initially relatively unchallenged by anti-communist opposition forces resulting in less 
political decentralisation, and a slower pace of reform after 1989. 
It appears that where the state was more decentralised in the pre-1989 period, more 
decentralisation was at least on the agenda in the post-1989 period, if not actually 
implemented. Where the political systems were less oppressive and more open during the 
late communist period, they continued to be more open to processes of change in the post- 
communist period. Where the revolutions were negotiated, there appeared to be better 
prospects for alternative elites to participate in government, and move the reform process 
forward. 
There were also differences within the cases. Each country developed particular political 
institutions and power relationships. This was partly due to the particular nature of each 
communist system, and to the form and timing of regime change during 1989 and early 
1990. For example, the Polish semi-free elections in 1989 and the pact made with the 
communists, at a time when neither side were sure of Soviet reaction, led to a directly 
elected President which had its effects for presidential-parliamentary relations, as did the 
personality of Walesa. In Hungary the inability of any one group to dominate during the 
"negotiated" process led to the blocking of a directly elected President, and less conflictual 
institutional power relations. In Bulgaria some opposition involvement in revolutionary 
processes resulted in some constraints on former communist domination. While in 
Romania the lack of organised opposition involvement in the 1989 events enabled Iliescu 
in particular to manipulate political processes, despite internal party conflicts. 
February 1994, CD-ROM 
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Despite the emphasis in this chapter on the effects of more complete regime change in 
Poland and Hungary, the marginalisation of former communists from politics in the early 
1990s did not exclude them from regaining political power, or completely marginalise 
them from economic elite positions. As we shall see (in the following chapters) former 
communists in this case rapidly reorganised and reoriented themselves within the changing 
political and economic systems. The new political parties in Poland and Hungary were not 
well consolidated and lacked experience in government. Governing coalitions were subject 
to instability (especially in Poland), and parties suffered the effects of personal rivalries. 
For much of society the perception was that they had merely exchanged one political elite 
for another who continued to control the state, and consequently their lives. 301 Society 
could, of course, express political opinion, and actively participate through voting in 
competitive elections for the first time in over forty years. However a proliferation of new 
and reformed parties, coupled with sometimes complex electoral systems provided a 
confusing array of choices. The change from a one-party to multi-party system was an 
important element of political change, and it is to political parties and party systems that 
we now turn in order to complete the discussion of the main political aspects of the post- 
communist systems. 
301 More will be said on this aspect in terms of political apathy, lack of confidence in 
politicians, and low voter turnout, see below in Chapter 6; and for example see Gortat, R., 
& Marciniak, P., "On the Road to Democracy: the Emergence of Political Parties in 
Poland, " in Wightman, G., (ed) (1995) p. 49 
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Chapter 5 Political Parties and Party Systems 
The first semi-free and free elections in 1989 and 1990 changed the dimensions of party 
politics in all four countries. The communist parties lost their monopoly of power and a 
proliferation of new and re-established parties appeared on the electoral landscape. 302 This 
chapter will examine some of the dimensions of political parties within the post-communist 
context. This includes first, describing a variety of new and reconstituted parties, their 
electoral positions, and some aspects of the fluctuating party systems; and second, 
discussing party identification in terms of ideological representation with a particular focus 
on two prominent aspects: nationalism and populism. 
Differences between the cases in terms of political party development can be traced. We 
have already seen that the political, economic and social conditions in 1989 provided the 
context within which opposition movements in Poland and Hungary could take part in 
negotiations to change the political systems. This had its effects for post-1989 party 
developments. By contrast, Bulgarian and especially Romanian opposition movements 
lacked organisation and influence within revolutionary processes which did not prevent the 
formation of new and alternative political parties, but appeared to slow their development 
and have different consequences for former communist parties. The main focus of this 
chapter is to examine the differences (and similarities) in post-1989 political party 
development, and the conditions apparent in shaping those developments. 
In order to investigate the post-1989 parties and party systems the main political parties 
which were part of governments from 1989 to 1997 will be described and discussed. In the 
first part of the chapter the parties are divided into three categories: traditional parties with 
historic roots in the inter-war years (and in some cases continuance as "satellites" during 
communist rule); new parties which were mainly formed as part of an anti-communist 
bloc; and lastly the reformed communist parties. This is perhaps a simplistic categorisation 
302 For an extensive review of political parties in the early 1990s, see Szajkowski, B., (ed) 
(1991) Nei i, Political Parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Longman. 
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which follows a mainly genetic typology. 303 However, it will serve to distinguish the 
differences in development of the main political parties within the post-communist 
systems. 
The second part of the chapter will discuss ideological aspects of the political parties 
highlighting the main trends of ideological representation apparent within and between the 
two cases. We shall see that the lack of established and organised anti-communist 
opposition movements in Bulgaria and Romania in 1989 appeared to delay processes of 
party development relative to the Polish and Hungarian case. Although there are some 
particular differences within the cases, patterns of difference between the cases can be 
highlighted. 
5.1 New and Reformed Political Parties 
The Polish political parties present a complex scene which is not easily interpreted. The 
initial Solidarity "anti-communist bloc" which contested the first semi-free elections as a 
collectivist, essentially non-pluralist force, fragmented rapidly after the initial phase of 
communist opposition. Personal rivalries (especially during the presidential election 
campaign of December 1990), development of new political groups and associations 
alongside shifting party affiliations and coalitions, produced a confusing number of 
electoral choices for subsequent free elections of 1991 and 1993. The proportional 
electoral system coupled with factional parties and conflictual politics meant governments 
were also subject to instability. 304 
303 For this typology and a thorough discussion of party formation processes see Agh, A., 
(1998) The Politics of Central Europe, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks & New Delhi, 
es ecially pp. 113-123 
30 The Polish electoral system appeared to have a significant impact on the number of 
parties (29 groups received seats in the Sejm in the first free elections in 1991), but the 
result was not as proportional as first assumed, see for example, Kuusela, K., "The 
Founding Electoral Systems in Eastern Europe 1989-91", in Pridham, G., & Vanhanen, T., 
(eds) (1994), especially pp. 130-135. The electoral law for the May 1993 elections 
introduced a 5% threshold, or 8% for a coalition of parties, which led to electoral alliances 
and party mergers. This reduced the number of parties in the Sejm and left 35% of 
electorate unrepresented, see Enriquez, C. G., "Electoral Behaviour in Central and Eastern 
Europe" Politicka Revue, to be published (Cevres 96/97). ) 
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In comparison, Hungary's parties were more stable entities. The Hungarian parties 
appeared uniquely as consolidated political parties for the first free elections of 1990. 
Although some factionalism took place within the parties, the six parliamentary parties of 
the 1990 legislature continued in their basic form to contest the elections of 1994. This was 
partly due to the party nomination process and electoral system, which, although complex, 
tended to discourage small minority parties and parliamentary factionalism. 305 Also 
important - despite aggressive electoral campaigning in the run up to the first elections - 
was the willingness on the part of the political elite to make compromises over 
constitutional matters for the sake of stability. 306 In both Poland and Hungary 
"oppositionists" defeated reformed communists and formed government coalitions in the 
first post-communist legislative periods. However, by the second free elections, reformed 
communists regained their electoral strength and formed new governments (Hungary 1994 
and Poland 1993). Despite the marginalisation of former communist parties from political 
power immediately after 1989, they were to successfully reorganise and "reinvent" 
themselves within a short time period (as we shall see in the second part of this chapter). 
A Bulgarian opposition "front" also managed some electoral success immediately after 
1989. However, it was not until the second free election of October 1991 that the Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) formed a government, and the party's influence was relatively 
weak and short-lived. Like Polish opposition forces, UDF factionalism did not assist in 
producing stable governments. Additionally the Bulgarian anti-communist bloc did not 
obtain a substantial majority in the assembly. In Romania the anti-communist opposition 
had difficulty in competing against the NSF, and it took from 1990 to 1996 for an electoral 
force to become strong enough to form an alternative government. 
There are many reasons for these differences between the countries including the impact of 
electoral systems, electoral behaviour as well as ideological and institutional aspects. 
305 For comments on the electoral system see Racz, B., "The 1990 Elections in Hungary", 
Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 1991, pp. 107-136 and for effects of the electoral system on 
the parties see Hibbing, J., & Patterson, S., "The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990". 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24, No-4 January 1992 especially pp. 440-453. 
306 See Ilonszki, G., "Tradition and Innovation in the Development of Parliamentary 
Government in Hungary", Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1993, 
pp. 253-265. 
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Detail of these aspects will not be addressed here. 307 Although relevant points will be 
mentioned as appropriate, the main purpose of this chapter is to discern the patterns of 
difference in party development by comparing the two cases. 
Traditional Political Parties 
In all four countries some traditional political parties - or parties pertaining to have historic 
roots - were reformed to compete in the first free elections. Despite their historic identity 
none did well initially in terms of percentage vote, although several survived as coalition 
partners in government. 
Some of the oldest political parties of the region were the social democratic parties. In all 
except Bulgaria they did poorly in the first post-communist elections mainly because of 
their association with the communists; their forced absorption into communist parties or 
popular fronts during the communist take-overs of the 1940s discredited them. The most 
notable traditional parties to re-emerge during the post-communist period were Christian 
and peasant parties. 
Poland and Hungary 
In Poland, the particular circumstances of the first elections of 1989 and the Solidarity 
victory - which acted as a referendum on communist rule - left little room for the 
307 There is substantial literature on aspects such as the influence of electoral systems on 
party formation, party political fortunes, and political culture. See for example, previously 
mentioned texts in footnote 4; Simon, J., "Electoral Systems and Regime Change", 
Representation, Vol. 35, Nos 2&3, Spring/Autumn 1998, especially pp. 44-50; and 
Meyer, G., "The Socialists' Rise to Power and the Democratization of Political Cultures in 
East-Central Europe", in Los-Nowak, T., Armstrong, D., (eds) (1997) Emerging 
Conceptions of Democracy in Transition Europe, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wrolawskiego, Wroclaw. However, the details of such influences are only partially 
relevant to the patterns of difference which are discernable here. Just as political 
institutions do not follow any pattern between the cases, so electoral systems are different 
in each country. This is not to say that the choice of political institutions and electoral 
systems had no effects, but that their relevance appears relatively insignificant to the 
argument presented here. 
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resurgence of traditional parties. 308 The "satellite" parties: the Peasant party (ZSL), 
Democratic Party (SD) and three Catholic groupings were guaranteed seats alongside the 
communists under the round table agreement whereby 65% of seats were uncontested (the 
ZSL got 16.5% of vote). By the 1991 elections much of the political spectrum had 
attempted to establish links with traditions of the inter-war era. Yet, there were few with 
any clear linkage to parties of the inter-war or early post-war period. This fact was partly 
due to the proliferation of parties and the continual splits, mergers, alliances and further 
splits within various movements, party blocs and political camps. 
One "historic" community which provided potential support for a revived party was the 
peasant population. The peasants were a potential source of unified support, becoming one 
of the most disaffected groups in society in 1991. However, apart from a re-established 
peasant party, few parties vying for the agrarian vote could claim a clear connection to 
Wito's inter-war peasant party and the post-war party of Mikolajczyk. 309 It was the Polish 
Peasant Party (PSL) - mainly consisting of the successor to the United Peasant "satellite" 
(ZSL) - which became the leading agrarian party. The PSL had the advantage of an 
organisational structure inherited from the communist period, and although it had a lower 
membership than Rural Solidarity, retained a disciplined following. The Democratic Party, 
the other main "successor" party, received less than 2% of the vote and gained 1 seat in the 
Sejm (see Table 5.1 below). 
308 In the Polish semi-free elections of 1989 the Solidarity Parliamentary Group (OKP) 
comprised candidates who claimed diverse identities, including social democrats, worker 
self-management activists, liberals, agrarians, christian democrats and right wing 
conservatives. See Barany, Z., & Vinton, L., "Breakthrough to Democracy: Elections in 
Poland and Hungary", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXIII No. 2, Summer 
1990 pp. 191-212. 
309 The Polish Peasant Party "Wilanow" reestablished in 1989 merged with the successor to 
the communist satellite (ZSL) in 1990. By the spring of 1991 several peasant parties 
(including rural movements associated with Solidarity) agreed a common programme. 
However the coalition broke down and two electoral peasant alliances contested the 1991 
elections: the PSL-Programmatic Alliance (which included the Union of rural Youth and 
the network of Rural Circles) and the Peasant Accord (PL) which consisted mainly of the 
Solidarity movement. See Millard, F., (1993) p. 843; and Rivera, S. W., "Historical 
Cleavages or Transition Mode? influences on the Emerging Party Sytems in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, " Party Politics, Vol 2 No. 2 1996, pp. 177-208, Sage 
Publications, notes to Appendix Table A2. 
For claims to traditional credentials, especially of the Right, see for example 
Macdonald, O., "The Polish Right", Labour Focus on Eastern Europe , No. 
2,1990 pp. 17- 
23. 
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The PSL became one of the most stable groups in the Sejm. The party headed three 
ministries in the Mazowiecki government and was reformed and vigorously "cleansed" of 
its communist affiliations between 1990 and 1991. It gained 48 seats in the 1991 elections 
to become the fourth largest parliamentary group. Peasant party leader, Waldemar Pawlak, 
became the third nominee after Mazowiecki for Prime Minister, but was unable to form a 
coalition at that time. In the 1993 elections the PSL held the second largest number of 
parliamentary seats and became coalition partner to the reformed communist government, 
with Pawlak as Prime Minister. However by the 1997 elections the PSL saw its support in 
the countryside collapse. 
Table 5.1 Polish Elections 
Sejm Election 1989 
Party Sejm Seats Percentage Vote 
PUWP 173 37.5 
United Peasant Party (ZSL) 76 16.5 
Democratic Party (SD) 27 6.0 
Christian Groups 23 5.0 
Solidarity 161 35.0 
Source: Millard, F., (1994) The Anatomy of the New Poland, Edward Elgar, Hants & 
Vermont, p. 66 
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Seim Election 1991 
Party Sejm Seats Percentage Vote 
Democratic Union(DU) 62 12.31 
Alliance of the Democratic 60 11.98 
Left (SLD) 
Catholic Election Action 49 8.73 
(WAK) 
Centrum 44 8.71 
Peasant Party-Programmatic 48 8.67 
Alliance (PSL) 
Confederation for Independent 46 7.50 
Poland (KPN) 
Liberal Democratic Congress 37 7.48 
(KLD) 
PL 28 5.46 
Solidarity 27 5.05 
Friends of Beer 16 3.27 
German Minority 7 1.17 
Total Sejm seats 460. 
18 other parties were represented in the Sejm with between 1 and 5 seats, all having less 
than 3% of the vote. 
13 parties were represented in the Senate with the Democratic Union receiving the highest 
number (21 seats). 
Source: Millard, F., (1994) p. 137 
Sejm Election 1993 
Party Sejm Seats Percentage Vote 
SLD 171 20.4 
PSL 132 15.4 
DU 74 10.6 
Labour Union 41 7.3 
KPN 22 5.8 
Non-Part Bloc (BBWR) 16 5.4 
German Minority 4 n/a 
9 other parties (including Solidarity, KLD and PL) did not receive enough votes to provide 
them with seats, leaving some 35% of the electorate unrepresented. In the Senate election 
the SLD and PSL were the most successful with 37 and 36 seats respectively. Solidarity 
received 10 seats, the Democratic Union 4, and 13 seats went to other parties. 
Source: Keesings Archives, September 1993, p. 39644; and Rivera, S. W., (1996) p. 199 
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Sejm Election 1997 
Party Sejm Seats Percentage Vote 
Solidarity Electoral Alliance 201 33.8 
SLD 164 27.1 
Freedom Union 60 13.4 
PSL 27 7.3 
Movement for the 6 5.6 
Reconstruction of Poland 
German minority 2 n/a 
Solidarity Electoral Alliance also received the most seats in the Senate (51), SLD had 28 
seats, and other parties 8 seats or less. 
Source: Keesings Archives, Vol. 43, No. 9, September 1997, p. 41832 
Unlike Poland, two parties with historic roots were initially prominent in Hungary. First of 
these was the Christian Democratic People's Party (CDPP). This was the successor to the 
strongly anti-communist Democratic People's Party formed after the Second World War. It 
was reformed in June 1989 by politicians who had been members of the party before the 
communist take-over. The party remained relatively stable from its formation, and its 
membership and local activity grew steadily from 1989. The second traditional party was 
the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP). Reformed in November 1988, the party's 
origins go back to the beginning of the century. It was also the largest party immediately 
after World War II. The reformed party was the first to organise supporters at the local 
level and by the end of 1990 claimed a membership of between 60,000 to 70,000. The 
parliamentary party was subject to a number of factional conflicts and defections. 310 Part ly 
as a result, the FKGP had a poorer electoral showing in 1994. Both these traditional parties 
became coalition partners in government with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in 
1990, and went into opposition after the reformed communists won an overall majority in 
1994 (see Table 5.2 below) 
310 see Lomax, B., "Obstacles to the Development of Democratic Politics", in Cox, T., & 
Furlong, A., (eds) (1995) Hungary: The Politics of Transition, Frank Cass, London, pp. 81- 
100 
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Table 5.2 Hungarian Elections 
Parliamentary Election 1990 
Party 
Hungarian Democratic 
Forum (MDF) 
Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SzDSz) 
Independent Smallholders 
Party (FKGP) 
Hungarian Socialist Party 
(MSP) 
Alliance of Young 
Democrats (Fidesz) 
CDPP 
Agrarian Alliance 
Independents 
Joint Candidate 
Seats 
165 
91 
44 
33 
21 
21 
1 
6 
4 
Percentage Vote 
24.73 
21.39 
11.73 
10.89 
8.95 
6.46 
3.15 
Seats represent the total number of seats won in single-member districts, and on regional 
and national lists. Percentage Vote represent the national share of votes. 
Source: Rivera, S. W., (1996) p. 201 
Parliamentary Election 1994 
Party Seats Percentage Vote 
MDF 38 11.74 
SzDSz 69 19.74 
FKGP 26 8.82 
MSP 209 32.99 
Fidesz 20 7.02 
CDPP 22 7.03 
Agrarian Alliance 2 2.10 
Source: Rivera, S. W., (1996) p. 201 
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Bulgaria and Romania 
There were four parties in Bulgaria which existed prior to communism which were re- 
established in the post-communist period: the Democratic Party, the Radical Democratic 
Party, The Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party (BSDP) and the Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union-Nikola Petkov (BZNS-NP). The latter two were the most significant and 
the largest formations in the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) in 1990. However, by the 
elections of 1991, major factions of these parties had left the UDF and failed to receive a 
significant percentage of the vote. Like Poland, agrarian parties in Bulgaria had a strong 
heritage. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) was particularly significant in 
the inter-war period, producing the historic Stamboliiski government of the early 1920s. 31' 
BANU also retained a token existence during communism which gave it a nation-wide 
organisation; an advantage denied other emergent Bulgarian parties in early 1990. 
Additionally - like the Polish agrarian movement - the agrarians were subject to a number 
of factional disputes, splits and further fusions, which resulted in a fragmented movement 
with seven parties and coalitions claiming to be heirs to the original BANU. 312 By the 
December 1994 elections one faction, BANU "A. Stamboliiski", was part of the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (BSP) coalition which won a resounding victory, one faction remained in 
the UDF, whereas the other major factions disappeared from the legislature (see table 5.3 
below). 
311 Aleksandur Stamboliski's Peasant Union ruled Bulgaria from October 1919 to June 
1923. Stamboliski purported to represent the peasantry and one of his main achievements 
was an egalitarian land reform. However, his methods - and that of his Orange Guard - 
were often brutal, and he and his active supporters were wiped out in a bloody military 
coup in 1923. See Bideleux, R., & Jeffries, I., (1998) pp. 453-454 
312 For some of the complexities of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Unions' factions and 
disputes see Waller, M., "Making and Breaking: Factions in the Process of Party 
Formations in Bulgaria", in Gillespie, R., Waller, M., & Nieto, L. L., (eds) (1995) Factional 
Politics and Democratization, Frank Cass, London, pp. 152-167 
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Table 5.3 Bulgarian Elections 
Constituent Assembly Election June 1990 
Party 
BSP 
UDF 
MRF 
BANU 
Others 
Seats Percentage Vote 
221 47.15 
144 36.20 
23 6.03 
16 8.03 
6 
Source: Karasimeonov, G., "The Legislature in Post-Communist Bulgaria", in Olsen, & 
Norton, (eds) (1996) p. 44 
Parliamentary Elections October 1991 
Party 
BSP 
UDF 
MRF 
Seats Percentage Vote 
106 33.14 
110 34.36 
24 7.55 
All other parties received less than 4% of the vote. Source: Karasimeonov, G., "The 
Legislature in Post-Communist Bulgaria", in Olsen, & Norton, (eds) (1996) p. 49 
Parliamentary Elections December 1994a 
Party Seats Percentage Vote 
BSP* 125 43.50 
UDF 69 24.23 
National Union 18 6.50 
MRF 15 5.44 
Bulgarian Business Bloc 13 4.72 
'Results for major parties from 40 registered. 
*BSP in coalition with BANU A. Stamboliski and Political Club for Ekoglasnost. 
Source: Karasimeonov, G., "Parliamentary Elections of 1994 and the Development of the 
Bulgarian Party System", Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4,1995, p. 583 
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Parliamentary Elections April 1997 
Party Seats 
UDF 137 
Democratic Left 58 
Union for National Salvation 19 
Coalition Euro-Left 14 
Bulgarian Business Bloc 12 
The UDF coalition comprises the Union of Democratic Forces (DS); the Democratic Party 
(DP); the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (BZNS); and the Bulgarian Social 
Democratic Party (BSDP). The Democratic Left Bloc consists of the BSP and the 
Ecoglasnost Political Club. The Union for National Salvation comprises the Turkish bloc; 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms alongside smaller monarchist and centrist groups. 
Source: Keesings Archives, Vol. 43, No. 4, April 1997, p. 41604 
Two historic parties emerged by January 1990 in Romania to contest National Salvation 
Front (NSF) dominance. The National Liberal Party (NLP) and the National Peasant Party 
(NPP) were hastily reconstituted from the remnants of their pre-communist equivalents. 313 
Unlike Bulgaria, there was no "satellite" organisations, or continuity of membership to 
sustain either party during communist rule. The ruthless communism of the early post-war 
years and decades of state propaganda totally discredited their attempts to associate 
themselves with their inter-war predecessors. For many poorly educated rural people the 
inter-war period was remembered as a time of exploitation by rural landlords and urban 
capitalists. In consequence many people were disinclined to vote for parties stressing their 
"historic" affiliations. The NLP no longer had an entrepreneurial electorate and the peasant 
party had difficulty in appealing to what should have been its natural social base. Neither 
the rural population nor the urban "worker-peasant" appeared to associate with parties that 
urged individuality or independence from the state. 314 Like many other new or renewed 
parties of the region factionalism became a feature of party development. Internal rivalries 
between returning emigres and resident activists, low membership and lack of popular 
appeal served to diminish initial hopes that they would regain a leading role in national 
politics. 
313 in 1991 the NPP added the suffix Christian Democrat to become the NPP-CD 
314 see Gallagher, T., (1995) Romania After Ceausescu, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, pp. 144-147 
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In the first post-communist elections of May 1990 neither "historic" party made any 
significant inroads into the electoral scene (see Table 5.4 below). The failure to agree a 
common opposition candidate for the Presidency or a common list for the two houses of 
parliament did not assist their campaign. After the elections internal dissension and mutual 
recriminations led to splits in the parties. 315 By the time of the February 1992 local 
elections, the two historic parties ran on the joint lists of the Democratic Convention 
(DCR). This alliance of groups included several other parties and associations which ran in 
opposition to the NSF (see New Political Parties below). Despite a strong showing for the 
DCR in the local elections, the NLP withdrew from the DCR for the national elections of 
September 1992.316 The NLP had already participated in the caretaker government of 
October 1991 to October 1992, headed by the independent technocrat Theodor Stolojan. 
Several NLP deputies took ministerial portfolios, but could do little to alter policy. This 
alternation between opposition and tacit co-operation with the NSF did little to enhance the 
party as a focus for popular protest, and contributed to the final break up of the party. The 
NPP-CD was less prone to splits and remained more strongly associated and allied to a 
democratic opposition. However, neither party was able to win significant electoral support 
as independent parties. 
One further phenomenon peculiar to Bulgaria and Romania was the popularity of 
monarchist parties. Although the monarchist parties did not gain significant electoral 
support, the visit of Michael to Romania in 1992 and Simeon to Bulgaria in 1996 were 
significant events for much of the population. The exiled monarchs popularity caused 
considerable political concern and in Romania, Michael was regarded as a threat to the 
ruling socialists. 317 
315 see Almond, M., "Romania Since the Revolution", Government and Opposition, Vol. 25, 
1990, pp. 484-496 
316 see Shafir, M., "The Revival of the Political Right in Post-Communist Romania", in 
Held, J., (1993) Democracy and Right-Wing Politics in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, East 
European Monographs, Boulder, pp. 153-174 
317 Georgieff, A., "Kings of Romania and Bulgaria Dream of a Comeback", The European 
Magazine, 30 January -5 February 1997 pp. 14-15 
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Table 5.4 Romanian Elections 
Parliamentary Election 1990: Assembly of Deputies 
Party Seats Percentage Vote 
National Salvation Front 263 66.31 
(NSF) 
Hungarian Democratic Union 29 7.23 
of Romania (HDFR) 
National Liberal Party (NLP) 29 6.41 
Romania Ecological 12 2.62 
Movement 
National Peasant Party (NPP) 12 2.56 
Alliance for United Romania 9 2.12 
Democratic Agrarian Party 9 1.83 
Romanian Ecological Party 8 1.69 
Romanian Socialist 5 1.05 
Democratic Party 
Social Democrat Party 2 0.53 
Democratic Group of the 2 0.48 
Centre 
7 other Parties received one seat each and less than 0.38% of the vote. 
Parliamentary Elections 1990: Senate 
Party Seats Percentage Vote 
NSF 91 67.02 
HDFR 12 7.20 
NLP 10 7.06 
NPP 1 2.50 
Romanian Ecological 1 2.45 
Movement 
Alliance for a United 2 2.15 
Romania 
Democratic Agrarian Party - 1.59 
Romania Ecological Party 1 1.38 
Romanian Social Democratic - 1.10 
Party 
Independent 1 - 
The NSF won 91 seats in the Senate election; the HDFR 12; the NLP 10; with 5 other 
parties gaining 1 or 2 seats. 
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Source: Crowther, W., & Roper, S. D., "A Comparative Analysis of Institutional 
Developments in the Romanian and Moldovan Legislatures", in Olsen, D. M., & Norton, P., 
(eds) (1996) The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, Frank Cass, London & 
Portland, Oregan, p. 13 8. 
Parliamentary Elections 1992: House of Deputies 
Party Seats Percentage Vote 
Democratic National Salvation 117 27.71 
Front (DNSF) 
Democratic Convention 82 20.01 
(DCR) 
NSF 43 10.18 
Party of Romanian National 30 7.71 
Unity 
HDFR 27 7.45 
Greater Romania Party 16 3.89 
Socialist Party of Work 13 3.03 
The DNSF won 49 seats in the Senate election; the Democratic Convention 34; the NSF 
18. Five other parties were represented in the Senate with between 5 and 18 seats. 
Source: Crowther, W., & Roper, S. D., (1996) p. 141 
Parliamentary Elections 1996: House of Deputies 
Party Seats Percentage Vote 
DCR 122 30.17 
Party of Social Democracy in 91 21.52 
Romania (PSDR) 
Social Democratic Union 53 12.93 
HDFR 25 6.64 
Greater Romania Party 19 4.46 
Party of Romanian National 18 4.36 
Unity 
In addition 15 minority organisations each received a seat. 
In the Senate elections the DCR received 53 seats; the PSDR 41 seats; Social Democratic 
Union 23 seats; HDFR 11 seats; Greater Romanian Party 8 seats and Party of Romanian 
National Unity 7 seats. 
Sources: Popescu, L., "A Change in Power in Romania: the Results and Significance of the 
November 1996 Elections, " Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2, Spring 1997, 
p. 181; and The Romanian Central Electoral Bureau, 10 November 1996, OMRI, electronic 
version. 
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In all four countries traditional parties had difficulty in mobilising significant support. 
Several reasons are suggested for the difficulties encountered by historic parties in 
successfully re-establishing themselves after a period of authoritarianism. The 
effectiveness of repression and length of time an authoritarian regime has been in power 
being two main causes put forward. 318 However, in the two cases examined here there are 
similarities across the cases, rather than differences between the cases as might be expected 
if more or less suppression were a major factor. In Poland and Bulgaria "successor" 
agrarian parties were favoured over other traditional formations. This was partly due to the 
peasant parties ability to maintain organisational links and social bases as "satellites" under 
communism. In Romania and Hungary traditional forces attempted re-establishment with 
moderate success. However, it was only in Hungary that traditional parties remained 
established as separate parties. This appears to be as much to do with the relatively early 
consolidation of all post-communist political parties as separate entities in Hungary, rather 
than any specific legacies associated with the traditional parties themselves. 
New Political Parties 
A large number of new political parties emerged to compete in the post 1989 elections, 
only the most significant will be examined here. In Poland the unity of Solidarity in the 
semi-free elections of June 1989 soon factionalised. The Solidarity Civic Parliamentary 
Club (OKP), formed out of the 161 seats won by Solidarity and the Citizens' Committees, 
involved a number of personalities and political identities which were submerged during 
the initial phase of anti-communist opposition. Once in power these factions re-emerged 
and new parties appeared. In Hungary opposition factions had already formed into specific 
parties by the first elections of 1990, and continued a relatively cohesive formation. In 
Bulgaria and Romania opposition parties gained electoral strength as "umbrella" 
organisations. Although containing identifiable political parties, these organisations were 
more reminiscent of pre-1989 opposition movements in Poland and Hungary than of 
developed political parties. 
318 See for example, Geddes, B., "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in 
Eastern Europe", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, July 1995, pp. 239-274, 
especially pp. 242-247 
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Poland and Hungary 
The underlying factionalism of the Solidarity camp came out into the open almost 
immediately after the 1989 election. After weeks of confusion over the balance of forces in 
the Sejm, the election of Jaruzelski as President in July (agreed at the Round Table 
negotiations) established the opposition as a political power. 319 However, Solidarity's role 
as an integrating force alongside the conditions of the first elections which led to an 
emphasis on unity, retarded the development of opposition parties. When the political 
context was unexpectedly changed by the overwhelming Solidarity victory in June 1989 
and the formation of the Mazowiecki government in August, a gradual splitting of the 
movement began. Within a year at least five main factions had emerged within the OKP. 
The most significant political parties to emerge from the Solidarity movement were: the 
Democratic Union (DU) which began as an electoral alliance in support of Mazowiecki's 
presidential candidacy in 1990; the Congress of Liberal Democrats (KLD), which 
originally emerged from the entrepreneurial wing of Solidarity in Gdansk led by Bielecki 
(who became Prime Minister in January 1991); the Centre Democratic Accord (or 
Centrum), originally conceived as a coalition to support Walesa's bid for the presidency; 
the Christian National Union (ZChN), a clerical party which became the major force 
behind Catholic Election Action (WAK); and finally the Solidarity peasant movement. 
One other significant group emerged from the Solidarity left-wing: the Union of Labour. 
Initially in 1991 - as Labour Solidarity - the party did not do well, receiving only 4 seats in 
the Sejm. By the 1993 election the new party - Union of Labour, launched in 1992 by 
Ryszard Bugaj - won 41 seats (see table 5.1). The new party was an attempt to overcome 
the divisions of post-Solidarity and post-communist groupings. It contained people from a 
variety of backgrounds including the Social Democratic movement, the Labour Solidarity 
association and former activists who began the disintegration of the PUWP. 320 Membership 
of the party grew considerably, especially in the towns and cities. Its liberal socialist 
economic programme and anti-SLD tendency gaining electoral support from those 
319 for details of the first election and political manouvering see Barany, Z., & Vinton, L., 
"Breakthrough to Democracy: Elections in Poland and Hungary", Studies in Comparative 
Communism, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Summer 1990 pp. 191-212 
320 See Union of Labour Statement and interview with Ryszard Bugaj, in Labour Focus on 
Eastern Europe, No. 2 1992, pp. 34-36 
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concerned about such issues as unemployment. 321 A further electoral force which emerged 
to contest the 1991 elections from the anti-communist opposition, but outside the 
Solidarity movement, was the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN). This was 
an old dissident party founded in 1979, and apart from some minor divisions remained 
basically the same from its establishment. 
Amongst these new parties only the DU was to gain the most significant electoral success 
in the 1991 elections, and by the 1993 elections was the main post-Solidarity grouping to 
retain seats in the Sejm. 322 In many ways the opposition's internal divisions could be traced 
back to the establishment of the basic movements, such as the KOR (see previously in 
Chapter 3). However, there was little direct continuity of identity or personnel within the 
post 1989 political parties. Most of the new parties emerged out of disputes within the 
Solidarity elite over different strategies for reform. Additionally there was conflict over 
access and occupation of leadership positions both within the parties and for government 
positions. 
Institutional conflict only added to the strains between opposition factions. Walesa's "war 
at the top" and decision to create his own Non-Party Bloc (BBWR) for the 1993 elections 
produced further tension as party factions not only competed for power in the Sejm, but 
were also in conflict over the electoral system, presidential-parliamentary and central-local 
power relations. These conflicts contributed to difficulties in forming and maintaining 
government coalitions, slow policy output, a confused and dissatisfied electorate, and the 
final ousting of opposition parties from government at the 1993 parliamentary elections. 
In contrast to the confusing Polish situation, the Hungarian anti-communist opposition had 
consolidated their identities and resolved their main constitutional and institutional 
differences during the Round Table negotiations and subsequent run up to the elections 
(see previously in Chapter 4). Three new parties were formed prior to the first free 
elections. Rooted in the late 1980s "inside" opposition movements the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF), the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) and the Young 
321 Artur Polenski, Wroclaw Union of Labour party member and activist, interview with 
Ruth Rodda, Wroclaw, 3/4/98 
322 As already mentioned the Union of Labour won 41 seats -a significant gain from 1991. 
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Democrats (Fidesz) were able to present a clear choice to the electorate in 1990 (see 
previously in Chapter 3 for more detail of their formation). 
The MDF was initially strongly linked to the reform wing of the communist party (the 
party's first president, Zoltan Biro, was in fact a reformed communist). Under Jozsef Antall 
(who became president of the party in October 1989 the party distanced itself from the 
more radical democratic opposition, became overtly anti-communist and attempted to 
move away from its populist, nationalist and rural roots towards a more European Christian 
Democratic orientation. A successful "catch-all" formula appeared to have been found to 
appeal to a wide cross section of the population for the 1990 elections where the party 
gained the most seats. However, different political platforms did emerge within the 
parliamentary party, and several MDF members "crossed the floor". The largest breakaway 
was by Istvan Csurka's extremist right-wing faction in 1993, to form the Hungarian Justice 
and Life Party. Csurka's convictions were backed by many in the MDF, although less 
popular with the general population. 323 The faction created increasing tension within the 
MDF, but it was not until 1992 that Antall finally distanced himself and the government 
from this group. As a result of defections, the MDF's parliamentary party was reduced 
from 164 members in 1990 to 134 in the late summer of 1993.324 Antall's unchallenged 
authority as party leader and prime minister - until his death in December 1993 - 
maintained stability within the party. However the government came under increasing 
attack for unpopular policies from autumn 1990 onwards and in the 1994 elections the 
MDF won only 37 seats. 325 In March 1996 the party experienced a further split, with a 
liberal group of deputies breaking away to form the Hungarian Democratic People's Party 
(MDNP) reducing the number of seats the Forum occupied in parliament to 19. By the 
1998 elections the party was reduced to 17 parliamentary seats. 
323 Csurka's anti-semetic, ultra-nationalist and populist rhetoric had marginal appeal, but 
helped to create a hostile, anti-communist atmosphere. For details of the Hungarian Right 
see Berend, I., "Jobbra At! [Right Face] Right Wing Trends in Post-Communist Hungary", 
in Held, J., (ed) (1993) pp. 105-134 
324 Lomax, B., "Obstacles to the Development of Democratic Politics", in Cox, T., & 
Furlong, A., (eds) (1995) pp. 82-100 
325 Social unrest in Hungary was relatively minor. However when the government 
unexpectedly increased the price of petrol in October 1990 taxi-drivers and other transport 
workers blockaded roads for three days. 
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The second major new political party in Hungary was the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SzDSz). Rooted in the urban intellectual dissident movement of the 1980s it was launched 
as an umbrella organisation (the Network of Free Initiatives), and became a campaigning 
political party in October 1989. Initially an elite grouping of intellectuals, it quickly 
became an aggressive opposition and was transformed into a popular political force by its 
successful campaign to block presidential elections through a referendum (see above in 
New Institutions). In the first round of the 1990 elections the SzDSz was neck and neck 
with the MDF, but lost out considerably to the Forum in the second round, finally taking 
second place with a relatively poor 91 seats. The party's political manoeuvring to place 
itself on the right of the political spectrum as a democratic opposition party failed as the 
MDF moved closer to the right and outwitted the SzDSz at its own game. 326 As the largest 
opposition party of the 1990 to 1994 legislature, the party was compensated for national 
electoral defeat with the election of Arpad Goncz as President, and electoral gains in major 
towns and cities in the local elections of October 1990. 
The third major anti-communist party, Fidesz, also made significant gains in the first local 
elections and proved to have strong popular appeal with younger urban based members of 
the public. A radical and liberal organisation, Fidesz originally set an age limit of 35 for its 
members, while its representatives wore jeans to parliament. This "alternative" image was 
subsequently moderated. The inability of the party to win many seats in parliament (21 in 
1990 and 20 in 1994) or willingness to co-operate with their most obvious potential 
partners, the SzDSz, led to a re-orientation of the party. Fidesz drifted ideologically 
towards the centre and the liberal national wing of the MDF, while some prominent 
founding members of the party (notably Gabor Fodor) left the party and joined the SzDSz. 
Despite an apparent loss of direction and support in 1994, by the 1998 elections the party 
superseded the other two former opposition parties gaining the largest number of seats. 327 
The antagonism and independence of the separate anti-communist parties in Hungary 
created a situation in which any alliance against the reformed communists was difficult. In 
consequence, the MDF - who did not have an outright majority in 1990 - formed a centre- 
right coalition with the two historic parties (CDPP and FGKP). In the 1994 elections the 
326 See below in the following section on Ideological Representation; and in Kolosi, T., et al 
"Making the Political Fields in Post-Communist Transition (Dynamics of Class and Party 
in Hungarian Politics, 1989-90)", in Bozoki, A., et al (eds) (1992) Post-Communist 
Transition, Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, Pinter, London & New York pp. 132-155 
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SzDSz gained second place once again and despite the MSP's ability to govern alone, and 
the SzDSz's former oppositional stance, the MSP and SzDSz formed a coalition 
government. 328 
Bulgaria and Romania 
In Bulgaria and Romania the anti-communist opposition was less successful in the first 
free elections than their Polish and Hungarian counterparts. Neither country developed 
strong opposition movements prior to 1989 and this was reflected in the poor 
organisational development of new political parties. Bulgarian opposition fared better than 
its Romanian counterpart during the first free elections. The Bulgarian Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) established itself as a relatively strong electoral force quite 
quickly. In Romania the Democratic Convention (DCR) was less successful in challenging 
the reformed communists in the early stages of post-communist politics. The maintenance 
of control by the communist and reformed communist parties during the initial period of 
political change severely restricted "opposition" party development in both cases. 
In Bulgaria the UDF began as an anti-communist bloc, similar to Solidarity and the OKP 
parliamentary club in Poland, or the late 1980s Hungarian clubs and circles. However, 
unlike the Polish and Hungarian movements, the registration of these groups as political 
parties for the first free elections did little to transform their organisation. 329 The UDF 
success in the election of 1991 had some similarities with Solidarity's semi-free election 
victory. An anti-communist bloc formed a government and subsequently suffered internal 
divisions and defections. However, unlike the Polish case this did not lead to the demise of 
the anti-communist bloc. The UDF's short-lived term in office and associated inability to 
produce radical change alongside the ability of the reformed communists to maintain their 
327 FideSz gained 148 seats, the SzDSz 24, and the MDF 17 seats 
328 The MSP's rationale for an alliance with SzDSz had as much to do with proving their 
social-democrat credentials to Western observers as to domestic considerations, although 
the coalition provided the government with the two thirds majority in parliament required 
to alter the constitution. See for example, Rady, M., "The 1994 Hungarian General 
Election", Representaion, Vol. 32, No. 119, Autumn 1994, pp. 69-72, especially p. 71 
329 See Waller, M., & Karasimeonov, G., "Party Organisation in Post-Communist Bulgaria", 
in Lewis, P.. (ed) (1996) Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe, Edward 
Elgar, UK & US, pp. 134-162 
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strength, contributed to the maintenance of the UDF as a more unified anti-communist 
political entity. 
The UDF functioned very much as a single party despite being a coalition of diverse 
parties, clubs and movements. 330 On the eve of the 1990 elections the member 
organisations fell into three main categories: first, the "historic" parties (see above in 
Traditional Parties); second, a group of new organisations including civil rights groups, 
reform-minded members of the communist party (the Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and 
Democracy) and environmentalists (the Green Party and Ekoglasnost); and lastly, 
organisations representing social groups (such as the Federation of Independent Student's 
Societies and the trade union body Podkrepa). Several shifts in the composition of the UDF 
subsequently took place. Four parties which split from the UDF for the 1991 elections 
failed to gain representation. An attempt to form centrist political forces was difficult in the 
communism versus anti-communism climate which prevailed at that time. 331 
The UDF's first government required the support of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (MRF) (see below). This support for the Dimitrov government was withdrawn in 
November 1992 which brought the government down. In a similar process to that in 
Poland, conflicts within and between opposition parties, fragmentation or otlyuspi (flake- 
offs) and shifting coalitions led to government instability. By December 1992 six 
governments had been formed since the downfall of the communist regime. By 1994 the 
UDF was left with small insignificant parties as members. Further attempts to fill the 
centre political space between the reformed communist BSP and the UDF largely failed 
with only the Bulgarian Business Bloc and National Union gaining seats in the 1994 
parliamentary elections. 332 The 1994 elections produced a partial undermining of the bi- 
polar party system, but returned the BSP to power with a substantial majority. The 
330 For a list of the various strands of the UDF and subsequent factionalisation see 
Waller, M., "Making and Breaking: Factions in the Process of Party Formation in 
Bulgaria", in Gillespie, R., et al (eds) (1995) pp. 152-167, especially pp. 157 & 158 
331 Karasimeonov, G., "Differentiation Postponed: Party Pluralism in Bulgaria", in 
Wightman, G., (ed) (1995) pp. 154-178, especially p. 168 
332 The National Union's main constituent elements were the Democratic Party and a 
BANU faction which left the UDF in September 1994. For details of the 1994 elections, 
UDF factions and new party formations see Karasimeonov, G., "Parliamentary Elections of 
1994 and the Development of the Bulgarian Party System", Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
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previously successful anti-communist stance of the UDF failed to mobilise its former 
electorate and gave the party a further identity crisis. The coalition has subsequently 
developed a more centralised structure and has become more like a single political party. 333 
There were also similarities with Poland regarding added tensions between presidential and 
parliamentary forces. President Zhelev openly clashed with his own party's 1991-1992 
government. This continuous disunity within the UDF between the original leadership and 
"new" political forces was also evident in the run up to presidential elections in 1996. Petar 
Stoyanov, deputy chairman of the party defeated the incumbent President Zhelev in a 
presidential primary in June 1996, ending a long feud between the party and President. 334 
Stoyanov needed to win the presidential election otherwise members of the opposition 
parties would have been blamed for their non-support of Zhelev. In fact the strategy of a 
new candidate proved successful as Stoyanov won a resounding victory over his BSP 
opponent Ivan Marazov in November 1996.335 
The Romanian "opposition" did not suffer the same institutional tensions, but had some 
similarities with the UDF in its original formation. "Historic" parties were part of the initial 
opposition bloc along with several new party formations. Most notable of the new parties 
was the Civic Alliance Party (PAC) formed mainly by Bucharest based members of the 
creative intelligentsia in July 1991, and the Hungarian Democratic Federation in Romania 
(HDFR) set up in December 1989 (as the Hungarian Democratic Forum of Romania, see 
more below). The DCR was formed to present a united opposition front for the first local 
elections. At this time there was particular concern that democratic practice would not 
prevail when Prime Minister Roman appointed county prefects - many of whom had an 
active communist past - to help prepare for the local and national elections scheduled for 
1992. 
1995, pp. 579-587; and Crampton, R. J., "The Bulgarian Elections of December 1994", 
Electoral Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1995 
333 For details of UDF development see Waller, M., & Karasimeneov, G., in Lewis P., (ed) 
(1996) especially pp. 153-161 
334 See Krause, S., "Opposition Chooses a Single Candidate in Landmark Election 
Primary", Transition, Vol. 2, No. 15,26 July 1996, Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) 
(electronic version) 
335 Krause, S.. "Petar Stoyanov Elected Bulgaria's President, Analytical Brief, OMRI, 
November 4,1996 
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Like the UDF, the DCR suffered from fragmentation and shifting coalitions of parties 
within the bloc, but presented a united front to the electorate through a rigid anti- 
communist stance. However, unlike the UDF in the 1991 Bulgarian election, the Romanian 
opposition was not strong enough to remove the NSF and its associate parties from power 
in the 1992 elections. The defeat in the elections resulted in splits and new party and 
coalition formations. A new Liberal party (Liberal Party '93) was formed and initially 
associated itself with the DCR. In the run up to the 1996 elections more conflict ensued 
amongst the opposition party leaders over the presidential candidacy. The PAC left the 
DCR and formed a National Liberal Alliance (ANL) which included the Liberal Party '93, 
a move which threatened to take away votes from the anti-Iliescu camp. 336 However the 
DCR and their presidential candidate Constantinescu were successful in the national 
elections of November 1996, winning both houses in the assembly and the presidency. 337 
The ANL made no significant showing in the elections. Three other opposition parties 
which entered the assembly were all organised on ethnic or national lines. 338 
In both Romania and Bulgaria national minority parties were significant political 
groupings. In Bulgaria the party of the Turkish minority - the Movement of Rights and 
Freedoms (MRF) - found itself holding the balance of power in the assembly after the 1991 
elections. Initially the party aligned itself with the UDF allowing the opposition to form a 
government. However, the party derived little advantage for the Turkish population from 
this alliance, and later shifted its support to the non-party - but BSP supported - Berov 
government. In Romania, the HDFR was initially allied to the DCR, and was a significant 
and relatively stable component. In 1992 it was not the Hungarian party which held the 
balance of power in Romania, but the ultra-nationalist Greater Romanian Party (GRP) and 
Party of Romanian National Unity (PRNU). Both the Turkish and Hungarian minority 
parties lost support in subsequent elections (in the Turkish case partly due to breakaway 
factions after 1992). However, it is significant that both minorities felt the need to establish 
336 See Shafir, M., "Romania's "Different" Presidential Candidate: Nicolae Manolescu", 
Analytical Brief, OMRI Net, August 13,1996, 
337 See Popescu, L., "A Change of Power in Romania: The Results and Significance of the 
November 1996 Elections", Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2, Spring 1997 
172-186 338 
These three parties were the HDFR, Greater Romania Party (GRP) and Party of 
Romanian National Unity (PRNU) (see more below in the following sections). The HDFR 
and Petre Roman's Social Democratic Union (SDU) were coopted into the DCR 
government. 
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political parties based on ethnic identity. Both ethnic groups suffered persecution and 
discrimination under communist rule, and during post-communism both groups were 
subject to accusations of autonomist tendencies, rather than being seen as movements for 
the protection of minority rights. This is especially the case for the Hungarian minority in 
Romania, where Romanian ultra-nationalists proved to have considerable political 
salience. 339 
The Reformed Communist Parties 
In all four countries the reformed communist parties initially had difficulty in reorienting 
and regrouping themselves after the collapse of communism. This was especially the case 
for the Hungarian and Polish parties who were demoralised and confused after the anti- 
communist vote of the first semi-free and free elections. The nature of the Bulgarian and 
Romanian revolutionary process left former communists with greater organisational 
strength and electoral support, yet in all four countries the communists had to make efforts 
to "re-invent" themselves. 
Poland and Hungary 
Despite the initial success of the "opposition" in Poland and Hungary, the reformed 
communist parties (whose main successors were the Social Democratic Party of the 
Republic of Poland (SdRP) and Hungarian Socialist Party (MSP)) re-emerged relatively 
quickly to challenge new and "historic" parties. The Polish SdRP was established at the 
final PUWP congress in January 1990, and became the leading member of Democratic Left 
339 The PRNU is the Political wing of the extreme-nationalist anti-Hungarian organisation 
Vatra Romaneascu (Romanian Cradle) which had electoral support amongst the 
"imported" Romanian ethnic element in Transylvanian regions. Along with the nationalist 
GRP, the PRNU went into coalition with the NSF after the 1992 elections and both parties 
reputedly had strong links with segments of the NSF. See Shafir, M., "The Revival of the 
Political Right in Post-Communist Romania", in Held, J., (1993), especially pp. 158-166. It 
is also notable that 15 minority organisations representing different ethnic minorities each 
received seats in the lower house in the 1996 elections. See the Romanian Central Electoral 
Bureau data on the 1996 elections, OMRI Net, 10 November 1996. 
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Alliance (SLD). 340 The SdRP was initially hopelessly compromised by its communist past 
and found difficulty in appealing to the electorate, as did most Polish parties who 
attempted to place themselves on the left of the ideological spectrum. By the elections of 
1991, the SLD gained 12% of the vote, sending 61 deputies to parliament. 341 By 1993 the 
electorate were thoroughly disillusioned with "opposition" government attempts to reform 
the economy, and along with the PSL, the SLD was able to form a new government. 342 In 
November 1995 an SdPR founder member and chairman of the SLD, Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, was elected Polish President. Cimoszewicz, who was deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Justice in the Pawlak government (October 1993 to March 1995), was 
elected Prime Minister in February 1996. In the 1997 elections, the SLD managed to 
increase its share of the vote, but due to the collapse of the PSL vote and strained relations 
with its former coalition partner, the SLD accepted defeat. 
Similarly the MSP's fortunes revived after their initial defeat in 1990. Formed in October 
1989 - following the disbandment of the HSWP - they were initially led by reform 
communist Nyers, supported by Pozsgay, Nemeth and former foreign minister Gyula Horn. 
343 In spite of numerous groupings within the party - ranging from liberal socialism to more 
radical left-wing trade unionism, the MSP proved to be a stable political formation. The 
party succeeded in transforming itself into a modem, European social democrat party. 
Growing disillusionment on the part of the electorate with the MDF coalition government 
(1990-1994) helped to give the MSP a substantial victory in 1994. Along with their 
coalition partner (SzDSz), the MSP commanded a two thirds majority in parliament after 
the 1994 elections. 
340 the SLD was a parliamentary club which contained other post-PUWP factions including 
the National Trade Union Accord (OPZZ) and was established as an informal alliance in 
the autumn of 1990 to support the presidential candidacy of Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz 
(non-party affiliated). 
341 Lewis, P., "Poland's SLD, The Communists who came in from the cold", Labour Focus 
on Eastern Europe, September-December 1993, pp. 29-34 
342 It is suggested that the electorate would have been disillusioned with any party in 
government at that time because the expectations of the electorate were so high, but that 
the disillusionment was also a result of the government's "false promises". See Winiecki, J., 
(ed) (1996) Five Years After June: The Polish Transformation, 1989-1994, The Centre for 
Research into Communist Economies, London, pp. 118-119 
343 Subsequently Nyers, Pozsgay and Nemeth left the party, and Horn became party leader. 
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During the 1994 electoral campaign, the MSP were able to exploit the electorate's 
discontent with their socio-economic conditions. Despite the MDF government's 
achievements in building a relatively successful market economy; high inflation, rising 
unemployment and a growing resentment of the new entrepreneurial elite provided much 
of the electorate with a nostalgia for the security of the old political system. The socialist 
party's background and organisational structure were also put to good use. They promoted 
themselves as non-ideological experts who had experience of managing the country in 
contrast to the amateurism of their rivals. As already mentioned, despite their electoral 
success, the MSP entered into a coalition with the SzDSz which gave the coalition control 
of 72% of the seats in parliament. This ensured that all legislation could be passed and left 
a potentially marginal role for the opposition. The coalition also gave the MSP greater 
legitimacy. By allowing the SzDSz substantial influence over policy, appointments and 
draft legislation, and giving the SzDSz some important ministerial portfolios, the MSP 
could declare itself to be very much part of a post-communist system, satisfying an 
expressed wish of their supporters and alleviating Western fears of a return to communism. 
However, the government's commitment to a market economy has meant a loss of support 
since 1994. Many Socialist voters hoped the party could establish a market economy whilst 
shielding people from the worst social effects of economic change, which proved to be a 
difficult task. 
Although it is suggested that the electoral systems distorted the former communist victories 
in Poland and Hungary in 1993 and 1994 elections, and that "opposition" factionalism and 
fragmentation had its effects in enabling former communists to return to power, it is 
evident that the early post-1989 marginalisation of the communists enabled a more 
thorough organisational and ideological reorientation of former communist parties in this 
case. 344 
344 For a comprehensive discussion of factors enabling former communists to return to 
power in Poland and Hungary in 1993 and 1994, see Meyer, G., "The Socialists' Rise to 
Power and the Democratization of Political Cultures in East-Central Europe", in Los- 
Nowak, T., & Armstrong, D., (eds) (1997) pp. 33-56 
170 
Bulgaria and Romania 
Unlike other communist parties of the region, the Bulgarian Communist Party preserved a 
certain continuity with its communist past including its social base, organisation and 
leadership, whilst adapting to the new post-communist situation. The party changed its 
name to the Bulgarian Socialist party (BSP), revised its ideology and lost some of its 
assets, including work place organisation, but kept intact much of its former organisational 
strength through "clubs of interest". Although abandoning democratic centralist practices it 
maintained a hard-core, widely spread membership, a body of professional organisers, and 
also attracted a loyal number of young party workers. After the 1990 elections the party 
was relatively successful in integrating the UDF into the political system whilst keeping 
hold of the major levers of power. The parties maintenance of political power from 1989 to 
1991 also gave the party time to put the communist's financial assets into new companies 
and develop the reformed party's own financial concerns. 345 Even with the loss of political 
control in the parliamentary elections of 1991 (by a very slim margin), and especially after 
the fall of the UDF government in 1992, the BSP was able to use its parliamentary position 
to counter anti-communist policies. 
These factors were no doubt an advantage for the BSP, and assisted their electoral and 
political strength. By the 1994 elections the BSP won a landslide victory. The party was 
able to capitalise on the disappointment with the reform process, mostly associated with 
the UDF. Like the Hungarian MSP, it was able to appeal to the people who were suffering 
the negative consequences of economic reform. However, the BSP's electoral prospects 
were to be seriously reduced by similar, if not more severe, pressures than those 
experienced by the UDF government. In 1996, the original socialist candidate for the 
presidential elections - Pirinski - who was a popular choice, and considered a front runner, 
was declared ineligible to run for President because he was not born in Bulgaria. A change 
of candidate alongside the government's failure to deal with the ongoing economic crisis 
hampered the socialists' chances. A humiliating electoral defeat for the socialists led to 
calls for premier and party leader Zhan Videnov's resignation, and threats of a split from a 
345 See the following chapter; and for example, Waller, M., & Karasimeonov, G., in 
Lewis, P., (ed) (1996) especially pp. 139-140 
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faction within the party. 346 By December 1996 the BSP administration had collapsed and 
attempts to form a new government abandoned. Severe political and economic crises led to 
early general elections in April 1997. The BSP contested the election as part of a 
Democratic Left Bloc, but received only 58 seats compared to the UDF's 137. 
In comparison to other reformed communist parties, the Romanian NSF was a more unique 
phenomenon. It professed to be a movement which defended the revolutionary overthrow 
of the Ceausescu regime, and emphasised an anti-communist stance. However, the make- 
up and style of the NSF leadership, and the readiness of the NSF to monopolise control 
over state assets - including radio and television - displayed more continuity with 
communism than departure from it. 347 The intellectual opposition in Romania certainly saw 
the NSF as a formation of ex-communists building, at best, a limited democracy in order to 
preserve power and privileges of a still intact communist establishment. 
In a similar fashion to the BSP, the NSF utilised established networks to maintain control 
of the political system. The NSF also showed a readiness to exploit anti-democratic 
elements within society, dealing brutally with opposition forces in the early post 1989 
period (see previously in Chapter 4), making populist appeals, utilising nationalism for 
legitimation and attacking opposition as "the enemy within". 
Like all post-communist political parties NSF factionalism led to rifts. The most notable 
was after the local elections of 1992. The NSF was losing its appeal to voters due to 
austerity measures introduced by the Roman government which were continued under 
Stolojan. An open breach between Iliescu and Roman (begun when Roman was forced 
from office in September 1991) culminated in a formal split into two parties. Roman's 
faction initially retained the NSF name (later becoming the Social Democratic Union). The 
majority of the parliamentary party became the DNSF which was less a party and more a 
platform designed to secure the re-election of Iliescu. The ultra-nationalist groupings 
346 See Synovitz, R., "Bulgaria: Opposition Candidate Hopes Victory will split Socialists", 
RFE/RL Report, 23 October 1996 (electronic version); and Krause, S., "Petar Stoyanov 
Elected Bulgaria's President", Analytical Brief, November 4 1996, OMRI-Net 
347 For example Brucan's communist style statements on pluralism and Iliescu's speeches 
about Western economies, privatization and international monopolies. See Calinescu, M., & 
Tismaneaunu, V., "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future", Problems of Communism, 
Jan - April 1991, p. 52 
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(mentioned above) also emerged as distinctive forces at this time, rather than movements 
operating in the shadow of the ruling party. As a result of these splits, alongside 
disillusionment with the government amongst the electorate, the DNSF lost considerable 
electoral support in the 1992 national elections. Although it emerged as the largest party, 
27.71% of the vote was not enough to enable the party to govern alone. Iliescu retained the 
presidency and Vacaroiu (a senior civil servant) formed a non-party government sustained 
by an informal alliance of the DNSF and ultra-nationalists. The latter received considerable 
political influence as a result of their support. 348 In July 1993 the DNSF changed its name 
yet again to become the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR), but remained a 
patronage party dominated by ex-communist officials. 
Even in the 1996 elections the PSDR retained a significant percentage of the vote 
(21.52%). The DCR had to form a coalition with the HDFR and Roman's SDU in order to 
govern. Supporters of Iliescu and the PSDR were mainly found in the poorer rural regions 
of the South and South East. 349 As in Bulgaria it was the less educated rural people who 
were most likely to retain their support for the former communists, being less inclined to 
see the need for party competition. Especially in Romania, the years of authoritarian rule 
were well ingrained. Alternative perceptions of how they could be ruled were slow to 
develop. Equally the socialist and former communist parties were slower to adapt to the 
pluralist context and develop social democratic credentials. 
5.2 Political Parties and Ideological Representation 
It is difficult to generalise about ideology within any political context. This is even more 
problematic in East-Central Europe in the early post-communist period, when the collapse 
of Marxism-Leninism left an ideological vacuum, and new and reformed political parties 
were in a state of flux. It is not the intention here to go into a detailed description of the 
changing ideological orientations of all political parties and prominent politicians, but 
merely to emphasise certain trends which can be discerned within and between cases. 
In all four countries elements of a Western discourse were evident, especially in terms of 
ideas concerning multiparty democracy and some form of free-market economy. Most 
" 
348 See Gallagher, T., (1995) pp. 219-220 
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political parties strove to be seen as adopting liberal democratic principles. 350 However, 
political liberalism was often subdued even amongst so-called liberal, intelligentsia-led 
parties. It was economic liberalism which permeated many parties, especially those which 
pronounced themselves to be liberal and pro-western. Some parties did model themselves 
on contemporary Western parties. There were also a great number of small or marginal 
groups which adopted extravagant names and promoted peculiar, vague or single issue 
ends, and many parties which were little known outside their own region or social group. 
However, many parties attempted to utilise pre-communist traditions in some form, and 
often utilised a mixture of pre-communist ideology alongside contemporary Western ideas. 
Although "historic" political parties failed to reassert themselves, the political memory of 
pre-communist politics provided a foundation for ideological orientation and was available 
as a basis for political mobilisation. 
During the initial phase of post-communist politics, ideological identity was difficult to 
define. After the initial communist - anti-communist phase, a reorientation of former 
communist and opposition parties began. However, a Right-Left ideological continuum 
had little meaning in the new context. In Poland the continuum might be described as "a 
horse shoe not a horizontal line" . 
351 Initially, in Poland and Hungary, the "left" was 
discredited through - what was perceived as - forty years of communist misrule. Although 
the reformists within the communist parties pre-1989 helped to shape the newly reformed 
socialist parties, reformed communists and socialists had to reorient and "reinvent" 
themselves. In Bulgaria and Romania the reformed communists maintained a considerable 
grip on power and had less need for dramatic "reinvention" in the initial post-1989 context. 
Equally, and again more specifically in Poland and Hungary, the anti-communist 
movements which had mobilised populations during the communist and early post-1989 
period could no longer rely solely on their "anti" identification in the post-communist 
context. Yet, a "right" identification was no easier to discern than the "left". In all four 
countries, traditional and inter-war party identifications were hopelessly outdated. Yet, 
historic and cultural symbols remained salient. Using comparative examples, the following 
sections will examine briefly; first, how ideology was reconstructed within a communist 
349 Popescu, L., (1996) p. 184 
350 The Western discourse was particularly evident in the promotion of the so-called "Big 
Bang" approach to economic change. More will be said about this in the following chapter. 
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versus anti-communist polarisation; and second, how traditional ideas and symbols 
manifested themselves within the new political context. 
Communism versus anti-communism 
A communism versus anti-communism polarisation may appear to be an over- 
simplification in some respects. There was indeed considerable diversity within the 
communist and anti-communist camps. For example, most communist parties split into 
several factions; some proclaiming social democratic credentials while others remained 
explicitly communist. Oppositionists also consisted of many ideological factions, and 
many former revisionist intellectuals identified themselves with the Left as well as Centre 
and Right. Yet, in all four countries, an antithesis continued to exist between the former 
communists and oppositionists to a greater or lesser extent. 352 However, it was in Bulgaria 
and Romania that this polarisation continued as a prominent means of defining the party 
system. To examine this dimension the two cases will be compared. 
Poland and Hungary 
After the first founding elections in Poland and Hungary, the anti-politics of the 
oppositionist intellectuals no longer held the different strands of opposition movements 
together. 353 The political discourse, built around concepts of human and political rights, 
legalism, individual responsibility, personalism and neo-evolutionism was ineffective for 
producing political programmes to satisfy mass expectations of improved living standards 
and reformed lifestyles. 
351 Professor Ryszard Herbut, Institute of Poltical Science, Wroclaw University, interview 
with Ruth Rodda, Wroclaw, 2/4/98 
352 See for example the Polish context where communists and oppositionists split into 
many factions. Yet, the SdRP was still identified with the old communist party and even 
oppositionists such as Adam Michnik were identified with the post-communist left if they 
attempted to bridge the communist/anti-communist gap. See for example, Walicki, A., 
"From Stalinism to Post-Communist Pluralism: the Polish Case, " New Left Review 185, 
1991, pp. 92-121 
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In the first Hungarian post-communist parliament, political cultural cleavages of the "anti- 
communists" were placed around two main sets of ideas. First, the pro-western promoters 
of the free market who also supported many "liberal" values; the SzDSz and Fidesz were 
mainly identified with this strand. Second, a more traditional, national-christian and 
"conservative" camp, which the MDF, Smallholders and Christian Democrat Parties could 
be identified with. 354 Poland's ideological landscape was less easily discerned. Attitudes 
and values surrounding dimensions of the economy, structure of political power, church- 
state and nation-civil society were not easily separated within or between parties. The 
factional nature of Polish politics meant that a "right" stance in one dimension did not 
necessarily mean a similar approach in another. 355 For example, "the electoral manifesto of 
a christian democratic party might be very conservative, anti-market and sometimes anti- 
liberal", but as part of government, their "policy might not be so different from the Post- 
communists .... European 
integration, [for example], is accepted by both parties ". 356 
Despite the attempts within post-communist parties to reorient themselves towards the new 
political context, anti-communism had its effects. This was especially the case initially in 
Poland and Hungary for political parties identified with the ideological left. A "left" or 
social democratic identity was unpopular, and a potential handicap within societies which 
were attempting to rid themselves of the communist past. In Poland and Hungary all social 
democratic parties - traditional, new and reformed communist - failed to make a mark in 
the first round of elections. Similarly any social-liberal tendencies within other parties 
were hampered by underlying anti-communism at this early stage. For example, in 
Hungary in the summer of 1989 SzDSz anti-communism could be directed at the MDF 
who were close to the reform wing of the communist party. The SzDSz consequently 
focused its campaign on the populist wing of the HSWP and the left of the MDF. However 
with Antall's leadership, the MDF moved to the right and outwitted the SzDSz at its own 
353 For an analysis of anti-politics and crystallisation of new political trends see 
Jorgensen, K. E., "The End of Anti-politics in Central Europe", in Lewis, P. G. (ed) (1992) 
Democracy And Civil Society in Eastern Europe, St. Martins Press, pp. 32-59. 
354 For the two camps of cultural politics in Hungary, see Markus, G. G., "Parties, Camps 
and Cleavages in Hungary", in Waller, M., et al (eds) (1994) p. 165 
3" See for example, Terry, S. M., "What's Right, and What's Left, and What's Wrong in 
Polish Politics? ", in Held, J., (1993) especially pp. 45 &46 
356 Professor Ryszard Herbut, Institute of Poltical Science, Wroclaw University, interview 
with Ruth Rodda, Wroclaw, 2/4/98 
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game. The left was ousted from the MDF and the SzDSz was identified with its left wing 
past. 357 
In Poland too social-liberalism was difficult to sustain initially within the political parties. 
Attempts to embrace a "left" stance on any issues was accentuated by de-communisation. 
The Lustration Resolution of May 1992 did not weaken de-communisation as a political 
issue, and made it more difficult for politicians with any connections or affiliations to the 
communist regime (including Walesa) to obtain or maintain popularity. 
Nevertheless, in Poland and Hungary, the initial wave of anti-communism and support for 
"opposition" parties soon waned. The shift at elections towards reformed communist 
parties after 1993 suggests that concern amongst the population for economic performance, 
social welfare and workers rights overtook any fears of returning to a communist past. 358 
Although it was not so important a factor within the parties (because of the continuing 
difficulties with a left or right identity, especially in Poland), "economic problems formed 
a main line of polarisation for the electorate by 1993". 3s9 The social democrat and former 
communist parties proved to be the most consistent in their political orientations and 
programmes. They mainly focused on softening processes of change through gradual 
economic reform and retaining redistributive functions of the state. Their economic and 
social policies were vote winners to those hard-hit by recession. Consequently their 
support improved when the first post-communist government's attempts to manage the 
economy were perceived by the electorate as failing. Although there appeared to be yet 
another reversal of support in Poland in the 1997 elections when economic improvements 
357 Many of the SzDSz leaders had strong Marxist connections, such as Janos Kis, a 
Lukacs disciple. 
358 For example, in 1993 and 1995 millions of Poles voted for the ex-communists to 
express their opposition to the social costs of shock therapy. See Holland, D., "Dirty 
Politics in Poland, " Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, No. 53, Spring 1996, pp. 47-52. 
There is also evidence that many who were economically and socially better off also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the first reform governments. Psychological factors played a 
role. Some disliked success because it meant exerting extra effort, something not required 
under the previous communist system. In Poland, the communalism and subordination of 
individual interest promoted by Catholicism was also seen as a factor in making pro- 
capitalist changes harder. See Winiecki, J., "The Reasons for Electoral Defeat Lie in Non- 
Economic Factors", in Winiecki, J., (ed) (1996) 
85-94 V9 
"although not for the parties" Professor Ryszard Herbut, Institute of Poltical Science, 
Wroclaw University, interview with Ruth Rodda, Wroclaw, 2/4/98 
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under the SLD did not appear to be credited to the party. However, the failure of the SLD 
to retain its position was less to do with Solidarity Electoral Action's appeal to traditional 
and moral issues, and more to do with loss of votes to the SLD's coalition partner, the 
Peasant Party. 360 In both Poland and Hungary the former communists retained at least a 
consistent, if not increasing share of the vote in 1997 and 1998 elections. 361 
Bulgaria and Romania 
Bulgarian and Romanian socialists were affected by the same popular perceptions that 
government had to provide economic improvements alongside a programme of social 
welfare. However, in Romania and Bulgaria the anti-communist opposition was barely 
formulated in the early post-communist phase. The political vacuum left by the collapse of 
the old regimes was easily filled by the reformed communists. Homogenisation of society 
was much more acute during the communist period, and social divisions amongst the 
population were relatively indiscernible. Oppositionist intellectuals were fragmented with 
little or no organisational base. Especially in Romania, they lacked social vision and had 
little or no contact with any social strata but their own. As a consequence the opposition 
movements were urban based, often student supported, with little appeal amongst the rural 
population. 
New political parties formed in the run up to the first multi-party elections were often 
based upon pre-given notions of what political parties should look like, rather than on well 
defined ideological programmes. Simplistic agendas which promised democracy and a 
liberal economy without "sweat or tears" were often all that was required to amass votes. 
The figureheads of communism embodied in the leadership of Zhivkov and Ceausescu 
360 The Peasant Party lost votes between 1993 and 1997 from farmers because they blamed 
the party for the lack of change to the agricultural system, and for the small farmers being 
the biggest losers during economic reform. Views gathered from Robert Wiszniowski, 
postgraduate, Institute of Political Science, Wroclaw University, interview with Ruth 
Rodda, Wroclaw, 2/4/98. For Solidarity Electoral Action's appeal to traditional and moral 
issues see Bowdler, N., "Solidarity takes 'moral' electoral crusade to Poland's Catholics, " 
The Guardian, September 6 1997, p. 6 ; and Mather, l., "Solidarity assumes command, " The 
European, 25 September-1 October 1997, pp. 22-23 
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enabled the reform communists to divert the populations' attention away from the old 
"party". The reformed communists' ability to focus blame for the past on the old guard 
communist leadership, alongside their maintenance of control over the political system, 
aided their own electoral chances. 
In addition, in Bulgaria a short time-span between old guard collapse and the first 
democratic elections made it difficult for a weak, fragmented and poorly funded opposition 
to organise and advertise itself. In Romania the opposition intellectuals were a small group, 
at first co-opted by the NSF, and later suffering a similar lack of resources with which to 
set up opposition parties. In both countries, the perception that the old party-state was 
being dismantled and encouragement of multipartism by the new reformed communist 
leadership was often enough to symbolise political change for the mass of the population. 
Intellectuals and students in Romania soon identified the NSF with the old regime, 
accusing the party leadership of co-opting the revolution (see previously in Chapter 4). 
Yet, the electorate were not easily convinced that the opposition could govern, or that an 
opposition was even necessary. 
In the Bulgarian and Romanian case a strong anti-communist trend remained as a cohesive 
force amongst the opposition. In Bulgaria, anti-communism was virtually all that held the 
factions of the UDF together during the first four years of post-communist parliamentary 
relations. In Romania it took six years for politicians to enter into positive debates about 
down to earth issues such as economic performance, salaries and pensions. In the 1996 
Romanian electoral campaign political leaders finally moved away from the moralising 
themes previously employed, in which the "necessity of a moral process of communism" 
and the "fight against neo-communism and neo-communists" played important roles. 362 
In all four countries opposition parties had difficulty in breaking away from an anti- 
communist mentality. Even in Poland, where the socialists were identified as relatively 
Western and social democratic, the 1997 election campaign was still couched in 
361 In Poland the SLD percentage vote increased from 20.4% in 1993 Sjem elections to 
27.1% in 1997. The MSP vote remained approximately the same with almost 33% of the 
vote in 1994 and 32.3% in the first round of the 1998 parliamentary elections. 
362 Popescu, L., "A Change of Power in Romania: The Results and significance of the 
November 1996 Elections, " Government & Opposition, Vol. 32 no. 2 Spring 1997, pp. 172- 
186, p. 185 
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communist/anti-communist terms. However, there was far greater ideological diversity 
within and amongst the parties than the campaign rhetoric might suggest. In Hungary this 
form of polarisation was less evident; it was acceptable for the "oppositionist" SzDSz to 
enter into a coalition with their former rivals in 1994. 
Political Traditions and Symbols 
As the new and reformed political parties began to search for new identities, many 
traditional and inter-war identifications re-emerged. Religion was never removed from 
Polish politics, and although suppressed in the pre-1989 period, also became evident in 
Romania after 1989. In Poland Catholicism played a major role within anti-communism 
and remained prominent within post-communist politics. In Romania Christian Orthodoxy 
appeared to provide a substitute for the ideological gap left with the demise of Marxism. 
For example, in Romania political candidates on all sides displayed their religious feelings 
in the electoral campaign of 1996.363 Monarchism was also revived and became a 
prominent phenomenon in Romania and Bulgaria. 364 However, the most salient notions for 
the mass of the population appeared to be those which supported ideas of nation. 
Nationalism 
Nationalism was an underlying ideological force of many political parties, movements and 
political personalities of the inter-war and early post-communist periods. Indeed, many 
communist regimes also adopted increasingly nationalistic stands emphasising historic 
animosities. This was especially the case in Romania, but also evident in Poland, Hungary 
and Bulgaria. East-Central European nationalism was often seen as only marginally 
tolerant of ethnic, national or religious diversity at best. At worst it was regarded as 
xenophobic and anti-Semitic. However, it must also be recognised that this negative 
363 See Popescu, L., "A Change of Power in Romania: The Results and significance of the 
November 1996 Elections, " Government & Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2, Spring 1997, 
172-186, p. 176 364 
For example, several monarchist organisations existed in Bulgaria, see Troxel, L., "the 
Political Spectrum in Post-communist Bulgaria, " in Held, J., (1993) pp. 191-202 
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perception was partly due to the culture bound Western perception of the "East" as to 
differences between Eastern and Western nationalism. 365 
In all four countries many post-communist political elites relied on traditional national 
symbols emphasising such values as national culture, authority and discipline, which also 
often involved promotion of the established church. Even the Hungarian MDF - which 
under Antall was apparently modelled on a Western christian democrat party - remained 
truer to traditional national values than it outwardly professed. More overtly nationalist 
parties also emerged amongst the post-communist parties. For example in Hungary, Istvan 
Csurka's Hungarian Justice and Life Party (a breakaway faction of the MDF) became 
aggressively nationalistic and openly anti-Semitic. 
In Poland several strands of nationalism which owed their origins to the inter-war years 
could be discerned. For example, the Endecja and Pilsudskite traditions re-emerged within 
several new parties. In Poland most parties that displayed nationalism also emphasised a 
christian dimension alongside their nationalist ideas and orientations. 366 There was also a 
trend in which Catholicism was the governing political concept; only Catholics could claim 
the right to be Poles and all secular political movements were illegitimate. An important 
group representing this authoritarian populist trend was the Christian National Union 
(ZChN). 
In Bulgaria there was less a revival of inter-war nationalism - which had an outward, 
expansionist focus - and more growth in inward looking organisations. Apart from the 
party which represented the Turkish minority, the small number of Bulgarian nationalist 
movements received little support from the electorate. The main reason for this appears to 
be that the Bulgarian socialists co-opted most of the nationalist vote. Continuing the 
traditions of the communist party, the BSP ran a national assault on the ethnic Turks and 
365 For an interesting discussion of this, and for arguments suggesting it was the 
"weakness" of Eastern "nation" that provided salience for Eastern nationalists, see 
Burgess, A., (1997) Divided Europe, the New Domination of the East, Pluto Press, London, 
Chicago & Illinois, especially Chapter 8 
366 See MacDonald, O., "The Polish Right", Labour Focus on Eastern Europe No. 2,1990, 
pp. 17-23 
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their party in the 1991 election campaign, and joined a pre-election coalition with several 
nationalist parties, such as the Fatherland Party of Labour. 367 
The NSF chose a similar strategy in Romania. In spite of their self-professed centre-left 
ideological declarations, their promises of social protection were not fulfilled (as we have 
seen in Chapter 4). In fact the NSF embraced positions far more reminiscent of the 
Ceausescu period, especially in relation to the Hungarian minority. This was particularly 
evident in the local elections of 1992, when the NSF ran on joint lists with the extremist 
PRNU and GRP. 
The PRNU and GRP were both radical nationalist parties. The PRNU was a regional party: 
the political arm of the extreme nationalist anti-Hungarian Vatra romaneasca. The GRP 
was less regional but it was anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy. It strove to re-evaluate the 
communist regime's achievements, even promoting a predominantly military government 
to "safeguard the nation". 368 Both parties became influential during the coalition with the 
DNSF after the 1992 national elections. The government was perfectly willing to use and 
tolerate nationalists who offered simple solutions to complex problems by focusing 
attention on a range of "internal enemies". 
Populism and Populist Leadership 
Another traditional aspect which re-emerged in various forms was populism, and an 
associated use of populist symbols and rhetoric by some political leaders. Especially within 
the Balkan context, populism was often closely associated with nationalism, and a false or 
pseudo-egalitarianism. Historically, populism helped to unite the nation against real and 
"unreal" enemies both within and outside the state. After 1989 traditional populism was 
most prominent in Romania, especially in the immediate aftermath of the December 
revolution. Iliescu's popularity - mainly amongst the rural population - was based in the 
367 See Troxel, L., "The Political Spectrum in Post-Communist Bulgaria", in Held, J., 
(1993) pp. 191-202 
368 See Shafir, M., "The Revival of the Political Right in Post-communist Romania, " in 
Held, J., (1993) pp. 153-174 
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myth of the NSF as "the child of the revolution against Ceausescu. "369 Iliescu consistently 
promoted the NSF as a product of a popular revolution. The NSF utilised communist 
methods of misinformation and rumour to mislead the more isolated rural communities 
into seeing any opposition to the NSF as "counter-revolutionary". The Bulgarian BSP was 
less explicit in its tactics, but like the NSF was able to appeal to the less educated rural 
population who were politically apathetic and ideologically disinterested. 
In all four countries some political conflicts were based in personal animosities. 
Traditional values of religion, nation and community were often used to disguise personal 
bids for power, or to defend personal privileges. 370 For example in Romania, Vatra's 
rhetoric disguised a number of bureaucrats and officials with a record of manipulating the 
state to serve their own interests. 371 In Poland, the initial break-up of Solidarity into the 
Democratic Union and Centre Alliance were by-products of the contest between 
Mazowiecki and Walesa for the presidency. Much of the apparent ideological divisions 
between the two camps were a sham. The divisions stemmed from personal and social 
animosities. 372 
Many of the post-communist political leaders appeared to model themselves on prominent 
inter-war political actors and espoused populist rhetoric in attempts to enhance their 
appeal. For example, Walesa appeared to model himself on Pilsudski, and had an 
authoritarian style reminiscent of the inter-war leader. 373 Walesa's Non-Party Bloc to 
34 support Reform also suggested a parallel with a similar bloc set up by Pilsudski in 1927. 
Antall also looked to the pre-communist years, seeking to remould the Hungarian system 
in the spirit of nineteenth century reform statesmen. His role models were Ferenc Deak, 
Jozsef Eotvos and Count Bethlen. He reputedly embarked on an ideological mission of 
what he saw as Hungary's main intellectual traditions: populist radicalism, Christian 
369 Almond, M., (1990) p. 487 
370 Schopflin, G., (1993) p. 276 
371 Gallagher, T., (1995) p. 196 
372 See for example Zubek, V., "Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition, " Problems of 
Communism, Jan-April 1991, pp. 69-83 
373 See Garton Ash, T., 1990, We the People, Penguin, pp. 34-35 
374 See Baylis, T. A., "Presidents versus Prime Minister, " World Politics 48, April 1996, 
pp. 297-323, p. 312 
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democracy and nineteenth century liberalism. 375 His initial political style - as a 
"compulsive micromanager" of all issues that came before the cabinet - yielded poor 
results. He retreated into the office of Prime Minister. 376 He attempted to stay aloof from 
daily politics to protect his image as a national leader. In doing so, he managed to recreate 
a secretive and unaccountable system reminiscent of Kadar's Central Committee apparat of 
the 1970s. Some parts of government operated on the bases of top secret executive orders. 
Despite the government's record of continuing and supplementing the previous reform 
communist's generous social policies, Antall's popularity declined rapidly after 1991, 
mainly as a consequence of his style of leadership. 
In all four countries elements of pre-war ideology resurfaced to fill the vacuum left by the 
demise of Marxism-Leninism. Pre-modern values articulated by the more conservative 
intellectuals and politicians were based in traditions surrounding nation, religion and 
community. Within some extremist parties national-populism manifested itself as anti- 
Europeanism. While many traditionalist centre-right parties failed to "Europeanise" 
internally, reducing their Europeanism to simplicities for the consumption of the less 
educated masses. 377 The superficial perception of many ordinary people concerning the 
realities of Western liberalism and capitalism created an opportunity for some populists 
and nationalists to exploit a moral concern for the selfishness of consumerism and 
perceived "enemies" of the nation. Especially in Romania and Bulgaria, the rural 
populations were susceptible to populist rhetoric and traditional leadership symbolism. 
Conclusion 
The effects of such factors as electoral systems and institutional contexts on political 
parties and party systems cannot be dismissed. For example, the timing of the semi-free 
and first free election in Poland, and presidential-parliamentary conflicts played their part 
in producing the factionalism of the formerly cohesive Solidarity movement. In many 
respects patterns of difference in party developments were not clear cut, and it remains 
375 Tokes, R. L., (1996) Hungary's Negotiated Revolution, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, New York & Melbourne, especially pp. 424-7 
376 ibid. p. 426 
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difficult to attribute outcomes to any particular factors. There were many general 
similarities across the cases, and particular differences within the cases which are not 
easily explained. However, the type of communist system and differing forms of revolution 
appeared to contribute to some overall differences between the cases. 
In all four countries communist rule virtually eradicated the social bases for traditional 
political parties. Only the peasant parties retained any residual electorate. Where these 
parties remained as "satellites" during the communist period - as in Poland and Bulgaria - 
some continuity from the pre-communist to post-communist period was discernible. Yet, 
the Hungarian Smallholders Party also re-emerged without communist "satellite" status. 
The issue of land restitution after 1989, and the populist leadership of Jozsef Torgyan, 
played a part in providing the party with a support base, and a measure of popularity in the 
countryside. 378 In Romania the peasant party had little electoral success as a separate 
independent party. Although the type of communist regime enabled some traditional 
parties to retain organisational structure and some social linkage, in none of these countries 
were "historic" parties able to establish any significant electoral success as independent 
parties after 1989. The only other significant social bases for parties after 1989 were the 
ethnic minority parties, especially the Turkish and Hungarian parties in Bulgaria and 
Romania. This might be partly attributed to the persecution of these groups during the 
communist period. 
In all four countries new political parties suffered from factionalism, personal rivalries, and 
difficulty in defining their ideological identity once the old communist regimes collapsed. 
However, where the anti-communist organisations were well established prior to 1989 (in 
Poland and Hungary) new political parties gained the most electoral success in the first 
post-1989 elections, and were able to form lasting (although not necessarily stable) 
governments. These parties also encountered the most difficulty in terms of ideological 
representation as they moved rapidly from anti-communist movements to governing 
political parties. Poland's party system was the most fluid initially, partly due to the 
377 For a discussion of neo-traditionalism and national-populism, and the kinds of parties 
associated with these ideas, see Agh, A., (1998), especially pp. 62-66 
378 For party leadership and policy see for example, Tokes, R. L., "Party politics and 
political participation in postcommunist Hungary", in Dawisha, K., & Parrott, B., (eds) 
(1997), especially p. 143; and Lomax, B., "Factions and Factionalism in Hungary's New 
Party System", in Gillespie, R., Waller, M., & Nieto, L. L., (eds) (1995) pp. 131-132 
185 
original diversity of the Solidarity movement, the particular form of change during 1989, 
and resulting presidential-parliamentary conflict. Post-1989 "opposition" parties in Poland 
also reflected the involvement of workers and the grass roots nature of communist 
opposition, especially in the development of the Union of Labour. Hungary's opposition 
movements had already formed distinctive groupings by the time of the National Round 
Table negotiations, and new political party formations reflected these distinctions, and the 
intellectual and elite roots of Hungarian communist opposition. The more pragmatic form 
of change during 1989 and early 1990 also aided greater continuity within the party 
system. In both these countries there were contradictory processes at work. On the one 
hand the former oppostitions were able to form governments and attempt further system 
change. On the other hand their sudden rise to power created the potential for internal party 
strife and disagreements over processes of change. 
Despite the UDFs early - but short-lived - parliamentary electoral success in Bulgaria, the 
tendency in Bulgaria and Romania was for anti-communist "bloc" movements to continue 
well into the post-communist period. The late formation of opposition movements, and the 
lack of "negotiations" with the communists during 1989 led to a delay in party 
development processes. On the one hand the new parties lacked resources, and had 
difficulty in establishing electoral bases of support, especially amongst the rural 
population. Conversely they did not need to establish individual party identities whilst 
remaining in opposition to former communists; they could retain a relatively cohesive anti- 
communist bloc identity. 
Again in all four countries the former communist parties were able to retain elements of 
their past organisational and social links. However, the marginalisation of communists 
from political power in Poland and Hungary, and the dislocation and partial restructuring 
of these communist party-states prior to 1989 contributed to more rapid and complete 
reformation and reorientation of the parties in this case. 
Although Bulgaria is something of an interim case, and Romania an extreme case, the 
more centralised communist states and closer patron-client networks had its effects on 
former communists. The reformed communist parties did not relinquish their communist 
identities or move towards social democracy as quickly as their Polish and Hungarian 
counterparts. The form of political change in 1989, which involved little or no "opposition" 
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influence, enabled relatively unchanged former communists to retain and utilise much of 
their organisational and social links from the communist past. 
In Bulgaria, the 1994 election saw a partial undermining of the bi-polar party system which 
emerged from the revolutionary events of late 1989 and early 1990. Yet, a mainly 
"communist" versus "anti-communist" polarisation remained evident. Similarly in 
Romania, a mainly bi-polar system emerged. Decline in support for the NSF in elections 
was not necessarily contingent with a decline in power and central control. The form of 
revolution in Romania assisted the former communists in maintaining power over the state. 
The complete lack of organised anti-communist opposition movements in the pre-1989 
period, and lack of any real oppositionist participation in the revolution, led to a severe 
delay in the success of any opposition parties after 1989. 
Especially in Romania, populist and nationalist rhetoric was often used at elections with 
some effect. Many politicians saw traditional and moral issues as a means to appeal to the 
electorate. However, the remnants of communist structural conditions were often as 
important as ideological programmes in determining the success or failure of political 
organisations. Even in Poland and Hungary, despite the handicap of affiliations to the old 
regime, trade unions which had their basis in communist organisations - such as the 
Hungarian MSzOSz and Polish OPZZ - retained considerable membership in the early 
stages of political change. The organisational structure of the reformed communist parties 
also gave them an advantage against new and historic parties which were often 
disorganised, and had minimal memberships. This was especially the case in Romania and 
Bulgaria where the communist structures were dismantled at a slower pace, and where 
oppositionists lacked resources to promote themselves. 
Historic and cultural symbols were certainly significant during opposition to the 
communist regime. In the euphoria of 1989 and early 1990, spontaneous mass movements, 
the growth of political organisations and certain events - such as the reburial of Imre Nagy 
in Hungary - were symbolic of the changes taking place. Events and personalities were 
identified with the struggle for freedom and democratic rights. However, as the euphoria 
abated so the effects of this kind of symbolism subsided. For example in Poland, Walesa 
became a symbolic figure in the struggle against communism. Yet, once censorship was 
lifted many people saw him as a coarse, uneducated man, unfit to hold Presidential office. 
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Ideology remained essentially the property of the intellectual and political elite. In fact, for 
most of the population the complexities of ideological programmes had little appeal. They 
became more interested in realising their expectations for improved living standards and a 
free lifestyle. In consequence they responded most positively to those parties perceived as 
providing economic necessities and protecting social welfare. We now turn to a fuller 
discussion of economic and social change. These factors need closer examination to fully 
understand the outcomes of the revolutionary processes. 
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Chapter 6 Economic and Social Change 
All the communist systems were in crisis by the 1980s. Social mobility had slowed, 
economies were stagnating and in decline. All post-communist regimes had to address the 
problems of reforming economies, and appeasing societies. Political change during and 
after 1989 also meant the introduction of economic change, which had inevitable economic 
and social consequences. Some political consequences of economic change have already 
been noted (previously in Chapter 4). The differing forms of revolution had some impact 
as differences in proposals for, and pace of economic change will show. However, the 
economic bases from which each country began economic reform were also significant. In 
the short term, rapid economic change created political problems and economic "shocks" in 
all countries. Yet, economic conditions in 1989 provided very different "starting points" 
for economic outcomes. These differing bases had the greatest impact in the longer term as 
Poland and Hungary experienced general economic improvements over and above those of 
Romania, and especially Bulgaria. Patterns of difference in some aspects of social 
outcomes are less easily discerned. Yet, here too some differences between the cases can 
be highlighted. The domination of former communists in Bulgaria and Romania over 
political and economic reform processes also had an impact on social outcomes. Former 
communists retained political elite positions, and control over unrestructured, centralised 
states, which enabled them to manipulate greater benefits from system change. The rest of 
society in these two countries suffered harsher consequences, appeared to be more 
politically active, and yet less civil associations developed than in either Poland or 
Hungary. 
This chapter will examine these economic and social outcomes. The initial part of the 
chapter will describe first, proposed and actual economic reforms; second, the problem of 
uncompetitive industry, especially with regard to state-owned enterprises and privatisation 
programmes; and third, the economic consequences of these reforms. The subsequent part 
of the chapter will outline the main social changes apparent in the early post-1989 period. 
There are four sub-sections, which examine change amongst the political and economic 
elites, and the major economic and political consequences of the revolutions for the rest of 
society. 
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In the section on economic change a comparison of the two cases will be undertaken. In all 
four countries new regimes initiated programmes to transform their economies from 
centrally planned to market economies. Many of the individual requirements for socialist 
economic reform were faced by developing countries, such as South American or African 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these economic transformations were less 
dramatic than those faced by East-Central Europe. "Under communist rule capitalism was 
destroyed and not merely suspended or distorted", and the new governments faced a range 
of serious economic problems in 1989.379 The four main problems they faced were: 1) the 
almost total nationalisation of the economy; 2) structural distortions stemming from 
monopolisation, administrative price regulation and centralised investment decisions; 3) 
the high level of social spending by the state relative to economic development; and 4) 
macroeconomic instability stemming from inflationary pressures and growing foreign debt. 
Additionally (as we have seen in Chapter 2) the decline in Soviet economic power had its 
effects on East-Central European economies. In the post-communist period a movement 
away from dependence on former Soviet economic links created economic and political 
pressures for the East-Central European region. For example, the change in trade patterns 
after the collapse of CMEA led to greater involvement with West European and American 
markets, increasing competitive pressures. These external factors will be addressed more 
fully in Chapter 7. This chapter will focus on internal economic change, and the longer 
term consequences for each economy. 
It is more difficult to compare the cases in the section on social change, due to the lack of 
available information on relevant aspects of society in Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore a 
more general approach will be taken in this part of the chapter, while some anecdotal 
evidence will be utilised to draw out comparisons between the cases where possible. In all 
four countries the elites were the main benefactors of change, while the rest of society 
suffered the negative consequences. Some theoretical debates concerning the reproduction 
and circulation of elites will be addressed within the investigation of social elite change, 
while the latter aspect will be examined by looking at the growth in economic inequality. 
This inequality was especially apparent in terms of declining real wages for many sections 
379 Balcerowicz, L., "Understanding Post-Communist Transitions", Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 5, No. 4 October, 1994, p. 80, in Dabrowski, M., "Controversy on Transition Strategy", 
Opera Minora 7, Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, 1996, Poltext, 
Warsaw, p. Il. 
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of the population, and was mainly caused by unemployment and inflation. This increase in 
inequality was a source of discontent for much of society, which in turn put pressure on the 
post-1989 governments. However, as the section on society and politics will show this 
discontent did not necessarily result in greater political activity. Despite the euphoria 
experienced during 1989 and early 1990 many people were relatively passive in their 
approach to politics. Despite these general similarities across the cases, there were some 
differences between the cases which can be highlighted. 
6.1 Economic Chance 
In each country new regimes introduced some form of marketisation and privatisation 
programme, but there was considerable controversy over how these changes were to take 
place; whether to implement changes quickly (the "Big Bang" or "shock therapy" 
approach) or whether to take a more cautious approach. There were also significant 
differences between proposed economic change and actual policy implementation. An 
inter-related issue was the economic basis from which each country began reform. 
Restructuring of industry to compete in both internal and external markets was particularly 
important for long term economic success. Although the initial effects of economic reform 
were broadly similar in all four countries, the structural conditions in Poland and Hungary 
in 1989 provided better potential for a more successful economic outcome in the longer 
term. 
Proposals for and Implementation of Economic Reform 
All the post-communist governments were essentially committed to replacing command 
economies with western style market systems. In Poland and Hungary, especially among 
more liberal intellectuals, the influence of Thatcherism and "neo-liberal" economic ideas 
was prominent. For example, in Poland many academics studied at Western universities 
during the early 1980s, uncritically accepting an oversimplified version of liberalism, and 
were convinced that "the theory and practice of liberalism" would solve the country's 
problems. It was not until theory was put into practice that disillusion set in. Equally, and 
probably more important, western cultural influence upon the masses led politicians to 
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react to economic demands. 380 The main difference in economic reform proposals was in 
terms of the pace of economic change. As soon as the Mazowiecki government was 
appointed in Poland, a shock therapy approach to economic change was immediately 
initiated. Hungary also began to move towards similar marketisation and privatisation 
programmes, but took a more gradual approach. 
Before 1989 in Romania and Bulgaria "Thatcherite ideas" appeared to be "inaccessible 
ideals" for those living within the Soviet bloc. 381 However, after 1989 the new 
governments were ostensibly committed to similar economic programmes. Bulgaria was 
something of an interim case. In some areas, such as price liberalisation, Bulgaria was 
quite radical. However, in both Romania and Bulgaria actual movement towards a market 
system was comparatively slower and implementation more piecemeal. The two cases will 
be compared in order to examine differences in proposals for change and implementation 
of programmes. 
Poland and Hungary 
In Poland a "shock-therapy" program associated with Deputy Prime Minister, Leszek 
Balcerowicz was swiftly introduced. The Balcerowicz plan, devised in co-operation with 
the IMF, was initiated on January Ist 1990. The program aimed to stabilise the economy 
through eliminating excess demand and reducing inflation. By freeing prices, liberalising 
trade (which included instantaneous internal convertibility of the zloty) and controlling the 
money supply, the government intended to move rapidly through the shock of inflation and 
end consumer shortages. The package also included cuts in government spending and a 
restrictive incomes policy. 382 During the 1980s the government had already relaxed central 
control over enterprises, and a 1990 law extended this by providing for the transformation 
of state enterprises into joint-stock and limited-liability companies. A Privatisation Law 
380 Dr. Adam Chmielewski, Institute of Philosophy, Wroclaw University, interview with 
Ruth Rodda, 31/3/99. 
See also Chmielewski, A. J., "Rationality, Values, Traditions", in Society and Economy in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. XVII, No. 5 
381 Dr. George Voicu, Faculty of Political and Administrative Sciences, Bucharest 
University, e-mail conversation with Ruth Rodda, 20 June 1998 
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(1990) created a centralised Ministry of Ownership Transformation to oversee a proposed 
mass privatisation programme. 
Hungary considered a gradual approach to economic change more appropriate. Steps 
towards a market economy had already been implemented. The New Economic 
Mechanism had already introduced a market type approach to certain sections of the 
economy (see previously in Chapter 2). For example, prices had been gradually liberalised 
over the years since 1968, and from 1974 foreign companies were able to establish joint 
ventures with Hungarian enterprise. Further reforms in the 1980s encouraged private 
enterprise, joint stock companies and competitive banking. After the 1990 elections the 
new government accelerated the reforms begun by the communists, and in March 1991, the 
finance minister, Mihaly Kupa, presented a five year programme for conversion and 
development of the economy. This long term strategy included measures to accelerate 
trade liberalisation and redirect trade from the former CMEA region towards western 
markets. 
In Poland, the radical economic reform programme continued more or less unabated during 
the early 1990s, despite changes in government. Price liberalisation and cuts in subsidies to 
industries continued, but privatisation was modified. In Hungary, price liberalisation went 
ahead on a smaller scale. A proportion of prices continued to be subject to mainly indirect 
government controls. Privatisation was relatively moderate. Proposals to sell off large state 
enterprises made little headway, although a sizeable number of state-owned enterprises 
were successfully transformed into treasury-owned corporations with public share offers. 
Substantial progress was made in foreign investment and foreign trade liberalisation, 
although proposed targets were by no means achieved. 383 
382 see Koves, A., (1992) Central and Eastern European Economies in Transition; The 
International Dimension, Westview Press, Boulder, San Fransisco & Oxford, p. 20-21 
383 See Bozyk, P., "The Transformation of East Central European Economies: A Critical 
Assessment, " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXV, No. 3, September 1992, 
pp. 257-273, p. 262 
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Romania and Bulgaria 
Romania and Bulgaria introduced their own versions of "shock therapy" programmes, but 
actually followed more piecemeal approaches to marketisation and privatisation. In 
Bulgaria Lukanov did little initially to break with the economic policies of Zhivkov. 
Economic considerations were less prominent than political matters during debates in the 
run up to the June elections of 1990. During the first months of post-communist 
government decree 56 remained in force with minor amendments (see previously in 
Chapter 2). In March 1990 an economic programme was introduced which proclaimed a 
market economy to be the goal of reform. This supposedly included goals to change 
economic conditions and regulators to satisfy market requirements, property reform, 
gradual liberalisation of prices and measures to ensure minimal standards of living for 
certain sections of the population. 384 By the end of 1990, as a result of reforms initiated by 
the Lukanov government, 20% of the prices of goods and 50% of the price of services 
were liberalised. This partial price liberalisation without accompanying monetary, bank or 
enterprise reform stimulated a process whereby state managers in the unreformed state 
owned enterprises started channelling resources and large portions of state companies into 
their own private companies. 385 A further reform programme, approved by the IMF, was 
launched in February 1991. This envisaged a reduction in the budget deficit, the unification 
of the exchange rate and the attainment of a current account surplus. Prices on over 90% of 
goods were immediately liberalised, interest rate management was entrusted to the newly 
independent National Bank and foreign trade restrictions were relaxed. 386 In 1992 a 
Privatisation Law provided for a conversion of state and municipal enterprises into joint- 
stock or limited-liability companies, and a new law on Economic Activity of Foreign 
Persons and Protection of Foreign Investment allowed foreign citizens greater rights to 
enter domestic economic activity. Parliament quickly created the Privatisation Agency, the 
384 see Wyzan, M. L., "The Bulgarian economy in the immediate post-Zhivkov era, " in 
Sjoberg. O., & Wyzan, M. L., (eds) (1991) p. 89-90. For a discussion of the government's 
programme in English see Nikolaev, R. "The Government's programme for crisis 
management and economic reform", Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, No. 17,27 April 
1990, pp. 1-5 (cited in Wyzan, M. L., (ed) (1991) note 6) 
385 Izvorski, I., "Economic Reform in Bulgaria: 1989 - 1993", Communist Economies and 
Economic Transformation, 1993, Columbia Education, Columbia University, electronic 
source 
386 Frydman, R., et al (1993) The Privatisation Process in Central Europe, Central 
European University Press, Budapest, London & New York, pp. 3,6,9,10 & 11 
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body responsible for privatisation. Small scale privatisation, with regard to small shops, the 
restitution of factories and renting municipal properties began immediately. Land 
restitution also went ahead, but large scale industrial privatisation was postponed. It was 
politically more controversial, and required the consent of government. This proved 
difficult when governments were unstable and politicians were involved in continuous 
political wrangles. 
In Romania, Ceausescu's last years in power had produced chronic shortages of basic 
consumer goods alongside heavy cuts in hard currency imports. These austerity measures 
left Romania with one of the most tightly controlled and centralised economies in Eastern 
Europe. The immediate goal of Petre Roman's revolutionary government was to restore 
living standards and working conditions, and gain support for the forthcoming elections. 
This was accomplished by increasing imports and halting exports of foodstuffs, lowering 
the price of and derestricting the use of energy, reducing working hours, and removing 
price controls on sales by peasants. Nearly all the newly constituted political parties gave 
lip service to a speedy conversion to a market economy. The newly elected government 
(May 1990) announced an economic program which would move Romania rapidly and 
irrevocably towards a market economy. A "bold and comprehensive reform package" was 
to be implemented. 387 Commitments were made to dismantle central planning bodies, 
reduce controls on prices and wages, privatise state enterprises and provide a social safety 
net. Laws enacted between 1990 and 1992 provided for large scale reorganisation of state 
enterprises and co-operatives. However, the economic reform path chosen by the new 
government conformed to the leftist platform of the NSF, which remained more committed 
to consolidating its own power than to designing a comprehensive reform package capable 
of stabilising the economy. 388 Considerable restrictions on private and foreign ownership 
remained. Public sector enterprises continued to be governed by rules typical of a centrally 
planned economy. This aided the steady decline in efficiency of industry which in turn was 
offset by constant price rises. The state was also heavily involved in overseeing any re- 
organisation that did take place through such bodies as the Romanian Development 
Agency (which regulated foreign investment) or the National Agency for Privatisation 
387 Isarescu, M., "the Prognoses for Economic Recovery" in Nelson, D., (ed) (1992) 
Romania after Tyranny. Westview, Boulder & Oxford 
388 see Stan, L., "Romanian Privatisation: Catching up with the East, " in Stan, L., (ed) 
(1997) pp. 127-161, especially p. 128-9 
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(responsible for co-ordinating, guiding and controlling the privatisation process). 389 After 
the forced resignation of Petre Roman and the interim leadership of Theodor Stolojan. 
reformers in the ruling NSF were marginalised. A conservative faction of the NSF 
ascended to power under Vacaroiu, a former middle-ranking central planner, who was 
appointed Prime Minister in November 1992. This government reluctantly moved the 
economic transition forward reacting to economic crises rather than establishing the pace 
of change. 
The Problem of Uncompetitive Industry 
In all four countries the introduction of a successful market economy depended not only on 
the willingness of politicians to initiate and implement reform, but also what kind of 
economic bases existed at the time reform was undertaken. Privatisation was initially seen 
as a swift and effective way to encourage movement away from centrally controlled, 
monopoly enterprise. However, it quickly became clear that the quality of privatisation and 
general restructuring of enterprises was more important for producing competitive and 
successful market economies. The more open economic systems of Poland and Hungary 
provided better potential for the restructuring of companies and privatisation of state 
owned enterprises. However, the initial enthusiasm for privatisation programmes were 
considerably modified as the effects of price and trade liberalisation came into effect. 
Nevertheless these two countries did succeed in creating more effective restructuring of 
industry, partly because they were starting from a more adaptable economic context in 
1989. Comparable evidence of industrial restructuring (especially for Bulgaria and 
Romania) is patchy and difficult to obtain, but a comparison of the two cases will be 
undertaken to indicate how enterprise restructuring progressed. 
Poland and Hungary 
There is evidence to suggest that privatisation in Poland and Hungary was relatively 
successful as a means of restructuring. A variety of performance indicators - such as 
389 see Frydman, R., et al (1992) pp. 219-262 
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profitability and labour productivity - suggested that privatised firms were more successful 
than state owned enterprises. 390 However, there is also evidence that countries which were 
successful at privatising industry were also the countries which had the administrative 
skills and political capacity to run state owned firms in "an effective and efficient 
manner" . 
391 An indication of successful industrial restructuring can be seen in the 
improvement in industrial production. Initially industrial production fell in both countries 
(see table 6.1 below). State-owned enterprises were especially likely to see a decrease in 
output. However, production steadily improved from 1991. Although planned privatisation 
slowed, the private sector increased and aided competitiveness in both countries. For 
example, in Poland the output of state industry fell by 6-7% in 1993, but the output of 
private industry rose by 35-40% in the same year. 392 In Poland the share of the private 
sector steadily increased after comprehensive reform was introduced. According to official 
estimates, the share of private sector GDP rose from 31% in 1990 to 56% in 1994.393 In 
Hungary government figures suggested that approximately 80% of GDP was generated by 
the private sector by 1999.394 However, this official data was likely to exaggerate the 
extent of private sector industry, as many partly state owned firms were included. In 1994 
the actual size of the private sector was more likely to be 12 to 15%, rather than the 60% 
reported in official data. 395 
390 see for example, a study by Pohl, G., et al, "Privatization and Restructuring in Central 
and Eastern Europe - Evidence and Policy Options", World Bank Technical Paper, 
No. 368,1997, Washington, DC. Their conclusions were was based on a sample of 6,300 
firms in seven countries. 
391 Shirley, M., "Bureaucrats in Business: the Roles of Privatization versus Corporatization 
in State Owned Enterprise Reform", unpublished article, quoted in Nellis, J., "Time to 
Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies? ", International Finance Corporation 
Discussion Paper No. 38, The World Bank, Washington, DC, p. 22 
392 Winiecki, J., "The Reasons for Electoral Defeat Lie in Non-Economic Factors". in 
Winiecki, J., (ed) (1996) Five Years After June: the Polish Transformation 1989-1994, 
Centre for Research in Post-Communist Economies, London, p. 91 
393 Country Profile - Poland'96, electronic source 394 The Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs. March 1999, electronic source 
395 See for example Stark, D., cited in Tokes, R. L., "Party politics and political participation 
in postcommunist Hungary", in Dawisha, K., & Parrot, B., (eds) (1997) p. 135 
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Table 6.1 Industrial Production (% change) 1990-1997 (selected years) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1997 
Poland -24.2 -8.0 2.8 6.4 9.7 11.4 
Hungary -10.2 -16.6 -9.7 4.0 4.6 10.9 
Bulgaria -16.8 -22.2 -15.9 -10.9 7.0 -7.0 
Romania -19.0 -22.8 -21.9 1.3 9.4 -4.0 
Source: Key Data, Business Central Europe, electronic version. 
There is further evidence to suggest that Poland and Hungary were relatively more 
competitive to start with, and more effective in restructuring firms during the 1990s. A 
sample survey of firms indicated that in 1992 37% of firms in Poland, and 59% of firms in 
Hungary were profitable. By 1995 49% and 70% respectively had become profitable. 396 
The growth in labour productivity was also relatively good with an increase of 18% in 
Poland, and 34% in Hungary between 1989 and 1995.397 
Some "commercialisation" of industry had already started during the communist period in 
both countries. Nominally bankrupt state industries were turned into commercial 
companies, or insider elites created private companies which often utilised state resources, 
foreign partners and foreign investment as a means to support enterprise. 398 Although this 
unregulated or "spontaneous" form of privatisation became a political issue (especially in 
Poland) after 1989, it provided some potential for enterprise restructuring before the more 
radical privatisation plans were introduced. The so-called "second economy" also provided 
a basis from which small private sector enterprise could grow relatively rapidly within the 
post-1989 economic context. Although commercialised and small private enterprises were 
not necessarily successful within the new competitive markets, these features apparently 
396 Pohl, G., et al (1997), p. 6 
397 Figures adapted from Hunya, G., "Large privatisation, restructuring and foreign direct 
investment", in Zecchini, S., (ed) (1997) Lessons from the Economic Transition, Kiewer 
Academic Publishers, US & Netherlands p. 277, Table 1 
398 See for example, Meaney, C. S., "Foreign Experts, Capitalists, and Competing Agendas: 
Privatisation in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary", Comparative Political Studies. 
Vol. 28, No. 2, July 1995, Sage Publications, pp. 275-305. More will also be said about the 
role of foreign investment in the following chapter 
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provided Poland and Hungary with a better basis for restructuring industry and creating a 
competitive market economy. 399 
Bulgaria and Romania 
As in Poland and Hungary industrial output in Bulgaria and Romania fell sharply in 1990 
(see table 6.1 above). Although production improved between 1992 and 1995, it fell again 
in 1997. Bulgaria was in an especially difficult position. The country was dominated by 
large state industries. In 1992 97% of industrial output came from the public sector. This 
was only reduced to 86.4% by 1996.400 Privatisation was difficult to undertake - partly 
because of centralisation during communism and post-1989 political conflict - but also due 
to the country's concentration of heavy and energy intensive industries. A private sector 
was virtually non-existent during the 1980s, but did emerge, and begin to grow quite 
rapidly during the 1990s. The private sector grew to account for approximately 41% of 
total employment by 1995. However, the vast majority of private enterprises were small 
trading and service entities employing less than five people. 401 
Similarly Romania began economic reform with a high density of inefficient heavy 
industry with poor production technologies and low levels of managerial skills. In both 
Bulgaria and Romania the profitability of firms was low in 1992. Profitability increased in 
Bulgaria by 1995, but decreased in Romania. 402 There was also a considerable decrease in 
labour productivity in Romania between 1989 and 1995.403 However, there was evidence 
399 Other factors, such as banking reform, institutional reform, foreign investment, and 
trade patterns were also important. Some of these factors will be touched on below and in 
the following chapter. 
400 Bulgarian Statistical Yearbook 1997, National Statistical Institute, electronic version 
401 European Commission, Agenda 2000, Commission Opinion on Bulgaria's Application 
for Membership of the European Union, July 1997, p. 14 
402 A survey of sample firms indicated that in 1992 28% of firms in Bulgaria and 30% of 
firms in Romania were profitable. By 1995 45% of Bulgarian firms and 24% of Romanian 
firms were profitable. See Pohl, G., et al (1997), p. 6 
403 In Romania labour productivity decreased by 14%, while Bulgaria's decreased by I%. 
Figures adapted from Hunya, G., "Large privatisation, restructuring and foreign direct 
investment", in Zecchini, S., (ed) (1997) p. 277, Table 1 
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of growth in the Romanian private sector. Private sector GDP was around 16.4% in 1990, 
and rose considerably to 58% by 1997.404 
Despite these improvements in private sector growth, both countries suffered from 
continuing difficulties with industrial restructuring. In particular delayed or slow reform of 
the banking sector, as well as a generally slow economic reform process, resulted in 
considerable subsidising of unprofitable state owned enterprises. 405 Privatisation required 
capital which was not readily available from within the country, and the general economic 
climate did not encourage foreign investment. As already noted (in the previous section) 
partial reform gave many former communists the opportunity to profit from unrestructured 
state industries by hiving off profitable resources. Both countries lacked either the 
structural conditions or sufficient economic or political incentives for rapid industrial 
restructuring. 
Some Economic Consequences of Economic Reform 
In all four countries economic reform had immediate effects. The economies went into 
steep decline as the previous semi-protective trade with the Soviet bloc was swept away, 
and each economy was exposed to international markets. Even when economic reform was 
more gradual, there was a shock effect as the economies adjusted to the new context. In the 
short term there was little difference between the cases, but in the longer term Poland and 
Hungary adjusted more quickly and suffered less. Where there were differences initially it 
was as much to do with the bases from which the economies started as from how their 
reforms progressed. 
404 Private Sector Development Yearbooks: Romania, World Bank Group, electronic 
version 
405 See for example, Carare, O. V., & Perotti, E. C., "The evolution of bank credit quality in 
Romania since 1991 ", in Zecchini, S., (ed) (1997) pp. 301-313 
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Poland and Hungary 
Despite the different approaches to economic reform in Poland and Hungary (and 1989 
economic conditions), the results of economic change had similar effects. Both suffered 
from a steep decline in output in the early 1990s (as we have already seen). Inflation was 
also initially high, and especially acute in Poland, although this later dropped (see Table 
6.2 below). 
Table 6.2 Inflation (%) 1989-1997 (selected years) 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 
Poland 251.1 553.6 70.3 35.3 27.8 15.3 
Hungary 17.0 28.9 35.0 22.5 28.2 18.3 
Bulgaria 10.0 23.8 338.5 72.8 62.1 1083.0 
Romania na 5.1 170.2 256.1 32.2 154.8 
Sources: 1989 figures - Poland and Hungary - Gros, D., & Steinherr, A., (1995) Winds of 
Change, p. 279. Bulgaria - Wyzan, M. L., "Economic transformation and regional inequality 
in Bulgaria: in search of a meaningful unit of analysis", in Jones, D. C., & Miller, J., (eds) 
1997 pp. 24-25. 
1990-1997 figures - Key Data, Business Central Europe, electronic version 
In Poland the "Big Bang" approach to economic reform resulted in a rapid decline in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and living standards in 1990 to 1991, whilst inflation soared in 
1990. Public sector workers and social security recipients suffered in particular. However, 
Poland started from a much less favourable position than Hungary in 1989, and "by the 
fourth quarter of 1992 was enjoying many elements of an export-led recovery with 
declining rates of inflation" . 
406 By 1995 Poland had one of the strongest performing 
economies of the region in terms of GDP growth, especially within manufacturing (see 
Table 6.3). 
406 Slay, B., "Transition from Planned to Market Economy: Hungary and Poland Compared: 
A Comment, " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 25, No. 4, Dec. 1992, pp. 335-341, 
p. 339 
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Table 6.3 GDP (% change) 1989-1997 (selected years) 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 3.8 7.0 6.9 
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -0.6 1.5 4.4 
Bulgaria -1.9 -9.1 -11.7 -1.5 2.1 -7.4 
Romania na -5.6 -12.9 1.5 7.1 -6.6 
Sources: 1989 figures - Poland and Hungary - Gros, D., & Steinherr, A., (1995) Winds of 
Change, p. 279. Bulgaria - Wyzan, M. L., "Economic transformation and regional inequality 
in Bulgaria: in search of a meaningful unit of analysis", in Jones, D. C., & Miller, J., (eds) 
1997 pp. 24-25. 
1990-1997 figures - Key Data, Business Central Europe, electronic version 
In Hungary, despite the more gradual approach to economic change, the economy 
unexpectedly contracted and negative growth continued into 1993. Inflation did not reach 
the heights of Polish increases, but was nevertheless a cause for concern. Hungary's early 
movement towards market reform and opening of the economy to the West (before the 
collapse of communism) did not initially aid economic recovery. Recession was not as 
acute as in other East-Central European countries, but the decision to maintain payments 
on external financial obligations (caused by the high level of external debt inherited from 
the communist period), meant the domestic economy strained under an increasing budget 
deficit. 
In both countries unemployment was not that high considering the slump in production and 
restructuring of the economy (for unemployment figures see Table 6.4 below). There was a 
tendency for enterprises to maintain a slower pace of production in the face of recession, 
rather than cut their work force. The decline in output also hid a substantial increase in the 
setting up of small private enterprises (as we have seen in the previous section) which 
provided increasing employment opportunities. In addition governments were reluctant to 
force a large wave of bankruptcies (and hence redundancies) within the state owned 
enterprises for political reasons. State sector workers increasingly demanded that 
governments prevent erosion of wage differentials. A social safety net was also difficult to 
maintain whilst implementing austerity measures under budget constraints; another reason 
for the initially slow movement towards restructuring state enterprises. 
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Despite these difficulties in the initial post-1989 period, all the macroeconomic indicators 
show a steady improvement in economic conditions. This is especially noticeable in terms 
of average monthly wages (see Table 6.5 below). Set against the gradual reduction in 
inflation (see previously in Table 6.2) living standards in Poland and Hungary slowly but 
steadily increased. 
Table 6.4 Unemployment as a% of labour force 1990-1997 (selected years) 
Country 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 
Poland 6.3 11.8 16.4 14.9 10.5 
Hungary 1.9 7.8 13.3 11.1 10.8 
Bulgaria 1.7 11.1 16.4 11.1 13.7 
Romania 0.4 3.1 10.4 9.5 8.8 
Source: Key Data, Business Central Europe, electronic version 
Table 6.5 Average Monthly Wage (US$) 1990-1997 (selected years) 
Country 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 
Poland 108.4 166.0 215.7 285.5 352.7 
Hungary 212.8 239.8 295.2 309.5 310.5 
Bulgaria 157.5 55.0 116.9 113.1 na 
Romania 138.6 97.6 103.1 138.3 121.8 
Bulgaria's average monthly wage for 1997 was not available, but dropped to 75.5 in 1996 
Sources: Poland 1990-1991, Lavigne, M., (1995) The Economics of Transition, Macmillan, 
London, p. 260 & 266 
All other figures - Key Data, Business Central Europe, electronic version 
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Bulgaria and Romania 
A major economic problem for Bulgaria in the post-communist period was the foreign 
indebtedness inherited from the end of communist rule and the collapse of CMEA trade. 
The stabilisation programme introduced in 1991 helped to avoid hyperinflation, kept wages 
under control and maintained external trade balances for much of the period to 1994. 
However, economic performance was weak, and inflation and foreign exchange rates 
became an increasing problem. 
As can be seen from tables 6.1 to 6.5 above, real GDP and industrial production declined 
considerably during the period 1989-1993. Inflation averaged 4.5% per month from 1991, 
unemployment reached a peak of over 16% in 1993, whilst average monthly wages 
remained relatively low. Failure to reach an early agreement with the IMF on assistance in 
paying back foreign debt and service obligations exacerbated Bulgaria's problems. Trade 
was also restricted while the United Nations embargo against Serbia - as a result of the 
Bosnian conflict - blocked one of Bulgaria's main export routes (also see the following 
chapter). By the spring of 1996 the country was in the midst of a severe foreign exchange 
crisis. Wages and living standards rapidly declined while inflation soared. By early 1997 
appalling economic conditions within the country led to mass social protests and 
government crisis (see more in following sections). 407 
In Romania the initial economic conditions in 1989 made any economic reform difficult. 
The legacy of Ceausescu's policies, underlying state-oriented structure, complex 
bureaucracy, and inefficient production created a shortage economy with little capacity for 
market economics. The slow progress of reform in all economic areas resulted in rising 
unemployment, rising inflation, a negative balance of trade, and continuous erosion of 
consumer purchasing power up to the end of 1993. Several critical policy decisions at the 
end of 1993 which introduced "interest rate shocks" and devaluation of the leu, coupled 
with an austerity budget in 1994 implemented to counteract the poor state of the economy, 
407 For socio-economic conditions and resulting political crisis, see for example 
Krushelnycky. A., "Street revolt driven by prices, not principles", The European, 16-22 
January 1997, p. 6 
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resulted in a surprising economic recovery by 1995.408 Inflation was substantially reduced 
and economic growth began to improve quite rapidly (see tables 6.1-6.5 above). However, 
this improvement did not last. By 1997 the economy suffered a further downturn. 
Despite the different approaches towards economic reform, and different implementation 
of policies, all four countries had limited success in achieving robust economic recovery 
and in implanting market mechanisms initially. 409 However, Poland and Hungary were 
able to adjust more readily to marketisation and western trade. As we shall see (in the 
following chapter) relative economic success was partly due to their geographical and 
"ideological" proximity to Western European trade partners. It was also due to these two 
countries' pre-1989 attempts at economic reform, and the structural bases from which they 
began more radical reform in 1989. Bulgaria and Romania were not only relatively 
economically and ideologically isolated from the West during the communist period which 
had its effects, but also began the process of economic change from a structurally weaker 
and poorer economic base. 
6.2 Social Change 
This section will examine social change in three main areas. In the first section continuity 
and change amongst political elites and economic elites will be examined. In the second 
section some important effects of the post-1989 context for the rest of society will be 
discussed in terms of economic consequences, and political activity and attitudes. In all 
four countries the political and economic elites of the post-1989 period adapted - to a 
greater or lesser extent - to the new political and economic context whilst most of society 
remained mainly "outside" and/or in opposition to political processes. This will be the 
main focus for describing and interlinking societal change with the political and economic 
variables already examined. 
408 see Daianu, D., "Macro-Economic Stabilisation in Post-Communist Romania", in 
Stan, L., (ed) 1997 pp. 93-125 esp. pp. 107-116 
409 For more detailed accounts of approaches and the economic consequences of economic 
transition, see for example, Zecchini, S., "Transition approaches in retrospect", in 
Zecchini, S., (ed) 1997 pp. 1-34 
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Most of the data utilised in this section regarding social structural change from 
communism to post-communism relates to Poland and Hungary. Few (if any) empirical 
studies of such aspects have been done in Romania and Bulgaria. 410 A comparison of 
social change between the two cases is therefore restricted. However, by utilising the 
examples of Poland and Hungary in some depth, and referring to what is known about 
Romania and Bulgaria, certain trends can be discerned and interpreted across the cases. 
Elite Change and Continuity 
In order to examine the change in elite structure it is first necessary to differentiate 
between different types of elite. Elites of communist and post-communist societies have 
been classified in various ways. 411 In this section a possibly simplistic differentiation is 
made between communist and post-communist political and economic elites. People may 
belong to more than one category, but this categorisation will suffice for the purpose of 
describing social change in this area. Within existing East-Central European literature there 
is considerable argument over whether there has been a "circulation" or "reproduction" of 
elites. 412 Information from these debates will be utilised, and although it is not the purpose 
of this section to enter into the "circulation" or "reproduction" arguments in any depth, 
410 Sociological studies were not encouraged in Romania and Bulgaria during the 
communist period and are slow to appear in the post-communist period. Some attitude 
surveys were done in these countries before 1989 - for example, in Bulgaria - but studies 
were often not published due to the "embarrassing nature of the findings", see 
Karasimeonov, G., "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Political change in East-central 
Europe", in Bull, M. J., & Ingham, M., (1998), p. 67 and footnote 5. There are some post- 
1989 studies appearing which are mainly concerned with economic elites, their behaviour 
and attitudes, see for example Toneva, Z., "Research on economic and political elites in 
Bulgaria in the period 1990-1995", in Best, H., & Becker, U., (eds) (1997) Elites in 
Transition, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, pp. 91-106. In Romania even after 1989 few past 
nomenklatura positions and connections of elites were made public, the press especially 
often suffering "self-censorship". See for example, Carey, H. F., "From Big Lie to Small 
Lies: State Mass Media Dominance in Post-Communist Romania", East European Politics 
and Societies, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 16-45 & pp. 34-35 
411 For example, Rudolf Tokes differentiates between "New", "Old" and "Holdover" elites. 
See for example, "Democracy in Hungary: The First Hundred Days and a Mid-Term 
Assessment", in Volten, P. M. E., (ed) (1992) Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy 
in East Central Europe, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 151-190 
412 For definitions and debates on this subject see especially the articles in Theory and 
Society, Vol. 24, No. 5, October 1995, also referred to below 
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some theoretical issues are confronted, and implications for defining the 1989 events 
addressed as a result (see Chapter 8, section 2). 
The reproduction of elites thesis dominated early literature on post-communist societies. 
According to this theory pre-1989 communist cadre were able to convert political assets 
(or capital) into economic capital and become the new propertied "class", thereby 
continuing to occupy the most privileged positions in post-communist societies. The 
circulation of elites thesis is less clearly formulated, but generally implies that the elite was 
radically transformed. The conversion of political assets into economic capital was 
difficult, and often unsuccessful. A circulation of elites thesis suggests that there was 
significant downward social mobility for those who held assets key to elite status under the 
old regime. 
Much of the empirical research undertaken so far in East-Central European countries 
focuses on the characteristics of individuals and their social mobility, and does not 
establish whether the nature of social structural positions have changed. A third approach 
to elite change suggests that a change in personnel does not constitute significant social 
change as long as the elite continues to have the same degree of power, or is selected on 
the same criteria as under communism. "' These three approaches provide a background to 
the following section where certain aspects of elite change and continuity are addressed. 
Change in Political Elites 
It is clear that there was a change of political elites in the first post-communist 
governments; a change of regime occurred. 414 Even in Bulgaria and Romania where former 
communists initially remained in power, it tended to be the younger, technocrats who 
replaced the previous "old guard" political elite. In all four countries the state remained 
413 For more detailed accounts of these theories, and empirical research findings, see 
Szelenyi, S., Szelenyi, I., & Kovach, I., "The making of Hungarian postcommunist elite: 
circulation in politics, reproduction in the economy", and other articles in Theory and 
Society, Vol. 24, No. 5, October 1995. 
414 For the importance of differentiating between regime and state in this context, and the 
example of Hungarian separation of state and regime 1988-90, see Fellegi, T. L., "Regime 
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relatively controlled from the centre (although not necessarily strong in terms of power or 
authority); administrations were transformed to a greater or lesser extent, but many 
personnel were not replaced (see previously in Chapter 4). Many communist personnel 
remained within the state bureaucracies both during the revolutionary period and 
subsequently. In all four countries many former members of the communist nomenklatura 
and state bureaucracy retained their positions within state structures, and were the people 
with the knowledge, wealth, skills and adaptability to potentially infiltrate, and take 
advantage of, the post-communist political and economic structures. 
There are three levels of elites within the political arena that can be examined. First, the 
elites in government; second, state bureaucrats; and third, regional and local politicians. In 
Poland and Hungary the electoral success of "opposition" parties in 1989 and 1990 led to 
significant personnel change within government, and the possibility that recruitment of 
supportive personnel to positions of authority would follow. Despite this general similarity 
there were some differences within this case which reflected the particular nature of the 
pre-1989 communist systems. 
With the change of government in 1989 and 1990 it was not surprising that amongst the 
new political elite in 1993 over 50% of personnel in Hungary and nearly 70% of personnel 
in Poland had never been members of their respective communist parties. 415 However, it 
was also interesting to note that amongst the political elite of 1988 nearly 79% in Poland 
and only 68.5% in Hungary were members of the communist party. Therefore the change 
from communists to non-communists within the political elite was not totally dependent on 
the events of 1989 and the subsequent success of opposition parties in elections. The fact 
that there was a considerable percentage of non-communists already present among the 
Transformation in the Mid-Level Bureaucratic Forces in Hungary", in Volten, P. M. E., (ed) 
(1992) pp. 119-150. 
415 Statistics used in this section (unless otherwise stated) are taken from Szelenyi, I., & 
Treiman, S. J., "Social Stratification in Central Europe: Hungarian Elite Survey" and further 
surveys undertaken as part of "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe After 1989", see 
Szelenyi, I., & Szelenyi, S., "Circulation or reproduction of elites during the postcommunist 
transformation of Eastern Europe", p. 615, and other articles in Theory and Society, Vol. 24, 
No. 5, October 1995. 
The new political elite of 1993 are distinguished as incumbents of high positions in 
government and regional administration, and deputies to Parliament, Wasilewski, J., & 
Wnuk-Lipinski, E., "Poland: the winding road from the Communist to the post-Solidarity 
elite", Theory and Society Vol. 24, No-5 October 1995, p. 679. 
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political elite of 1988 suggests that some elite change had already taken place within the 
state and party during the communist period. Much of this change took place during the 
1980s. 
In Poland the imposition of martial law and subsequent attempts to change recruitment 
practices within the communist party led to the party losing a third of its members between 
1981 and 1982, whilst recruitment of new party members virtually came to an end. 416 
During the Solidarity and Martial Law period, and again in 1986 when attempts were made 
to introduce Hungarian type pro-market economic reform, many of the old cadre 
disappeared. Many "liberals" were recruited from outside party or government ranks into 
top nomenklatura positions. In Hungary a similar process took place, but rather than a 
decline in party membership, it was the co-option of experts into the state bureaucracy 
which led to a change in top political personnel. Between 1984 and 1988 there was a 53% 
turnover amongst ministers, deputy ministers, secretaries of state, heads and deputy heads 
of main departments. Also the 1985 multi-candidate elections led to some change in the 
composition of parliament. In Hungary during the 1980s many party apparatchiks were 
retired or pensioned off. The May 1988 communist party conference led to a replacement 
of one third of the Central Committee and speeded up the early retirement of scores of 
apparatchiks, replacing the old elite with reformist party members. 417 By 1993 in both 
Poland and Hungary a substantial number of the old political elite were no longer part of 
the labour force. 
Poland and Hungary saw significant changes in the "class" backgrounds of the political 
elite between 1988 and 1993. Many of the new post-1989 political elite were members of 
the former "opposition" groups, and to some extent their social backgrounds reflected the 
composition of those groups. In Poland in 1993 nearly 12% (as opposed to Hungary's 4%) 
of the new political elite were previously non-manual, skilled or unskilled workers, 
reflecting the workers and non-professionals involved in Solidarity. 418 In both countries a 
large proportion of the new political elite were previously professionals (around 50%), and 
it is notable that in Hungary a high proportion had degrees in humanities. This reflected the 
416 See previously in Chapter 2, and Wasilewski, J., & Wnuk-Lipinski, E., (1995) p. 674. 
417 For more details, see previously in Chapter 2; and Tokes, R., "Hungary's New political 
Elites", Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec, 1990, pp. 55,56 & 60. 
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fact that many former oppositionist intellectuals in Hungary were philosophers, historians 
and writers, whereas the new Polish elite was more likely to hold technical 
qualifications. 
419 
Within the bureaucracies there was also considerable change of personnel at the higher 
appointment levels. Yet, this did not mean there was a complete change within the state 
administration. For example in Hungary, despite the electoral campaign rhetoric of "spring 
housecleaning" by the new political parties, by mid July of 1990 only 100 of the 700 old 
nomenklatura positions, and several hundred of the estimated 5000 to 7500 national and 
regional level executive positions, were filled with new appointees. 420 Many of the top 
bureaucrats had skills and expertise which allowed them to move into the economic sector, 
but the majority of lower-level state bureaucrats had little alternative but to serve the new 
government, and it proved impossible for the new government to eradicate all levels of the 
old state bureaucracy. 421 
In the initial post-communist period there appeared to be considerable change amongst the 
top political elite in Poland and Hungary up to 1993, some of which had begun before 
1989. Yet, at local and regional level change was less apparent. In Hungary at the local 
level many former communist party members were elected as councillors. For example, in 
the local elections in Hungary in 1990 "independents" won a substantial number of seats in 
the rural areas, but at least 80% of independents were so-called "holdover" elites. 422 
418 See Fodor, E., Wnuk-Lipinski, E., & Yershova, N., "The new political and cultural elite", 
Theory and Society, Vol. 24, No. 5,1995, pp. 796 & 788, table 1 
419 Ibid. It is also interesting to note Rudolf Tokes comment that some parliamentary 
members may have "inflated" their professional and education credentials in order to 
promote their election prospects, see Tokes, R., Problems of Communism, 1990, p. 60, 
footnote 22. 
420 Tokes, R., Problems of Communism, 1990, p. 61. 
421 For more on the "convertible skills" of old state managers see below in the section on 
economic elites. 
For an argument on the available options for mid-level bureaucrats and the changes in the 
1980s in Hungary which led to the particular position of this group in Hungary see 
Fellegi, T. L., "Regime Transformation and the Mid-Level Bureaucratic Forces in 
Hungary", in Volten, P. M. E., (ed) (1992) pp. 119-150. 
422 For example, in 2758 villages 82.9% of elected mayors were independents. Tokes 
denotes "holdover elites" as mid-level members of the old regime who continued to serve 
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Additionally after the 1993,1994 and 1995 national elections, with the return of the post- 
communist parties to prominence, many top government posts were filled by former 
communists. A prime example was Kwasniewski - the Polish President - who joined the 
Polish communist party in 1977, was a member of the executive committee of the Council 
of the Socialist Union of Polish Students, from 1985 held government ministerial posts, 
and was a leading figure amongst the PUWP negotiators at the 1989 Round Table 
meetings. Also with the return of post-communist parties many state managers of 
"commercialised" enterprises (i. e. still partly state owned Joint Stock Companies, ) were 
replaced. However, this was not a restoration of the "old" elite. Many post-1993 
government appointees came from former communist and satellite parties, but most did not 
belong to the pre-1989 communist elite. 423 
Certainly within the top governing ranks a form of elite circulation appeared to take place 
in Poland and Hungary. There were not only changes in personnel, but also social and 
generational changes taking place. However, there appeared to be less change within the 
state bureaucracies or at the local and regional level. 
In Bulgaria and Romania it is more difficult to examine in any depth the change in political 
elites, due to the lack of surveys and data. 424 However, it is possible to look at change 
within government and elected officials where political elite change was initially more 
limited than in Poland and Hungary. Connections of the immediate post-1989 personnel to 
the old regime were clearly evident among top government posts. 425 
In Romania, the particular conditions of the Ceausescu regime made it difficult for anyone 
wishing to pursue their career to survive outside the communist party. It is therefore 
unsurprising that many former communists remained within government, administration 
the new post-1989 governments. Tokes, R., "Democracy in Hungary: The First Hundred 
Days and a Mid-Term Assessment", p. 177, in Volten, P. M. E., (ed) (1992) p. 158 
423 Wasilewski, J., "Poland", in Best, H., & Becker, U., (eds) (1997) p. 26 
424 In Romania de-communisation was not initially discussed at all, and there was an 
implicit agreement amongst the press not to discuss past nomenklatura positions because of 
the mass of informer networks and numbers of Securitate collaborators. See Carey, H. F., 
"From Big Lie to Small Lies: State Mass Media Dominance in Post-communist Romania", 
East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 16-45, p. 35 
42' For example the leaderships of the National Salvation Front and the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party were dominated by former communists. See also previously in Chapter 4. 
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and economic institutions after 1989. Even opposition party members who were mainly 
professionals (lawyers, doctors, or academics) would have been members of the 
communist party. Many, including members of the new government after 1996 (for 
example, Prime Minister Ciorbea - formerly a lawyer and military prosecutor - and 
President Contantinescu -a former faculty Communist Party Secretary) were part of the 
rank and file of the Romanian Communist Party; career-wise nobody could move without 
party membership. 426 
In Romania the opportunity for any kind of counter-elite to emerge was virtually 
impossible before 1989 (see previously in Chapter 3), and severely restricted in the 
immediate post-89 context, where the National Salvation Front dominated and controlled 
the political scene. Historically the intellectuals were dependent on their political masters 
and associated themselves with authority. 427 Deprived of any personal or institutional 
autonomy during Ceausescu's rule, and severely limited by their general historical attitude 
towards other social strata, anti-communist opposition groups that emerged in late 1989 
and early 1990 had difficulty in forming cohesive, social-based associations. 428 The post- 
communist political elite was therefore dominated by former communist apparatchiks; a 
group which inherited the apparatus, networks and support of the state bureaucracy from 
the old communist party. There were some changes amongst local political elites in 
Romania after the local elections of 1992. However, where mayors of the opposition 
parties were elected in important cities, they generally failed to replace local bureaucracy 
and had to rely on the old administrative machinery. Thus attempts to initiate change in 
personnel or policy were invariably blocked by pre-1989 personnel and associated 
networks. 
426 Shafir, M., "Victor Ciorbea: Romania's Prime Minister Designate", Simple Analytical 
Brief, November 20 1996, Electronic Version, OMRI-NET. 
427 The development of intellectuals, both ideologically and institutionally, was particular 
to the Romanian historical context, and was not just a result of the peculiarities of 
Ceausescuism. See for example, Mungiu, A., & Pippidi, A., "Letter from Romania", 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 29, No. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 348-361, especially pp. 352- 
354. 
428 Historically intellectuals claimed to represent the interests of the peasantry or workers, 
but in reality they tended to be rather patronising towards these social strata. Michael 
Shafir, Radio Free Europe, interviewed by Ruth Rodda, Prague, March 1998. 
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In Bulgaria the formation of a political counter-elite faced similar problems, but the post- 
1989 elite formation was of a more intermediate nature. Despite the rapid growth of 
opposition movements in 1989, and the relative success of the Union of Democratic Forces 
in the national election of October 1991, the groups which made up the anti-communist 
opposition were prone to internal divisions and personal rivalries like their Romanian 
counterparts, the Democratic Convention. Bulgaria's anti-communist opposition lacked a 
well-educated strata prepared to fully participate in politics and relied on former 
communist "turncoats", and non-communist professionals who invariably lacked political 
competence. 429 Although the state in Bulgaria did not remain under such tight control by 
former communists as in Romania, the successor to the communist party (Bulgarian 
Socialist Party - BSP) was advantaged both in organisation and personnel. The BSP 
inherited organisational structures and networks from the pre-1989 communist party. The 
removal of the old guard communists allowed a younger generation of better educated, 
more experienced professionals to maintain strong influence, especially within political, 
economic and media spheres. 430 The adaptability of the former communist elite was 
particularly evident within the BSP which did not formerly disband, and avoided serious 
splits. The "old guard" elite surrounding Zhivkov was removed and many older 
conservative members retired, yet diverse groups were evident within the party ranging 
from the Union of Social Democracy to the Marxist Platform. The former communist 
political elite appeared able to adapt to the post-1989 political context. 
The most interesting point to note about post-1989 change amongst the political elite is that 
in all cases there was considerable generational change. For example, in Poland "the new 
elite [was] ten years younger on average". 431 Although there are no pre-1989 figures for 
comparison, even in Bulgaria it can be noted that between 1991 and 1994 40% of the 
parliamentary members were aged between 35 and 45 years, with only 24% over 55. It is 
unlikely that there were so many members of the younger generation amongst the top 
429 See Karasimeonov, G., "Bulgaria's New Party System", in Pridham, G., & Lewis, P., 
(eds) (1996) p. 260. 
430 This new "clientura" coupled with the legacy of the Zhivkov years, instability of post- 
1989 governments, and slow institutional reform created conditions within which 
disrespect for the law and corruption could grow unchecked. For a discussion of these 
issues see Meininger, T. A., & Radoeva, D., "Civil Society: The current situation and 
problems", in Zloch-Christy, I., (ed) (1996) pp. 45-76. 
431 Wasilewski, J., in Best, H., & Becker, U., (eds) (1997) p. 27 
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politicians of Zhivkov's political entourage, or that there were so many from professional 
backgrounds. 432 
This generational change was especially noticeable amongst former communists. It was the 
younger generation of former communists who transformed and adapted the parties to the 
post-1989 context. The Polish and Hungarian post-communist parties both attempted to 
distance themselves from their respective communist legacies and formally disbanded. 
Although there was more discontinuity within the Hungarian HSP than the Polish SdRP in 
terms of both personnel and organisation, both parties were successfully restructured and 
reoriented. The Bulgarian post-communist party was something of a hybrid which 
attempted to preserve much of its legacy from the pre-1989 party. In Romania the NSF 
held on to most of the resources of the old party apparatus. The section of the pre-1989 
communist elite which took over in 1989 initially suffered little opposition from any kind 
of counter-elite, only moving towards social democratisation after 1992.433 
In contrast to the changes apparent in Poland and Hungary, it appears that less political 
elite change occurred in Bulgaria and Romania. Although there is insufficient empirical 
evidence to verify theory, it is most probable that the reproduction thesis is the most salient 
for this case. There may well have been some generational change as the "old guard" was 
removed from high-ranking positions, and those with more professional and technocratic 
expertise replaced them. However, the evidence available suggests that little significant 
change in social background could take place due to the closed nature of communist 
societies in these two countries. 
432 Between 1991 and 1994 25% of parliamentarians were in law related professions, 42% 
were doctors, teachers or other professionals, and 14% were engineers. 97% had a 
university education. Karasimeonov, G., "The Legislature in Post-Communist Bulgaria", in 
Olsen & Norton (1996) p. 57. 
It is also worth noting that the post-1989 political elite were not necessarily better 
educated, but certainly in Hungary, they were more likely to have had a better quality 
education, with less likelihood of Marxist majors. See for example, Szelenyi, S., 
Szelenyi, I., & Kovach, l., "The making of the Hungarian post-communist elite: circulation 
in politics, reproduction in the economy", Theory and Society, Vol. 24, No. 5, October 
1995, p. 712 
433 Karasimeonov, G., "Conceptions and misconceptions of political change in East-Central 
Europe", in Bull, M. J., & Ingham, M., (1998) pp. 68 & 69 
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Change in Economic Elites 
There appears to be general agreement that in Poland and Hungary there was greater 
continuity overall within economic elites than within political elites. 434 Evidence from the 
data shows only small differences in the basic characteristics of pre-1989 and post-1989 
economic elites. For example in Hungary, members of the new economic elite were 
significantly younger than their 1988 counterparts, but almost as many 1993 elites as 1998 
elites were members of the communist party in 1988.43s It was initially thought that where 
some private economic activities had been allowed during the communist period, that the 
new entrepreneurs would have an advantage. However, even in Hungary where the 
"second economy" was most developed before 1989 very few managers of large firms in 
1993 had previously been entrepreneurs in the "second economy" in 1988. It was the 
communist managers who gained most from the post-1989 changes to the economy. In 
Hungary over 42% of the new economic elite in 1993 were low-level managers in 1988 
and over 31 % were previously elite nomenklatura. In Poland slightly more (48.7%) of the 
new economic elite were elite nomenklatura and slightly less (31.3%) were low-level 
managers in 1988.436 The age differential suggests that many of the 1988 low-level 
managers were promoted after 1989 when their superiors were forced to leave by the new 
governments. Additionally most of the new economic elites remained part of the state 
sector. The relatively low level of privatisation amongst the large state-owned enterprises 
was reflected in the small percentage of businesses where managers claimed any 
ownership. For example in Hungary in 1993 only 2.1% of managers of enterprises with 
over 100 employees were reported as owning 50 to 100% of the business. 437 
Turning to Romania and Bulgaria there is less statistical, but much anecdotal evidence to 
support a similar if not more pronounced process whereby many of the former communist 
political elite initially transferred themselves into a "new" economic elite, mainly via 
434 See for example, Szelenyi, I., Treiman, D., & Wnuk-Lipinski, E., (eds) (1995) Elity w 
Polsce, w Rosji na Wegrzech, Wymiana czy reprodukcja?, Polish Academy of Sciences, 
Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw, and Eyal, G., Szelenyi, I., & Townsley, E., "The 
Theory of Post-Communist Managerialism", New Left Review, March/April 1997, pp. 60- 
93. 
45 Szelenyi, S., SzelenY I., & Kovach I. Theory and Society, 1995, pp. 707 & 711. i> 
436 Eyal, G., Szelenyi, l., & Townsley, E., New Left Review, 1997, pp. 84 & 85. 
437 Information taken from TARKI Survey 1993, tables reproduced in Eyal, G., Szelenyi, I.. 
& Townsley, E., New Left Review, 1997, p. 87. 
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former communist networks. In particular the slow process of privatisation in both 
countries enabled former political elites to acquire assets in the reforming economy 
In Romania, most state owned industry managers were the first to profit from the 
beginning of privatisation, starting businesses and illegally transferring state property to 
themselves. The establishment of the State Privatisation Funds also gave the governing 
party control over the whole privatisation process. 438 Privatisation often became a means 
for rewarding political loyalty and strengthening elite power. Government officials from 
the ruling coalition parties were rewarded with highly paid positions. 439 
Alleged corrupt business practices and unregulated scam savings schemes which often 
involved senior party members or close associates of the political elite were also seen as 
evidence of corruption and inefficiency within government. 440 After the 1996 elections 
there was a greater attempt to confront the past and open government practices and 
politicians to public scrutiny. For example a bill was passed in April 1998 allowing people 
to check if journalists or public officials worked for the former communist secret police, 
and efforts were initiated in order to discover the truth about the events of 1989.441 
In Bulgaria, despite a law which was intended to divest the former communist party of 
property and financial resources, the party was able to pump its assets into new companies 
and create its own economic concerns. 442 Many new businessmen "amassed their wealth as 
party leaders and as former employees of the security services". 443 Privatisation in Bulgaria 
438 Mungiu, A., & Pippidi, A., "Letter from Romania", Government and Opposition, Vol. 29, 
No. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 348-361, p. 355 
439 Stan 
, 
L., "Romanian Privatization Programme"., in Stan, L., (ed) (1997) p. 133 
440 A major example was the Caritas affair -a pyramid investment scheme promoted by 
Funar a leading member of the Party of Romanian National Unity - which, despite the 
failure of many small investors to recoup there money when it collapsed, ironically did not 
result in immediate criticism from the electorate for Funar or his party. See for example 
Gallagher, T., (1995) especially pp. 220-223 
441 See for example "Romanian Senate passes bill on securitate files" and "Romanian 
President wants to know the truth about 1989 uprising" RFE daily report, 10/4/98, 
electronic version 
442 Waller, M., & Karasimeonov, G., "Party Organisation in Post-communist Bulgaria". in 
Lewis, P., (ed) (1996) p. 139 
443 Tilgidjiev, N., "Jump Postponed Indefinitely: Social Stratification in Post-Communist 
Societies: Difficulties and Trends in the Bulgarian Case" in Zloch-Christy, I., (ed) (1996) 
p. 53 
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was slow, state enterprises predominated, and executives of state-owned enterprises were 
appointed by each new government for political rather than economic reasons. As a result 
executives were more interested in short-term personal gains than any long-term enterprise 
management. Also many government officials overseeing state-owned enterprises were 
appointed to boards of directors or supervisory boards. As a consequence such officials 
were likely to oppose any privatisation rather than lose the income and prestige gained 
from these appointments. 444 Many state enterprises were asset stripped by managers and 
private businessmen with close ties to the former communists. 445 
In all four countries it appears that certain sections of the former communist apparatus 
were well placed to find elite positions within the new economic context. They had the 
necessary skills, experience and connections to at least maintain their status if not promote 
themselves. Even with the change of government in 1989 in Poland and Hungary, they 
were the people with the political, economic and cultural capital who could readily adjust 
and adapt to the post-1989 political and economic conditions. 446 
It appears that a greater reproduction of economic elites took place in both cases. However, 
in Poland and Hungary this was not a simple power conversion of the pre-1989 communist 
elite into a "new" economic elite. There was downward as well as upward mobility as 
former state managers were removed or took early retirement, and significantly younger, 
formerly lower-level managers took their place. Additionally, political assets were not 
necessarily converted directly into economic capital. Few former communists became 
owners of large businesses; most private businesses were small and high-risk operations. 
However, it is apparent that former communists were in positions to maintain some control 
444 See for example, Pamouktchiev, H., Parvulov, S., & Petranov, S., "Process of 
privatisation in Bulgaria", in Jones, D. C., & Miller, J., (1997) The Bulgarian Economy: 
Lessons from Reform during Early Transition, pp. 205-230, especially pp. 205-6 
445 Borger, J., "The old man dies of the Bulgarian sickness", The Guardian, 17 December 
1994, Electronic Version. 
446 Cultural capital is used here in terms of power or influence principally based on 
knowledge and expertise, see for example Szelenyi and Townsley's use of the term in "The 
theory of post-communist managerialism", New Left Review, No. 222, March/April 1997 
pp. 60-92. It is also worth noting that there were others with cultural capital who 
maintained there positions. For example, a change of ownership of print media often left 
"holdover" journalists and editors in place within newspapers which continued to have a 
wide circulation, see for example Tokes, R. L., "Hungary's New Political Elites, " Problems 
of Communism, Nov-Dec 1990, pp. 44-65 
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over economic assets, especially within the former state sector, where either only nominal 
privatisation took place or companies were asset stripped in some way. Yet, it is not clear 
that former communists had the same degree of power or were selected on the same 
criteria in the post-1989 context. Even in Bulgaria and Romania, where former communist 
networks provided the main means to social advancement, neither political nor economic 
elites could fully control outcomes once reforms were initiated (see especially the political 
consequences of economic change previously in Chapter 4, section 2). 
Social Change and Society 
Social change amongst the rest of society is potentially more complex to examine. 
However, there are two main areas which can be focused on to indicate what consequences 
the events of 1989 had for the majority of society. First, some of the social consequences 
of economic change can be discussed; and second we can examine some effects of political 
change on society. This will be done by first, looking at some indicators of social 
inequality which resulted from the post-1989 economic shock. Secondly, some evidence of 
political participation, and societal attitudes will be discussed to see how political activity 
changed, and how people perceived the post-1989 conditions. 
The Social Consequences of Economic Change 
In all four countries the movement away from central planning towards market oriented 
economics had considerable affects on society. Although one result of efforts to liberalise 
the economies was that a wider variety of consumer goods became more readily available, 
it was also the case that few people could initially afford to buy those goods. Although the 
economies steadily improved over time for many Poles and Hungarians (see previously in 
this chapter), in general, most people suffered an initial decline in living standards. If this 
decline was not directly through lower incomes, it was at least as a result of the withdrawal 
of subsidies on basic goods, and the gradual reduction in social benefits provided via the 
state or state-owned employers, such as holidays, health and child care. Notable effects of 
these changes were the previously officially unrecognised phenomenon of unemployment, 
and an increase in income inequalities. 
218 
As we have seen (previously in tables 6.1,6.2,6.3 & 6.4) unemployment was substantial in 
all four countries, and was highest in 1993 and 1994. Bulgaria and Poland suffered the 
worst rates of unemployment with over 16% in 1993. Social benefits were generally 
eroded as governments were pushed towards tightening public spending. Although there 
were variations in the effects, which were often hidden by general unemployment figures - 
for example, the differences in the numbers suffering long term unemployment, regional 
disparities or the number of people unrecorded in official statistics - the result was a 
general impoverishment for many families which would previously have received 
relatively generous social benefits. 
Unemployment was only one aspect which led to greater social inequalities. In all four 
countries policies of price liberalisation launched at the beginning of the economic reform 
process tended to lead to inflation. 447 It was generally the case that as a result of price 
liberalisation wages lagged behind consumer prices and real wages fell rapidly. In 
Romania, and to some extent also in Bulgaria, the governments did not immediately 
liberalise prices on some basic goods - such as bread, milk, public transport and housing 
rents - in order to protect the most vulnerable groups in society, such as pensioners. Also 
in Bulgaria many managers and full-time production workers initially continued to receive 
considerable fringe benefits from industrial firms. 448 However, as the Romanian and 
Bulgarian economies were relatively impoverished, these factors did little to help the 
majority of people on low incomes. 
To illustrate the decline in the purchasing power for most consumers we can examine the 
fall in average real wages. In Poland real wages fell sharply in 1990 and continued to fall 
447 Price liberalisation was not the only cause of inflation, nor was it the only policy which 
affected wages or poverty levels. Inflation was also a result of the inherited situation, the 
elimination of subsidies, commercial, currency, fiscal and credit policies. Additionally a 
variety of policies specifically related to wages (such as income policies, various forms of 
wage bargaining, and setting of minimum wages) had various effects on income levels. See 
for example, Vaughan-Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) Paying the Price; The Wage Crisis in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Macmillan, London & St. Martin's Press, New York 
448 Benefits such as subsidised housing, severance pay, child care, transport and clothing 
allowances were still received in 1992-3 by some workers. Temporary and civil contract 
workers received far fewer benefits, if they received any. See Klinedinst, M., & Rock, C.. 
"Fringe benefits in transition: evidence from Bulgaria", in Jones, D. C., & Miller, J., (1997), 
pp. 329-340 
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more moderately over the next three years. They then rose again in 1994 and 1995, but 
overall during 1990 to 1995 real wages fell by over 25%. In Hungary real wages declined 
every year except 1992 and 1994, declining nearly 20% between 1989 and 1995. In 
Bulgaria after price liberalisation in 1991 real wages fell initially by nearly 40%, and again 
fell sharply in 1994. Despite wages keeping pace with prices in 1992 and 1993, between 
1990 and 1996 real wages fell overall by nearly 48%. Also in Romania there was a sharp 
fall in 1991 of nearly 20%. Real wages also fell in 1992 and 1993, but began to increase in 
1994 and substantially increased in 1995 giving an overall decline of over 23%, 449 
In all four countries the pay levels of workers were well below the levels they had received 
before 1989, whilst the additional social benefits and services they had previously received 
- such as education, holidays, housing and health - were invariably being reduced. Coupled 
with increases in unemployment, these factors led to substantial growth in the number of 
people living below the poverty line. For example, in Hungary in 1994 around 33% of the 
population were living on incomes below the subsistence level. 450 In Poland, 35.8% of the 
population were below the poverty line in 1993.451 In Bulgaria the share of people with 
incomes below the subsistence minimum rose from 36% in 1992 to 67% in 1994.452 
In addition to this general decline in incomes there was substantial growth in wage 
differentials between regions, sectors, occupational and social groups. The largest 
disparities in relative wages opened up between regions within each country. The regions 
which suffered the most were those where heavy industry had previously predominated. 
Also many rural areas were affected as the relative wages of agricultural workers declined. 
One sector where wages grew the most was the banking and financial sector. Foreign 
enterprises and joint ventures were more likely to pay higher average wages. Those 
working in the public sector were likely to suffer reductions in relative wages, especially 
those working in education, health and culture. 
449 Vaughan-Whitehead, D., "Wage Policy Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe", in 
Vaughan- Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) pp. 22-24 
450 Berki, E., & Lado, M., "Moves towards Free Wage Bargaining in Hungary", in Vaughan- 
Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) p. 216 
451 Kabaj, M., "Searching for a New Results-oriented Wage Negotiation System in Poland", 
in Vaughan-Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) p. 252 
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For example, in Hungary there were significant differences between industrial and 
occupational wages in the 1980s, but there was still some growth in differentials after 
1989. The widest difference developed between those in the public sector and those in 
competitive spheres. Public employees and teachers tended to be relatively the worst off 
with earnings of 55-60% the national average, although judges and lawyers exceeded the 
national average by 70%. Wages in industrial enterprises provide contradictory evidence. 
In 1992 wage levels in privatised firms were twice as high as in state owned enterprises, 
but in 1994 and 1995 in industries where the state was still the main or majority owner, 
earnings were between 10 and 14% higher than the average in the competitive sector. 
However, enterprises with a foreign stake provided wages 25% higher than the national 
average. 453 
In Poland the main losers amongst employees were those in education and health, whilst 
the main winners were in finance, insurance and state administration. Wage differentials 
increased between 1991 and 1995 by more than one quarter. Managers gained 
considerably: real relative wages rose the most in joint venture companies, followed by 
private enterprises, and increased the least amount in public enterprises. Although miners 
and those workers in coal, electricity, gas, water, wood and paper industries were winners 
compared to other industrial workers, many workers and especially smallholders were 
living below the poverty line. 
454 
Similarly in Bulgaria, employees in education, health and culture generally became worse 
off. Between 1990 and 1994 employees in these sectors suffered an erosion of real wages 
of over 50%. Only in the financial and banking sector was there any real wage growth, 
whilst agricultural workers were the main losers. 455 In Romania more than 80% of 
employees received wages below the national average in 1993 and 1994. Those most 
affected were employed in light industry, commerce, agriculture and the wood industries. 
A very small number of employees received very high wages of 10 times the minimum 
452 Tzanov, V., "For a Negotiated Alternative to the Tax-based Incomes Policy in Bulgaria, " 
in Vaughan-Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) p. 113 . 453 Berki, E., & Lado, M., in Vaughan-Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) pp. 197,198 & 201 
454 Kabaj, M., in Vaughan- Whitehead, D., (ed)(1 99 8) pp. 243-253 
455 Tzanov, V., in Vaughan-Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) pp. I l 1-113 & 131 
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wage. Again those working in financial services were most likely to have the highest 
incomes. 456 
There appear to be many similarities between the two cases in terms of growth of income 
inequalities and a general decline in living standards, especially for certain industrial and 
public sector workers. One notable difference between the two cases can be seen when 
looking at average monthly wages (see tables 6.1 - 6.4 in previous economic section). 
Bulgaria and Romania had fluctuating levels and the lowest levels of average monthly 
wage for the whole of the 1990 to 1996 period. In comparison Poland and Hungary had 
steadily growing, and much higher levels indicating steady improvements generally in their 
economies and gradual improvements in living standards after the initial post-89 economic 
shocks. Although social inequalities grew, in this case the partial restructuring of economy 
and society prior to 1989 alongside more complete regime change, and comparatively 
rapid movement towards a market economy after 1989, resulted in steady improvements in 
economic conditions by the mid 1990s. 
Politics and Society 
This section will examine the consequences of post-1989 politics for the majority of people 
in society in terms of political participation and attitudes towards politics. Within recent 
literature on East-Central Europe there is much concern for "civil society", or the lack of it. 
It is not the intention here to evaluate "civil society" or delve into complex notions of post- 
communist political culture, but to point out that for most of society so-called 
democratisation meant little change in society's political relationship with the state; the 
"us" (society) versus "them" (the ruling elite group) of communism tended to continue into 
the post-communist period. This can be seen by first, noting the considerable number of 
strikes and protests which took place after 1989, which were mainly directed against the 
new post-1989 governments; second, examining some developments within autonomous 
groups in society; and third, looking generally at some apparent trends in peoples attitudes 
towards politics and politicians. There are some differences between the cases in terms of 
political activity, but reasons for these differences cannot be substantiated. 
456 Pert, S., & Vasile, V., "Romania: Introducing Wage Bargaining in a Monopolistic 
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People were of course free to join political parties and associations, took part in free 
elections and could strike and protest on the streets without fear of being locked up for 
"counter-revolutionary" activities (except perhaps on some occasions initially in Romania). 
After the initial euphoria of 1989 and early 1990 there were signs of discontent within 
society; a discontent directed mainly towards the post-1989 governments, and in some 
respects towards the new political system. As we have seen (in Chapter 4 regarding 
political consequences of economic change) there were a considerable number of strikes 
and protests in all four countries, especially as a result of the early post-1989 economic 
conditions. For example, in Poland in 1992 a fall in wages led to trade union action and 
subsequent disruption and strikes amongst teachers and employees in public education who 
received salaries below the minimum wage. In Romania there were strikes and protests 
throughout the post-1989 period. Workers protests became less dramatic in 1995, but 
strikes and rallies were staged in that year by students from various university centres to 
protest about miserable living conditions and a controversial education law. Also in 
Bulgaria, the severe economic crisis of 1996 led to street protests in the major cities across 
the country; protests that finally brought down the socialist government. This kind of 
spontaneous action in protest to conditions and specific reforms was prevalent in all four 
countries, although Hungarians were probably the least active. 
However, despite these visible signs of discontent, large numbers of people apparently 
never participated in political protest action. A 1991 survey indicated that in Bulgaria 48% 
of those surveyed had not participated in any political action. In Poland 72% had never 
participated, whilst in Hungary 84% had never protested. 457 The Hungarian figure might 
not be so surprising as little political protest action was visible even in 1989. However, 
Poland's high figure of non-participation does appear more surprising - even when the 
reduction in Solidarity activity in 1989 compared to 1980-81 is taken into account. It 
appears that relatively few members of society were politically active in this way, and far 
less were active in Poland and Hungary than in Romania or Bulgaria. 
Context", in Vaughan-Whitehead, D., (ed)(1998) p. 293 
457 Survey undertaken in 1991. Protest action included ten variants from writing to a 
newspaper or signing a petition to joining a strike or blocking traffic. Romania was not 
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A further trend was apparent which also suggests a lack of political participation: a decline 
in voter turnout after the first competitive elections. Initially voter turnout in elections was 
fairly high, especially in Romania and Bulgaria in 1990. However, in later elections voter 
turnout dropped considerably. Relatively low voter turnout was most evident in Poland and 
Hungary. In the first parliamentary elections of 1990 in Romania and Bulgaria turnout was 
86% and 83% respectively. In the Bulgarian 1994 election the turnout dropped to 75%, 
whilst in Romania the turnout for the second round of the Presidential elections of 1992 
was 73%, although it was still relatively high in the 1996 elections at 75%. Turnout for the 
first ballot of the first free parliamentary election in Hungary in 1990 was comparatively 
low at 63%. In Poland in 1991 and 1993 elections turnout was only 43% and 52% 
respectively. 458 The Polish in particular appeared "inactive in political life ... and [were] 
reluctant to join political organisations and so on". 459 Whether these voting trends were due 
to voter apathy, dissatisfaction with the political system, or because people felt unable to 
influence politics was to some extent dependent on the context, and is of course open to 
debate, 460 
Another indication of participation is membership of political organisations. Most political 
parties and other social movements did not have large numbers of members or strong 
social bases. The reform communist and peasant parties were the main exceptions. For 
example, in Poland membership of the Polish Peasant Party was estimated at 190,000 in 
surveyed. See Mason, D. S., "Attitudes toward the Market and Political Participation in the 
Postcommunist States", Slavic Review 54, no. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 383-406, p. 396 
458 See Antoszewski, A., "Electoral behaviour in post-communist Poland", in 
Jablonski, A. W., & Meyer, G., (eds) (1996) The Political Culture of Poland in Transition, 
Wroclaw University Press, Wroclaw, Table 6, p. 171. 
For the Bulgarian 1994 election see Crampton, R. J., "The Bulgarian Elections of December 
1994", Electoral Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 , 
June 1995, p. 238. For the Romanian Presidential 
elections 1992 see Gallagher, T., (1995) Romania after Ceausescu, Edinburgh University 
Press, p. 127; and the 1996 elections see Popescu, L., "A change of power in Romania: the 
results and significance of the November 1996 elections", Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 32, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 186) 
459 Professor Andrzej Antoszewski, Institute of Political Science, University of Wroclaw, 
interview with Ruth Rodda, 3/4/98 
460 Low electoral turnout is probably due to all three, Professor Ryszard Herbut, Institute of 
Political Science, University of Wroclaw, interview with Ruth Rodda, Wroclaw, 2/4/98. 
Also indicative of a combination of factors was a Bulgarian opinion poll after a 1994 local 
election (where the turnout was only 34%) which suggested that the low turnout in Veliko 
Turnovo was due to disillusion with government performance and fear that, because of the 
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1995, the reform communist party (SdPR) had approximately 60,000 members, while other 
parties had from a few hundred to a maximum of 25,000 members. 461 Yet, in total only 
around 2 or 3% of the population belonged to political parties. 462 Similarly in Hungary 
after the 1990 elections "a small minority of citizens - perhaps 100,000, or less than 2% of 
eligible voters - became declared and dues-paying party members". 
463 Political parties 
were - in general - poor at mobilising much of society. This was partly due to the 
considerable "blurring" of roles between political parties, representative organisations and 
other social movements. For example, business parties - such as the business Bloc in 
Bulgaria, or the Republican Party in Hungary - became parliamentary representatives of 
entrepreneurial interests. Similarly Solidarity in Poland and Podkrepa in Bulgaria, initially 
formed as trade unions took on party-type roles within the anti-communist opposition. 
However, political parties tended to be unrepresentative of much of society. As we have 
seen (in Chapter 5) many historic and "new" parties generally lacked social bases or 
salience, especially for the main "losers" of economic change. 464 It might not be surprising 
then that political parties were one of the least trusted organisations in political lif 465 e. 
There was some greater evidence of political participation within trade union 
organisations. There was considerable growth in the numbers of trade unions in the post- 
1989 period. This was especially the case in Romania where there was an explosive growth 
in the trade union movement from early 1990. Within a relatively short space of time three 
trade union confederations emerged at national level. 466 In Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria 
the old "official" unions claimed the bulk of union membership, while the newly 
electoral system, many of the votes cast would be wasted, see Crampton, R. J., (1995) 
0238 
61 Most marginal parties did not have more than 100 members and many only a few 
dozen. See Gebethner, S., "Parliamentary and Electoral Parties in Poland", in Lewis, P. G., 
(ed) (1996) pp. 120-133, especially p. 130, Table 6.2 
462 Professor Andrzej Antoszewski, Institute of Political Science, University of Wroclaw, 
interview with Ruth Rodda, 3/4/98 
84 Tokes, R. L., "Party politics and political participation in postcommunist Hungary", in 
Dawisha, K., & Parrott, B., (eds) (1997) p. 126 
464 The main "losers" were those who suffered the most from the increase in inequalities 
generated by movement towards marketisation, see previously in the section on Social 
consequences of Economic Change 
465 View based on data taken from Rose, R., & Haerpfer, C., (1995) New Democracies 
Barometer, cited in Henderson, K., & Robinson, N., (1997) p. 290 
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independent unions also claimed substantial numbers of members. 467 However, as a 
percentage of the labour force membership of unions was relatively low, and much lower 
in Poland and Hungary than in Bulgaria and Romania. In 1992 to 1993 union membership 
was 23% in Poland, 39% in Hungary, 48% in Bulgaria, and 46% in Romania. 468 It was 
suggested that none of the unions initially took on the role of mass mobilisers of protest 
action against governments, or became clearly identified as autonomous politically 
influential groups which could successfully liase with, or lobby government on behalf of 
their members. 469 Indeed in the early 1990s in all four countries trade unions were involved 
in forms of tripartite negotiations involving unions, business groups, government, and 
other interested parties (although in Poland no official tripartite structures were set up). 
This was seen as "insider" bargaining which invariably resulted in unions accepting wage 
restraints or non-strike action and allowed governments to proceed unchecked with their 
economic programmes in exchange for some extensions to union rights and promises of 
some form of wage indexation. However, unions did become more pro-active, especially in 
Romania from 1994.470 This indicates that unions became an increasingly useful means to 
organise social protest, especially against perceived government ineptitude. 
There were many social movements, such as ecological, peace and student organisations 
often founded in the late 1980s, which continued to flourish in the post-1989 period. For 
example, in Hungary the number of registered "civil associations" increased from 8,574 to 
466 See for example, Pert, S., & Vasile, V., "Romania: Introducing Wage Bargaining in a 
Monopolistic Context", in Vaughan-Whitehead, D., (ed) (1998) pp. 272-318, especially 
282-283 467 
In Poland and Hungary the former communist union organisations were not identified 
with the "old regime" in the same way as the communist parties initially were. The 
"successor" trade union membership figures of 70-100% were probably exaggerated, but 
they certainly outweighed the newer organisations. Even Solidarity only appeared to have 
organised around 20% of employees in 1991. See Myant, M., & Waller, M., "Parties and 
Trade Unions in Eastern Europe: The Shifting Distribution of Political and Economic 
Power", in Myant, M., & Waller, M., (eds) (1994) Parties Trade Unions and Society in 
East-Central Europe, Frank Cass, UK & US, pp. 161-181, p. 173 
468 Employed trade union members as a percentage of the dependent labour force. Source: 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 1992, table reprinted in Budge, I., Newton, K., et al. 
(1997) The Politics of the New Europe, Addison Wesley Longman, Harlow & New York, 
170 
469 Myant, M., & Waller, M., (eds) (1994) p. 177 
470 See previous footnote 23, and for example, Borger, J., "Strike adds to Romanian 
government's troubles", The Guardian, 28 February 1994 
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19,950 between 1989 and 1992.471 These groups were mainly supported by younger urban 
members of society. The hard core of professional organisers only slowly adjusted from 
"underground" activists to pressure group mobilisers. 472 Nevertheless, there is some 
evidence that the most active civil society groups (mainly non-governmental organisations 
and foundations) were to be found in Poland and Hungary. In Bulgaria and Romania self- 
organised activities tended to be weaker, and more often confined to closed groups of 
intellectuals. It is suggested that this difference between the cases could be associated with 
the fact that Bulgarian and Romanian society was more concerned with the sheer struggle 
for survival. 473 However (as we shall see in the following chapter), Bulgarian and 
Romanian society also received less support from international organisations which 
promoted such associations. It appears that despite the evidence to suggest that Polish and 
Hungarian societies were less politically active in terms of direct political participation, 
there was a greater expansion of "civil" associations in this case. 
In all four countries there appeared to be contradictory perceptions in play. On the one 
hand the general attitude of the populations suggested a cynicism of politics and 
politicians. On the other hand the state was still seen as the main provider of social and 
economic benefits. For example, when asked about the role of government in the economy, 
respondents gave substantial support to questions asking whether government should 
guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living and provide jobs for all who wanted 
them. 474 Surveys have indicated that most people did not want to return to the communist 
past. For example, in Poland, despite a the historic tradition of strong political leaders, and 
a considerable percentage of Poles who approved some kind of dictatorship, "the 
evaluation of the past is fairly negative.... and there is a low percentage of support for a 
471 Hungarian Yearbook 1994, cited in Tokes, R. L., "Party politics and political 
participation in postcommunist Hungary", in Dawisha, K., & Parrott, B., (eds) (1997) p. 132 
72 See for example Szabo, M., "The culture of Protest. Hungarian Social Movements in 
Transition", in Plasser, F., & Pribersky, A., (eds) (1996) Political Culture in East Central 
Europe, Avebury, UK & US, pp. 149-166 
473 See Kaldor, M., & Vejvoda, I., "Democratization in Central and East European 
Countries", International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 59-82, especially pp. 76- 
77. 
474 Mason, D. S., "Attitudes toward the Market and political Participation in the 
Postcommunist States", Slavic Review 54, no. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 390-391. Other public 
opinion polls also suggested that people felt the state had an obligation to provide and 
was responsible for the well being of citizens whilst discontent with the political system 
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return to communism". 475 Although often dissatisfied with economic reform and 
performance of post-1989 governments, they were still generally in favour of continued 
reform of the system. 476 Yet, most political institutions were held in low esteem. Even in 
Romania, despite high voter turnout and relatively strong support for the post-communist 
successor party, around 72% of those polled were dissatisfied with the work of parliament 
by 1994.477 
In all four countries post-communist political organisations were generally poor at mass 
mobilisation. As seen above, post-communist political parties mainly lacked social 
cleavage bases. Even in Poland and Hungary, where "new" parties formed governments, 
most of society perceived politicians as elitist, and politics as separate from society. All 
four societies were disillusioned after 1989. This was partly due to the unrealistic 
expectations of what marketisation and democracy would bring. Western images before 
1989 led to false conceptions for both masses and elites. The intellectual elites absorbed 
their own "idealistic" and "utopian" conception of free markets and democracy. This 
alongside promises made by post-1989 politicians - which included quick and easy 
solutions to problems - did not match society's conception of freedom and consumerism. In 
any case such aspects as freedom to travel, or a variety of goods in the shops, were of little 
use without relative increases in incomes. 478 The people rejected the old regimes in 1989, 
but still wanted the social welfare protection of the old system. 
grew between 1990 and 1993. See for example, Jablonski, A. W., "Politics of Virtue versus 
Politics of Interests" in Jablonski, A. W., & Meyer, G., (eds) (1996) pp. 46 & 49 
475 "Around 40% of Poles may approve some form of dictatorship - but not communist 
dictatorship", Professor Andrzej Antoszewski, Institute of Political Science, University of 
Wroclaw, interview with Ruth Rodda, 3/4/98 
476 See for example, Rose, R., & Haerpfer, C., New Democracies between State and Market: 
A Baseline Report of Public Opinion, Studies in Public Policy 204,1992, University of 
Strathclyde. The suggestion of disappointment with the new political systems which these 
kind of surveys portray needs to be set against the backdrop of previously formed high 
expectations of what the post-1989 reforms would bring. See for example, Agh, A., 
"Political Culture and System Change in Hungary", in Plasser, F., & Pribersky, A., (eds) 
(1996) pp. 127-148, especially p. 136 
477 See Weiner, R., "Democratization in Romania", in Stan. L., (1997) Romania in 
Transition, p. 12-13 
478 Even for social groups whose incomes were increasing the perception was often that 
they were worse off. For this and some interesting discussions of the lack of 
communication between the "new" political elite and the masses, see Winiecki, J., (ed) 
(1996), especially Chapter 8 
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There appeared to be a dualistic division within society -a distinctive feature of communist 
socio-political relations - where "us" (society) was contrasted with "them" of the 
paternalistic state. This was especially evident in Poland where initially the first Solidarity 
government for a short time became "ours" rather than "them", but the old stereotype soon 
returned. 479 An "us" and "them" attitude "is still present in the Polish] mentality, but 
"them" at the moment are quite another than "them" in communism. The distance between 
governing and governed is still very high". 480 Even the Catholic Church in Poland, which 
became a symbol of society against the state during communism, lost popularity as an 
institution in the post-communist period. Although the impact of the Church on politics 
increased after 1989 - through affiliated political parties and associated policy proposals 
and implementation - there was evidence that support for the Church declined . 
481 Despite a 
general consensus that the new political system and reforms should continue, in all four 
countries much of the old "state versus society" attitudes were generally retained; system 
change appeared to do little to alter elite-mass linkages. 
Nevertheless (as we have seen above), there were some differences between the cases in 
terms of political participation. It is not entirely clear why similar dissatisfaction should be 
articulated in different ways, although some suggestions can be made. Agh for example, 
suggests that the masses in (what he terms) East-Central European states (who prior to 
1989 had links to the counter-elite) became disillusioned and pessimistic because the 
"transitional" elite tried to demobilise previously active and optimistic societies. Whereas 
in Balkan countries elite-mass linkages were more antagonistic; the masses were mobilised 
after 1989 through reaction to elite manoeuvres to "steal the revolutions". Rising mass 
dissatisfaction followed "normal channels for articulated political pressures" in East- 
Central European states, whereas in the Balkans "sharper confrontations" were evident. 482 
This may be a partial explanation for differences in political activity between the two 
cases. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the forms of revolution in Poland 
and Hungary did little to alter political activity in society. For example, most Poles were 
479 See for example Fras, J., "Political Discourse as an Expression of the Polish political 
Culture after 1989", in Jablonski, A. W., & Meyer, G., (eds) (1996) pp. 151-162, p. 157 
480 Professor Andrzej Antoszewski, Institute of Political Science, University of 
Wroclaw, interview with Ruth Rodda, 3/4/98 
481 Libiszowska-Zoltkowska, M., (1993) "Liberalizm a religia w Europie Zachodniej Iw 
polsce" p. 337-339, cited by Antoszewski, A., in Jablonski, A., & Meyer, G., (eds) (1996) 
p. 173 
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relatively apathetic towards formal politics during the communist period, and became 
increasingly so during the 1980s. The 1987 referendum on economic reforms when too few 
people voted to enable the government to win the required majority of eligible voters was 
an example. 483 After the semi-free elections in 1989, which acted as a referendum on the 
communist regimes, most people may have merely returned to this apathetic approach to 
politics. "The rapid disintegration of Solidarity.... and the plethora of political parties - the 
confusing differences between the electoral appeals" also may have confused voters and 
contributed to the lack of political activity. Additionally, in Poland "politics is viewed as 
something for a small group of people... [it] is reserved for professional politicians.. . who 
should govern effectively - and should be totally responsible for all the actions. The Polish 
people are reluctant to take part .... we 
don't see action in political life". 484 
There is one further indication as to why there were differences between the cases. Surveys 
suggest that those who were politically active were more likely to have experienced 
political injustice. 485 It may be that more Bulgarians and Romanians felt they had suffered 
injustice due to the harsher nature of the communist systems, and continued to feel some 
injustice after 1989. Although the evidence presented here cannot completely verify these 
notions, there are indications that the form of revolution in Poland and Hungary did little to 
alter political participation in the longer term. In Bulgaria and Romania the revolutions 
may have unleashed feelings of injustice; feelings which were previously suppressed by 
system conditions. 
482 Agh, A., (1998) p. 73 
483 See previously in Chapter 2; and for this and further evidence of Polish political apathy, 
see for example, Mason, D., "Public opinion in Poland's transition to market democracy", in 
Deacon, B., (ed) (1992) Social Policy, Social Justice and Citizenship in Eastern Europe, 
Avebury, Hants, UK & Ashgate, Vermont, USA, especially p. 193 
484 The views of Professor Andrzej Antoszewski, Institute of Political Science, University 
of Wroclaw, interview with Ruth Rodda, 3/4/98 
485 40% of those who claimed to be politically active had experienced injustice compared 
to 17% of those who were politically inactive. See Mason, D. S., "Attitudes toward the 
Market and Political Participation in the Postcommunist States", Slavic Review 54, no. 2, 
Summer 1995, p. 398 
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Conclusion 
In all four countries some form of marketisation and privatisation was introduced. All post- 
1989 governments modified reforms as economic "shock" effects were encountered. As 
economic decline produced social discontent and consequential social pressures, 
incumbent governments were blamed for mishandling economic reform. Each country 
suffered political consequences which tended to result in modification of radical reform 
proposals, and marginalisation of the more radical economic reformists. 
Despite these general similarities, there were some notable differences between the cases. 
The different proposals for economic reform made little difference to longer-term 
economic outcomes. Poland's "shock therapy" approach, and Hungary's more gradual 
approach, both resulted in longer-term economic improvements. Bulgaria and Romania 
took similar piecemeal steps to reform with different outcomes. In fact Romania made 
considerable short term progress considering the country started with one of the most 
impoverished and centralised economies. Bulgaria suffered the worst long-term economic 
consequences with similar sector by sector reform efforts. External conditions had the most 
damaging effects for this country (see more in Chapter 7). 
What appeared to make the most difference to outcomes was the condition of the 
economies by 1989, and regime change. The Polish and Hungarian economies were 
already partially decentralised prior to 1989, and greater infiltration of "liberal" economic 
ideas was evident within the new regimes' proposals for marketisation and privatisation. 
Poland and Hungary were also more successful at industrial restructuring. Despite the 
initial negative consequences of implementing relatively rapid economic liberalisation, 
both countries made a slow but steady economic recovery. Romania and Bulgaria began 
economic change with relatively poorer economies, the regimes were generally slower to 
take up free market economic ideas, and implement reform. Both countries had greater 
adjustments to make for successful industrial restructuring, and suffered far more 
damaging fluctuations in economic progress. 
In terms of social change there were again similarities across the cases. Amongst the elite 
an element of generational change took place, especially amongst the former communist 
elite. Most of the "new" economic elite emerged from the pre-1989 communist elite. 
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Economic change also resulted in an increase in social inequalities. State managers, 
banking and financial sector employees made the greatest gains, whilst agricultural and 
certain public sector workers (mainly teachers and health workers) were the main losers. 
All four communist parties provided the means to social status prior to 1989 (see 
previously in Chapter 2). Many former communist party members, and administrative state 
personnel, were those with the skills to remain at the top of the social strata after 1989 
indicating some continuity from the pre-1989 to the post-1989 social systems. 
However, it is apparent that the basic "reproduction" and "circulation" of elites arguments 
are not totally adequate in explaining social elite change, especially in Poland and 
Hungary. The recruitment of personnel into new elite positions was much more complex 
than either thesis suggests. Some reproduction of economic elites took place, but this was 
not a simple power conversion. The basic characteristics of economic elites did not change 
to any degree, but a significant number of low-level managers were promoted, while 
former high-level managers took early retirement or were forced out of their former 
positions. Equally, the circulation of political elites was not complete. Many lower level 
state bureaucrats and local politicians remained in similar positions to those occupied 
before 1989. 
Differences in social change between the cases are most apparent when looking at changes 
to the communist parties. It is evident that change had already occurred within the Polish 
and Hungarian communist parties during the 1980s. Much of the "old" communist elite 
was no longer part of the political elite by 1989. This, coupled with regime change during 
1989 and 1990, led to greater political elite restructuring after 1989 in this case. Former 
communists were still able to reposition themselves as "new" elites within the post- 
communist systems (especially within the economies), but political marginalisation of the 
parties initially, along with pre-1989 party and personnel changes, enabled these parties to 
adapt relatively successfully to the post-1989 environment. In the Bulgarian and Romanian 
case there is little evidence of any similar pre-1989 changes within the communist parties. 
Neither communist party was strongly affected by either the changes going on within the 
Soviet Union, or by Western cultural and ideological penetration prior to 1989 (as seen 
previously in Chapter 2). The post-1989 changes to the parties were as much symbolic as 
real. The form of revolution left strong elite ties to the old system in place after 1989, 
which enabled many former communists to continue to transfer communist party assets 
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and practices into the reforming political and economic systems well into the 1990s. In the 
Bulgarian and Romanian case a reproduction of political and economic elites was much 
more likely. There appears to have been little change in recruitment patterns to the party 
prior to 1989, and despite some disunity within the parties due to the effects of Soviet 
reforms in the late 1980s, there was little or no organised counter-elite to marginalise 
former apparatchiks immediately after 1989. 
Evidence on the political activity of the rest of society is in many ways inconclusive. All 
four societies were quickly disillusioned by the changing systems, and elite mass-linkages 
were generally unaltered by regime change. It appears that where there were organised and 
"visible" opposition movements prior to 1989 involved in "negotiated" forms of political 
change (in Poland and Hungary) societies were less directly active in political processes 
after 1989. Yet, there was substantial growth in civil associations in these countries. The 
evidence available does not make it completely clear why this occurred. 
No matter what arguments are invoked to explain the complex changes taking place, what 
the application of the comparative-historical method shows is that in both cases 
communists no longer held a monopoly of power, and the communist party-state no longer 
controlled the economy. The introduction of marketisation and privatisation (however 
poorly implemented) had effects. Many former communists were able to take advantage of 
the political and economic changes that took place, but not all former communists 
remained privileged or maintained high social status. There was considerable growth in 
social inequalities and organisations independent of the state grew. The difference between 
the cases highlights that in Poland and Hungary significant economic and social change 
had already occurred prior to 1989, and that the economic and social "starting points" were 
as significant as political forms of change for developments after 1989. 
This chapter concludes the examination of internal variables. We have seen that there are 
significant patterns of difference between the cases in terms of internal conditions. 
However, there is one further aspect that needs to be discussed to complete the comparison 
of outcomes. Western influences played their part in pre-1989 conditions, and continued to 
have influence in the post-communist period (as we shall see in the following chapter), not 
only indirectly through cultural and ideological penetration, but also more directly, 
especially on economic and political outcomes. 
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Chapter 7 The Post-1989 International Context 
There are significant differences between the cases in terms of the way political, economic 
and social change took place after 1989. In part these differences were a result of the 
differing nature of the communist systems and forms of revolution. However, the 
international context was also integral to shaping outcomes. The desire for East-Central 
European countries to be integrated into Western institutions and associations, and the 
reliance on Western finance and trade to bolster their economies was of particular 
importance to the post-communist regimes. Not only did they need to reposition their 
countries politically and strategically within the post-Cold War world, they also required 
economic and technical assistance from the West to compete within the world economy. 
Equally international organisations and Western states encouraged post-1989 regimes and 
societies to make changes that were acceptable to neighbouring West European states, and 
to the most influential members of international organisations. In this chapter it will be 
argued that all four countries were potentially "pulled" towards some form of 
democratisation and marketisation of their systems. Yet, Poland and Hungary were already 
advantaged in 1989. These countries were "closer" to the West and structurally more 
adaptable to the kind of change encouraged by the international context. 
This chapter will address significant external economic and political influences during the 
early post-1989 period, and the important effects of these influences on each country. A 
comparison of the two cases will be undertaken within two sections: first, economic 
influences; and second, political influences. These influences are inextricably linked, but 
will be generally separated for the purpose of this discussion. The economic influences 
section incorporates the effect of foreign debt, the need for foreign direct investment and 
external trade, and the influence of international finance bodies on these countries. Political 
influences include these countries' attempts to become part of Western political and 
economic associations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the 
European Community/European Union (EU), and the influence of other significant 
Western associations. The acceptance of these countries as members of Western 
associations and processes was partly based on how democratic and economically stable 
they were perceived to be by Western governments and institutions. This perception in turn 
affected internal policy options and the pace of change within each country. There is a 
potential "circularity" of argument here. It cannot be concluded that external influences 
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were any more the "cause" of forwarding or retarding change than were internal 
circumstances. However, it will be taken that the international context was influential in 
each country's marketisation and democratisation. 
7.1 Economic Influences 
None of the four countries were forced to accept specific economic programmes by outside 
organisations. For example, Poland and Hungary chose very different economic reform 
paths (see previously in Chapter 6). However, external economic constraints did affect 
each country's chances for economic success, and each government's room for manoeuvre 
regarding economic policy. The need to acquire financial assistance gave Western 
organisations potential leverage over internal policies, and often influenced government 
action. This section will look first, at foreign debt and how that affected the level of 
economic assistance available; second, the general effects on the economies of foreign 
investment and changing trade patterns; and third, the main international institutions which 
provided or co-ordinated financial assistance and their influence on each economy. 
Foreign Debt 
Poland and Hungary's foreign debt burden, associated balance of payments problems, and 
shortage of private investment was a central concern for the post-communist governments. 
The legacies of communist rule were compounded by the initial economic "shocks" 
produced by post-1989 economic reforms (see previously in Chapter 6), and it became 
apparent that significant financial support was required throughout the region. 
Hungary had the highest per capita debt in 1989, and owed three quarters of this debt to 
commercial banks. Private banks were unwilling to provide debt relief However, the 
economic reforms of the communist era, and the acceleration of reform in the late 1980s 
aided Hungary's competitiveness (see previously in Chapter 2). This allowed the 
Hungarians to secure extensive pledges of financial assistance during 1989 and 1990 from 
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external institutions. 486 Poland was also indebted to Western creditors, but more of this 
debt came from Western donors who were willing to make concessions on debt payments 
in exchange for economic reforms. The Polish economic strategy of "shock therapy" was 
started in advance of any pressure from international financial institutions. Yet, the Polish 
government knew that in starting the adjustment program it was more likely to receive 
substantial external support. The Polish program found approval with the IMF and World 
Bank, which led to the provision of an internationally-financed stabilisation programme by 
the end of 1989, which in turn facilitated agreements on debt reduction. 487 
In 1989 approximately four fifths of Bulgaria's foreign debt was owed to Western 
commercial banks. The main creditor countries were West Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and Austria. 488 Bulgaria's foreign debt continued to grow between 1990 and 
1993. This caused the country considerable problems. Inability to service the growing debt 
impeded access to international financial markets and commercial credit, and inhibited 
exports. Even with the possibility of IMF loans and debt rescheduling the economy was 
489 put under serious strain (see the section below and also previously in Chapter 6). 
Romania was the only country not facing a significant foreign debt burden in 1989. The 
extreme policy of paying off all external obligations undertaken by Ceausescu in the late 
1980s virtually eradicated foreign debt, but at considerable cost to the Romanian 
population (see previously in Chapter 6). Although this factor potentially made Romania 
independent of external financial institutions, the substantial pressure on the regime after 
1989 to revitalise the economy - especially in terms of consumer goods - resulted in a rapid 
increase in foreign debt. Romania was not as indebted to Western financial institutions as 
486 For more details and a comparison of Hungary's situation with Poland's see for 
example, Haggard, S., & Moravcsik, A., "The Political Economy of Financial Assistance to 
Eastern Europe 1989-1991 ", in Keohane, R., et al (eds) (1993) After the Cold War, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, especially pp. 273-279. 
487 IMF agreements did impose strict conditions regarding budget deficit, inflation, 
progress with privatisation, and growth of production. See Millard, F., (1994) The Anatomy 
of the New Poland, Edward Elgar, England & USA, p. 224-5 
488 World Bank (1991) Bulgaria: Crisis and Transition to a Market Economy, Washington, 
Vol. 1, pp. 157-8 
489 For more detail of Bulgaria's economic problems see previously in Chapter 6; and for 
example, Angelov, I., & Doulev, S., et al "Economic Outlook of Bulgaria 1994-1996", 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Sofia, December 1993, printed in 
Bulgarian Economic Review, No. 7,1994, pp. 5-12 
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Poland or Hungary - even by 1996 (see table 7.1 below) - but in order to raise the economy 
to a competitive level, Romania was potentially as dependent on Western technical and 
financial assistance. 
Table 7.1 Foreign Debt ($bn) 1990-1996 (selected years) 
Country 1990 1992 1994 1996 
Poland 49.4 47.0 42.2 40.0 
Hungary 21.3 21.6 28.5 27.6 
Bulgaria 10.9 13.9 11.4 9.6 
Romania 1.2 2.5 4.6 7.2 
Source: Business Central Europe, Statistical Database, Electronic Version, 21/5/98 
Foreign Investment and Trade 
With the opening of Eastern economies to international markets and the collapse of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading block from January 1991, it 
became essential for all four countries to reorient their trading patterns and encourage 
foreign investment as part of their economic recovery strategies. Poland and Hungary had 
greater inflows of foreign direct investment in the early 1990s than either Bulgaria or 
Romania (see Table 7.2 below). Only Hungary had any significant pre-1989 experience of 
foreign investment, and being the first to open up to foreign capital the country initially 
maintained its leading position. Poland had officially been open to foreign investment from 
1976, but investors faced considerable constraints in the scale of operation and potential 
for profitability. 490 However, Poland's "big bang" approach to economic restructuring in 
1990 included lowering trade barriers and setting up a legal and tax framework which did 
not discriminate against foreign business aided investment. 491 As a result of this relatively 
490 See for example, Spar, D. L., "Foreign Direct Investment", in Keohane, R., et al (eds) 
(1993), especially pp. 290-296 
491 Not all sectors were completely open to foreign investment. Some areas. such as radio 
and television, telecommunications and fishing were restricted to below 50% foreign 
ownership. Land was virtually excluded from foreign ownership because of fears for 
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liberalised approach to foreign investors, Poland experienced rapidly growing investment 
inflows during the early 1990s (see table 7.2). American investors accounted for the largest 
share of stock value of foreign investments by 1994 (23.9%), followed by Germany 
(22.2%) and the Netherlands (13.1 %). 492 Hungary's largest investors at the beginning of 
1996 were Germany (29%) followed by the US (24%) and Austria (10.5%). 493 
Table 7.2 Foreign Direct Investment Flow ($m) 1990-1996 (selected years) 
Country 1990 1992 1994 1996 
Poland 89.0 300.0 1875.0 5190.0 
Hungary 300.0 1500.0 1100.0 1790.0 
Bulgaria na 42.0 105.0 125.0 
Romania 18.0 73.0 347.0 212.0 
na: not available 
Source: Business Central Europe, Statistical Database, Electronic Version, 21/5/98 
Poland and Hungary were the least reliant of the four countries on CMEA trade before 
1989 and had significant trade with the West by 1989 (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below). 
Trade with the West was an effective means to expand competitive sectors within their 
economies. When the communist regimes collapsed in 1989 the European 
Community/European Union (EU) and the G24 countries moved quickly to liberalise 
quotas and grant tariff advantages. 494 Initial restrictions on such products as iron and steel, 
chemicals, clothing and textiles, and agricultural goods did not allow adequate export 
competition with Poland's small farms, and unease (especially in Western Poland) that 
there would be an influx of Germans taking advantage of relatively cheap land prices. Dr 
hab. Jaroslaw Kundera (European Chair, Research Centre on European Integration), 
Wroclaw University, interview with Ruth Rodda, April 1 st 1998 
492 Biskup, J., "Characteristics of Foreign Direct Investment in Poland at the end of 1994", 
in Biskup, J., Chojna, J., et al (1996) Foreign Investments in Poland, Foreign Trade 
Research Institute, Warsaw, p. 83 
493 Kopec, U., "Foreign Capital in Central and Eastern Europe", in Biskup, J., Chojna, J., et 
al (1996) p. 135 
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potential. However, the early agreements with the EU and relatively liberalised trade with 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries helped 
to stimulate the production of competitive goods, which in turn encouraged further foreign 
investment. 
Table 7.3 Intra-CMEA Exports and Imports as a percentage of Totals 1989 
(Imports rounded to the nearest whole number) 
Country CMEA Exports 
Poland 40.7% 
Hungary 44.6% 
Bulgaria 80.9% 
Romania 40.8% 
CMEA Imports 
32.0% 
39.0% 
73.0% 
55.0% 
Sources: Exports - Izvorski, l., "Economic Reform in Bulgaria: 1989-1993", Communist 
Economies and Economic Transformation, February 1993, Yale University, Department of 
Economics (electronic version) 
Imports - Bristow, J. A., "The international Economy", in Jones, D. C., & Miller, J., (eds) 
(1997) The Bulgarian Economy: Lessons ftom Reform during Early Transition, Ashgate, 
UK & US, p. 181 
Table 7.4 Exports and Imports to and from the Developed West 1989 
(percentages of total exports and imports) 
Country Western Exports Western Imports 
Poland 48.7 53.1 
Hungary 43.1 49.3 
Bulgaria(1988) 6.3 15.3 
Romania 27.7 10.2 
Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (July 1990); IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
(1991) 
NB: Because of overvaluation of the transferable rouble to the dollar, trade shares are 
overestimated, and are greatest in those countries with the largest shares of trade - see 
Koves, A., (1992) Tables 5.3 & 5.4, pp. 87 & 88 
494 See more on this below in the following section, and in the Political Influences section. 
also for example, Pinder, J., "The EC and Democracy", in Pridham, G., Herring, E., & 
Sanford, G., (1997) especially p. 120 
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For both Poland and Hungary early economic liberalisation and reform progress, alongside 
closer political links and geographical proximity to European Union countries, provided 
relatively favourable conditions for improving trade and increasing investment. Although 
the amount of investment inflows were not huge in terms of overall product, this trade and 
investment aided recovery from the early post-1989 "economic shocks". 495 
In Bulgaria and Romania, the relatively greater centralisation of the economic systems 
prior to 1989, more reliance on heavy, technologically outdated industry, a delayed process 
of economic reform, and weaker economic revival post-1989, all tended to discourage 
foreign investors. As we have seen (in the section above) Bulgaria's debt problem severely 
limited the country's economic restructuring. Foreign investment was the only means to 
obtain foreign capital. After considerable efforts debt rescheduling came into effect in July 
1994 which contributed to some improvement in foreign investment. 496 Romania's 
agreement to restructure debt to commercial banks in 1994 also partially removed barriers 
to foreign investment. However, in both countries relatively slow privatisation, the slow 
pace of reform, and continuing political tensions (see previously in Chapters 4,5 and 6), 
did not create an encouraging environment for foreign firms. The largest share of foreign 
investment in Romania at the end of 1994 came from Germany (38%), whereas Bulgaria's 
largest share was from South Korea (13%). Germany's interests in Bulgaria were much 
497 smaller, at only 8%. 
495 Foreign direct investment assets as a percentage of GDP in 1993 were 14.5% in 
Hungary and only 3.6% in Poland. Figures from Ladyka, S., "Foreign Direct Investment in 
the World Economy" in Biskup, J., Chojna, J., et al (1996), Table 7.4, p. 128. Trade with the 
EU grew steadily. Hungarian exports to the EU were 71.2% of total exports by 1997; 
Polish exports were 64.2%, while imports were 62.8% and 63.8% respectively. Regular 
Report from the European Commission on Progress towards Accession, <Poland> 
<Hungary> Annex, Statistical Data, 1998 (electronic version) 
496 Debt rescheduling did not solve the debt problem in the longer term. A failure to reach 
agreement with the IMF at an early date aggravated Bulgaria's economic problems and 
contributed to the severe foreign exchange crisis of 1996. For more details on this and 
related problems see for example, Jones, D. C., & Miller, J., "Early transition in Bulgaria: 
review and evaluation", and Bristow, J. A., "The International Economy", in Jones, D. C., & 
Miller, J., (eds) (1997) The Bulgarian Economy: Lessons from Reform during Early 
Transition, Ashgate, UK & US, pp. 3-19 & 179-202 
497 Figures from Kopec, U., "Foreign Capital in Central and Eastern Europe", in Biskup, J., 
Chojna, J., et al (1996) pp. 139-140 
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External trade was also affected by the weaker, more inefficient, and less competitive 
aspects of the Bulgarian and Romanian economies. Romania's trade with CMEA in 1989 
amounted to just over 40% exports and 55% imports. Exports to the West were 27.7% in 
1989, but grew substantially. By 1994 Romania was exporting 48.2% of total exports to 
the EU countries. 498 Bulgaria was the most reliant on CMEA trade in 1989, suffered the 
most from the collapse of CMEA, and started with the lowest percentage of Western trade 
(for a comparison of exports and imports in 1989, see Tables 7.3 and 7.4 above). The 
official figures suggest that over 80% of Bulgaria's exports went to CMEA countries in 
1989, while CMEA accounted for 73% of the country's imports. These figures were 
probably biased due to overvaluation and were - in real terms - more likely to be around 
62% and 52% respectively. 499 For Bulgaria especially, the high percentage of fuel imported 
from the former Soviet Union, and the more than doubling of prices for this fuel between 
1989 and 1991, had particularly detrimental effects. Also, with regard to trade with the 
European Union, Bulgaria was at a disadvantage. The barriers to free trade on certain 
sectors (see above with regard to Poland and Hungary) affected Bulgaria more profoundly. 
Products in these sectors accounted for 50% of Bulgaria's exports to the EU, and growth in 
trade was slow. Restrictions on access to EU markets denied Bulgaria opportunities to 
expand trade and reduced incentives for EU firms to invest. 500 Although Romania's share 
of EU markets increased substantially between 1989 and 1997, both Bulgaria and Romania 
lagged behind Poland and Hungary in terms of Western investment and trade. 
Western organisations and financial assistance 
Western governments tended not to be as forthcoming with financial assistance as the 
statements they issued suggested. Between January 1990 and June 1991 around $45 billion 
of aid disbursements went to the region. However, this was a relatively small amount 
498 Imports from the EU were also 48.2% as a percentage of total imports. Exports steadily 
increased to 56.6% by 1997. Regular Report ftom the European Commission on Progress 
towards Accession, Romania, Annex, Statistical Data, 1998 (electronic version) 
499 For reasons for overvaluation in Bulgaria see Bristow, J. A., "The International 
Economy", in Jones, D. C., & Miller, J., (eds) (1997) p. 180 
500 Bulgaria's exports to the EU only grew to 28.1% of total exports by 1993 and 38.8% by 
1996. Regular Report ftom the European Commission on Progress towards Accession, 
Bulgaria, Annex, Statistical Data, 1998 (electronic version) 
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considering the estimated financial need. 50' The United States (US), Japan and EU 
countries provided around 90% of aid to Eastern Europe in 1990 to 1991, around 50% of 
the total going to Poland and Hungary between 1989 and 1991.502 Germany played a 
leading role through a range of assistance from projects and export credits to private 
investment support. 503 A number of Western and international organisations were involved 
in co-ordinating financial aid, including the European Union (EU), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The EU and its member countries were East- 
Central Europe's key trading partners. As a consequence much of the assistance given was 
geared towards promoting trade and investment. The G7, G24 and Paris Club were also 
involved in co-ordinating Western assistance. G24 initially consisted of representatives 
from OECD countries which agreed in August 1989 to co-ordinate food aid for Poland, 
investment promotion through joint ventures, improved access to Western markets, co- 
operation in environmental protection, and vocational training. The European Commission 
was given the administrative task of providing these support measures. 
The European Commission's first action plan involved the Poland/Hungary Aid for 
Restructuring Economies (PHARE) programme which focused on immediate needs, for 
example agricultural supplies and credits, environmental protection and human resource 
development. In December 1989 extension of the programme to other East-Central 
European countries including Bulgaria was agreed, and put into action in July 1990. 
Romania was considered in February 1990, but not approved at that time. 504 In 1991-92 the 
PHARE programme was expanded to include support for privatisation, joint ventures and 
small and medium sized enterprises. Within this wider framework of support for economic 
and social reform other PHARE programmes were initiated. For example, the PHARE 
501 Sentiments reiterated in speeches by ministers and leaders suggested that a high level of 
support for Eastern Europe was desirable for the security and stability of the region. G 30 
estimates of total financial need from 1991 through 1995 were $237 and $252 billion 
which included an overestimation of potential contributions from the private sector of 
approximately $160 billion. See for example Haggard, S., & Moravcsik, A., in Keohane, R., 
et al(1993) pp. 251,252 & 257 
502 ibid p. 273 
503 Commission of the European Communities G-24 Assistance to Central and Eastern 
Europe Summary Tables, November 1991 (in Keohane, R., et al (1993) p. 254) 
504 For more detail regarding the Association or "Europe" Agreements and EU assistance 
see for example, "The Europe Agreements with Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics", The European Commission Background Report B11 /95, 
September 1995 
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Partnership Programme which provided financial support to encourage economic 
development and institutional strengthening, launched in 1994. 
Financial institutions associated with the European Union were also active in providing 
financial support. These included the European Investment Bank (EIB - the European 
Community development bank) and the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). The EBRD was set up in 1990 specifically to invest in East 
European transitions, and all four countries became members. Hungary in particular was an 
ardent supporter of the EBRD seeing it as a principal source of credits. The EIB had 
already started lending to Poland and Hungary between 1989 and 1990. However, the 
creation of the ERBD, alongside objections from France and Britain, meant proposed 
expansion of EIB lending to Bulgaria and Romania was initially blocked. The EIB works 
closely, and co-operates with the EBRD and World Bank, and since the Central European 
applications for membership to the EU, has become an increasing source for project loans. 
As part of the EIB's pre-accession strategy, loans are issued to aid development in areas 
such as communications, the environment, energy and industry. In order to receive loans 
the applicant countries' projects are assessed for consistency with EU policies. Criteria 
such as technical and financial viability, and environmental protection, are considered 
before a proportion of the necessary investment costs (usually up to 50%) is made 
available. Overall, loans were modest: in the region of 5.4 billion ecus for the whole 
s° Central and Eastern European region between 1993 and 1997. 
The IMF and the World Bank played a major role in promoting financial assistance. The 
IMF stepped in to assist in the management of balance of payments crises in East European 
countries in 1990-91. Poland and Hungary were members of the IMF before 1989, and 
signed stand-by agreements to support financial stabilisation in early 1990. Bulgaria joined 
in September 1990, and an IMF standby facility was approved in March 1991. Romania 
also negotiated its first post-1989 regular program in spring 1991. As economic crises 
deepened in 1991 the IMF provided additional resources to all four countries to fund 
energy imports. The World Bank was slower to respond than the IMF, but provided loans 
505 Amounts loaned to each country vary from year to year. In 1997 Poland received 355 
million ECU, Romania 142, Bulgaria 60 and Hungary 35. For amounts, and details of 
appraisal and supported projects see, European Investment Bank, Annual Report 1998, 
pp. 35,36 & inside the back cover 
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aimed at aiding structural adjustment such as privatisation, or financial sector 
development; for restructuring business, especially in sectors where export performance 
could be improved; and infrastructure improvements. 
IMF and World Bank assistance - and the attached conditions - potentially aided 
investment and loans from other external sources. 506 IMF funds enabled recipient countries 
to finance outstanding debts, and government policies - promoted under the agreements - 
encouraged other creditors and investors to commit funds. However, by complying with 
IMF-World Bank conditions each country was implementing domestic austerity measures 
which potentially created a decline in living standards. If a country did not comply with the 
conditions further loans and support were likely to be withdrawn. In Poland (where debt 
was partially written off) and Hungary (which continued to successfully service its debt) - 
domestic austerity measures paid off, economic performance gradually improved (as we 
saw previously in Chapter 6). The Bulgarian economy was caught in a vicious circle. The 
IMF remained the only source of external financing after the suspension of foreign debt 
servicing in early 1990. Foreign debt reservicing remained crucial to regaining creditors' 
and investors' confidence. Yet, servicing foreign debt alongside deepening economic crises 
impeded economic stabilisation measures required under IMF agreements. 507 The 
cancellation of a fifth IMF loan tranche in 1993 - due to a breach of loan conditions - only 
served to compound Bulgaria's economic problems. After the severe economic crisis in late 
1996, the IMF and World Bank approved substantial loans and projects to the caretaker 
government after commitments to a macroeconomic stabilisation programme and structural 
reform were made. 508 In comparison, Romania was not caught in the same debt servicing 
506 IMF-World Bank conditions of "structural adjustment" may include economic 
stabilisation (such as currency devaluation, price liberalisation and budgetary austerity 
measures) and structural reform (such as trade liberalisation, privatisation programmes and 
deregulation of the banking sector). For these conditions and their potential effects on 
domestic economies see for example, Chossudovsky, M., (1997) The Globalisation of 
Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, Zed Books Ltd., London & New 
Jersey, USA. 
507 Angelov, I., & Doulev, S., et al "Economic Outlook of Bulgaria 1994-1996", Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Sofia, December 1993, printed in Bulgarian 
Economic Review, No. 7,1994, p. 5-12 
508 In April 1997 the IMF approved a $657 million standby loan and financial package, and 
the World Bank approved $300 million worth of projects if Bulgaria introduced a currency 
loan board which linked the lev to foreign currency reserves in an attempt to end the 
financial cycle which permitted commercial banks to drain state money through 
government bailouts. See "Report on Bulgaria's Parliamentary Elections", April 19,1997, 
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trap in the early post-1989 period, but by making agreements with the IMF was potentially 
pushed towards similar domestic austerity measures. For example, in order to receive 
structural adjustment loans in agreements signed in 1991 and 1992, subsidies to state 
owned enterprises were dramatically cut. Subsequent increases in inflation can partially be 
attributed to such measures. 509 Several instalments of agreed standby loans were not paid 
due to slow reform progress. Further IMF deals were reliant on the introduction of an 
austerity budget and restructuring of the banking system. 510 
7.2 Political Influences 
The association of East-Central European countries with Western organisations and 
governments provided indirect as well as direct political influences. By moving towards 
the West, and some form of liberal democracy, the Eastern countries were implicitly, if not 
explicitly, associating themselves with countries which were likely to condemn - what the 
West perceived to be - undemocratic political and social practices. Strategic and economic 
interests as well as political goals were a part of both Western and Eastern aims. However, 
in order to become members of Western "clubs" each Eastern country's democratic status 
was particularly important. 
All four East-Central European countries needed to redefine their foreign and defence 
policies after 1989. The collapse of communism - and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet 
Union and associated organisations, such as the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) - left 
these countries with few options in terms of strategic alliances. 51 1 None of these countries 
prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, May 
1997, electronic version 25/2/99 
509 For more details of this particular structural adjustment in Romania, and its 
consequences on the banking system, see Carare, O. V., & Perotti, E. C., "The evolution of 
bank credit quality in Romania since 1991 ", in Zecchini, S., (ed) (1997) Lessons from the 
Economic Transition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dodrecht, Boston & London 
510 These were key prerequisites for a fifth IMF deal in 1999, see Central Europe on-line 
business news "Romania expects IMF Deal by the End of February", Thursday, February 
18,1999, London, Prague, New York 
511 The Warsaw Treaty Organisation's military structures were not officially disbanded 
until April 1991. However, revision of the Pact from 1987 began a restructuring of the 
alliance, while German unification in October 1990 accelerated the process of 
disintegration. See Michta, A. A., (1992) East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: 
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were self-sufficient in terms of military defence, having relied on the Soviet alliance during 
the communist period for their main defence provision. To protect their newly gained 
independence from the Soviets - and remain independent within what was potentially in 
early 1990 an unstable Eastern and Central Europe - they needed to create new bilateral 
and regional pacts and become part of Western associations. They in fact made movements 
towards both bilateral and regional co-operation, whilst also pressing to join Western 
associations. 512 
All four countries also favoured integration into European organisations which would 
enhance their economic prospects. However, Poland and Hungary were more committed to 
a closer Western relationship, and moved more quickly towards association with the West 
than either Bulgaria or Romania. Poland and Hungary's geographical proximity to Western 
Europe, and apparent rapid movement towards democracy and the free market, also 
encouraged greater penetration of both governmental and non-governmental organisations 
from the West. These are the main issues to be addressed in this section. The two cases 
will be separately discussed and compared in order to highlight some similarities and the 
main differences within and between the cases. 
Poland and Hungary 
The Council of Europe was the first of Europe's multilateral organisations to reach out to 
the former communist states in order to help them achieve swift democratic reforms. The 
Council's Parliamentary Assembly set up a "special guest status" for parliamentarians from 
reforming Eastern states that had applied for Council membership, but not yet met the 
body's stiff democratic criteria for entry. The Council secretariat's expertise in legal, 
human-rights and minority questions was used to advise candidate states on essential 
democratic reforms. In several cases Council experts worked closely with national 
Security Dilemmas in the 1990s, Greenwood Press, New York, Connecticut & London, 
pecially pp. 51-61 es 
51 Many bilateral and regional agreements were made in the early post-1989 period - both 
between Central and East-Central European countries, and between each country and 
bordering countries. Although important in terms of security in the early post-1989 
redefinition of "East" and "West" Europe, only relevant agreements will be mentioned 
here. For more detail on foreign policy relations, see for example Michta, A. A., (1992) 
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governments in drafting new constitutions and basic laws. Advice was offered on matters 
ranging from the treatment of prisoners, through citizenship requirements, to dealing with 
government corruption. 
The advice was often welcomed and even solicited by East European states, which came to 
regard the Council as the essential "gateway" organisation for integration with the EU and 
NATO. Each candidate knew that the sooner Council membership certified democratic 
allegiance, the sooner they would be accepted by other European organisations. Hungary 
was the first former Soviet satellite to become a member of the Council of Europe in 
November 1990. Poland's membership was slightly delayed as the Council did not regard 
Poland's 1989 general election as free and fair. 513 
In 1989 a primary concern for Poland and Hungary was their strategic position. Neither 
country was keen to remain within a "buffer zone" between East and West Europe. Both 
countries were in the forefront of dismantling the Warsaw Pact (WTO). The Hungarians 
were the first former Soviet satellite to broach the subject of withdrawal from the WTO, 
and negotiate an agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Both countries sought 
close association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as the most suitable 
alternative to their security dilemma. However, NATO itself was initially rethinking its 
own strategy. With the decline of the old East-West Cold War enmity and ultimate 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO did not want to risk offending Moscow by 
rushing to redefine East-West divisions. A Partnership for Peace Programme created by 
NATO in 1994 was the first real movement towards strengthening military and political 
ties with Central and East European states (including Russia). It in fact took until July 1997 
for NATO to invite Poland and Hungary (as well as the Czech Republic) to begin formal 
talks on accession. It was clear that their inclusion in the alliance would not take place 
before 1999.514 Although the movement towards integration into NATO was slow, the 
513 Poland joined the Council of Europe in November 1991, subsequently signing the 
European Convention on Human Rights which came into effect in January 1993. For 
details and the implementation of human rights, see for example Blocker, J., "Europe: 
Council Of Europe--A Leading Gateway To Integration", Prague, 11 November 1997 
(RFE/RL), and "Implementation of the Helsinki Accords Human Rights and 
Democratisation in Poland", A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, Washington DC, January 1994 (electronic version 25/2/99) 
514 See NATO internet web site. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic formally joined 
NATO on March 12th 1999. 
247 
commitment to joining the Western alliance, and the general acceptance by NATO 
countries that they would eventually become members, enhanced Poland and Hungary's 
credibility as "Western" style democratic states. This was seen as an important factor by all 
post-communist governments in furthering their independence as nation-states in strategic, 
political and economic terms. 
Membership of the European Community/European Union (EU) was also an early goal for 
Polish and Hungarian post-communist governments. For Hungary a close relationship with 
Germany created informal channels to NATO and the European Union. 515 Germany also 
gave Poland an indirect link to the EU by becoming Poland's major trading partner, and 
providing aid and capital. 516 A Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian summit in Visegrad in 
February 1991 resulted in a treaty on economic and environmental co-operation, and these 
three countries became known as the Visegrad states. This regional co-operation was 
intended to stabilise relations between the countries, but was also a means of increasing 
their credibility as prospective partners of the EU, and a means of strengthening 
negotiations for entry. 
The EU was initially quick to respond to the 1989 events liberalising trade, and negotiating 
trade and co-operation agreements with most Central and East European countries (as 
already discussed in economic influences above). Although the EU delayed granting full 
membership to these countries - mainly for economic reasons - associate membership and 
EU supported programmes provided economic, technical and political assistance. For 
example the Poland/Hungary Aid for Restructuring Economies (PHARE) programme 
launched in 1989, later extended to other East European countries, aimed to support 
economic reconstruction and democratic reform. 
Other Western government and organisational support was also influential. For example, 
Western European and American political parties and foundations were involved in aiding 
East-Central European political parties, especially in the run up to the first free elections. 
Some financial assistance and a variety of organisational and political "expertise" was 
515 A relationship initiated in 1989 through Budapest's help with East German refugees in 
keeping the Austro-Hungarian border open. 
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given. Transnational party links only provided limited support and did not necessarily 
result in the "Westernisation" of East-Central European political parties, but organisational 
techniques and contacts no doubt enhanced some party's election prospects and affected 
their status and identity. For example the ex-communist parties sought links with the 
Socialist International, which was not prepared to admit them until they demonstrated their 
commitment to democracy and human rights. This provided extra pressure on these parties 
to adhere to reformist tendencies, thereby providing a direct external influence on internal 
political processes. 517 
Other external political influences in the post-1989 period came more directly from 
Western liberal democratic governments. In effect Western governments had some 
potential to influence the formation of East-Central European governments through their 
support or disapproval of personnel or parties. For example, in Hungary a major issue after 
the 1990 elections was what form the coalition government should take. The United States 
appeared to favour a grand coalition, while Germany looked approvingly at a centre-right 
coalition. These differing external signs of support reflected the different Hungarian party 
identities. The Free Democrats with their more radical liberal ideas attracted the American 
freedom of spirit and enterprise; Antall and the Democratic Forum were more closely 
identified with Europe and the German economy. 518 
More informal external influences came in the form of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) which began to operate in the region. These organisations were often supported by 
the West, and some were funded by Western governments. 519 Between 1989 and 1992 the 
number of registered "civil associations" in Hungary increased from 8,574 to 19,950. In 
516 Polish-German relations were tense on occasion, particularly over border issues, see for 
example Millard, F., (1994) The Anatomy of the New Poland, Edward Elgar, England & 
USA, especially Chapter 8 
517 For more detail of transnational party links and associated issues see Pridham, G., 
"Transnational Party Links and transition to democracy: Eastern Europe in Comparative 
Perspective", in Lewis, P., (ed) (1996) Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central 
Europe, Edward Elgar, US & UK 
518 Whitefield, S., (ed) (1993) p. 86 
519 For example the United States National Endowment for Democracy disburses funds to 
NGOs with the aim of building "civil society". See for example Burgess, A., (1997) 
Divided Europe: The New Domination of the East, Pluto Press, London & Chicago, 
Illinois, p. 169 
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Poland an estimated 20,000 non-governmental associations were operating by 1995.520 
Encouragement of "civil society" and a more bottom up decentralisation of power also 
came from such organisations as the George Soros Foundation which initially helped fund 
and develop the Central European University (CEU) and Open Media Research Institute. 
The Soros Foundation initiated projects throughout the East-Central European region to 
promote market economies, the protection of minorities, and educational projects clearly 
aimed at promoting democracy and critical thinking in Western and American terms. 52' 
Although such foundations and organisations operated throughout the region, Poland and 
Hungary were often amongst the first countries to become associated with these types of 
organisations, and experienced greater penetration of Western influences as a consequence. 
Bulgaria and Romania 
Both Bulgarian and Romanian post-communist governments were hampered in their 
applications for membership of Western associations. Western organisations invariably 
backed away from formal agreements, despite the rhetoric which implied that all the 
former Soviet bloc countries could be included. 
Bulgaria and Romania gained full membership of the Council of Europe in 1992 and 1993 
respectively. Both countries applied for NATO membership, but no movement towards 
incorporation was made. Prospects for membership were not aided by Russian objections 
to further enlargement, nor by the Bulgarian government's tentative proposals for an 
Eastern alliance with former Soviet Republics. 522 Romania's human and minority rights 
policies were criticised by Western institutions, and the United States made it clear that the 
520 For Hungary see Tokes, R. L., "Party politics and political participation in 
postcommunist Hungary". For Poland see Michta, A. A., "Democratic consolidation in 
Poland after 1989", both in Dawisha, K., & Parrott, B., (eds) (1997) The Consolidation of 
Democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, UK, US & Australia, 
n t). 132 & 99 respectively. 
1 Soros' objectives for the CEU and an example of the academic programme can be found 
in the CEU Prospectus, 1996, pp. 5 & 119. 
522 Palmer, J., "West carves up Europe in a new Yalta", The Observer, 21 April 1996, p. 21 
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presence of extremists in the Romanian government in the mid 1990s did not boost their 
chances of joining NATO. 523 
Both countries signed initial Europe Agreements with the EU in early 1993, two years after 
Poland and Hungary. The PHARE programme was extended to Bulgaria in 1990 and 
Romania in 1991. The Europe Agreements offered the prospect of full membership, but the 
likelihood of Bulgaria or Romania meeting the criteria (especially economic) within a short 
time were remote. Bulgaria's associate membership of the EU became effective in 
February 1995. Romania submitted its official application for full membership in June 
1995. However, the EU "blacklist" of countries believed to pose a threat to security and 
immigration published in September 1995 included both Bulgaria and Romania, implying 
these countries were less acceptable as full members than some of their other East-Central 
European neighbours (notably the Visegrad countries). 
Bulgaria probably encountered the most direct external governmental influence during the 
first free elections of 1990. The US Embassy actively supported the Union of Democratic 
Forces against the former communist BSP. A team of advisors arrived with $1.3 million 
dollars to aid their campaign. However, this did not result in a UDF win, and the public 
awareness of US involvement probably did more harm than good. 524 
The United States' Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status was also influential in Romania. 
From 1975 to 1988 Romania enjoyed MFN status and considerable trade links. 525 The new 
post-1989 regime was keen to restore MFN, and relations with the Americans. Secretary of 
523 The US Ambassador to Romania was apparently referring to the presence of the Party 
of Romanian National Unity as a coalition partner in government 1994-1996. See 
Gallagher, T., "Nationalism and Post-Communist Politics: The Party of Romanian National 
Unity, 1990-1996", in Stan, L., (1997) p. 40 
524 Pridham, G., "Transnational Party Links and transition to democracy: Eastern Europe in 
Comparative Perspective", in Lewis, P., (ed) (1996), p. 203 
525 On February 26,1988, the State Department announced Romania's decision that it was 
no longer interested in MFN status, and noted that MFN would expire on July 3,1988. In 
addition, Romania would be ineligible for any United States government export credits 
through programmes such as the Commodity Credit Corporation of the Eximbank. The 
loss of trade was considerable. In 1988, the two countries exchanged a total of $940 
million worth of goods. By 1989 two way trade had dropped to $509 million. See 
Harrington, J., Karns, E., & Karns, S., "American-Romanian relations, 1989-1994", East 
European Quarterh', Summer 1995, vol. 29, no. 2, p207-29 
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State Baker visited Bucharest on February 11,1990. Although he promised President 
Iliescu humanitarian aid, he emphasised that the future of American-Romanian relations 
rested on Bucharest's willingness to move rapidly toward greater democratisation, religious 
freedom, protection of human rights and the rights of minorities. American observers were 
sent to the May 1990 elections. Although the observers reported no blatant fraud, some 
irregularities were recorded. However, the Tirgu Mures incident in March concerning the 
Hungarian minority, and the miners rampage in June 1990 provided the main evidence that 
Romania's democratic progress was far from acceptable to the Americans (for these 
incidents see previously in Chapter 5). Trade gradually increased between the two 
countries, but further agreements with Western institutions tended to rest on the perception 
of how democratic Romania was becoming - invariably measured by how free and fair 
each set of elections was perceived to be by outside observers. It was not until 1992, after 
Romania agreed to support UN economic sanctions on Yugoslavia (which was potentially 
detrimental to Romanian trade) that support from the West began to increase. 
Transnational political party links were also evident in Bulgaria and Romania, but most 
activity was centred on Poland and Hungary (and Czech and Slovak Republics). The only 
EU state to systematically develop links in Bulgaria and Romania was Greece. Leaders of 
the BSP established links with the Greek socialists. The Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (the Turkish minority party in Bulgaria) also received campaign support from 
Turkey. 526 
As already mentioned (above) indirect influences from NGOs, foundations and educational 
projects were in evidence throughout the region. For example, Western based voluntary 
organisations, such as the White Cross involved in the Romanian orphanage crisis, brought 
with them their own attitudes to child care, and children's rights. However, overall there 
tended to be less Western government or EU supported projects due to the delay in 
incorporating Bulgaria and Romania into Western programmes and associations. 
526 See for example, Pridham, G., "Transnational Party Links and transition to democracy: 
Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective", in Lewis, P., (ed) (1996), p. 211 
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Conclusion 
The political and economic conditions imposed by external organisations were not the sole 
constraint on each country's policies. East-Central European government policies and 
internal conditions did not always take the direction preferred by the West. Equally 
Western governments and institutions were often slow or reluctant to give aid and 
incorporate East-Central European countries into Western "clubs". Nevertheless, Western 
organisations had significant influence throughout the region. Through association with 
Western institutions, East-Central European countries were encouraged to promote 
Western (liberal democratic) style policy directions and value orientations within their own 
internal programmes. For example, the EU's stated aims towards Central and Eastern 
Europe were: to support their movement towards market economies, pluralist democracies 
and international integration. EU policy statements distinctly specified elements of 
democracy - such as rule of law, respect for human rights, pluralism, and multi-party 
elections. 527 The focus of programmes - such as PHARE - also changed from general 
promotion of private enterprise and democratic governmental practice towards "teaching 
governments to manage and regulate a market-oriented system by developing new 
institutions and non-governmental organisations.... [which included] aiming to build 
democratic process at 'grassroots' level by encouraging the free media and independent 
NGOs". 528 The development of "civil society", through encouraging non-governmental 
organisations, became an additional means for promoting and consolidating democracy. As 
a result of these kinds of external influences many East-Central European policies - not 
only economic and political, but also social policies (including minority and human rights 
policies) - were shaped by a wide variety of Western oriented international organisations, 
non-governmental bodies and charities. 
Although Bulgaria and Romania moved towards integration into Western associations, it is 
noticeable that they were slower than Poland and Hungary in formalising agreements and 
joining Western "clubs". Internal economic conditions - especially the level and structure 
527 See for example, Pinder, J., "The European Community and Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe", in Pridham, G., Herring, E., & Sanford, G., (1997) Building Democracy? 
The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe, Leicester University 
Press, London & Washington 
528 The European Commission Background Report B/3/97 "The Enlargement of the 
European Union", February 1997 
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of the Bulgarian and Romanian economies - not only meant that these countries were 
starting from different bases which made it difficult to compete within the world economy, 
but also made them less attractive to foreign investors, and impeded their integration into 
Western associations. Bulgaria was especially disadvantaged in terms of trade and 
investment. In both countries the initial post-1989 domination of former communists in 
government was also detrimental - especially for Romania - as their democratic credentials 
were called into question. These countries were not only perceived to be "lagging" behind 
Poland and Hungary politically and economically, but were also actively condemned and 
penalised for their perceived status. This may have encouraged more Western oriented 
democratic practices and policies to be introduced, but it also served to decrease their 
chances of becoming integrated into Western European and international associations, as 
they struggled to improve economic conditions with lower levels of external support. 
Movement towards marketisation and democratisation by all four countries was generally 
encouraged by Western governments and international organisations. Yet, internal 
differences between the cases were reinforced by the aids and constraints of the 
international context. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
This chapter will conclude the analysis of the 1989 East-Central European revolutions by 
first, drawing together the patterns of difference between the cases already established in 
Part 1 and Part 2, and the argument these patterns imply. Second, a summary of the main 
theoretical issues confronted within the thesis, and implications for defining the East- 
Central European changes will be addressed. Third, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
comparative-historical method will be assessed, and the usefulness of its application to the 
East-Central European cases examined. 
8.1 Patterns of Difference Between the Cases 
The application of the comparative-historical method to the 1989 revolutions in Poland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania has shown that some factors were common to all four 
countries. It has been established that all the communist regimes faced similar crises by 
1989. Each country retained structural and cultural elements from their respective 
communist systems. Each post-communist regime faced specific political, economic and 
social issues in attempting change from centralised political and economic systems to 
market economies and pluralist democracies. Certain aspects of change are not clear-cut. 
Nevertheless, the application of the method has also identified patterns of difference 
between the cases. Inferences have been drawn from these differences which suggest that 
the differing "nature" of the communist systems had an impact on the forms and outcomes 
of revolutionary change. 
Part 1 examined contributing factors to the revolutions, and found that the conditions 
within the communist systems were very different by 1989. Common external influences 
had different effects in each case. These differing internal conditions, alongside regime 
action or reaction to the crises faced, appeared to result in differing forms of revolution. 
Table 8.1 below summarises significant aspects of the patterns of difference between the 
cases, highlighting the conditions evident by 1989. 
The common external changes within, and foreign policy signals emanating from, the 
Soviet Union, alongside increasing Western economic, cultural and ideological 
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penetration, had significant influence on Polish and Hungarian regimes, opposition 
movements and societies by the late 1980s. These regimes, opposition movements and 
societies were partly a product of the liberalised, partially restructured states and 
economies that developed out of the post-1956 "normalisations". During the late 1980s 
political actors responded to external influences and internal conditions; their actions 
culminating in "negotiated" forms of revolution. 
In Bulgaria and Romania the same external conditions had little, or no effect within the 
centralised states, hierarchical parties, and closed societies, until late 1989. Despite 
relatively poor and impoverished economies, and some penetration of utopian images from 
the West, no organised and focused opposition movements emerged to "negotiate" change. 
Regime leaders and "politicised" militaries remained entrenched until eventually forced to 
react to external and internal pressures. 
In Part 2 the conclusion to each chapter has identified some similarities across the cases 
and differences within the cases in terms of outcomes. In particular political party 
developments do not show clear differences between the cases, while reasons for some 
aspects of social outcomes must remain partly speculative. 
The post-1989 context itself provided political, economic and social constraints and effects 
for all four post-communist regimes. Political conflicts over the nature and pace of reform, 
unsettled institutional and constitutional matters, factional parties, unstable party systems, 
personal rivalries, and economic crises had potential to disrupt and delay processes of 
change in each country. Economic outcomes in particular were partly determined by 
internal and international factors which surrounded post-1989 regimes, moderating fast 
track economic policies and slowing privatisation plans. Post-1989 economic "shocks" also 
had severe consequences for societies, which in turn influenced decision-makers - 
particularly with regard to privatising large state industries -a process delayed even in 
Poland and Hungary despite initial intentions. 
Nevertheless patterns of difference between the cases are apparent. Table 8.2 below 
summarises significant aspects of differences in forms and outcomes. In Poland and 
Hungary - where the communist systems were already partially reformed and restructured 
prior to 1989, and established opposition movements took part in "negotiated" forms of 
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political change - there was greater potential for more radical reform of post-communist 
systems, especially in terms of regime change, political elite change and change within the 
communist parties. Former communists were politically marginalised, there was relatively 
steady movement towards more complete system change, longer term economic 
improvements, and international integration. The political, economic and social conditions 
in Bulgaria and Romania in 1989, and the form of political change - with little or no 
organised opposition involvement - generally restricted and delayed post-1989 reform 
processes, including reform and reorientation of former communists. 
Although each variable has been examined in relative isolation, the interaction of internal 
and external variables appears to be important for understanding the processes of change. 
The internal political, economic and social restructuring within the Polish and Hungarian 
systems prior to 1989 and the external influences during the 1980s, especially the effects of 
the Gorbachev reforms and Western influences, created a particular context and form of 
revolution. The context and form of revolution also appears significant for shaping the 
nature and pace of change after 1989. In contrast the highly centralised communist 
systems, close regime and party-state associations, and less penetration of external 
influences prior to (and after) 1989 in Bulgaria and Romania, resulted in incomplete 
regime change, and overall slower system change after 1989. 
The comparative-historical method employed in this thesis has identified common factors 
across the cases (external pressures alongside similar internal economic and social crises). 
Following the logic of the method these similarities appear to be the crucial preconditions 
for the collapse of the communist systems. The method has also identified differences 
between the cases which suggest that the different political, economic and social "nature" 
of the systems created the contexts within which political actors and social forces could act 
or react to external and internal pressures for change. These contexts appear significant for 
the different forms of change that took place in 1989/1990, and also appear to have 
significance for outcomes. 
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8.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Issues 
During the investigation of existing literature on East-Central Europe a host of theories 
were encountered, some particular theoretical issues were addressed, and debates entered 
into. Some main points from these encounters can now be drawn together. First, a crisis of 
legitimacy as an explanation for the collapse communism was addressed in Part 1. There is 
a lack of empirical evidence to substantiate the presence or absence of legitimacy during 
the communist period - especially in Bulgaria and Romania. However, the discussion 
presented in this thesis suggests that, although a lack of mass legitimacy and a loss of elite 
self-legitimacy may have played a precipitating role in the collapse of communism, this 
does not provide complete explanation. In itself, a lack of legitimacy may not destabilise 
the state or regime. The application of the method shows that a conjuncture of political, 
economic and social crises, alongside international pressures (albeit with differing 
consequences), appeared to be the main contributing factors to the collapse of communism. 
A second issue that was addressed in Part 2 was the circulation and reproduction of elites 
theses. The dominant view in the existing literature was that marketisation and 
privatisation would benefit former communist elites, who would retain their positions at 
the top of the social strata with few constraints. The circulation of elites thesis suggests that 
the former elite would be able to maintain some positions at the top of the social structure, 
but there would be political limits determining the extent to which they would be 
successful at maintaining these positions. 529 
It is evident from the examination of the East-Central European cases that there was a 
greater circulation of political elites in Poland and Hungary than in Bulgaria or Romania. 
A circulation that was already in progress prior to 1989. Whereas, in both cases, a greater 
reproduction of economic elites took place. However, neither a simple reproduction or 
circulation thesis is adequate to explain the complexities of elite social change that 
occurred in Poland and Hungary, while insufficient empirical evidence is available to fully 
substantiate theory in Bulgaria and Romania. 
529 See Szelenyi, S., & Szelenyi, I., (1995) and Chapter 6, section 2 of this thesis 
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Nevertheless, the elite continuities evident are often seen within existing literature on East- 
Central Europe, and by many East-Central Europeans themselves, as producing a less than 
revolutionary outcome to the 1989 events. 53o Although it is beyond the remit of this thesis 
to redefine the events of 1989/90, and for the comparative-historical analysis undertaken 
here unnecessary, some implications for defining and examining these events can be made. 
To refuse to classify these events as revolutions on the basis of elite continuity is first, not 
attending to how revolutions are invariably defined. Second, it suggests a misreading and 
oversimplification of what revolutions entail and what took place in the so-called "classic" 
French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. On the first point, only Marxists and Marxist- 
oriented social scientists such as Barrington Moore require a change in social stratification 
as a necessary characteristic of revolutions. "' On the second point, although the "classic" 
revolutions may not be seen as comparable to the East-Central European events of 1989 - 
the historical and structural contexts are very different - there are some similarities, 
especially in terms of social change. For example, in the French revolution former elites 
were not completely overthrown. A bourgeois or capitalist class did not immediately 
emerge to replace the aristocracy or nobility. Middle ranking, educated, formerly marginal 
elites achieved career mobility as a result of the revolution. "' In East-Central Europe 
former communists were not completely eradicated from top economic or political 
positions. In this case, former middle ranking managers and a younger generation of better 
educated professionals and technocrats acquired social mobility as a result of the 
1989/1990 events, which swept away the pre-1989 "old guard" communists. In addition, 
the expectation that capitalist social relations and a "new class" of private entrepreneurs 
would emerge quickly in East-Central Europe was a high expectation. After all the French 
revolution was only bourgeois in that it consolidated and simplified property rights, and 
only capitalist in that it cleared away barriers to the expansion of a competitive, national 
market economy. Although local antagonists of peasant communities were removed - 
institutionally speaking, the old collective customs survived leaving the peasants divided, 
while not all peasants benefited as a result. In fact, if we focus on changes in the state 
rather than on social structure, it was changes in the former that enabled a new class to 
s; o See for example, Szelenyi, S., & Szelenyi, I., (1995) p. 616-617 
53' See Kotowski, C. M., "Revolution", in Sartori, G., (ed) (1984) p. 421 
131 Skocpol (1979) p. 166 
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emerge in this "classic" revolution, and even then it took some considerable time. 533 In 
East-Central Europe the domination and control of the party-state over the economy was 
removed by the events of 1989/1990, states are in the process of being de-centralised, and 
certainly in Poland and Hungary, there is evidence that complex patterns of social mobility 
are appearing. In all four countries new markets - both domestic and international - are 
being established, and there are winners and losers in society. None of these changes are 
purely determined by, or necessarily in the interest of, former communist elites. 
There are, of course, also considerable differences between the East-Central European 
events and the "classic" revolutions. There are three main points to note. First, these were - 
in the main - not violent events. As we saw in summing up Part 1, the interdependence of 
the Soviet bloc, the attitude of the Moscow regime, and the international climate of the late 
1980s was significant for the non-violence during the collapse of communist regimes in 
East-Central Europe. Additionally, in the least violent cases (Poland and Hungary) a less 
politicised, more professional military appeared less likely to intervene in political 
processes of change. Second, the communist party-states were dismantled or at least 
severely disrupted, but the basic state structures did not completely collapse. The 
communist systems already had urban, industrial and educated societies organised by state 
institutions, and already had in place (if only in facade form) the basic institutions required 
for some form of democracy to be established. Third, the trajectory of change was 
different. The "classic" revolutions incorporated a movement towards centralisation of the 
state, whereas in East-Central Europe the movement is away from centralisation, of both 
the state and the economy. Certain socio-economic conditions "carry over" in any 
revolution. In the East-Central European context, some continuity of elites and residual 
control over decentralisation processes (especially in economies with large state-run 
sectors) may be inevitable. 
What the application of the comparative-historical method shows is that where there were 
smaller state bureaucracies, where political dislocation of the party-state and 
decentralisation of the state had already occurred, and where independent opposition 
movements were already established prior to 1989 (in Poland and Hungary), a greater 
circulation of political elites and reorientation of communist parties could take place after 
5ý3 Ibid, pp. 179,127-128 
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1989. However, despite the intentions of "new" political elites, the existence of "second 
economies" before 1989 and the relatively advantageous "starting points" for economic 
restructuring, a similar circulation of economic elites has not - as yet - taken place. Instead, 
a significant number of elite nomenklatura and former middle-ranking managers maintain 
some control over economic assets, especially within the unrestructured state sector. 
If we take Hungary as an example of the processes involved, it appears that Kadar's 
"goulash communism" altered dependence patterns within the Hungarian communist party 
hierarchy. This led to the party becoming less reliant on nomenklatura recruitment and 
contributed to considerable deconstruction of the party apparatus prior to 1989. The 
political and economic conditions in Hungary, coupled with declining social mobility, 
encouraged many communists to manoeuvre themselves out of the political power 
structure and into mid-level positions within the economic managerial sector before 1989 
(see previously in Chapter 2, sections 3 and 4). Many of these mid-level managers 
achieved social mobility as a result of the 1989 events. Although in this case less than a 
third of the elite nomenklatura became part of the "new" economic elite, it is evident that 
certain sections of the former communist elite were those with the skills, experience and 
connections to adapt to the post-1989 political and economic conditions. There is evidence 
to suggest that similar social elite change took place in Poland before 1989. However, in 
contrast to Hungary the more bureaucratic Polish communist party-state enabled slightly 
higher numbers of elite nomenklatura to become "new" economic elites, while slightly 
fewer lower-level managers benefited from change (see previously in Chapter 6, section 2). 
In Bulgaria and Romania, it appears that the highly centralised economies, the presence of 
a large state apparatus, and party hierarchies based on personalised patronage and corrupt 
practices did not enable any similar social elite change to take place before 1989. This 
could only begin in late 1989 and early 1990 when the party-state and communist parties 
were severely disrupted, and decentralisation of the state and economy initiated. Only then 
could alternatives for recruitment to either political or economic elite positions emerge. 
Although processes of change were delayed in Bulgaria and Romania, and the post-1989 
internal conditions and international context appear to be constraining as much as 
supporting continued change, this does not mean that these countries will not continue 
moving towards some form of democracy and marketisation. In fact, the Polish and 
Hungarian example provides an account of how a departure from central planning and an 
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overly centralised state can erode party-state associations, alter previous patterns of 
dependence and lead to further political, economic and social change. The 1989 and 1990 
political changes in Bulgaria and Romania may indicate that such a process is in its early 
stages. This thesis assumes that a similar dynamic is taking place in all four countries (due 
to the similarities apparent, see also the following section). However, the different internal 
conditions and post-1989 international context will have effects, and may result in slightly 
different final outcomes for Bulgaria and Romania. The overarching trajectory may be the 
same, but the location within that trajectory, timing of changes, and order of processes may 
differ. 
In short, this discussion highlights the need to focus attention not just on elite 
characteristics, their social position or behaviour at the time radical political change occurs. 
It is also necessary to investigate conditions within the state, the effects of the international 
context and the inter-relationship of elite actions with political, economic, social and 
cultural conditions before, during and after such revolutionary situations. The East-Central 
European changes may well be unique, and may not be comparable to any other form of 
change. They may equally require new methods of investigation, or new theories and 
concepts to explain the ongoing changes that are taking place. The approach taken in this 
thesis can at least highlight and potentially confront theoretical and conceptual issues of 
the kind discussed above. Additionally, the application of the method can illuminate where 
more research may be needed to fully explain the unique features of the East-Central 
European events and processes of change. 
8.3 The Usefulness of the Comparative Method 
The application of J. S. Mill's method of agreement has identified and highlighted patterns 
of difference between the cases. As indicated in the introductory chapter, there are 
problems in applying such a method. Despite the primary objective of illuminating causal 
regularities across sets of cases, a main weakness of the method is that similarities and 
differences can only suggest causal argument. The method cannot establish cause and 
effect. For example, the common factors of the external effects of the international context, 
and internal economic and social crises imply that these were the main causes of the 
collapse of communism. However, without examining another country within a similar 
262 
context where communism did not collapse (using the indirect method of difference), this 
cannot be perfectly validated. Even with the use of the indirect method of difference some 
unidentified factor may have produced the effect. Some factors must be assumed to be 
relevant or irrelevant. History never produces perfect comparisons. Perfect controls for 
potentially relevant variables can never be achieved, and any conclusions drawn cannot 
necessarily be generalised to other cases. Yet, a specific set of conditions can be identified 
as being significant for a process to occur, even if slightly different combinations of causes 
are at work in that process. In the East-Central European cases it appears that common 
external cultural, political and economic pressures on regimes which were potentially 
already destabilised by internal economic and social crises created the preconditions for the 
collapse of communism in all four countries. However, the collapse was precipitated by 
slightly different combinations of conditions within each country. The general process was 
similar, but the form of change and outcome varied in each case. The method can 
illuminate such variations, and as a result lead to a better understanding of overall 
processes and the specific differences that are intrinsic to those overall processes. 
It must also be acknowledged that the method alone is no substitute for theory. Theory 
informs the questions asked, and the selection of variables. The theoretical framework 
utilised in this thesis is very general in many respects, and is a reflection of the theoretical 
debates of the day. General theoretical frameworks in themselves create problems. The 
framework used has taken a range of variables, separated them in order to discuss 
processes of change, whilst attempting to acknowledge the interplay of factors. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, efforts to incorporate further levels or variables to a catalogue of 
conditions without fully theorising components of processes, tends to result in a list of 
contributory factors, rather than complete explanation. Clear identification of the inter- 
relationship of variables is exceedingly difficult in any political science investigation. This 
is especially the case in the study of such revolutionary situations as the East-Central 
European cases where complex interactions between cultural, economic, social, and 
political variables took place. As a result it is impossible to identify determining factors. 
Each variable is potentially determining of, or determined by any other. The comparative- 
historical method can greatly assist in the identification of common and differentially 
specific causal variables, but exhibits far less merit in the clear determination of the 
relationship between them vis-a-vis cause and effect. 
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Despite these problems, the application of the method can stimulate new ways of looking 
at cases. Arguments may initially be disproved, and assumptions are often brought to the 
investigator's attention. This can lead to reformulating or refining arguments as the 
investigation continues. An example can demonstrate this process. Initially, in 
investigating the East-Central European cases, it was assumed that opposition movements 
were a focus for attention. Theoretical discussion highlights "independent autonomous 
communities" or "popular mass mobilisation potential" as potential contributory factors to 
the breakdown of states. 534 However, differences identified between the East-Central 
European cases suggest that established independent opposition groups were not a 
necessary condition for the collapse of communism. Such groups were not established in 
Bulgaria, and non-existent in Romania prior to 1989. Nevertheless, it does appear that the 
presence or absence of opposition groups had significance for forms and outcomes: 
whether negotiations for change took place and alternative political elites were in waiting 
(Poland and Hungary), or whether remnants of the old regimes remained dominant within 
1989 and early post-1989 processes (Bulgaria and Romania). Additionally, by looking at 
differences within the Polish and Hungarian case, it is apparent that very different 
developments in opposition movements took place. In Hungary, the opposition developed 
from inside the state and ruling elite, rather than outside the party-state apparatus as in 
Poland. Yet, this difference did not prevent a generally similar political outcome. Such 
observations turns attention, not only to other political factors, such as the role of the 
communist parties, the military or party-state apparatus, but also to other economic and 
social variables, and their contribution to processes of change. The similarities within the 
Polish and Hungarian case suggest that smaller state bureaucracies, the effects of Western 
cultural penetration, relatively apathetic society and relatively adaptable economic 
"starting points" contributed to the overall similar outcome in this case. 
Similarly when examining common factors across cases further investigation will often be 
undertaken. If no common factors were found, this might suggest that different types of 
change had occurred. Each case might then be investigated to establish new typologies for 
the events. In the East-Central European cases there are factors common to all the cases 
which suggest causal explanation. External pressures, and internal economic and social 
crises do appear to be significant contributory factors to the collapse of communism. 
534See for example, Skocpol or Goldstone in Chapter 1 
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However, it is also apparent that these common features can differ in causal significance. 
In the cases studied here, international influences had very different effects. A search for 
reasons for these differences then takes place. When cases do not fit the assumed 
argument, other variables are examined, and new interpretations may be found. In the East- 
Central European cases it was discovered that the interplay of political factors - such as the 
smaller (or larger) state bureaucracies inherited from the communist system, pre-1989 
restructuring (or not) of state institutions, and the presence (or absence) of alternative 
political elites (as established independent oppositions) - with economic and social factors 
- of a slow-down in social mobility, partially decentralised (or highly centralised) 
economies and partial political elite restructuring (or not) prior to 1989 - alongside 
differing penetration of external influences - contributed to the more (or less) complete, 
and rapid (or slow) system change after 1989. In other words the comparative-historical 
method encourages "process-tracing" of a wide range of factors throughout a historical 
period which can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of events. 535 This thesis has 
identified factors that have been recognised within existing literature on East-Central 
Europe as potentially significant to processes of change. However, this existing literature 
often identifies these factors separately or in isolated configurations, and often lacks 
acknowledgement to the overall context. The particular development of communist state 
structures, societies and economies provided particular conditions within which political 
elites and actors could act or react. Investigation of the interplay of such factors as 
economic conditions or social and state structures with political factors are important for 
understanding why apparently similar political changes take different forms, and have 
different outcomes. Narrow investigations of political regimes and actors, or such broad 
concepts as legitimation crisis, do not illuminate overall contexts, nor do they fully explain 
processes of change and differences between cases. 
Thus, the comparative-historical method encourages investigation of a wide range of 
variables, often questions assumed arguments, and potentially generates new explanations. 
Neither the method, nor the theoretical frame of reference used in this thesis, can 
thoroughly "test" the inferences drawn. However, the analysis does suggest that a 
s3s Goldstone refers to "process-tracing" in comparative history as a means to validate 
findings which differentiates comparative history from correlation studies using many 
cases. The former can point out relationships that are - as yet - unrecognised or 
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comparative-historical approach to such unique phenomena as the East-Central European 
events of 1989/1990 is an appropriate method to use, and can add to understanding and 
explanation. The East-Central European cases highlight several factors and processes that 
could be taken up and investigated further as part of a comparative history "research 
cycle". 536 For example, the effects of external influences upon the "nature" of other 
communist systems could be demonstrated through a parallel comparative-historical 
approach. This might stimulate a contrast-oriented study that could draw out greater detail 
and identify further inter-relationships between factors. This in turn could lead to new 
explanatory arguments. Each "logic" has its own limitations, but together they can generate 
new arguments or theoretical leads. The test of comparative history is not whether it can 
precisely predict events or provide incontestable theories, but that it identifies and 
illuminates relationships in particular sequences of historical events. 
Comparative analysis will always struggle with the sorts of problems highlighted here, but 
a comparative-historical approach, alongside a broad theoretical framework, can encourage 
cases and processes to be examined as wholes, put them in context, identify and 
acknowledge the interaction of a variety of structural, cultural and agency factors, and 
potentially generate new ideas. 
misunderstood, while the latter provide limited generalisations that remain to be 
demonstrated. Goldstone, J., in Gans, H. J., (ed) (1990) pp. 275-292, especially p. 290 
536 See Skocpol, T., & Somers, M., (1980) and Chapter 1, p. 9 of this thesis. 
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